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Contents

- 5 Deconstructing The Tourist Bubble: A Juxtaposition of Times Square and Detroit's Waterfront
Victoria Prouse
- 23 How Bodies Matter: Exploring the Social Construction of Electric Razors in the United States During the Late 1920s
Lauren Kilgour
- 39 Working with "Women": Rethinking Basic Vocabulary in Historical Writing About America in the 1960s
Katherine Bergevin
- 55 Issues and Controversies Regarding Fox News
Leila Khaze
- 71 The Existential Threat in 23 Bottles of Jack Daniels: A Close Read of Philip Roth's "Goodbye, Columbus"
Michael Proulx
- 77 Cold War Victory: The Defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva
Adrian Zita-Bennett
- 103 The World of Suzie Wong: Hollywood Constructs the Orient
Emily McNally
- 111 The Political Economy of the Washington Consensus: Neoliberalism and the Resumption of History
Nicholas Erwin Longstaff
- 137 Three Conceptualizations of Militarism and Social Control in 1960s America
Alex Ognibene

Editors' Note and Acknowledgements

The Munk School of Global Affairs' Undergraduate Journal of American Studies is an annually published academic journal that showcases the work of the University of Toronto's thriving undergraduate student population.

Focusing on social, cultural and political issues and themes affecting both the historical and contemporary United States, we have striven over the past six years to display the diversity and inclusiveness of American Studies as a discipline. This year was no exception, as we welcome outstanding undergraduate papers from the fields of Architecture, English, Film, History, and Political Science.

The expansiveness of American Studies is not only reflected in the papers' subject matter, but in their style and structure, which range from three part experimental pieces on Cold War and gender issues, to lengthy research papers rich in evidentiary support from both recent and historical sources, and everything in between. Despite the number of approaches to an equally varied number of topics, the passion and vision of the University's American Studies students is evident, both in the papers we have chosen to publish and in the number of excellent submissions we received.

This journal is entirely the fruit of undergraduate student labours – written, edited, designed and produced by student hands. We would like to take this opportunity to recognize the indispensable work and support of a handful of industrious individuals.

First of all, hats off to our outstanding contributors. From this year's substantial pool of submissions, we drew only the most exceptional. These writers represent a sample of some of the brightest young minds attending this institution. Their work exhibits a true representation of the quality, diversity and groundbreaking original thought present within the American Studies program.

For the efficiency of this year's production, we are indebted to our team of eminently capable associate editors: Alex, Bianca, Rezwana and Neil. Thank you for your time, dedication and sound independent judgment. We would also like to express enormous gratitude to Nigel Soederhuysen, our fabulous graphic designer, who is solely responsible for the journal's elegant and professional appearance.

Finally, this publication would not be possible without the continuing support of the Centre for the Study of the United States. We are hugely grateful to Stella Kyriakakis for her professional guidance and expertise, and to Elspeth Brown for her sensible advice and steady confidence in our untried capacities.



Deconstructing The Tourist Bubble: A Juxtaposition of Times Square & Detroit's Waterfront

By: Victoria Prouse

Six hundred miles apart, crowds of excited people are stimulated by two spectacular presentations of lights, sounds, tastes, and energy. On the shores of Lake Michigan, the Joe Louis Arena shakes as the thunderous crowd celebrates a win for their beloved Red Wings. In midtown Manhattan, tourists gather in awe of the 5,000 square foot screen atop the Palace Theatre. While it may appear ridiculous in 2011 to compare New York, “the city that never sleeps,” with Detroit, “nature’s preeminent urban basket case,”¹ both cities experienced significant economic decline from deindustrialization in the 1970s – a decline that many analysts deemed irreversible.² Consequently, initiatives to resolve this economic decline has markedly impacted the morphology of these landscapes.

Deindustrialization precipitated a paradigm shift in municipal investment strategies. Harvey identifies this shift as the rise of urban entrepreneurialism, where investment is concentrated in projects that “increase [cities’] attractiveness to potential investors, residents, and visitors.”³ Consensus emerged that economic decline could be reversed through developments that would present an exterior image of a successful, safe, and affluent city to become contenders in an urban system growing increasingly competitive in a zero-sum game for economic investment. Consequently, a “modern city” was one that proliferated consumptive, commercial landscapes. The development of tourist infrastructure was perceived as a primary arsenal

of this urban entrepreneurialism. Cities could profit from selling the image of a safe, progressive area to visitors whose ties to the landscape were never deep enough to question the authenticity of the façade. These landscapes were predicated upon consumption; visitors engage in these landscapes through their purchasing power.

Spaces, which renowned urban political economist Dennis Judd defines as “tourist bubbles,”⁴ are archetypal of this development and quickly became a common entity throughout urban America. As sharply “demarcated and defended zones for middle class consumers,”⁵ they provided municipalities an opportunity to craft a clean, modern urban core free from poverty and blight, byproducts of industrial decline, that increasingly plagued inner cities. These spaces were both geographic and ideological. Perceived as safe areas, they were themed, obtrusive spaces comprised of hotels, cultural institutions, and superfluous amenities that artfully hid the desolate landscape surrounding them.

Times Square (See Figure One) and Detroit’s waterfront complex – comprised of the Renaissance Center and Joe Louis Arena (See Figures Two and Three) – are two examples of this “social and moral engineering,”⁶ developed under parallel investment strategies. Mayor Giuliani of New York City praised the city government’s partnership with Disney to revitalize Times Square as “a match made in Heaven.”⁷ Similarly,

¹ Peter Eisinger. “Reimagining Detroit,” *City and Community* 2(2003): 86.

² Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labour and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 168.

³ Dennis R. Judd and Susan Fainstein, *The Tourist City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 35.

⁴ Dennis R. Judd, *The Infrastructure of Play: Building the Tourist City* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 38.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶ Alexander A. Reichl, *Reconstructing Times Square*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 52.

⁷ Douglas Martin, “Disney Seals Times Square Theater Deal,” *New York Times*, February 3, 1994, B1.

Mayor Young of Detroit, who presided over the waterfront redevelopment, depicted the Renaissance Center as a symbol of the new, modern city, enhancing its “imageability.”⁸ Why have the fates of these insulated landscapes, and the cities they were devised to save, diverged so drastically? To what extent have these projects prescribed the course for New York City and Detroit over the past twenty-five years? Juxtaposing Times Square and Detroit’s waterfront will reveal in three ways how successful tourist bubbles are fundamentally paradoxical. To stimulate economic growth, these manufactured, “fake” landscapes must be an organic extension of a legitimate local historical discourse. Secondly, tourist bubbles are financially successful through corporate partnerships that render these locally-themed spaces increasingly homogeneous. Finally, boundaries must be gradual and penetrable for benefits to extend to the city-at-large.

For tourist bubbles – ultimately superficial environments – to successfully attract visitors and profits, their theming must have a tenable tie to the city’s heritage. This connection allows developers to capitalize on visitors’ real *and* imagined nostalgia for a specific era or ethos unique to the city. Since many are already familiar with these narratives, it is easier for visitors to forge a sense of place and an emotional bond with these manufactured landscapes. Times Square is a model of this strategy. Its redevelopment in the late 1980s was a sanitized imitation of its past persona – the “Great White Way” – during its zenith in the 1920s.⁹ Indeed, the media depicted this redevelopment as a *repossession* of space that had been

⁸ John McCarthy, “Revitalization of the core city: the case of Detroit,” *Cities* 14(1997): 106.

⁹ Reichl, *Reconstructing Times Square*, 2.

effectively colonized by poor African Americans and Latinos throughout the 1960s. The *Time’s* editorial board published a manifesto outlining reasons to redevelop 42nd Street. It included “reclaiming the magnificent theatres... generating millions of dollars in revenue for the city, and conquering the sour obstructionism that had come to strangle visions and stifle growth.”¹⁰ Therefore, Disney’s purchase of the New Amsterdam Theatre and ensuing investment from subsequent corporations created “a fantasyland of Broadway theatre, popular culture, and commercial glitz.”¹¹ This achievement was perceived by many as reasserting an authentic vision of the city on this block of “crime, drugs, pornography, prostitution, and menacing African American and Latino youths.”¹² This undesirable landscape was replaced by architecture evoking 1920s Art Nouveau – an appeal to “cultural symbolism”¹³ that was recognized and well-received amongst visitors. Its historical narrative, “packaged in the form of an elegant theatre district, lively place of popular entertainment, and a reassuring symbolic place,”¹⁴ appeals to nostalgia for a “simpler, purer lifestyle,”¹⁵ thus obliterating contemporary social issues.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹² *Ibid.*, 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 167

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 168

¹⁵ Kathleen LaFrank, “Seaside, Florida: ‘The New Town: The Old Ways,’” *Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture*, 6(1997): 113.

Unlike Times Square, Detroit's waterfront conveys the city's historical fabric with mixed success. This failure results from the disjointed nature of its redevelopment initiatives – both conveying opposing ideologies. Detroit's waterfront lacks conceptual coherency. The enduring presence of the Red Wings, synonymous with the city since 1932, symbolized for Detroit what McCarthy describes as a "visible badge of urban maturity."¹⁶ Therefore, the Joe Louis Arena benefited from a legitimate tie to the past. Dickinson analyzes this christening as part of an "extensive field of memory and commemoration, reflecting and engaging the complexities of Detroit's history."¹⁷ In contrast, the Renaissance Center was conceptualized by Henry Ford to both architecturally and ideologically represent a forward-thinking vision for Detroit's future. In response to the 1967 riots, Porter used brutalism to articulate a modern "renaissance" to instigate renewal when designing the building. When one compares these conflicting approaches to development, we affirm Judd's observation: infusing heritage into tourist venues often begets conflict with a problematic past.¹⁸ Ford did not want visitors and potential investors to be reminded of Detroit's contentious history. Instead, this "megalomaniacal complex tethered to [a] desolate downtown"¹⁹ sought to embody a middle-class, progressive enclave for arts, culture, and consumerism – completely opposing existing conditions – to lure suburbanites back to the downtown core. Thus, Detroit's waterfront presents a

contrasting ethos: one recognizing and employing Detroit's history as a marketing tool, and the other determined to discard this heritage. Consequently, the "Joe" is filled to capacity each game, while the Renaissance Center's halls are frequented only by employees, and the synergistic effect of these neighbouring developments is undermined.²⁰

The paradoxical nature of tourist bubbles reemerges when considering this corollary: although success is achieved when these spaces emerge from a specific context of a city's needs and aspirations, these landscapes have become increasingly uniform throughout America in terms of their amenities and corporate involvement. Their celebrated local flavour masks the reality that the services and corporations they attract are standardized. What do Times Square and the Renaissance Center have in common? McDonald's, Starbucks, and the Hard Rock Café. Robertson recalls it was not until the arrival of The Gap on 42nd Street that citizens really *believed* revitalization would be successful in New York.²¹ Likewise, Mayor Young identified "prestige development" by "flagship" corporations tantamount to diverting investment and population from the suburbs back to the downtown core.²² Judd also identifies an assemblage of standardized amenities – including the convention center and sports stadium – that are considered part of a mayors' "trophy collection"²³: investments guaranteed

¹⁶ McCarthy, "Revitalization of the core city," 106.

¹⁷ Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott, *Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials* (Tuscaloosa, AB: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 106.

¹⁸ Judd, *The Infrastructure of Play*, 37.

¹⁹ Mike Davis, "Fortress L.A." *City of Quartz* (New York: Verso, 2011): 157.

²⁰ That said, while the "Joe" successfully lures suburbanites downtown, this enterprise yields little economic gain for the city. Built in 1980 to bribe the Red Wings from moving to suburban Detroit, its \$57 million price tag was financed almost exclusively by the municipal government. It is rented to the Red Wings for a very low cost (Glaeser).

²¹ Paul Goldberger, "The New Times Square: magic that surprised the magicians," *New York Times*, October 15, 1996, C11.

²² McCarthy, "Revitalization of the core city," 4.

²³ Judd, *The Infrastructure of Play*, 39.

to facilitate profit accumulation. Public-private partnerships are considered a guaranteed currency to attract visitors and a marker for a healthy and successful downtown as their commitment made it feasible for municipalities to undertake large capital investment projects.

However, historian Kevin Boyle likens these partnerships to Mayor Young's "selling his soul – and the city,"²⁴ depicting the problem with this paradox in Detroit: to be considered a modern city, Young accrued investment from over fifty national corporations²⁵ – intended to provide credibility and security to the new developments. The "largest privately-funded urban development in history"²⁶ restricted government influence over Detroit's future, while the corporate bonds themselves proved mostly superficial. Visiting the Renaissance Center today reveals its transformation of businesses from initially high-end designer boutiques to mundane tourist shops and office supply stores today, thus demonstrating an exodus of capital. Political Scientist Peter Eisinger identifies the use of derivatives of urban renewal plans from other cities to create Detroit's tourist bubble as contributing to its failure in securing investment.²⁷ Thus, distinct urban morphologies beget correspondingly distinct designs for regeneration.

²⁴ Kevin Boyle, "The Ruins of Detroit: Exploring the Urban Crisis in the Motor City," *Michigan Historical Review*, 27(2001): 120.

²⁵ Renaissance Centre. *View from the top*, video. Web. Available: <http://jalopnik.com/5243287/gms-renaissance-center-hq-view-from-the-top> Accessed 2011-11-12

²⁶ Idem.

²⁷ Eisinger, "Reimagining Detroit," 91.

Judd defines tourist bubbles as inherently decontextualized landscapes.²⁸ They are considered representational of their city, yet are marketed as a detached entity. This trope structures the third paradox characterizing a *successful* tourist bubble: while it is demarcated from the rest of the city, its relationship with the city is interactive. Tourist bubbles that are able to successfully precipitate renewal through economic development possess porous boundaries where the disparity between outside and inside the tourist bubble is minimal. For example, Detroit's waterfront development was the solitary mechanism to instigate revitalization; mass disinvestment plagued the rest of the city, rendering the downtown core "an island in a sea of decay."²⁹ Therefore, its design inherently negated the opportunity for a windfall of economic benefits to the surrounding city.

In contrast, Times Square's reinvention was harmonious with the city's context. Initial conceptualizations were focused on utilizing this location's strategic significance as the crossroads of New York's key industries: entertainment to the north and the garment and fashion district to the south, effectively creating the "quintessential place of post-industrial work and play."³⁰ In his 1994 *New York Times* article, journalist Goldberg encapsulates New York's status by suggesting that Disney came to 42nd street – not because Disney was finally ready to impose its image upon New York, but because New York was ready and eager to become like Disney.³¹ As America's venerable economic hub – even during economic decline in the 1970s – New York City's commercial identity was longstanding. Therefore, the hyperbolic landscape pioneered by Disney was reinforced

²⁸ Judd, *The Infrastructure of Play*, 38.

²⁹ McCarthy, "Revitalization of the core city," 109.

³⁰ Reichl, *Reconstructing Times Square*, 78.

³¹ Goldberger, "The New Times Square: magic that surprised the magicians," C11.

by the preexisting commercial ethos emanating throughout the city. Municipal officials were actively engaged in consolidating New York as America's "ascendant city of leisure;"³² the Times Square project was *part of* this larger reassertion of identity. In this regard, can the entire island of Manhattan be considered a tourist bubble? The differentiated contexts within which the redevelopment of Detroit's waterfront and Times Square were pursued highlights the reality that one cannot depend on these entities to singlehandedly lift a city from despair; a foundation of social and economic capital must exist on which to build within the surrounding city.

The importance of permeable borders is a central tenet in contextualizing these seemingly abstract landscapes within the urban fabric – a paradoxical feature that facilitates the spillover of economic benefits from the tourist bubble to the city-at-large. Although the defining feature of tourist bubbles is their sharply demarcated edges allowing cities to hide unsightly parts of urban life,³³ Times Square's amorphous boundaries contributed to its success. Outward expansion occurred as more investors expressed interest in development and, unlike in Detroit, geography was not a limiting agent to this growth. Times Square quickly became the fastest growing area in the city³⁴ – economically *and* spatially. The city planning department even rezoned the surrounding area as the "Theatre District," thereby acknowledging and further encouraging this expansion.³⁵ The economic spillover and geographic encroachment

was possible because Times Square is comprised of a streamlined series of *individual* buildings: it is the street that ultimately threads this fabric together. The built form and social composition of its borderlands resonate with that at its core. Therefore, despite the gradual dissipation of the themed landscape, visitors feel protected, comfortable, and prepared to traverse these boundaries.

In contrast, the built form of Detroit's waterfront inherently restricts economic benefits and visitors to inside the imposing walls of the Renaissance Center and the Joe Louis Arena. Eisinger suggests Archer's idealistic vision for spin-off development in the 1990s³⁶ proves the subsidiary development Young promised from this bubble in the 1970s did not occur. This "typically hermetic development in which workers never need to set foot on a city street"³⁷ fulfill Davis' definition of a "fortress."³⁸ This bubble is physically impermeable, creating an insular state which thereby projects two Detroits: one indoors, and one outdoors. While 42nd Street is *part of* the spectacle of Times Square – linking together theatres, restaurants, stores, and attractions – visitors to downtown Detroit are transported via an elevated tram completed in 1987, called the "People Mover." Its stations are located inside hotels and attractions in the downtown core. Figure Four demonstrates how this tram's exclusion of Jefferson and Woodward Avenues was a significant error on the part of Detroit's visionaries. Incorporating these streets into the

³² William Sites, *Remaking New York: primitive globalization and the politics of urban community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 59.

³³ Judd, *The Infrastructure of Play*, 6.

³⁴ Sites, *Remaking New York*, 59.

³⁵ Amanda M. Burden, "Zoning Resolution: Article VII: Special Purpose Districts," *The City of New York*, (2011): 81.

³⁶ Eisinger, "Reimagining Detroit," 94.

³⁷ Young, 95.

³⁸ Davis, "Fortress L.A.," 221-265.

design of these developments would have linked them to the greater downtown they were created to save. These severe demarcations further exacerbate Detroit's polarized landscape; the enthusiastic Red Wings' fans enjoy an evening in the "pleasingly safe and superficially varied environment"³⁹ of the windowless Joe Louis, safely sheltered from the adjacent crime-ridden streets. The General Motors executives employed in the Renaissance Center possess a bird's eye view of the street, one that also hides its dangerous nature. At street level, the consumerist façade is fractured and the glaring reality of Detroit's precarious social condition is exposed; over one-third of its population resides below the poverty line.⁴⁰

Under creative leadership and correct circumstances, tourist bubbles can succeed in procuring entrepreneurial investment and obtain the highly sought-after image of an attractive city. However, this success is not all-encompassing; these developments prescribe a particular type of economic growth that does not cultivate a socially vibrant and cohesive city. Investing large portions of municipal budgets in infrastructure intended to only service tourists and the middle-class has deleterious, long-term, social consequences. The magnitude of these impending social costs is Eisinger's primary concern regarding the trajectory Detroit's policymakers have pursued; a cruise ship terminal marks the most recent downtown capital

project.⁴¹ The promotion of Detroit as a world-class, modern, postindustrial city inadvertently exacerbates the historical, institutional, and social divisions this vision explicitly fails to reconcile, or even acknowledge. Portman himself recognized that "physical things alone will not cause the city to return to a state of vitality."⁴² Similarly, the "re-appropriation" of Times Square as a white middle-class space disregards the plight of the African Americans and Latinos who established a sense of place in the area during the 1960s and 1970s. Urban political economy analyst William Sites renders this population a "symbolic image of dangerous urban culture."⁴³ In both Detroit and New York, no efforts were taken to address the systemic social conditions propagating this "dangerous" milieu; these populations were villainized, marginalized, and expelled. Attending to the needs of these populations – usurped by these developments – is *not* included in the vocabulary of neoliberal urban entrepreneurial discourse, despite its being promoted as beneficial for the entire city.

Tourist bubbles achieve economic success emanating throughout the city when they are paradoxical. They must project an artificial, consumerist landscape based on an authentic heritage. This localized theming hides the fact that these amenities are actually common throughout America, in part of the pervasive corporate influence on municipal investment strategies. Furthermore, interaction between the

³⁹ Larry Bennett, *Fragments of cities: the new American downtowns and neighbourhoods* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 37.

⁴⁰ United States Census Bureau, "Detroit, Michigan," *State and County Quick Facts 2012*. Online. Available: <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html>. Accessed 2012 May 02.

⁴¹ Ellen Creager, "More Michigan voyages ahead; 13 cruises to visit new Detroit dock," *Detroit Free Press*, November 14, 2011.

⁴² Kyle W. Bell, *Detroit: A City on the Brink*, 2009, web. Available: http://books.google.ca/books?id=UfJa0zBzMJEC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false Accessed 2011-11-15.

⁴³ Sites, *Remaking New York*, 2.

bubble and its periphery must be possible. Nevertheless, economic success *does not* indoctrinate social equity into the city's fabric and therefore the ability of these projects to facilitate *sustainable* renewal is questionable. Thus, this tale of two cities is contrasting: while both faced decline in the 1970s, Times Square represented one of the last "frontiers" to submit to the pervading tourist landscape of the island of Manhattan. In contrast, Detroit's waterfront was a pioneering initiative. Therefore, while Times Square is now a metonym for New York, it cannot be credited for singlehandedly bringing investment back to the city. Unlike in Detroit, it was part of a symbiosis of multiple development initiatives, thereby explaining why New York has succeeded and Detroit has remained stagnant. Tourist bubbles are really only able to help a city if there is sufficient preexisting economic and social capital and a market for tourist development. As Gary Cooper stated to Marlene Dietrich in 1936, "Detroit isn't a very exciting place. Big chimneys. Black smoke."⁴⁴ A monolithic convention center and hockey arena could not single-handedly transform the city's existing fabric.

⁴⁴ Zukin, *Landscapes of Power*, 103.

Figure One – Times Square



Paul Barker, Times Square 2007, Digital 2592 x 1944, <http://www.sxc.hu>

Figure Two – Renaissance Center



M. Jeremy Goldman, Detroit still has a skyline too 2007, Digital 2272 x 1704, <http://www.flickr.com>

Figure Three – Joe Louis Arena



Stephen Gough, DJoe Louis Arena 2009, Digital 1113 x 834, <http://www.flickr.com>

Figure Four People Mover Track



Luke Schray, People Mover! 2007, Digital 768 x 1024, <http://www.flickr.com>

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
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May 13, 1930.

J. SCHICK
SHAVING MACHINE

1,757,978

Filed April 23, 1928



How Bodies Matter: Exploring the Social Construction of Electric Razors in the United States During the Late 1920s

By: Lauren Kilgour

INVENTOR
Jacob Schick
BY
H. C. Campfield
ATTORNEY

Do machines make humans, or do humans make machines? While simply stated, this is a question with a long and complicated history – a history that must be addressed before the question can be responded to. Over thousands of years, reaching as far back as Plato's Republic, the nature and use of technology has been long debated and differently understood.¹ Some have believed that technology has innate characteristics that shape the societies they are part of – a view that Friedrich Engels articulated in his 1872 essay "On Authority."² Engels argued that authoritarianism and subordination are inherent elements of modern industry, and that by using modern industry to produce and circulate products, humans had chosen a political life that allowed them to be ruled by authoritarianism and subordination.³ Others have believed that social factors shape the use of a technology within a society – a view that Karl Marx outlined in Volume I of Capital.⁴ There, Marx argues that increasing mechanization will render hierarchical divisions of labour and their relationships of subordination obsolete because they were, in his opinion, only necessary during the early stages of modern manufacturing.⁵

In many ways, these two polarized views of technology offer a look into the ways two key – and equally polarized – groups would answer our original question. One group, technological determinists, whom Engels' views reflect, would answer, "Yes,

machines are the ones making humans." Whereas the other group, social constructivists, whom Marx's views reflect, would answer, "No, humans are the ones making the machines." However, while the views of technological determinists were privileged at earlier moments in history, the early 1980s marked the rise of social constructivists' views.⁶ During that period, the sociology of science and the history of technology came together; a merge which led to the creation of three distinct but intersecting models of technology: the social construction of technology (SCOT), actor-network theory, and the systems model.⁷ As Trevor Pinch has noted, "Opening up the 'black box of technology' became the rallying cry for the new work."⁸ A key result of these social constructivist approaches and that rallying cry is that the academy now largely rejects technological determinism.⁹ However, as social constructivist David Nye is careful to point out, although the academy no longer subscribes to technological determinism – it is still very active in public life.¹⁰ Thus, because technological determinism still carries social power, Nye notes that it cannot yet be wholly ignored or dismissed. Instead, technological determinism's power must be lessened by repeatedly disrupting it. Nye achieves these disruptions by exploring numerous instances where technological determinism was thought to be at work, and instead shows that the dominant force is actually social. An excellent example of this work can be seen in Nye's chapter "Cultural Uniformity, or Diversity?" in his book *Technology Matters: Questions to Live With*. In the chapter,

¹ Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts have Politics?," *In The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 6.

² *Ibid.*, 6.

³ *Idem.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ Trevor Pinch, "The Social Construction of Technology: A Review" in Robert Fox (ed.) *Technological Change: Methods and Themes in the History of Technology* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996), 22-23.

⁷ Pinch, 23.

⁸ *Idem.*

⁹ David E. Nye, "Technology and the Production of Difference," *American Quarterly* 58 (2006): 615.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 615.

Nye explores technologies such as automobiles, telephones, the Levittown housing development, department stores, grocery stores, and the internet. For each technology, Nye addresses how they were initially feared because of their capability to produce homogeneity, standardization, and uniformity. Then, Nye disrupts these technologically determinist fears by showing how each technology was actually used or remade by humans to produce difference, individualization, and diversity. Nye mainly demonstrates this in two ways. One being changes in the technology itself – such as added colour, different styles, innovations etc. – that show the technology is being moulded by human desires and demands. The other being the idea of “creolization,” wherein human users select or appropriate elements of technologies, rearrange their order and meaning, and through this process absorb it into their specific social and cultural location in history. Furthermore, Nye achieves his repeated disruption of technological determinism by using both methods to explore numerous examples in varied times and places. This strategy is persuasive because it allows Nye to show how technology has been used to produce difference – rather than uniformity.¹¹

Moreover, questions of technological determinism are often explored on a much larger scale – such as with highways, railroads, and bombs.¹² Yet, in his exploration of how different cultures interact with technology, Nye is careful to attend to questions of technological determinism on a much smaller scale – such as landscaping a garden or grocery shopping.¹³ In this way, looking at men’s shaving habits in the United States

¹¹ Ibid., 615.

¹² Winner, 2,3,8.

¹³ David E. Nye, “Cultural Uniformity, or Diversity?,” 71, 82.

during the late 1920s also offers a site of exploration capable of disrupting ideas of technological determinism. If David Nye were to approach this topic, he would first note how shaving razors can enable and perpetuate a standardized male form – the neat and tidy clean-shaven man. Then, he would disrupt this notion by describing how men’s use of shaving razors – whether they chose to shave off their beard or not; whether they chose to shape their facial hair (mustache, goatee, etc) or not; whether they preferred one method of shaving or not (a barber versus themselves, etc.) – actually produced personal differentiation. Furthermore, Nye would also note how American women’s adoption of shaving their legs and underarms during the 1920s shows creolization; because women selected a technology – the shaving razor – previously used for, and by, different users (men for their beards); and rearranged its meaning and used it to fit the needs of their growing autonomy and beauty culture.¹⁴ Thus, Nye’s approach would emphasize individual and “selective” uses of shaving razors to highlight how humans shape the meanings of a technological object. In simple terms: Nye would explore how people use shaving razors in different ways. Furthermore, by placing his analytic emphasis on differential use, Nye is able to disrupt technological determinism by challenging the idea that technological objects act on humans in predetermined ways – i.e. that razors shape humans, not just by cutting or removing human hair, but by calling into being certain types of shaving subjects and socialities.

¹⁴ Miriam Forman-Brunell, “Hygiene” in *Girlhood in America: An Encyclopedia*. (United States: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2001), 370.

However, while Nye's idea of differential use is helpful, I will argue that another potentially valid way to disrupt technological determinism is to explore how physical and cultural understandings of the human body itself, influenced the shaving razor's development in the United States during the late 1920s. Moreover, to add clarity to this line of argumentation, I will ground my exploration in the analysis of a specific site – Jacob Schick's patent application for his "shaving machine": the first recorded invention of an electric razor.¹⁵ This argument will follow several steps. First, I will describe how the physical dimensions and characteristics of the human body shaped the technological design of Schick's electric razor; second, I will describe how cultural ideas of the human body in the United States during the late 1920s shaped the material styling of Schick's electric razor; third, I will describe how the social and physical movements of the human body in the United States during the late 1920s also shaped Schick's electric razor by dictating its use-capacities; fourth, and finally, I will conclude with thoughts about why exploring elements of the human body's influence on the development of technology offers an effective and compelling approach for challenging technological determinism.

Filed on April 23, 1928, Jacob Schick's patent application for his "shaving machine," otherwise known as an electric razor, contains evidence that the technological components and developments of this technology were

¹⁵ Ellen van Oost, "Materialized Gender: How Shavers Configure the Users' Femininity and Masculinity," in Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch (ed.s) *How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technology* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

strongly shaped by the physical dimensions of the human body. This is made clear in two ways by Schick's description of his invention. First, the material size of the razor was dictated by common human dimensions. This is evidenced in the written description included in the invention's patent when Schick notes that his razor is, "a small device to be held in the hand."¹⁶ From this, it is clear that Schick's razor primarily aimed to accommodate and conform to plausible measurements of the human hand. Second, Schick notes that the final form of his razor was "a result of many experiments" with the human body.¹⁷ Schick had to test and retest the measurements of the technical components of his invention so that they did their job (removed facial hair), but did it in a way that kept the body comfortable (didn't cut or irritate skin).¹⁸ This evidence shows that the physical dimensions of the human body played a key role in dictating the material form of Schick's electric razor. Furthermore, this evidence also works to disrupt technological determinism, because it shows at the most basic level of conception and construction that the physical shape of the human body dictated how the materiality of the electric razor came into being. Moreover, the styling of the electric razor's material form was also influenced by the human body – particularly cultural ideas of the body. Schick's electric razor came into being in 1928, when the United States was in the midst of its Progressive era.¹⁹

¹⁶ Jacob Schick, "Shaving Machine." Patent 1,757,978. filed April 23, 1928, and issued May 13, 1930.

¹⁷ Idem.

¹⁸ Idem.

¹⁹ Wendy Kline, *Building A Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001): 13.

A key element of this era was the eugenics movement. At its core, eugenics sought to achieve “racial betterment” by limiting the mobility and livelihood of non-white Americans – both politically and sexually.²⁰ The reasoning behind implementing these limitations was often based upon classifying bodies as “fit” or “unfit.” A “fit” body was white, traditionally moral, mentally competent, sexually normative, and most likely middle-class or above; while an “unfit” body fell outside those very narrow parameters – usually targeting immigrants, African Americans, the poor, sex workers, the insane, etc.²¹ These projects of classification led to very particular cultural ideals of the human body during the 1920s. Scientifically, the eugenic conceptions of the human body were made desirable and enforced by calls for hygiene and sanitation in the public health movement.²² Socially, the eugenic ideas and ideals of the human body were made desirable and enforced by the growing commercial popularity of streamlined design.²³

To show how Jacob Schick’s electric razor was shaped by cultural ideas of the body in the United States during the 1920s, I will now analyze how eugenic principles of hygiene and streamlining influenced the styling of Schick’s razor. I will begin with hygiene. The entire principle behind Schick’s electric razor – the removal of facial hair – aligns with hygienic goals of the 1920s. As historian Nancy Tomes has noted, the arrival and rise of the germ theory of

²⁰ Kline, *Building A Better Race*, 13.

²¹ Lisa Lindquist Dorr, “Arm in Arm: Gender, Eugenics, and Virginia’s Racial Integrity Acts of the 1920s” *Journal of Women’s History* 11.1 (1999): 145.

²² David A. Hanks and Anne Hoy. *American Streamlined Design: The World of Tomorrow* (Paris: Flammarion, 2005): 114.

²³ Penny Sparke, *As Long As It’s Pink: The Sexual Politics of Taste* (London: Pandora, 1995): 127.

disease in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries triggered a corresponding awareness and fear of invisible germs and microbes, and resulted in what she calls “antisepticonscious America,” Americans became very worried, anxious, and vigilant about hygiene and sanitation in this period to combat the ills brought on by germs.²⁴ This public fervor led to the popularization of the clean-shaven man in society. Previously, doctors had begun to do away with their beards for reasons of surgical cleanliness and asepsis. However, as social fears about hygiene grew – resulting from a growing consciousness of the germ theory of disease which was heavily endorsed by eugenic agendas that supported the germ theory’s ethos of purity – more and more men subscribed to the clean-shaven look. Shaving, popularized by slogans like “the beard is infected with the germs of tuberculosis” and “revolt against the whisker,” soon became a widespread phenomenon because many fathers, brothers, and husbands still wanted to maintain the intimacy of kissing and being near their families and loved ones – without endangering their well-being with the dangerous microbes that might lurk in their facial hair.²⁵ Thus, the duty of Schick’s electric razor – to remove hair – catered to cultural ideas and ideals of the body active during the late 1920s in the United States, because the “close” shave the razor delivered ensured that the cleanliness of a man’s face would satisfy the rigorous hygienic standards of the germ theory and eugenics.²⁶

²⁴ Nancy Tomes, *The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998): 11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 159.

²⁶ Jacob Schick, “Shaving Machine,” Patent 1,757,978. filed April 23, 1928, and issued May 13, 1930.

Now, I will turn my analysis toward streamlining. As historian Christina Cogdell insightfully observes, “Streamline design served as a material embodiment of eugenic ideology.”²⁷ Both sought to maintain evolutionary progress by taking on problems of mass production and eliminating social “defectiveness” and “parasitic drag” through reform measures.²⁸ In short: streamline design and eugenics were possessed by strong desires for hygiene and efficiency in order to achieve “ideal types.”²⁹ The notion of ideal types can be seen in how Schick’s design adheres to cultural ideas of the body in the United States during the late 1920s. The idea of an “ideal type” is fulfilled by the tool of the razor itself; because it was so thoroughly made to fit the needs of the human body’s facial hair and skin – it represents an “ideal type” of razor. These mechanical workings are reinforced by its styling. As Schick’s patent diagram shows, the razor was sleek, seamless, simple, smooth, organic-looking metal – all attributes which directly conform to the principles of streamline design.³⁰ Furthermore, Schick repeatedly used the rhetoric of streamlining in his abstract, with constant references to “suitable” and “preferred” parts which evoke the idea of “ideal types;” he also notes that his measurements are directed at bodies with “normal” skin. This reference to “normal” skin allowed his streamlined design to cater to cultural ideas of the body in two ways.

²⁷ Christina Cogdell, *Eugenic Design: Streamlining America in the 1930s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004): 4.

²⁸ Idem.

²⁹ Idem.

³⁰ Sparke, *As Long As It's Pink*, 127.

First, on the level of measurements, it is inescapable that Schick was aware of the highly differential nature of the human body and attempted to universalize his invention’s dimensions enough that it would appeal to the largest amount of consumers. Yet, secondly, he also embedded cultural eugenic and streamlined ideas of the body into his invention through constructing the bodies it successfully shaves as “normal” – because it was able to effectively remove the facial hair. Thus, Schick, rather paradoxically, is able to acknowledge and cater to the differences of human bodies – while also offering human bodies a way to attain culturally desirable streamlining by coding his product as only working on streamlined, or “normal,” bodies. Thus, cultural eugenic ideas and ideals of the human body strongly influenced how the material form of Schick’s electric razor was styled – both physically and rhetorically. Again, this challenges a deterministic framework of technology; because, it clearly shows how highly social and cultural ideas about the human body called into being a technology that could provide, maintain, and enforce those particular ideas.

The ways late 1920s American bodies moved socially and physically also shaped the formation of Schick’s electric razor by demanding certain use-capabilities. Key to this discussion is the efficiency culture that was so pervasive during the 1920s. The design and intended use of Schick’s electric razor to benefit this culture of efficiency is evident in several ways. First, Schick designed his razor so that it “would be used for shaving without the necessity of the use of lather or equivalents for softening the hair on the face.”³¹

³¹ Jacob Schick, “Shaving Machine.” Patent 1,757,978. filed April 23, 1928, and issued May 13, 1930.

By eliminating the step and process of lathering up and later washing off the face, Schick made his electric razor a more efficient method of shaving because users could save the lather-time while their bodies physically moved through the motions of shaving. Second, Schick made doubly sure that as bodies moved through the task of shaving while using his electric razor, they would spend the most minimal amount of time cleaning their razor. Schick accomplished this by including two design features. One being, that he left “the ends of the shaving head open which avoids the necessity of withdrawing the cut hair by suction means.”³² The other being that, as the machine was handled, “the various angles at which it is placed when shaving will allow the hair to pass out at the open ends... [or] the hairs can be dislodged if necessary by simply blowing through the channel.” Both of these design features showcase the self-serving nature of Schick’s razor. It was designed to evacuate the cut hair itself or to have a user do it in an easy way. Both options are quick, and demonstrate that Schick was catering to the time-efficiency that people craved in the 1920s.

The final design detail that served the efficient movement of the bodies is the razor’s plug feature. By the late 1920s, almost 85% of American homes were electrified.³³ The design of Schick’s razor picks up on the efficiency offered by the ever-increasing momentum of this electrification. In his patent abstract, Schick notes that the motor his electric razor runs on can be connected by its cable to “an ordinary light socket.” Thus, by using his invention, the movement of bodies could be both physically and socially efficient. Physically it was efficient, because they were using an electric shaver that accomplished

³² Idem.

³³ Hanks, *American Streamlined Design*, 109.

the task of shaving more quickly than a manual razor (and also cut out the step of lathering, as noted above); and socially it was efficient, because it was a technology that could be used in the vast majority of locations due to the almost total electrification of the United States. Thus, Schick’s electric razor catered to the efficiency culture of the 1920s by offering a physically and socially efficient way to shave by eliminating lathering, using electric mechanization, and being compatible with a widely available power source. Because the electric razor so thoroughly aimed to meet the social and physical movements of the human body in relation to 1920s efficiency culture, it is clear that Schick’s electric razor again disrupts technological determinism because it was formed predominantly by the social and cultural desires of humans.

In sum, my analysis of Schick’s 1928 patent application for his electric razor has sought to disrupt notions of technological determinism by showing how this technology was socially shaped on the fundamental level of its design. Furthermore, I also hope to have offered an insightful and valid methodology of challenging deterministic frameworks of technology, by exploring how the physical and cultural understandings of the human body can shape the design and development of a technology in a myriad ways. For, as David Nye notes, “A technological outcome, whether it be the \$14.6 billion “Big Dig” in Boston or the construction of a new house, is not automatic, but negotiated.”³⁴ In short, my exploration of “how bodies matter” in shaping the development of a technology has sought to offer a fruitful line for further understanding the processes of negotiation that direct how technological outcomes come into being.

³⁴ Nye, “Technology and the Production of Difference,” 614.

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03

Working with “Women”:
Rethinking Basic Vocabulary in
Historical Writing About America
in the 1960s

By: Katherine Bergevin

The following short essays were written experimentally, as three unique responses to one complex question, drawing on a set number of sources.

Should historians stop using the term “women” when discussing the 1960s? Should they abandon that particular word and grouping for something else?

RESPONSE 1: WITH PROVISIONS

Anne Sexton, survivor of a suicide attempt inspired by the smothering circumscription of suburban life in the 1950s, described herself as “a victim of the American Dream.”¹ Her terminology, “victim,” after consideration, does not strike me as metaphorical; rather, it implies an aggressor, in the form of the “dream’s” authors and enforcers, who were primarily male. I would therefore argue that “women” remains a meaningful historical category, useful in the articulation of mass feeling and action, only provided that “men” are also acknowledged as a self-conscious social grouping, whose goals were articulated in the Cold War era through cultural narratives like the American Dream and Black Nationalism.

The macro political conflicts of the Cold War were typically expressed in gendered terms, as conflicts between groups of men. In 1959, President Nixon connected the superiority of Capitalism to its ability “to make easier the lives of our housewives.”² The hero of this Capitalist narrative was the white, middle-class paterfamilias. His financial independence, exemplified by his ability to

take care of his family without government support, was the defining principle of his “freedom.” His wife did not materially contribute to his wealth, but rather embodied it, in her carefully manicured appearance and abundance of leisure time. The Communist male, by contrast, was symbolically feminized through his dependency upon socialized childcare and the labour of his sexless “drudge” of a wife.³

Communism and the supposed “sissification” of American men – a phenomenon denounced by commentators like Philip Wylie in his conservative cultural polemic *Generation of Vipers* – operated very similarly as bugbears. Both were treated as cultural infections needing to be contained lest they compromise the quality of American masculinity. Economic bootstrapping policies were needed to prevent the impoverished Third World from being seduced to the fold of socialism, as it was the responsibility of men to reign in the natural “profligate,” self-indulgent habits of women. For example, the so-called “overpopulation crisis” in Puerto Rico was partly attributed to the failure of island men to curtail their wives’ “irrational” urge to have more children than they could afford.⁴ Meanwhile, writers like Wylie insisted, mainland American boys ran the risk of emasculation – evident in increased social visibility of mental illness and homosexuality – by an epidemic of “overprotective” mothers.⁵

³ Ibid., 11.

⁴ Laura Briggs, *Reproducing Empire: race, sex, science, and U.S. imperialism in Puerto Rico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 110, 118-20.

⁵ Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 20.

¹ Ruth Rosen, *The World Split Open: how the modern women’s movement changed America* (New York: Viking, 2000), 1.

² Ibid., 77.

The political and cultural investment in masculinity was by no means unique to white America. Within the male-dominated Black Power movement of the 1960s, “freedom” was also articulated as a fundamentally masculine quality. Slavery and the continued oppression of African Americans were widely articulated as a process of emasculation.

In her reflections on “White Women, Black Women, and Feminism in the Movement Years,” activist Wini Breins has commented that for black nationalists, “overcoming racism meant achieving manhood.”⁶ It was a story heavily invested in the ascent of males, who were mythologized (in a parallel to Cold War militarism) as an army, which would eventually overcome white hegemony through allegiance with people of colour in the Third World.⁷ Women’s role in this conflict was to bear and give birth to that army. Publications like the Black Muslim *Muhammad Speaks* condemned black women who employed birth control or abortion as dupes of a genocidal government conspiracy which “[involved] wiping out 2 billion potential liberation army soldiers in... Asia, Africa, Central and South America.”⁸ Furthermore, power gains made by black women were frequently treated as a betrayal of black men, and therefore a threat to the movement as a whole.^{9,10} Former Black Panther leader Elaine Brown recalled in her autobiography,

“A woman attempting the role of leadership [in the black power movement] was, to my proud black Brothers, making an alliance with the ‘counter-revolutionary, man-hating, lesbian, feminist white bitches.’”¹¹

White feminists also often found themselves dismissed by male liberal activists, who, Breines recalls, thought of them as “spoiled bourgeois ladies who voted Republican” or “a bunch of chicks with personal problems.”^{12,13}

Conscious male resistance to female “encroachment” into the workforce, politics, and intellectual culture of course did not end with rhetoric. Following the end of the Second World War, new government labour policies shunted women out of many areas of the workforce to make room for returning GIs. Women who retained employment suffered marked pay inequality and exposure to harassment, but risked termination if they protested.¹⁴ Those wishing to embark upon white-collar careers found job listings sex-segregated, typically relegating women to secretarial positions.¹⁵ Male academics actively discouraged women from pursuing advanced degrees, supposedly because they were not naturally suited to higher learning – while fretting among themselves that too much education might “equip and encourage women to compete with men.”¹⁶ After a brief period of party control between 1974 and 1976, Elaine Brown’s female Black

⁶ “What’s Love Got to Do with It? White Women, Black Women, and Feminism in the Movement Years,” *Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 27:4 (2002): 1120.

⁷ Jennifer Nelson, *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement* (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 96.

⁸ *Ibid*, 98.

⁹ *Ibid*, 97.

¹⁰ Breines, *The World Split Open*, 1113.

¹¹ Nelson, *Women of Colour and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 104.

¹² Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 5.

¹³ Breines, “What’s Love Got to Do with It?,” 1120.

¹⁴ Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 23-5.

¹⁵ Brian Beaton, HIS378: America in the 1960s (lecture, University of Toronto, 27 October, 2011).

¹⁶ Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 40-41.

Panther ministers suffered violent “discipline” at the hands of returning male leaders, who resented the successful redirection of party focus toward non-militarized community-based initiatives like providing school meals.¹⁷

Political movements predating Second Wave Feminism understood social advancement as the reclamation of masculinity. The social advancement of women seems to have represented a perceived direct threat to the status of men because Cold War era masculinity was defined fundamentally as the counterpoint to female dependency and subordination. For women to gain equal social influence was to negate the meaning of “manhood” – and the broad defensive reaction of men was no less concerted than the self-assertion of the emerging feminist networks of the 1960s.¹⁸ As Anne Sexton realized in the course of her memoirs, her “conventional life... was what my husband wanted of me.”¹⁹

RESPONSE 2: YES, BUT...

“Women” is a necessary term when discussing the 1960s, not least because that is the name which millions of American activists choose to adopt in their pursuit of political advancement. However, our present understanding of what “women” constitute as a social group has been shaped by the framework of “gender” developed during the feminist movement of the 1960’s and ‘70s.²⁰ Scholarship which fails to deconstruct the present meaning of “women” before engaging it as a category risks reflecting the politics

of the people who deliberately re-articulated the word’s meaning several decades ago, rather than accurately conveying how “womanhood” operated in the 1960s.

Some of what we in the 21st Century think of as the substance of “womanhood” was the same in the 1960s. It is undeniable that “women” were marginalized within American society on the basis of their common anatomy. Female bodies were specifically targeted in the form of sexual harassment and assault. They were experimented upon in the development of hormonal birth control, based on the assumption that they represented the “natural subject of medical intervention,” while tampering with male fertility was deemed unacceptably emasculating.^{21,22} Those capable of becoming pregnant were the only group who suffered the physical and emotional trauma of undergoing illegal abortions prior to the passage of *Roe vs. Wade*. However, what was considered a “biologically” determined characteristic extended beyond anatomy.

Based on many of the first-hand statements cited by Rosen, Briggs, Nelson, and Breines, “woman” appears to have been in the 1960s a highly exclusive status with many specific behavioural requirements. As the binary counterpart to “man,” its connotations were fundamentally heteronormative, perhaps best articulated by the character Debbie Reynolds in the 1955 film *The Tender Trap*: “Marriage is the most important thing in the world.

¹⁷ Nelson, *Women of Colour and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 103-4.

¹⁸ Beaton, HIS378 [27 October, 2011].

¹⁹ Via Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 1.

²⁰ Beaton [27 October, 2011].

²¹ Ibid., [20 Oct., 2011].

²² Briggs, *Reproducing Empire*, 136.

A woman isn't really a woman until she's been married and had children."²³ Those who fell outside of these parameters, including single women and lesbians, seem to have been denied full access to the name "woman," their divergent sexual identities dismissed as pathology or "emotional incompetence."²⁴ Meanwhile, to be biologically infertile was to be incomplete: Jennifer Nelson refers to the story of one woman who, upon being coerced into a government-directed sterilization procedure, specifically mourned, "there is no way to restore my womanhood."²⁵

Where had this white, maternity-oriented definition of "womanhood" come from? In previous decades, women had worn more practical, "masculine" clothing and worked in factories; they continued to do so elsewhere around the world – not least in the Soviet Union.²⁶ The process of militarizing the American populace during the Cold War involved imposing a level of day-to-day social conformity which I suspect was meant to echo the uniform dress and behaviour of members of a literal army. It required a standard of psychological, social, and sexual "normalcy," manifest in rigidly defined gender roles. The authority to determine who was a "normal" or "healthy" woman fell into the hands of mainly male doctors, scientists, and social engineers, whose politics depended upon a belief in the natural stratification of male and female social duties.²⁷ This philosophy was transmuted into developments like the popular acceptance of estrogen and testosterone as "sex hormones," despite their essential functions in both male and female bodies.²⁸

²³ Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 13.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 99.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 16-19.

²⁸ Briggs, *Reproducing Empire*, 134-5.

"Experts" still had to grapple, however, with recent revelations about how sexual identity originated and operated. Psychologists acknowledged the possibility for incongruity between biological and social sexual identity, even suggesting that these were entirely the result of the nurture a child was exposed to within the first 18 months of life.²⁹ Forms of sexual expression falling beyond what was considered medically permissible were coded as "mental illness" to avoid the undermining of politically-defined "womanhood." Various excluded groups showed their frustration through writings like the black feminist text *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave*, showcasing the struggle of those who felt unacknowledged by existing gender categories.³⁰ However, some of the most important gains in dismantling the hegemonic definition of "womanhood" were made within medical practice itself. By educating women about how to monitor their own health, and taking the concerns of female patients seriously, politicians like Elaine Brown and doctors like Adeleine Satterthwaite directly targeted the pseudo-scientific roots of restrictive Cold War sex roles.^{31,32} Redefining mental and social "normalcy" to include a more diverse array of lifestyles and sexual identities meant deliberately reinventing the term "woman" itself in the burgeoning field of "gender studies." For a 21st-century writer to broadly apply "women" to the female historical actors of the 1960s without self-reflection, is to risk glossing over the alienation from the term many individuals faced even as they rallied beneath it.

²⁹ Beaton, HIS378 (27 Oct., 2011).

³⁰ Breines, "What's Love Got to Do with It?," 1121.

³¹ Briggs, *Reproducing Empire*, 139.

³² Nelson, *Women of Colour and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 109-10.

RESPONSE 3: MAYBE, AS PART OF A LARGER PROCESS?

“*Is there an inherent tension in seeking to end gender discrimination by organizing according to gender/sex grouping?*”³³

When I first considered this question, I felt that it was basically semantic, and that it could easily be applied disingenuously. Women’s historical marginalization had been too systemic, particularly within the Cold War era, to discount their commonality as a group; claiming that sexism was really related to a factor other than sex seemed likely to merely cloud the problem and possibly create excuses for ignoring it within historical practice. However, I now wonder whether it would not be productive to – without obfuscating the sexual component of power discrepancies in 1960s America – think of the group “women” as one important part of a much more complicated web of power defining who had control over which kinds of bodies.

In reading “Demon Mothers in the Social Laboratory” by Laura Briggs, I was struck by the illogical and contradictory treatment of Puerto Rican women by mainland American doctors. The traits and habits psychologists and sociologists attributed Puerto Ricans in order to justify using them as medical test subjects, struck me as an odd choice. A sexual double-standard and cult of virginity, compelling women to marry early as the only means of self-direction; a “macho” culture among men that encouraged the objectification of and discrimination against women in order to facilitate homosocial bonding; and

³³ Beaton, [27 October, 2011].

widespread cultural anxiety about sex, bodies, and birth control, rooted in religious fundamentalism; all had direct analogues within mainland white American culture.³⁴ Most puzzling was the epithet Briggs referred to in her title, that of the “demon mother” applied to Puerto Rican women by “conservatives,” who bowed down to the cult of maternity when it applied to mainland-dwelling white Americans.³⁵ Why was it mainland American “spinster...[should] be barred by law from having anything to do with the teaching of children on grounds of emotional incompetence,” while an abundance of babies in Puerto Rico might even call for “a contraceptive agent in the water”?^{36,37}

Part of the double-standard could be attributed to simple racism. The perceived “overpopulation crisis” on the island certainly played into established fears of “race suicide.”^{38,39,40} For Puerto Rico to be targeted as a test site for new methods of birth control made a distasteful kind of sense. The appropriation of non-white bodies for the purposes of white economic and scientific advancement was not a new process in American history. This was, after all, the essence of slavery, while into the 20th century, black women became the targets for coerced sterilization, and black men test subjects for research in sexually transmitted diseases like syphilis.^{41,42}

³⁴ Beaton, HIS378 [20 Oct., 2011].

³⁵ Briggs, *Reproducing Empire* 110-21.

³⁶ Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 24.

³⁷ Briggs, *Reproducing Empire*, 110.

³⁸ Beaton, HIS378 [20 Oct., 2011].

³⁹ Nelson, *Women of Colour and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 98.

⁴⁰ Briggs, *Reproducing Empire*, 125.

⁴¹ Nelson, *Women of Colour and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 98-100.

⁴² Briggs, *Reproducing Empire*, 126-7.

African American communities continued to suffer disproportionately due to the compromise of personal bodily autonomy resulting from a lack of adequate health-care and nutrition.⁴³

Though it has been well established that attempts by white feminists to identify their struggles with those of African Americans and other racial “others” were deeply problematic and reductive, there does emerge a parallel in the treatment of female and non-white bodies in 1960s America. Both were regarded as subjects for medical intervention, and as tools in the machinations of macro-level social engineering. The use of a third unassenting group as test subjects, the mentally ill, is what drew me to consider the question of whether “women” ought to always be differentiated on the basis of their marginalization due to common biology. Rather, it may be productive to consider what qualified a member of society, more generally, as a “subject” or tool of social engineering rather than an instigator of social change. Obviously, those incapacitated by mental illness, or weakened by poverty and disadvantaged by race- or sex-discrimination were in one sense simply the easiest targets for “research” and experimentation. It then occurred to me that between women, African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and the mentally ill – all groups that could potentially overlap each other several times – there were very few really autonomous “actors” left to examine in American history. Even the most socially privileged group, white men,

⁴³ Nelson, *Women of Colour and the Reproductive Rights Movement*, 107-10.

experienced deep-seated frustration with dehumanizing working lives in which little creativity or individuality was demanded from them; they also chafed under the pressure to conform to heteronormative cultural standards.⁴⁴

There was one cultural movement that seemed even more transcendent than feminism or Black Power. The Sexual Revolution marked a sweeping change in how the majority of Americans thought about themselves, in bodily terms. If, as recounted within *The World Split Open*, “Fifties clothes were like armour,” there emerged a greater sense of widespread cultural ease in shedding such defenses.⁴⁵ The renewed interest in understanding how the human body functioned “naturally,” as sex was described in the emerging genre of the ‘sex manual,’ seems to speak to a widespread desire to reclaim personal autonomy through the cultural reappropriation of the human body.⁴⁶ It remains worth noting, however, that, as Ruth Rosen has observed, there was one group in particular whose sexual behaviour evolved most dramatically with the invention of the Pill and liberalization of sexual mores: “Women – not men – made the sexual revolution.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Rosen, *The World Split Open*, 19, 28-50.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁶ Beaton, HIS378 (20 Oct., 2011).

⁴⁷ *The World Split Open*, 18.

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Issues and Controversies Regarding Fox News

By: Leila Khaze

The following paper was written by the author, a current University of Toronto student, while attending school abroad, and as such is written in the French essay style.

In a speech made by President Obama in 2010, he illustrates his distaste for Fox News, "As president, I swore to uphold the Constitution, and part of that Constitution is a free press... [However, Fox News has] a point of view that I think is ultimately destructive for the long-term growth of America."¹ This statement by President Barack Obama represents the mainstream disapproval associated with Fox Entertainment Group's news network, Fox News. Fox News was created in 1996 by Australian media mogul Rupert Murdoch, who wished to create a 24 hour news channel in the United States that would bring news broadcasting to a global and worldwide platform.² As a result, Fox News was born and quickly launched itself as a mainstream news source associated with various issues and controversies. While Fox News has gained significant success in regards to ratings, there are various issues and controversies associated with the news channel. Such issues concern Fox News' neoconservative Republican bias issued in its news reports and political commentary programming, as well as Fox News' transformation of the era of cable news. This dissertation will begin by describing the issue of Fox News' Republican bias, followed by examples of how Fox News administers unfair and unbalanced news. Additionally, it will analyse how

Fox News' Republican bias provides an alternate opinion in a liberal news landscape. In conclusion, this paper will seek to describe the manner in which Fox News has transformed the era of cable news, as a result pushing other news networks to the boring mainstream.

A chief controversy associated with Fox News is the channel's neoconservative bias. Fox News has been notorious for broadcasting stories that cater to right-wing Republican politics and for its political commentators' aptness for upholding conservative ideologies. As a result of this ideological slant, Fox News has been labelled the most bias name in American news. This partisan bias has become extremely apparent through Fox's methods of reporting when compared to the original "Big Three" television networks; ABC, CBS, and NBC. Prior to the creation of Fox, these three networks enjoyed a pleasant relationship with one another in which they all shared a fairly liberal or centrist political position. However, with the introduction of Fox News, a populist and conservative news channel also recognized as the "fourth network", this relationship between the networks was altered as Fox provided an alternate ideology to news broadcasting that had never been seen before. Consequently, it was believed that Fox news was created as an arm of neoconservative Republican politics.³

¹ Lucy Madison, "Fox News' Viewpoint "Destructive" for U.S Growth, Obama Says", CBS News, September 28, 2010, accessed December 6, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20017849-503544.html.

² Robert Lenzner , "Murdoch, partner plan 4th Network," Boston Globe , May 5, 1985, accessed December 6, 2010.

³ Brian Stetler, "Foxes' Volley with Obama Intensifying," The New York Times, October 11, 2009, accessed December 6, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/business/media/12fox.html?pagewanted=all>.

Although Fox News advertises the slogan “Fair and Balanced News” there are various reasons to believe that Fox News’ creation and reporting methods act as an arm of the Republican Party. It is important to note that some of the most influential actors employed at Fox News have had previous or on going affiliations with the Republican party.⁴ For instance, Roger Ailes, the president and founder of the Fox News Channel, was a former Republican Party media consultant who assisted in the presidential campaigns of President Reagan and Nixon. In addition, Bill O’Reilly, of Fox’s “The O’Reilly Factor”, host of the highest rated cable news program on American television, is a registered member of the Republican Party. Lastly, creator of Fox Broadcasting Company, Rupert Murdoch, is a self-proclaimed Republican - donating \$1 million to the Republican Governors Association in 2010. Furthermore, the overwhelming amount of Republicans and conservatives who hold prominent positions at the network has led many to believe that Fox News is a product of the Republican Party. Additionally, in 1996, Andy Kirtzman, a well-known New York City cable news reporter applied for a job at Fox News. However, during his interview Kirtzman refused to disclose his political affiliation – at this point, it was understood that all future career prospects at Fox News had ended. Regarding the incident FAIR writes,

“ The abundance of conservatives and Republicans at Fox News Channel does not seem to be a coincidence. Andrew Kirtzman, was interviewed for a job with Fox and says that management wanted to know what his political affiliation was. ‘They were afraid I was a Democrat,’ he told the Village Voice (10/15/96). When Kirtzman refused to tell Fox his party ID, ‘all employment discussion ended,’ according to the Voice.”⁵

Therefore, it is apparent that Fox News attempts to recruit and maintain those whose ideologies are in check with that of the Republican party; additionally, it suggests that the channel does strive to maintain a right-wing bias.

Furthermore, Fox News’ Republican bias assists to manipulate news coverage to cater to its conservative agenda.⁶ As a result, this has damaged the credibility of Fox News as it is increasingly regarded as an illegitimate news source. This is portrayed in Fox’s news coverage of the 2008 presidential elections, and general representation of Democrat President Barack Obama. The Obama administration has even gone as far as to publicly denounce Fox on their rival network CNN, stating that “FOX News often operates almost as either the research arm or the communications arm of the Republican party.”⁷ This is a result of the on-going feud between Fox News and the Obama administration as a consequence of Fox’s conservative Republican bias in news coverage regarding Obama. While

⁴ Ethan Kaplan, “ The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122 (2007): 1187-1234.

⁵ Seth Ackerman. “The Most Biased Name in News,” *Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting* (July 2001), accessed December 5, 2010, <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1067>.

⁶ Jefferson N.C and Sloan David, *Media Bias: Finding it, Fixing it* (McFarland & Co, 2007), 258-263.

⁷ Stetler, “Foxes’ Volley with Obama Intensifying.”

tension between the press and presidents has always been an aspect of American politics, tensions continued to rise when Fox News commentator Glenn Beck - also recognized as an anti-Obama broadcaster and Tea Party advocate - labelled President Obama as a racist with a "deep-seeded hatred for white people... [who wishes to create] a Marxist utopia in America."⁸ Fox News also falsely reported that President Obama attended an Islamic school or *madrassa* when he was a child. These reports depict the extent to which Fox News manipulates its broadcasting power to cater to its neoconservative Republican agenda. As a result, this has led to a public dispute between Fox and the Obama administration. Obama has made strenuous efforts to appear on every chief news channel in the United States in 2009 except for Fox News, making his stance towards Fox News extremely clear. White House communications director Anita Dunn explained:

“... [As for Fox News] we're going to treat them the way we would treat an opponent... as they are undertaking a war against Barack Obama and the White House, we don't need to pretend that this is the way that legitimate news organizations behave.”⁹

Therefore, Fox News' Republican bias is a chief issue associated with the channel, even to the extent of the Obama administration's public disapproval of the network. Another chief issue associated with Fox News regards its role in transforming the era of cable news, leading other news channels to be regarded as the 'boring mainstream,' who therefore suffer a significant decline in ratings. Prior to the creation of Fox News,

news channels presented straight-forward, non-opinionated, centrist news reports and programming. However, Fox News introduced opinion-based, partisan news broadcasting which included hard-ball political commentary and programming.

For instance, "The O'Reilly Factor", Fox's most watched prime-time program, revolves around registered Republican reporter Bill O'Reilly interviewing various guests and discussing breaking news stories. Although "The O'Reilly Factor"'s format is fairly standard, O'Reilly's approach to interviews and reporting are significantly different than that of other news networks. O'Reilly is notorious for his hard-ball approach to interviewing, in which he forces his opinion on guests and is known to yell and demean. This style of interviewing has resulted in The O'Reilly Factor's mainstream success. Furthermore, programs on Fox such as "The O'Reilly Factor" are responsible for transforming the era of cable news, in which other news channels like CNN cannot compete. For example, Fox's "The O'Reilly Factor" has ratings twice that of CNN's highest rated program "Larry King Live", which both air at 8 P.M.¹⁰ "Larry King Live", hosted by Larry King, is a talk show in which celebrities and politicians are invited for an interview. Audiences prefer to watch "The O'Reilly Factor" as opposed to "Larry King Live" for the simple fact that O'Reilly provides a more entertaining experience. Consequently, Larry King's ratings have dropped significantly, and after the twenty-fifth anniversary of the show in 2010, it was announced that "Larry King Live" would be in its final year of production. The New York Times writes,

⁸ "Glenn Beck: Obama is a Racist" CBS News, July 29 2009, accessed December 6, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-5195604.html.

⁹ Stetler, "Foxes' Volley with Obama Intensifying."

¹⁰ Bill Carter "CNN Drops to Last Place Among Cable News Networks," The New York Times (October 26, 2009), accessed December 6, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-warner/the-ny-times-and-bloomer_b_339045.html.

“ CNN, which invented the cable news network more than two decades ago, will hit a new competitive low with its prime-time programs in October [of 2009], finishing fourth – and last – among the cable news networks ... The results demonstrate once more the apparent preference of viewers for opinion-oriented shows from the news networks in prime time... viewers seem to be looking for partisan views more than objective coverage... CNN’s performance was worst in the 8 p.m. Hour. Bill O’Reilly on Fox News continued his long dominance with the biggest numbers of any host, 881,000 viewers.¹¹ ”

Therefore, it is a result of Fox News’ programming which transformed the era of cable news into one in which audiences prefer aggressive, opinion-based programming instead of classic, trustworthy news coverage and interviews, where shows such as Larry King Live are pushed to the boring mainstream.

Fox News has continued to transform the era of cable news through the alteration and distortion of video clips and pictures. While in previous years, news channels may have distorted certain information or graphic footage to fit the news channel’s agenda, no other American news channel has been guilty of this to the extent of Fox News. For instance, political satirist and comedy television host Jon Stewart has often accused Fox News of distorting television footage in order to fit its conservative agenda. In 2009, Stewart claimed Fox was responsible for altering footage of a Tea Party rally in which they used old footage in order to make the size of the latest rally larger than it was. An article from “Media Matters for America” states,

“ On his Fox News show, Sean Hannity misleadingly aired video from the 9-12 March on Washington while discussing Rep. Michele Bachmann’s (R-MN) much smaller November 5 anti-health care reform rally to claim that ‘twenty-thousand plus’ people showed up to Bachmann’s protest. Hannity’s video switch-up -- which Jon Stewart highlighted on *The Daily Show* -- is just the latest example of Fox News hosts’ extensive history of deceptively using video and photos to advance a false or misleading story line.¹² ”

Therefore, It has been held that Fox News has a history of distorting and altering film or photo footage to create a news story that satisfies its neoconservative agenda. Such alteration has resulted in a change in cable news; previously, such news distortions were either not acknowledged by the public or news channels simply did not involve themselves, however, audiences are becoming increasingly familiar with Fox News’ history of news distortion, as Fox broadcasters even admit to such alterations - as Sean Hannity did the night after Jon Stewart mentioned the video clip distortion. Although Fox News has the highest ratings of any news channel in the United States, it does not have the highest digital ratings among other chief news channels. While Fox News launched its online website in 1995 - which offers Fox News columns, video clips, and the latest news coverage - Fox fails to be the highest rated digital news website, as CNN’s “CNN digital network” received approximately forty-

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Eric Hananoki, “Hannity Uses Fox News to fulfill reported behind-the-scenes promise to promote House Candidate.” *Media Matters for America*, July 17 2010, accessed December 4, 2010, <http://mediamatters.org/iphone/blog/201007170013>.

eight million visitors in 2010 compared to Fox News' which only received approximately twenty-four million visitors.¹³ Therefore, while Fox is the highest rated news channel in the United States, with an average of 1.8 million primetime viewers per day, its digital online ratings do not share the same results. For instance, while Fox News provides extremely entertaining programming and aggressive talk shows such as "The O'Reilly Factor", which receives the highest ratings out of all other news programming aired at the same time, it is true that audiences watch such programs for entertainment purposes rather than to receive trustworthy news. Furthermore, in order to receive dependable news, people rely on other news networks such as CNN's website, proving that CNN is a more a trusted news source than Fox News. Audiences seem to watch Fox News for entertainment purposes, and access information from CNN's website for reliable news.

Also, news channels such as CNN receive more online visitors than Fox News' website as a result of CNN's global influence; Fox news fails to be the global poster child. For instance, with the launch of CNN International, CNN provides news coverage for more than 200 million households in over 200 countries.¹⁴ As a result, CNN's international influence is greater than that of Fox News, which is chiefly accessible in North America, primarily in the United States. In April 2010, CNN was ranked third among international new sites, whereas Fox News ranked

eighth; evidence illustrates that CNN is more reliable than Fox is (as a whole).

Although Fox News is accused of reporting Republican bias, it is also important to acknowledge that Fox News is simply providing an alternative view to the liberal and centrist opinions of mainstream networks such as CNN and MSNBC. While such mainstream networks provide a fairly liberal or centrist bias in their broadcasting, Fox maintains that the network is filling the void as other networks such as CNN fail to provide or report a right-wing opinion.¹⁵ For instance, the president and founder of Fox News describes how Fox provides an alternate opinion to the mainstream liberal networks,

“...if we're conservative, what does that make the other channels? Liberals...in the last 25 years CNN had [conservative columnist] Bob Novak and they thought that was balanced. One half hour they had Bob and the rest of the time they had liberals...Fox has changed the political equation...that [news now] has both sides, whereas only one [liberal] side had it before...the public has to have more than one point of view to know whether to vote properly. If they are only getting one side of the argument it will destroy their freedom.”¹⁶

¹³ Mike Shields, "Fox News Digital Divide," *Adweek*, August 9 2010, accessed December 5, 2010, <http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/fox-news-digital-divide-103008>.

¹⁴ Shields, "Fox News Digital Divide."

¹⁵ David Baron, "Persistent Media Bias," *Journal of Public Economics* 90 (2006): 1-36.

¹⁶ "Interview Transcript: Rupert Murdoch and Roger Ailes" *The Financial Times*. 6 Oct. 2006.

Therefore, while Fox News provides a chiefly neoconservative bias in its news coverage, it can be argued that Fox is providing an alternative partisan opinion to that of mainstream liberal and centrist networks such as CNN and MSNBC.

Fox News has proven to be associated with various issues and controversies such as a neoconservative Republican reporting bias, as well as the unfavourable transformation of the era of cable news. Such Republican bias in Fox News' reporting has resulted in Fox's recognition as an illegitimate news source for the American and international public, as a result of its targeting of the Obama administration and inaccurate portrayal of the President. This Republican bias is a consequence of Fox News' abundance of Republican and conservative employees and individuals who hold chief positions at the network. This leads many to believe that Fox News was created to act as an arm of the Republican Party. However, it is noted that Fox News provides an alternate right-wing opinion, previously unavailable in mainstream liberal or centrist networks such as CNN or MSNBC. Another issue associated with Fox News is the channel's transformation of the era of cable news in which Fox's aggressive opinion-based interview programs such as "The O'Reilly Factor" resulted in declining ratings for other programming such as "Larry King Live", in which the host shares little of his opinion. Although this has resulted in a significant increase in Fox News' ratings, it is true that other news networks such as CNN still hold higher online ratings for their websites as a result of international recognition as a legitimate news source. Thus, the main controversies associated with Fox News are that of its Republican reporting bias, and transformation of the era of cable news.

While the chief issues associated with Fox News have been outlined, Fox News continues to present additional controversies. As President Obama continues to face a declining approval rating in the United States, it is uncertain how Fox News will interpret or report on the President's next political move. In addition, it will be extremely interesting to recognize how Fox News reports on the next Presidential elections, as the news network's reporting might present additional issues and controversies.

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The Existential Threat in 23
Bottles of Jack Daniels:
A Close Read of Philip Roth's
"Goodbye, Columbus"

By: Michael Proulx

Newark, New Jersey is the setting for Philip Roth's 1959 novel *Goodbye, Columbus*. The plot follows a social climbing third generation Jew, his upper middle class girlfriend and their contrasting acceptance of modes of assimilation into American society. Replete with 'pop' culture iconography and materialist ideology, the relationship between Neil Klugman and Brenda Patimkin contrasts the success of each as 'American.'

In the 1950s, America was embroiled in its third armed conflict in less than half a century. What differentiated this time from others was an existential paradox; as economic and technological successes satiated basic necessities and the national well being experienced significant improvements, images of the holocaust and atomic bombs acted as sobering reminders of the potential costs of progress. Between fulfilling the needs and wants of a material fixation and the pride in displaying one's success, was a self-conscious modesty towards the excessive pageantry of wealth, as remorse for America's culpability.

In Philip Roth's *Goodbye, Columbus*, this societal tension is situated in the person of Neil, the novel's protagonist. Roth establishes Neil's working class credentials through allusion; a descent into the Patimkin basement, the family of Neil's summer liaison Brenda. Signifying America's material abundance, Neil's first person description of the basement as a "comforting" space eases into the symbolic tension of *having* yet not *boasting*. Among predictable basement apparatus is the obligatory 'bar,' and it is there that this paper will focus.

The reader is told the bar is "stocked with every kind and size of glass"¹ and every other accoutrement in a veritable "bacchanalian"² exhibit. Class is again made explicit as Neil contemplates pouring himself a drink as a "wicked wage for being forced into servantry,"³ yet refrains. Hints vital to unraveling Roth's critique of material wealth as surrogate for personal enlightenment are alluded to in the following two sentences; "You had to break a label to get a drink. On the shelf back of the bar were two dozen bottles – twenty-three to be exact – of Jack Daniels. . . ."⁴ The first sentence provides the double entendre 'label,' instructing notions of class transcendence. To experience this material reward, Roth means realizing the trope of progress and improvement, rising above one's station in life. Understanding the next line in the text relies on conjecture. That a specific bottle count is mentioned, and made explicit by the use of dashes before and after the fact, is an authorial sign-post of some significance and warrants attention. A standard case of liquor would contain an even twenty-four bottles – the Patimkin bar is one short in this measure. Is it in fact missing? Has it been gifted? Perhaps it was previously consumed. The fact that there is no further recognition of this assumed significant piece of information disturbs the eye's flow due to the dashes, and mentally as Neil describes the photos above the bar of the two oldest children, Ron, and Brenda. Again, omission is the device employed by Roth, as the youngest Pitimkin, Julie, is conspicuous in her absence. Is this absenteeism relevant and related?

¹ Philip J. Roth, *Goodbye, Columbus* (New York: Random House, 1994), 41.

² Idem.

³ Idem.

⁴ Philip J. Roth, *Goodbye, Columbus* (New York: Random House, 1994), 42.

Discounting a missing bottle of whiskey reverberates with existentialist concern. This recognition by omission resonates with visions, observed in movie news reels and on television sets across the country, of the deified corpses of the holocaust, or the spectacle of instant atomic annihilation in the 'mushroom' clouds over Japan. These fresh memories of the detritus of war are starker yet as only a decade prior America herself experienced firsthand the capabilities of modern warfare. Roth seduces his readership by refraining from explicitly signaling loss. It is incumbent upon us, as readers, to be aware that despite glossed over appearances, there is a price for ideological conformity – selected memories. Similarly, this existential accounting of Julie by her absence, her picture is omitted in the Patimkin children's memoriam at the back of the bar, thus, future potential was reduced through the costs of war – a generation unaccounted for. That the Patimkin's have three children and only two are represented, mirrors the count of whiskey bottles on the bar shelf.

Material abundance is further reflected in the metaphor of a freezer "big enough to "house a family of Eskimos,"⁵ asking about the ways and means that provided this wealth. Ironically, it is war that is credited with providing the means to material gain, as "Patimkin Kitchen and Bathroom Sinks had gone to war"⁶ dutifully. Roth's irony foreshadows the farewell speech soon to come as President Eisenhower steps down warning Americans to vigilance in his infamous military-industrial complex speech.

A close read of Neil's descent into the Patimkin basement on pages 41-43 in Roth's *Goodbye, Columbus* reveals a critique of America's collective glance, avoiding the realities inherent in modern warfare, and the marginalization, even absence, of corporeal considerations. Through the use of contextual double negatives, not mentioning that which is missing by pointing out that which remains, Roth draws attention to societal anxiety in the 1950s. Existential threats were made 'real' by memories of Pearl Harbor referenced directly in this section of text, visual recordings of the holocaust, and the atomic nihilism demonstrated by the United States.

⁵ Philip J. Roth, *Goodbye, Columbus* (New York: Random House, 1994), 43.

⁶ *Idem*.



Cold War Victory: The Defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva

By: Adrian Zita-Bennett

At the height of the Cold War in 1967, the two major superpowers were simultaneously encountering periods of unprecedented vulnerability: the US was bogged down in the Vietnam War, and the Soviets were experiencing what one historian has called “an era of stagnation” under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.¹ Political developments dominated the popular discourse surrounding this East-West divide for much of its duration. However, this was not always the case—there were notable occasions when political tensions were overshadowed by those of a more apolitical nature. One such instance, occurred on April 21, 1967 when Svetlana Alliluyeva arrived in the United States. Her arrival sparked international furor: the *New York Times* characterized it as a “whirlwind,”² while readers of *Life Magazine* described the event as “fascinating”³ and “beautiful.”⁴ One even went so far as to proclaim it “an almost exhausting emotional experience.”⁵

The story behind Alliluyeva’s arrival to the US was a topical subject of interest to national press outlets in the spring of 1967. Yet, aside from her captivating voyage, her charismatic appeal, and the possibility of learning more about life within the Soviet sphere, the primary reason for such public curiosity was due to the fact that Alliluyeva was the daughter of Joseph Stalin.⁶ Indeed, the intrigue surrounding her arrival was, as the renowned former diplomat George

¹ Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2009), 398.

² Associated Press, “Short Cab Ride in India Began Her Odyssey,” *New York Times*, April 22, 1967, 11.

³ Eva Lou Long, “Letters to the Editor,” *LIFE Magazine*, October 6, 1967, 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Judi Aefano, “Letters to the Editor,” *LIFE Magazine*, October 6, 1967, 23.

⁶ She uses her mother’s maiden name.

Kennan perceptively noted, “a measure of the extent to which the great but terrible figure of her father still casts its shadow over our world.”⁷ Over his three decades of totalitarian rule, Stalin was a towering figure who truly epitomized Soviet strength and brutality. The prospect of his daughter defecting to the United States—the very country he disdained so willfully following the disintegration of their wartime alliance—not fifteen years following his death, was perplexing if not downright astonishing, especially from a Soviet perspective. This paper will quantify press commentary through a careful description of Alliluyeva’s journey to the West, as well as her impetus for departure. Her defection from the USSR and subsequent arrival to the US had symbolic resonance amidst the Americans’ struggle against the Soviets: it served as a striking ideological and quasi-cultural ‘victory’ for the former vis-à-vis the latter.

In order to properly gauge and contextualize the full significance of her defection, and depict how it revealed a small but decisive ‘victory’ for the United States, it is pertinent to explore and describe Alliluyeva’s life before 1967. Her 1969 memoir *Only One Year* details the tensions between Alliluyeva and the Soviet government that began in the mid-1960s, especially regarding her relationship with the Indian communist Brijesh Singh. Indeed, this contemporary source is particularly helpful since Alliluyeva’s account of events and her personal thoughts were likely still quite fresh in her mind. After “conservative elements” spearheaded the rise of Alexei Kosygin to the Soviet Premiership in October 1964, the Communist Party line became “different,” especially

⁷ George Kennan, “The Legacy of Stalinism,” *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Third Series, vol. 79 (1967): 123.

with regards to their treatment of the deceased dictator's daughter.⁸ Before, under Khrushchev, she happily was more or less "forgotten" by the Soviet leadership; under Kosygin, however, this lifestyle changed. Not only did Kosygin intend to force Alliluyeva back into the workforce, but he also condemned her relationship with Singh, asserting in May 1965 that the Soviet government would not register her marriage to the "old sick Hindu."⁹ This, from what records suggest, appears to be the beginning of the end of Alliluyeva's tenure in the USSR, and therefore can be considered the emotional catalyst for her departure.

Soon after, Singh—already seventeen years Alliluyeva's senior and suffering from a myriad of health problems—was forced into hospital. According to Alliluyeva, Soviet hospitals had become more politicized: for instance, although prior to Khrushchev's removal foreigners could mingle with Russians on the same ward, the new leadership made an effort to segregate hospitals according to ethnicity. Consequently, Russian and foreign patients were told to keep to themselves on different wards.¹⁰ Alliluyeva found this disconcerting, and as a result was only able to care for her husband (as she defiantly referred to him) during their walks together in the hospital garden.¹¹ For Singh, however, such walks required extra effort due to his poor health, and sensing that his days may be numbered, in October 1966 he expressed his wish to return to India alive, in order to be with his friends and family.¹²

Singh wanted Alliluyeva to accompany him on such a journey, and much like her earlier attempt to register their marriage, she was forced to request—or "beg" as she put it—the Soviet government for permission.¹³ When she was summoned to meet with Mikhail Suslov, the USSR's Second Secretary reasoned with her in much the same manner as Kosygin: not only would her father be "very much against" her marriage, Alliluyeva should "not be interested" in travelling abroad since it was not "patriotic."¹⁴ Furthermore, since her flight would also cause "political provocations" like "being instantly surrounded by newsmen," Suslov and the Soviet government pledged to "save" Alliluyeva by refusing her request.¹⁵ Disappointed, albeit not surprised with the decision, Singh decided to postpone the trip and remain in Moscow at Alliluyeva's home. His health continued to deteriorate rapidly, and on October 30, 1966, he succumbed to his various illnesses and died peacefully.¹⁶

Alliluyeva, fearing "bureaucratic formalities and delays," contacted Singh's Indian correspondents in Moscow who, as she put it, "took care of everything."¹⁷ As per Singh's last wishes, his body was cremated and the ashes scattered into the Ganges River in India.¹⁸ Alliluyeva felt an obligation to execute this wish—out of love, surely, but also because "[she] couldn't bring herself to trust anyone with the small urn [of Singh's ashes]."¹⁹ This sentiment, at least partially, was a reaction to Soviet medical authorities, who only a few short

⁸ Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Only One Year* (New York: Harper & Row, Publisher, 1969), 34, 37.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 35, 37.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹¹ According to Alliluyeva, this was the only place at the hospital where foreigners could mingle with Russians. See *Idem.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 45, 46.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁵ *Idem.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁹ *Idem.*

hours following Singh's passing wanted his body to perform an autopsy.²⁰ This was discourteous in two respects: to Alliluyeva, who felt "averse" to such an arrangement so soon, but also to Singh, since autopsies were contrary to Indian custom.²¹ Fortunately, Singh was cremated before the Soviets could perform such an investigation. Yet a larger fear still existed for Alliluyeva: namely, the issue of bringing her late husband's ashes to India. To leave the country, she would again need the Soviets' permission, a cumbersome ordeal that left her understandably skeptical, but she wrote to Brezhnev and Kosygin regardless. The latter summoned her, and Alliluyeva noted that he bore a "changed expression" than in previous meetings.²² She could only speculate that he might be ashamed, since in less than five minutes, the Premier granted her a passport to India good for one month, on the condition that she avoid contact with the press.²³ After a brief delay in her departure due to requests from Singh's relatives in India, Alliluyeva brought the ashes to New Delhi on December 20, 1966.²⁴

Upon her arrival, she still found it difficult to escape the pampering tentacles of the Soviet government. After briefly meeting with a few members of Singh's family at the airport, Alliluyeva was rushed to the Soviet Hostel by a government official. As a result, not only had her first meeting with the Singhs been "irreparably marred," but this "all too familiar" Soviet over-protectiveness made Alliluyeva

feel as if she "hadn't left Moscow."²⁵ Shortly thereafter, she was summoned to meet with more Soviet officials—a telltale sign her stay in India had hidden provisions attached. With the Soviet ambassador to India away from New Delhi at the time of her arrival, the Chargé d'Affaires, Nikolai Ivanovich Smirnov, highlighted his concerns with Alliluyeva's presence. He stated that with the general elections forthcoming, "the threat of Fascism [was] real" insofar as "the reactionary Jan Sangh and the pro-American Swatantra want[ed] to lead the country away from Socialism."²⁶ This meant the political situation was far too "tense," so it was clearly in Alliluyeva's best interest to reside in the Soviet Hostel and let the officials at the embassy transfer Singh's ashes to their rightful place.²⁷ To compound her aggravation, Smirnov added that if she stayed in New Delhi, she could visit some of the local tourist destinations and be back on a flight home to Moscow by January 4, 1967.²⁸ Suddenly, her visa had been shortened from a month to two weeks, because, as Smirnov professed, "a decision has been made in Moscow, a special decision."²⁹ Such an action was neither singular nor isolated: her trip to India was more or less comprised of a series of similar incidents. Indeed, akin to the preventative measures conducted by a pet owner to keep their pet domesticated, the Soviets were similarly opposed to letting Alliluyeva 'out into the wild.' Since the Soviets invariably continued to view her as a mere extension of her father, Alliluyeva's relations with her government only deteriorated further. It became clear to her that she had to look elsewhere if she wanted to have a free, uninhibited lifestyle.

²⁰ Ibid., 51.

²¹ Idem.

²² Ibid., 54.

²³ Idem.

²⁴ Idem.

²⁵ Ibid., 57.

²⁶ Ibid., 57-58.

²⁷ Ibid., 58

²⁸ Ibid., 58, 59.

²⁹ Ibid., 59.

In a chapter aptly titled “There Can Be No Return,” Alliluyeva contemplates defecting from the USSR in order to pursue freedom and seek refuge. For her, in many ways, the most difficult aspect of such a process was not so much disassociating from the USSR, but rather reconciling with her own past and upbringing. In effect, she had to defect from *herself*. She notes that her own “process of liberation” was “different” insofar as her whole life was divided into two periods: before and after 1953.³⁰ The former was while Stalin governed the USSR with an iron fist. Alliluyeva noted that while at first she believed in his “unshakeable stronghold” of authority, with time, and after hearing more and more of her father’s cruelty, she began to question not just his actions, but everything: the Community Party, the Soviet system of governance, and the ideology itself—it began to “wither away and fade in front of [her] eyes.”³¹ The kind of effect this must have had cannot be understated: how would anyone else react if the world they lived in—the world they believed in—was very much a destructive farce? Understandably, it caused great inner tumult and disillusionment, and as Alliluyeva reflected, “When you have once gained sight, it is impossible to feign blindness.”³²

Although she had reached the apotheosis of her process of self-defection through these ruminations regarding her difficult past and “futile” present, her future path was still unclear—it is not a stretch to suggest even she was unsure.³³ After all, she still felt confined and sheltered by the Soviets;

she would later note in an interview that “every week there was a call for [her] to come back, to go back, to go back...And [she] got madder and madder [as a result].”³⁴ It is not so surprising, then, that the leap of defection occurred on an impulse. During the afternoon of March 6, 1967, although she had already managed with great effort to lengthen her stay abroad by two months, Alliluyeva realized she still felt unsatisfied. She dreaded her return trip to Moscow that was to leave in two days, so she packed a single suitcase—not her largest, so as to be inconspicuous—and called a taxi, asking the driver the whereabouts of the American Embassy. He notified her that it was located nearby the Soviet Hostel.³⁵ Upon her arrival, she introduced herself as the daughter of Stalin, which spurred surprised queries from the officials on duty, so she reiterated: “Yes. *The Stalin*.”³⁶ What occurred next was more or less a game of diplomatic hot potato. Accompanied by a CIA lawyer named Robert Rayle, Alliluyeva was rushed out of India to Italy, where she stayed briefly, before travelling to Switzerland on March 12, where she stayed for several weeks.³⁷ It was here that the international press first learned of her defection, and over the course of her sojourn in the country, she was forced into a nomadic lifestyle.³⁸ Amid intensifying speculation that she had indeed defected, the Soviet government was obliged to respond. As reported in the *Times*, the Soviets acknowledged only that Alliluyeva had traveled to India to bury the ashes of her late paramour, calling it “a private affair,” with no mention of her recent defection.³⁹

³⁴ Quoted in Nicholas Thompson, *The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2009), 207.

³⁵ Alliluyeva, *Only One Year*, 191.

³⁶ Thompson, op. cit., 206.

³⁷ Ibid., 207.

³⁸ Ibid., 208.

³⁹ Associated Press, “Moscow Calls Trip of Defector Private,” *New York Times*, March 13, 1967, 1.

³⁰ Ibid., 141.

³¹ Ibid., 143.

³² Idem.

³³ Svetlana Alliluyeva, “To Boris Leonidovich Pasternak,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 219 (June 1967): 137.

Alliluyeva did not yet know where she was going, but her primary concern was publishing a manuscript of letters written to a friend outlining her life in the USSR—a manuscript that from a Soviet standpoint was surely “unpatriotic.”⁴⁰ For this reason, George Kennan, also an eminent Kremlinologist, was sent a copy of this manuscript by the State Department and urged to travel to Geneva with one mission: to convince her to come to the United States.⁴¹ After arriving on March 23, according to the author and journalist Nicholas Thompson, who conducted personal interviews with Alliluyeva in later years, Kennan “immediately won her over by his bearing [and] by the fact that he had clearly read the manuscript carefully and appreciated it.”⁴² Additionally, Kennan promised to secure her a publisher and, more practically, some money. Without any ‘money’ himself at the time of his death, Stalin had left her none.⁴³ Alliluyeva, for her part, kept writing of her excursion to the West. “Like a swimmer,” she wrote, “I had at last reached the opposite shore, had touched bottom and could take a deep breath.”⁴⁴ Discussing her relationship with the Soviets, she wrote, “I had torn myself away from those somber, heavy, gloomy people, at once oppressors and oppressed. I had stepped over the invisible boundary between the world of tyranny and the world of freedom.”⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Thompson. op. cit. The manuscript was published later in 1967. See Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Twenty Letters to a Friend* (New York: Harper & Row, Publisher, 1967).

⁴¹ Ibid., 207.

⁴² Idem.

⁴³ Idem.

⁴⁴ Alliluyeva, *Only One Year*, 193.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 207.

Her writings were not always joyful and triumphant, however, as she still bitterly resented the Soviets and felt heartache over Singh’s passing. During her stay in Switzerland, Alliluyeva was so moved after reading Boris Pasternak’s novel, *Dr. Zhivago*, that she published her first work in the June 1967 issue of the *Atlantic Monthly*—an open letter addressed to Pasternak that exemplified her aforementioned inner anguish and antipathy. As she put it, “Every word of this astonishing book comes to me as a revelation about my own life, and about the life of the Russia I knew.”⁴⁶ Regarding that Russia, Alliluyeva laments how it was “lost” and implored Russians to awaken from “their long sleep.”⁴⁷ Since it was “still prey to folly and desolation” under the current governance of the Soviets—she derogatorily calls them “Pharisees” on several occasions—it was therefore nothing more than a “prison” to her.⁴⁸ Seen in this sense, it is clear that Alliluyeva considered herself to be ‘escaping’ the USSR as much as she felt she was ‘leaving,’ an important detail to consider when assessing the significance of her departure—a point which will be further explored later. In a final critical passage from her work, Alliluyeva asserts that Singh’s death “was the end of [her] former life,” and that consequently, she had “crossed [her] Rubicon” and experienced an “eternal and inexorable renewal of life.”⁴⁹

Indeed, these were the inner emotions and sentiments that Alliluyeva held upon reaching her final destination: the United States. Greeted by a large gathering of reporters and television cameras at Kennedy International Airport on April 21, 1967, Alliluyeva impressed the spectators with her lucidity and charm.

⁴⁶ Alliluyeva, “To Boris Leonidovich Pasternak,” 137.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 134, 137, 138.

⁴⁸ Idem.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 137, 139, 140.

Her arrival dominated national news headlines: the *New York Times* alone included ten features on the event in the next day's paper, and NBC had to cut into two of its regularly scheduled daytime soap operas to provide complete coverage—a move they said cost them more than \$50,000 in advertising revenue.⁵⁰ The fascination surrounding her arrival was readily apparent. The *Times*, for instance, likened her to “a visiting queen from some small, friendly country.”⁵¹ Alliluyeva was asked during a television interview, rather ridiculously, how she might expect the Soviets to react to the defection of Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson.⁵² Notwithstanding her glamorous arrival, Alliluyeva had a concrete and fundamental message to convey: namely, that she came to the US above all to “seek the self-expression that [had] been denied [her] for so long in Russia.”⁵³ She mentioned, as well, that since “[her] husband's death brought long repressed feelings about [her] life to the surface [she] felt it impossible to be silent and tolerant anymore.”⁵⁴ She was also through with being treated as “state property”⁵⁵ and a “political worker.”⁵⁶ Certainly, Alliluyeva had several interrelated and overlapping reasons for defecting from the USSR. As Thompson noted, “To much of the country, she was a symbol of the superiority of the American way.”⁵⁷ This apparent ‘superiority’ was reflected in two ways: one ideological

⁵⁰ Associated Press, “Two N.B.C. Soap Operas Yield To Arrival of Stalin's Daughter,” *New York Times*, April 22, 1967, 63.

⁵¹ Olga Carlisle, “Dictator's Daughter,” *New York Times*, September 24, 1967, 357.

⁵² Jack Gould, “TV: Interview with Mrs. Alliluyeva,” *New York Times*, October 3, 1967, 95.

⁵³ Quoted in Associated Press, “I Could Not Return To Moscow” *New York Times*, April 22, 1967, 1.

⁵⁴ *Idem*.

⁵⁵ Peter Kihss, “Memoirs Sold – She Tells of Faith in God,” *New York Times*, April 22, 1967, 10.

⁵⁶ Associated Press, “Mrs. Alliluyeva Says Soviet Exacted a Promise,” *New York Times*, October 3, 1967, 19.

⁵⁷ Thompson, *Hawk and the Dove*, 208.

and the other quasi-cultural. Though her defection hardly sent shockwaves to alter the Cold War landscape, it nevertheless had an effect. Given the motivations for her departure from the USSR, it is not surprising that her story resonated with so many people upon her arrival in the US.

Interpreting Alliluyeva's defection as an ideological ‘victory,’ however, was not necessarily a universal sentiment. George Kennan, in a statement released shortly following her arrival, was adamant that the entire event not be viewed with an ‘us versus them’ mentality. The US could not “treat her as a ‘defector’ in the usual Cold War sense.”⁵⁸ He implored Americans to “rise above the outworn reflexes and concepts of the ‘cold war’ [and] accept [Alliluyeva] as a human being in herself and not just as a sort of extension of her paternity.”⁵⁹ In short, she was “not a political person.”⁶⁰ From an impartial standpoint, Kennan's opinion does have some merit—after all, political differences should not factor into individuals' fundamental right to freedom and dignity. However, having weathered turbulent periods such as Red Scares and McCarthyism, the American ‘ideology’ by the 1960s had become entrenched with anti-Soviet dogma.⁶¹ Academics noticed the existence of this ‘war’ ideology, and some even went so far as to affirm its necessity. The President of the American Historical Association Conyers Read, asserted

⁵⁸ George Kennan, “Text of Kennan's Statement of the Role He Played,” *New York Times*, April 22, 1967, 11.

⁵⁹ *Idem*.

⁶⁰ *Idem*.

⁶¹ Because the term risks vagueness, ‘ideology’ in this context refers to the general political consciousness, public opinion, political culture etc. For instance, because of the abovementioned overall attack on communism within the US—how it was ‘bad’ and such—most people were opposed to the USSR and its system and in turn held American democracy in far higher regard than Soviet Communism.

“that the liberal neutral attitude...will no longer suffice. Total war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part. The historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist.”⁶² For the head of the leading body of professional historians to equate the Cold War with ‘total war’ is evidence enough that anti-Soviet dogma was intrinsic to American ideology. Thus, with the existence of such an anti-Soviet ideological paradigm, Kennan’s implorations were utopian at best. It also did not help Kennan’s cause when Alliluyeva showed her political stripes by expressing her opinions on contemporary issues in the USSR. In early January 1968, for instance, after it became public that four young Soviet intellectuals were arrested, tried, and sentenced to lengthy terms in the Gulag for their dissident views, she condemned the USSR, calling the trials a “mockery of justice,” and appealed to Americans to not “remain silent in the suppression of fundamental human rights wherever it takes place.”⁶³

Indeed, the Cold War offered Americans little opportunity to remain totally impartial, and given Alliluyeva’s story, this inherent bias simply could not be contained. Her defection illuminated an ideological ‘victory’ in two key respects: first, that democracy was superior to totalitarianism, and second, that capitalism, or at least anti-communism, was preferable to Soviet communism. With regards to the former, four months after she first arrived, Alliluyeva affirmed in a lengthy interview that Americans were afforded more democratic freedoms than citizens in the

⁶² Quoted in Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 58.

⁶³ Quoted in Associated Press, “Mrs. Alliluyeva Calls Trial of 4 in Soviet a “Mockery of Justice,” *New York Times*, January 17, 1968, 1.

USSR. “The principles of life are totally different from those which I saw in my country,” she proclaimed, “[and] such main general principles as freedom of enterprise...speech, and... political opinion are great [and are] really what [bring] people to progress.”⁶⁴ Such words were not empty, as Alliluyeva explained the benefits of rioting, of all things. “I believe that when people have freedom to do whatever they want, and to express whatever they like and to have even freedom to have riots, [it is] good.”⁶⁵ Her appreciation for the American way of life led her to further denounce the Soviet system. She noted how the Soviets seek “sameness” for their citizens, in that they “do not like when an individual has his own opinion [or] makes decisions on his own.”⁶⁶ Instead, they “have tried to make the people in Russia...think the same way, have the same opinion, like the same art, poetry...and music, and have, of course, the same political point of view.”⁶⁷ Needless to say, from her point of view, the US truly did offer—at least far more than the USSR—the ideals that comprised the backbone of American democracy: ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ For this reason, her stay thus far had been “very pleasant.”⁶⁸ More importantly, the fact that she not only noticed, but even advocated the superiority of the American system was evidence to many that the US had bested the Soviets in terms of their system of governance.

⁶⁴ Peter Grose, “Mrs. Alliluyeva’s New Life Here,” *New York Times*, August 27, 1967, 1.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1, 44.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁶⁷ *Idem.*

⁶⁸ *Idem.*

In addition to noting the superiority of democracy over totalitarianism, Alliluyeva also underscored the inferiority of Soviet communism compared to American capitalism or anti-communism. Her arrival to the US provided a significant blow to communists in general—in fact, in many ways, they took it rather personally. An editorial from the French communist daily *L'Humanite Dimanche* offers what perhaps can be viewed as international communism's likely response to Alliluyeva's actions. Conceding that her defection was indeed a "big occasion," the newspaper attributes "the [American] dollar" as the primary reason for her departure, as it notes the large \$2.5 million salary she would receive publishing her memoirs there.⁶⁹ Although she stated on a number of occasions that most of this salary would be donated to charity,⁷⁰ the newspaper was unrelenting in its attack, calling the real reasons for her departure—namely, her utter disdain for the rigid Soviet system and leadership and the negative effect both had on her life—nothing more than "anecdotes, lies, and bluff."⁷¹ It also criticized her apparent lack of respect for her father, and likewise condemned the Americans, who in their opinion "set up the entire affair."⁷² Soviet Communism was more or less the wunderkind of International Communism; as one of the two global superpowers, the USSR was its biggest 'success story' on the international scene. Svetlana's defection from the USSR, as such, was more than a thorn in its side: in many ways it deflated the Soviet bubble. In the August 1967 interview, Alliluyeva painted a scathing portrait of Soviet Communism that made its

⁶⁹ Quoted in Associated Press, "Another Opinion: A Communist View of Svetlana," *New York Times*, June 4, 1967, E 13.

⁷⁰ Grose, op. cit.

⁷¹ Quoted in Associated Press, op cit.

⁷² Ibid.

current presence in the USSR look downright tragic. In its early years, she notes that "it was believed to be something which was very progressive and [therefore] made people enthusiastic."⁷³ Now, however, "a certain generation of people in Russia...finally found it wrong [since] it [had] not [been] able to give the people what it had promised in the beginning."⁷⁴ In summary, as she concludes, "it has done more harm than progress."⁷⁵ Soviet Communism left a profound, albeit negative, imprint on Alliluyeva's life. In an open letter to a friend living in France regarding the odds of her visiting, Alliluyeva wrote "I shall be happy to see France some day, although to tell you the truth, I am not drawn to countries where the influence of Communism is strong: having once been given an overdose of it, to this day I feel nauseated at the very mention of it."⁷⁶ In the same letter she announced in a light-hearted yet symbolic gesture that, contrary to communists' having proclaimed it to be 'bourgeois,' she was proudly going to buy a car.⁷⁷ It is clear, therefore, that to Alliluyeva, American capitalism and anti-communism, much like American democracy, were far preferable and more benevolent than Soviet totalitarianism and communism. Much to Kennan's chagrin, Alliluyeva's repeated reinforcement of such a judgment further illustrates that her defection should be viewed from an American perspective as an ideological victory over the USSR—a victory that was palpable despite its rather modest magnitude.

⁷³ Quoted in Grose, "Mrs. Alliluyeva's New Life Here," 44.

⁷⁴ Idem.

⁷⁵ Idem.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Associated Press, "Text of Svetlana Alliluyeva Letter to a Friend in Paris," *New York Times*, August 9, 1968, 14.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Indeed, from an American standpoint, Alliluyeva's defection illuminated their 'superiority' over the Soviets not only ideologically, but also in a quasi-cultural sense, based on the revealing reactions of the Soviets. With regards to the latter, since the defection occurred rather spontaneously, the Soviet government was forced to embrace a defensive, non-proactive strategy that utilized its power of censorship and mass propaganda to control, or at least mitigate, the potential symbolic reverberations of Alliluyeva's defection. In Stalin's museum in Gori, for instance, this obsessive approach was clear: the Soviets removed all traces of Alliluyeva's existence in connection to her father—a comprehensive process that even saw her doctored out of photographs.⁷⁸ The press, furthermore, was censored to an egregious degree. Professor Anthony Collings—also a former journalist situated in Moscow—noted that while news of Alliluyeva's defection "garnered banner headlines in newspapers and magazines around the world," in the USSR, there was "not one word" on the event.⁷⁹ Eventually, nearly a week following her defection, the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* finally 'reported' the incident. A tiny headline read "S. Alliluyeva," and under it the 'story' read: "Soviet citizen S. Alliluyeva is living abroad. How long she remains is a personal matter."⁸⁰ As Collings notes, most Russians knew her only as 'Svetlana' and did not know that she used her mother's maiden name.⁸¹ This lack of coverage

would continue: as the *New York Times* observed, "In more than two months after Svetlana Alliluyeva [defected], Soviet newspaper readers were given exactly three sentences about the case."⁸²

Furthermore, to use Collings' assessment, if such "comical" Soviet censorship aimed to obstruct its citizens from receiving accurate news coverage, then the Soviet propaganda machine was geared to mobilize general public opinion against Alliluyeva. The most popular refrain in this regard was their insistence that Alliluyeva's defection was at its core a US-led conspiracy to undermine the USSR. As such, they used George Kennan's role as their primary source of evidence. Repeatedly highlighting the fact that Kennan was a former diplomat to the USSR, and very much 'in the loop' as a result, the Soviets affirmed that since the US was frustrated by the "vitality and stability" of Communist ideals, they sent Kennan to recruit Alliluyeva to show the "erosion" of such ideals.⁸³ The Soviets further justified the existence of this conspiracy by claiming, with the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution to occur in October 1967, that such a milestone afforded the US the perfect opportunity to launch a "propaganda offensive" against the USSR by securing Alliluyeva a publisher for her scathingly anti-Soviet memoirs.⁸⁴ While the Soviets knew the truth regarding Alliluyeva's defection—that is, how she left of her own volition—they still steadfastly held that the US involved

⁷⁸ Associated Press, "Stalin Museum Erases Traces of His Daughter," *New York Times*, October 19, 1967, 28.

⁷⁹ Anthony Collings, *Capturing the News: Three Decades of Reporting Crisis and Conflict* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2010), 20.

⁸⁰ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 21.

⁸¹ *Idem.*

⁸² Associated Press, "Alliluyeva defection creates a stir among the Soviet People," *New York Times*, June 4, 1967, 18.

⁸³ Associated Press, "Kennan Assailed By Soviet Writer," *New York Times*, September 23, 1967, 8.

⁸⁴ Harrison E. Salisbury, "Kremlin's Hawks," *The Times of India*, July 24, 1967, 6.

itself solely to antagonize the Soviets—a notion the US government vehemently denied.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, seen in a different light, their antipathy towards the US has some merit. The historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. depicted this flip side of the coin perfectly:

“ One can understand their anger over a woman who, in their view, has done precisely what she herself condemned—betrayed her native land, given it up, run away in search of material comfort. How would Americans have felt at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence if the British, a month before July 4, 1826, had published a book by a daughter of George Washington exposing the glorious experiment as a racket and a fraud?⁸⁶ ”

The implication here is clear: the Soviets, much like the Americans in this hypothetical, had good reason to be perturbed by Alliluyeva's defection. However, the extent of the Soviets' propaganda 'war' against Alliluyeva paradoxically only served to further illuminate an American victory. Indeed, it was not enough merely to fault the US for their perceived misconduct—the Soviets even went so far as to authorize personal criticisms of Alliluyeva. The government-controlled *Pravda*, for instance, bizarrely called her “a hysterical and sick woman with a sexually troubled face.”⁸⁷ As the historian Priscilla Johnson McMillan concludes,

“ Even after Svetlana had defected and it was announced that her book was to appear in the West, the [Communist] Party was probably as troubled by the bad example she had set as by its own humiliation. [Thus] Stalin's daughter had to be characterized by the press and radio as a moneygrubber, as 'morally unstable' and mentally disturbed.⁸⁸ ”

The great lengths the Soviets undertook to simultaneously cover-up and expose Alliluyeva could be interpreted as an American cultural 'victory.' The defection of Stalin's daughter was no ordinary event, and the actions of the Soviets, including censorship and propaganda, certainly show that its symbolism did not go unrecognized or unappreciated. In effect, Alliluyeva's defection signified a key *defect* in the Soviet system, ideology, and culture.

Alliluyeva's defection was therefore a considerable ideological and quasi-cultural victory for the US against the USSR. To contextualize this triumph, intellectual commentary of the events is particularly useful. Collings affirms that “[amidst] the supercharged Cold War atmosphere,” Alliluyeva's defection “was a major propaganda setback for the Communists, coming as it did on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.”⁸⁹ Alexandra Tolstoy called it “an event of the utmost significance” and remarked that her memoirs could “seriously damage communist propaganda.”⁹⁰ Some historians, it must be

⁸⁵ Associated Press, “US Denies Responsibility,” *New York Times*, March 13, 1967, 19.

⁸⁶ Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “Twenty Letters to a Father,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 220 (November 1967): 95.

⁸⁷ Associated Press, “Soviet Says US Leads Conspiracy,” *New York Times*, July 23, 1967, 10.

⁸⁸ Priscilla Johnson McMillan, “Svetlana Alliluyeva,” *Virginia Quarterly Review* 44 (Autumn 1968): 557-558.

⁸⁹ Collings, *Capturing the News*, 21.

⁹⁰ Alexandra Tolstoy, “Book Review of Svetlana Alliluyeva's 'Tol'ko odin god,’” *Russian Review* 29 (January 1970): 88.

noted, were disappointed with Alliluyeva's memoirs, primarily because they failed to broaden the historical understanding surrounding her father's private life. According to Princeton University professor Robert C. Tucker, however, such high expectations are unwarranted since Alliluyeva's memoirs were written "to tell the story of her family" and therefore were not intended to be "political."⁹¹ The historian Robert H. McNeal echoes such sentiments, calling Alliluyeva's work "a therapeutic unburdening of memory, not a historical or political memoir."⁹² Notwithstanding these differing opinions of her memoirs, perhaps the most pertinent critique came from the editors of the *Russian Review*, who went so far as to call them "a unique document of the twentieth century."⁹³ With regards to Alliluyeva herself, *TIME Magazine* said it best: "Svetlana's defection was more than a propaganda coup for the West: it was a symbolic event in the moral imagination of millions of people."⁹⁴

Visiting the city of Detroit in mid-May 1967 through the International Visitors Program, renowned Soviet playwright Viktor S. Rozov offered his opinion on the top news of the day, including, of course, Alliluyeva's defection. Rozov noted it contained "a certain element of treason in it."⁹⁵ In his mind, she had experienced a "spiritual crisis" that caused her

to depart, and although "the press will make a great deal of noise about her," Alliluyeva's defection "will not change anything in the world."⁹⁶ While Rozov was certainly accurate regarding the press' extensive coverage of the event, his final statement is rather superfluous. In short, Alliluyeva's defection did not have to change the world to be significant. It offered Americans the chance to claim superiority over the Soviets, especially ideologically and quasi-culturally. Alliluyeva's defection reinforced the existence of a kind of ideological 'caste system' that displayed the benevolence of American democracy, capitalism, and even anti-communism above the presumed malevolence of Soviet totalitarianism and communism. Her departure highlighted cultural differences that the Soviet government merely exacerbated with its extensive use of propaganda and censorship, thereby reinforcing from an American standpoint, their 'supremacy.' Alliluyeva arrived in the United States to start afresh and have the opportunity to lead a previously 'impossible' life. The looming spectre of her father's shadow made her odyssey fascinating, and for those few weeks and months in mid-1967, her defection confirmed for the United States a significant, apolitical 'victory' vis-à-vis their Soviet rivals.

⁹¹ Robert C. Tucker, "Svetlana Alliluyeva as a Witness of Stalin," *Russian Review* 27 (June 1968): 296.

⁹² Robert H. McNeal, "Stalin's Family: A Commentary on Svetlana Alliluyeva's Memoirs," *Russian Review* 27 (January 1968): 78.

⁹³ Russian Review Editorial Board, "Prelude to Book Review of Svetlana Alliluyeva's 'Only One Year,'" *Russian Review* 29 (January 1970): 88.

⁹⁴ Patricia Blake, "Personalities the Saga of Stalin's Little Sparrow," *TIME Magazine*, January 28, 1985, accessed March 17, 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,959280-1,00.html>.

⁹⁵ Associated Press, "'Treason' Ascribed to Mrs. Alliluyeva," *New York Times*, May 12, 1967, 34.

⁹⁶ *Idem*.

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07

The World of Suzie Wong:
Hollywood Constructs the Orient

By: Emily McNally

In *Orientalism*, Edward W. Said draws attention to a tendency in the West to develop ideas of the 'Orient' that lack any substantive basis. Europe's conception of Asia, he argues, is more concerned with Europe's characterization of itself than with any sincere effort to comprehend another culture. He states, European culture gained "strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate or even underground self."¹ This impression can be easily construed to include America as a pillar of the West. In the 1950s, Hong Kong represented a distant, romantic and exotic facet of the Orient within the American psyche. In the film, *The World of Suzie Wong*, Hong Kong serves as a forum for the unequal interactions of Eastern and Western spheres. Hollywood's portrayal of Hong Kong and the Orient, however, is informed by a definitively Western worldview, betraying a degree of paternalism and condescension in the process. The film is a Hollywood fantasy created for a western audience. The Hong Kong of the film, therefore, is constructed rather than revealed, according to a Westernized vision of the Orient.

The plot of *The World of Suzie Wong* is faintly reminiscent of Puccini's *Madame Butterfly*. It explores the "male fantasy of a beautiful, available and submissive woman"² in which Robert Lomax (William Holden), an American expatriate artist, and Suzie Wong (Nancy Kwan), a Hong Kong Chinese prostitute, meet and fall in love, transcending race and class differences. At the level of the individual, Hong Kong is represented as a far away land where an open-minded American might explore the forbidden

¹ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979), 3.

² Thomas Y. T. Luk; James P. Rice, "Hong Kong as City/Imagination in *The World of Suzie Wong*, *Love is a Many Splendored Thing* and *Chinese Box*" in *Before and After Suzie: Hong Kong in Western film and Literature* (HK:CUHK, 2003), 75.

in relative safety. From an international perspective, however, the 1950s marked the first decade of Communism in China. Indeed, Hong Kong presented a base from which a post-war American identity could be defined against a fledgling Chinese communism and the evident decline of British colonialism.³ America, symbolized in the film by Robert Lomax, thus established a legitimate presence in Asia as an 'enlightened' Western power, contrasting the lingering imperialism of Britain.

Hollywood's contemporary depiction is therefore more conducive to the promotion of a cloaked American Cold War ideology than a realistic portrayal of Hong Kong at a particular point in history. Thomas Y. T. Luk contends that "there is no genuine attempt at actually grappling with the cultural and social geography of the place or its people."⁴ The cinematography juxtaposes the traditional with the modern: rickshaws and western cars, skyscrapers and sampans. In the 1950s, Hong Kong served as a transshipment point for people, goods and ideas. It rapidly began to modernize and industrialize, yet improvements in standard of living lagged. The Wanchai district, haunt to thousands of sailors and soldiers on leave and in search of brothels, is portrayed in the film to be crowded, impoverished and racially segregated. With modernization came Westernization, a phenomenon that infiltrated almost every sphere of social life in Hong Kong. In contrast with the lethargic command economy of socialist China, the British colony was blossoming into a "prosperous

³ Gina Marchetti, "White Knights in Hong Kong: *Love is a Many Splendored Thing* and *The World of Suzie Wong*" in *Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction* (LA: University of California Press, 1993), 110.

⁴ Luk, *Before and After Suzie: Hong Kong in Western film and Literature*, 76.

and vibrant capitalist metropolis.”⁵ The city depicted in the film, however, is at odds with the Hong Kong film industry’s contemporary rendering of its own city, which tends to champion traditional Chinese ethical values in an effort to counteract the “anomic socio-cultural setting.”⁶ Rather, the film seems to emerge solely from an American imagination. The film exhibits a proliferation of ideological opposites: West-East, white-nonwhite, rich-poor, colonizer-colonized, conservative-progressive. Many of these binary opposites are condensed into familiar and accessible male-female roles within a conventional Hollywood love story. The romance is employed as a metaphor for racial tolerance.⁷ Kay and her father, as well as Ben, the adulterous alcoholic, represent the British colonial establishment, which condemns interracial coupling. By framing these three ‘backward’ individuals as enemies of Sophie and Robert’s love, the film endeavours to promote a vision of racial tolerance, yet remains remarkably indifferent to gender inequality or the right of Robert to remove Suzie from her own culture and state of independence.

In order to properly analyze *The World of Suzie Wong*, race, gender, and class conflict cannot be isolated. Rather, these variables should be considered conjointly. Gina Marchetti identifies Robert Lomax as the film’s “white knight,” the enlightened Western hero representing American melting pot equality.⁸ Robert fights the sailor who strikes Suzie and rebukes the attitudes of Kay, her father and Ben toward

the Chinese population. Suzie, on the other hand, is a wretched damsel: illiterate, abandoned by her parents, forced to sell her body as a prostitute and accustomed to being regularly beaten by belligerent sailors. Moreover, she is forced to keep her illegitimate child a secret for fear of being punished by his absentee father, an “important man from the government.” This injustice was not an uncommon circumstance at the time. Suzie may be contrasted with Kay, a Western ‘new’ woman and daughter of a wealthy banker. She leads a comfortable upper class life working as her father’s secretary and hosting ostentatious dinner parties. Kay is eventually revealed to be an overbearing and conniving woman who ungraciously calls Suzie a “dirty waterfront tramp” and schemes to destroy her romance with Robert so as to have him all to herself. She represents the conservative intransigence and stagnation of British colonialism in the twentieth century, which Robert, the progressive American, rejects.

Instead, Robert chooses Suzie, suggesting that Asian women are more desirable and ‘feminine’ than the frigid Western ‘new’ woman. Thus, Suzie is rescued by the white knight from her unfortunate circumstances, and simultaneously wrenched away from her own culture and independence. This is implied by a fortune teller who tells Suzie she will grow old in America, and ultimately, confirmed in the final scene as they walk away from the camera, symbolically representing a shift from Asia. Marchetti explains,

⁵ S.K. Lau and H.C. Kuan, *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese*, Chapter 1 (HK: CUHK Press, 1988), 38.

⁶ A. Leung, *Perspectives on Hong Kong Society*, Chapter 3 (HK:OUP, 1996), 64.

⁷ Marchetti, *Romance and the “Yellow Peril”: Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction*, 110.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 115.

“ The relationship with the white male protagonist promises freedom of choice, material prosperity, and a Cinderella-like transformation of the ethnic female protagonist into an ‘American’ herself, an accepted part of the larger society who has found her American Dream through romantic love.”⁹ ”

When Suzie dons a western style floral dress, however, her sexuality becomes threatening because it is no longer contained within her Chinese exoticism.¹⁰ Robert is disgusted, calling her a “cheap European streetwalker.” Although he does not take issue with Suzie’s usual attire – tight and revealing Chinese-cut dresses – he feels justified in violently tearing the floral dress from her body, leaving her naked and sobbing. As the artist, it is Robert’s exclusive right to define what ‘beauty’ is.

Robert’s right to impose his will upon Suzie’s identity and recreate her according to his own desires is justified by the initial portrayal of Suzie as a confused and divided individual in need of a white knight to define, structure and improve her life. This is evident in the opening scene when Suzie concocts a fantasy, in which she is a rich virgin with an important father, in order to escape the hardships of real life. In his painting, Lomax illustrates an idealized and more ‘authentic’ Suzie. The white knight not only saves, but also transforms his damsel. He paints her in a traditional Chinese gown, which ironically is white. While white symbolizes virginity in Western culture, in China it is associated with death and mourning. Regardless, Robert uncovers the virginal Confucian bride within the Westernized prostitute. Painted as a Madonna holding her infant, she is transformed and transcends

the impoverished crowded slums of Wanchai. Yet Lomax’s identity as a bohemian artist veils a hidden agenda. His manipulation of Suzie’s identity betrays the Western insistence upon constructing and defining the Orient according to unsubstantiated Western ideas.¹¹ The white gown alone is emblematic of this.

The character of Suzie can easily be understood to symbolize the Orient.¹² If this is the case, the portrayal is paternalistic and condescending. Suzie’s personality is both childlike and one-dimensional, while her behaviour is compliant, servile and dependent. She is willing to discard her independence and entirely renounce her own culture for the affections of a handsome foreigner. Throughout the film, Suzie’s body is employed as a powerful sex object. Her exotic fecundity seems to represent the mysterious and forbidden allure of the Orient. Her accent, manner of speech and poor command of English, however, has the effect of making her sound simple. More importantly, however, Suzie’s identity is understood to be confused, divided, and in need of paternal, White American guidance.

Thus, in *The World of Suzie Wong*, Hong Kong is constructed rather than revealed according to a Westernized vision. Through a dominant male, white bourgeois ideology, the Orient is metaphorically depicted as childlike, lost and self-deceiving. It harbors a thinly veiled discourse of the Cold War that seeks to bastion American identity as a progressive and tolerant society, while simultaneously criticizing British colonialism as regressive and malevolent. In its bias, the film fails to realistically capture Hong Kong’s culture, values or people, but rather shamelessly promotes the American Cold War cause.

⁹ Ibid., 117.

¹⁰ Ibid., 120.

¹¹ Ibid., 120-121.

¹² Luk, *Before and After Suzie: Hong Kong in Western film and Literature*, 76.

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The background of the slide is a grayscale, high-contrast image of several US dollar bills. The bills are overlapping and slightly out of focus, creating a textured, layered effect. Visible details include the portraits of George Washington on the one-dollar bill, Thomas Jefferson on the two-dollar bill, and Benjamin Franklin on the one-hundred-dollar bill. The text 'FEDERAL RESERVE NOTE' and 'THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' is also visible on the bills.

08

The Political Economy of the Washington Consensus: Neoliberalism and the Resumption of History

By: Nicholas Erwin-Longstaff

In 1989, economist John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” to signify a package of economic reforms then being actively encouraged by the White House, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.¹ Until the mid-1980s, most of the countries of Latin America pursued a strategy of “import substitution”, encouraging the manufacturing of previously imported commodities; first consumer goods and then “intermediate goods” and machinery, through tariffs and subsidies.² Now, with the Cold War rapidly drawing to a close, liberal democracy, and therefore capitalism, had apparently swept aside all alternatives and ended history.³ Reflecting this new reality, every nation of Latin America began to adopt neoliberal policy packages akin to the one being formulated by Williamson.⁴

¹ John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reforms” in *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?*, ed. John Williamson (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990). Access provided by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. For his part, Williamson bemoaned the appropriation of his term by critics of “Market Fundamentalism”, and it may be pointed out that many of Williamson’s proposals, such as increased spending on infrastructure and education, were undeniably beneficent but also largely ignored. The term is intended here to be interpreted under its common usage, which was not what Williamson had in mind when he first coined the term, and is little more than a polite way of designating “free market fundamentalism” of the kind critiqued by Joseph Stiglitz and George Soros.

² Albert O. Hirschman, “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 82 (1968), 6.

³ Francis Fukuyama’s oft quoted essay deserves to have its key line reproduced here, as it demonstrates better than any other single document the sense of way in which American intellectuals framed the end of the Cold War. “What we may be witnessing” Fukuyama writes, “is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Fukuyama’s paper is characteristic of the period and illustrates how the imperial nature of American foreign policy was disguised. By claiming to be on the side of historical inevitability, technocrats promoting “Washington Consensus” style policies were able to frame their highly ideological policy prescriptions as pragmatic common sense. See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest* (Summer, 1989).

⁴ Eduardo Lora et al, “The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus” *Economía* 5 (2005), 1.

Yet twenty years after the publication of Williamson’s article, history has stubbornly continued, and the reformist zeal of the early 1990s no longer flourishes south of the Rio Grande. Amidst a backdrop of periodic financial crises and limited economic growth, a consensus emerged that any gains in productivity and welfare had been “disappointing” at best and illusory at worst.⁵ Since the mid 2000s, a new crop of leftist leaders have risen to power on a wave of popular resentment toward the perceived economic imperialism of the United States and the failure of their policies to deliver their promised prosperity. It now appears as though the end of history was only a beginning.

⁵ Dani Rodrik, *Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2.

⁶ It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore America’s imperial character in any depth, though in the course of narrating events a number of distinctively imperial policies will be analyzed. For a more complete analyses of the United States as an imperial power see Noam Chomsky, *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). This and other works by Chomsky constitute one of the more thoughtful, albeit highly polemical, critiques of American imperialism to be generated by the left. For a rueful, largely sympathetic account of American imperialism see Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004). It is important to note that “empire” is not intended as a pejorative, the great failure of American foreign policy is not so much its imperial nature as its poor results. An effective “Liberal Empire” of the sort proposed by Ferguson might well be a beneficent force in world affairs.

Since the late 2000s, it has become almost *passé* to speak of American imperial overreach, yet there are no more instructive examples of America's unique style of imperial management⁶ than are found in Latin America. It was in Latin America that the United States first laid the foundations of its "Market Empire"⁷ at the end of the nineteenth century, and, later, it was in this region that neoliberal reforms were pushed most vigorously. Now, two decades later, it is in Latin America that the perceived failures of neoliberalism have generated the most powerful and consistent backlash against Washington's favoured economic policies. This paper will first explore some of those policies and then transition to an exploration of how those policies have fomented a potent backlash.

⁷ The term "Market Empire" is taken from author Victoria de Grazia. She describes the American commercial imperium as "an empire without frontiers" that "arose during the first decades of the twentieth century, reached its apogee during its second half, and showed symptoms of disintegration toward its close" The characteristic of this new style of imperial management was that it "ruled by the pressure of its markets, the persuasiveness of its models, and, if relatively little by sheer force of arms in view of its wide power, very forcefully by exploiting the peaceableness of its global project in a century marked by others' as well as its own awful violence." Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 20th-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 2005), 3. de Grazia identifies five distinctive features of the Market Empire, the most salient of which for our purposes is its "power of norms-making". American business practices and beliefs about the separation of politics and economics "claimed to be norms, not laws. And by virtue of appearing to be natural, modern, and good ways to do things, they resisted being characterized as the "micro-powers" of modern governmentality... though that is exactly what they were" (*ibid.*, 8). This tendency to mask imperial policy as disinterested assistance or inevitable outcome, as Fukuyama does when he proclaims the end of history, is central to understanding the Washington Consensus. See also Fergusson, 2004, 13 where he lists "conversion", meaning "Americanization", "which is carried out less by old-style Christian missionaries than by the exporters of American consumer goods and entertainment" as one of the "public goods" perpetrated by the American empire.

The use of economic forces to project American power has long been a characteristic of American foreign relations, but it was only with the creation of a new international economic regime at Bretton Woods in 1944 that American economic imperialism entered its mature phase. In the aftermath of the Second World War, American policymakers articulated a sophisticated vision of their country's security in which economic and military power were inescapably intertwined. In a secret memo received by Secretary of State, General George Marshall, six days before the announcement of the famous plan that bears his name, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Will Clayton, noted the necessity of maintaining access to foreign markets: "Should economic instability engulf Europe", wrote Clayton, then "the immediate effects on our domestic economy would be disastrous: markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, depression, a heavily unbalanced budget on the background of a mountainous war debt. *These things must not happen.*"⁸ Despite this initial emphasis on Europe, to the exclusion of Latin America and other 'less developed' regions of the globe, the United States already clearly understood that it was destined for world wide hegemony and acted accordingly.⁹

⁸ Paul A. Papayoanou, *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 132, emphasis added. On the same page Papayoanou notes that: "The Marshall Plan and GATT were also designed to establish a U.S.-led liberal economic order by reducing incentives for protectionism in Europe and by expanding American exports".

⁹ The United States rejected the requests of Latin American leaders for a wide ranging program of development akin to that of the Marshall Plan in Europe. Instead the United States pushed for the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, ("TIAR", created in 1947), an early forerunner and model for NATO that President Harry Truman initially intended to serve as the locus for "an inter-American army under the command of the US." Margarita López-Maya, "The Change in the Discourse of US-Latin American Relations from the End of the Second World War to the Beginning of the Cold War", *Review of International Political Economy*, 2 (1995): 139-140.

Though initial plans to transform the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT, established in 1947) into a fully functioning, pseudo-independent bureaucratic entity¹⁰ floundered in the U.S. Congress and would have to wait until the end of the Cold War,¹¹ the International Monetary Fund and World Bank¹² quickly assumed their roles as pillars of the post-war economic order. Indeed the United States soon discovered that the looser format of the GATT gave it greater freedom of action without impeding its voracious hunger for fresh markets¹³. “The United States”, writes economic historian Niall Fergusson, “very deliberately used its power to advance multilateral and mutually balanced tariff reductions under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade.”¹⁴ Simultaneously the United States began to advance loans directly to countries in the ‘third world’, usually tying them to political and military concessions favourable to American interests.¹⁵ By 1952, when the Marshall Plan ended, all the salient features of the American “Market Empire” were already apparent. The United States would continue to conduct a “sustained push” to open up fresh markets

through both the State and Treasury Departments and the Bretton Woods institutions. When necessary the United States would resort to armed force but “the essence of American “hegemony” was the preferential treatment of American allies when it came to the allocation of loans and grants of aid.”¹⁶

Indeed the cultivation of allies turned out to be a matter of central importance to the United States; and, where money and trade agreements alone were insufficient to advance American interests, the use of force, covert or overt, was employed.¹⁷ Unfortunately for Latin America this new focus on security came at the exclusion of older policies that had encouraged democratic processes in the region, and in short order the United States was busy allying itself with some of the region’s harshest and most reactionary regimes, asking in return only that they support American economic interests and regularly affirm their fervent anticommunism.¹⁸

¹⁰ Early plans had labelled this hypothetical entity the “International Trade Organization” or ITO.

¹¹ S. R. Sen, “From GATT to WTO,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 29 (1994), 2802.

¹² Originally the “World Bank” was known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It was only after its combination with the International Development Association that it assumed its present title. Niall Fergusson, *The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 306.

¹³ S. R. Sen, who took part in many of the negotiations regarding the implementation and structure of the GATT, writes that the GATT “was biased in favour of the developed countries and was called informally as the “rich men’s club””. Sen, 2802.

¹⁴ Fergusson specifically cites the “conditionality” of IMF loans as an instrument used by the United States to put pressure on countries reluctant to reduce their tariff levels. Fergusson, 2004, 9.

¹⁵ These conditions, it should be further noted, “were not always in the best interest of the recipients” Fergusson, 2008, 307.

¹⁶ Fergusson, 2004, 84.

¹⁷ See Richard Overy, *The Times Complete History of the World: Seventh Edition* (London: Times Books, 2007), 327 for an overview (and useful visual representation) of the 15 or so direct military interventions undertaken by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean. See p. 331 for the long list of Latin American countries that have experienced American backed terrorist or insurgent activity in the 20th century. These two maps bring the imperial nature of American policy into particularly sharp relief.

¹⁸ For more on the changing focus toward anticommunism over democracy and its chilling effect on democratic reformers in Latin America see López-Maya p. 141.

Though any complete exploration of American economic imperialism during the Cold War period would be greatly exceeding the space available, a particularly instructive example may serve to highlight the uniquely American use of economic power, covert military force and ideological domination. This is the case of Chile during the 1970s, when the United States conspired to overthrow a democratic regime.¹⁹

As the last vestiges of Soviet-American cooperation vanished in the two years following the end of the Second World War, policymakers inside the United States became increasingly hostile toward any government espousing leftist rhetoric or policies. Having rejected the repeated requests of Latin America's democratic governments for the economic assistance they required to sustain the freedom of their nations,²⁰ the United States now took exception to the attempts of some Latin American governments to modernize their countries using protective tariffs. In a 1953 meeting

¹⁹ Another classic example is that of Guatemala in 1954. There, a democratically elected government under President Jacob Arbenz began to interfere with the interests of the United Fruit Company. Then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, were former partners in the New York law firm Sullivan & Cromwell, which had extensive connections with United Fruit. Operating at the "direct behest" of United Fruit, the CIA, under Dulles, contrived the overthrow of Arbenz' government. See Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2007): 58-59. The quality of Klein's overall analyses is uneven but her narrative of the events in Chile is well sourced and convincing. See also Papayouanou pp 133-135 for an account of how individuals working "in or with key bureaucratic agencies during the [Second World] War" shaped economic and security policy so that "the two were compatible". Many of these individuals retained their positions of influence after the war and "internationalist economic groups also had a strong and influential voice in the government, lobbying for national-security policies that would protect their interests abroad."

²⁰ López-Maya, 140.

with Albion Patterson, director of the U.S. International Cooperation Administration in Chile, Theodore Schultz, then chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago, noted with dismay the spreading influence of Raul Prebisch and his 'protectionist' theories. "The United States must take stock of its economic programs abroad" Schultz asserted, "we want [Latin America] to work out their economic salvation by relating themselves to us and by using our way of achieving their economic development."²¹ To this end Patterson and Schultz began to lay the groundwork for what became known as the "Chile Project". When the project began in 1956, the United States government began paying hundreds of Latin American students²² to pursue advanced degrees at the University of Chicago, where they were instructed in the reactionary anti-Keynesian policies of Milton Friedman and the "Chicago School". "We came here to compete," declared Schultz in regard to Chile, "not to collaborate". Rather than cultivate higher learning, the principle focus of the plan was to churn out ideological warriors. Who was to be allowed into the program and what was to be taught were so strictly regulated that when Patterson approached the University of Chile with a grant to set up the exchange program, he was turned down on the grounds that the local faculty would have no input in what was taught. Patterson then turned to and was quickly accepted by the conservative Catholic University, which until then had not possessed an economics department.²³

²¹ Schultz had previously commented to one of his colleagues that "What we need to do is change the formation of the men, to influence the education, which is very bad." Klein, 59.

²² The first cohort was one hundred Chilean students, with more arriving each year. In less than a decade the program had also expanded to other areas of Latin America, most notably Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Klein, 60.

²³ Klein, 60.

Rather than merely content itself with this overt form of ideological warfare, the United States also undertook a comprehensive propaganda program from the early 1960s onward using the CIA. A declassified report compiled by the agency frankly describes its activities: "In the 1960s and the early 1970s, as part of the US Government policy to try to influence events in Chile, the CIA undertook specific covert action projects in Chile" with the explicit aim to undermine the political prospects of socialist politician, Salvador Allende, "and to strengthen and encourage their civilian and military opponents to prevent them [Allende's party] from assuming power"²⁴ Millions of dollars were funneled into opposition parties, and CIA operatives conducted a sophisticated propaganda campaign through manipulation of mass media and the printing of leaflets and posters.²⁵ When a plurality of the Chilean people persisted in electing Allende despite the CIA's unrelenting interference, the Agency "sought to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office".²⁶ When this ended in failure, American pressure intensified: "the United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation" stated Henry

²⁴ The National Security Archive, "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet's Repression: Report to Congress Reveals U.S. Accountability in Chile" *The George Washington University*. Quote is taken from "CIA Activities in Chile", 2.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4. On the following page the document's author goes on to assert that "Although CIA [sic] did not instigate the coup that ended Allende's government on 11 September 1973, it was aware of coup-plotting by the military, had ongoing intelligence collection relationships with some plotters, and—because CIA did not discourage the takeover and had sought to instigate a coup in 1970—probably appeared to condone it." This page further notes the CIA's awareness of a "severe campaign against leftists and perceived political enemies" in the months after the coup, but the CIA continued to train the security forces of the new regime and conducted propaganda on its behalf. (*Ibid.*, 5) See also p. 11.

Kissinger in a classified memo addressed to the Secretaries of State and Defence, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Director of the CIA, to "limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests."²⁷

Far from being exceptional, the Chilean example is typical of the United States' government's conduct in Latin America. Though it would be an exaggeration to suggest that American officials actively discouraged the spread of democracy on principle, they clearly regarded dictators or oligarchies as more dependable allies and were callously indifferent to the plight of Latin America's oppressed masses. Whether or not one, having surveyed the evidence, feels comfortable giving this informal but potent form of dominance the title of "Empire"²⁸ or would prefer to simply employ the term "hegemony" or some other such euphemism, the practical results were much the same. What distinguished the mature phase of American imperialism was simply that it undertook a time honoured imperial practice, common amongst other imperial polities from the Romans to the British, of selecting local elites to govern in its stead. The Americans simply resorted to this form of indirect rule more often than their predecessors.

²⁷ The National Security Archive. Quote is taken from "National Security Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 93, Policy Towards Chile, November 9, 1970", 1.

²⁸ See Fergusson, 2004, Chapter 1, for an extended discussion of why it makes sense to label the United States as an empire. It is worth noting that for Fergusson the U.S. has always been an empire.

Once a dictator or oligarchy was firmly in control of a given Latin American state, the International Monetary Fund played a crucial role in propping up the new regime and maintaining its loyalty to American interests.²⁹ In an exhaustive survey of the available data, Strom Thacker, Director of the Latin American Studies Program at Boston University, found that when a country moved to align itself more closely with American interests, it became substantially more likely to receive a loan from the IMF.³⁰ In general, the

available data seemed to contradict the IMF's claims of "Economic Neutrality"³¹ and affirmed that "the US still seems willing and able to exercise its weight within the executive board of the IMF."³²

The increasing politicization of the IMF may seem counterintuitive at first, but in fact, the end of the Cold War has necessitated this shift in policy. Until the end of the 1980s, the United States justified its extensive interference in the internal affairs of other countries on the basis of the need to fight communism.³³ "For an empire in denial", writes Fergusson, "there is really only one way to act imperially with a clear conscience, and that is to combat someone else's empire."³⁴

²⁹ The British based think tank Jubilee Research states that "One-fifth of all developing country debt consists of loans given to prop up compliant dictators. Mobutu, Marcos, Suharto and other notorious dictators were propped up by massive loans. Even when they committed gross human rights violations, were notoriously corrupt, and blatantly transferred money to Swiss banks, the flow of loans continued.", Joseph Hanlon, "Report: Dictators Debt", Jubilee Research (November 1998).

³⁰ To determine a country's political alignment vis-à-vis the U.S. Thacker referred to the State Department's "Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations". Readers who are skeptical of how reliable an indicator this might be are referred to the past statements of the U.S. government itself, which has stated that the examination of UN voting patterns makes it possible "to make judgments about whose values and views are harmonious with our own, whose policies are consistently opposed to ours, and whose practices fall in between" Strom C. Thacker, "The High Politics of IMF Lending", *World Politics*, 52 (1999), 53. See also Thacker p. 65, where he discusses how to separate correlation and causation in this regard.

³² Thacker suggests that the IMF's tendency to repeatedly lend money to "problem debtors", even when they have defaulted on past loans, indicates a political rather than economic motivation for extending the loans in the first place. (Thacker, 40). Indeed, having defaulted on a past IMF loan actually made a country statistically more likely to receive another loan in the future (Thacker, 58-59). Thacker also notes an earlier study that found "at least one-third of the seventeen countries studied secured favorable loan terms on their IMF programs due to the intervention of major shareholding countries on their behalf" (Thacker, 42).

³³ *Ibid.*, 65. Thacker notes that rather than being a primarily Cold War era phenomenon, the tendency of the United States to reward countries that align themselves more closely with its own interests has actually increased since 1990. Indeed whereas in the past stable U.S. allies were unlikely to receive assistance, the United States now appears to reward both new and old clients. "The end of the Cold War has been associated with the increasing politicization of the IMF by the U.S." (*Ibid.*, 70).

³⁴ In a CIA released summary of the campaign against Allende in Chile, for instance, the agency spends page after page detailing its intimate involvement with the Junta, including the provision of arms, military training and friendly propaganda. By way of explanation the agency offers the following: "The Cuban revolution and emergence of Communist parties in Latin America had brought the Cold War to the Western Hemisphere.... The consensus at the highest levels of the US Government was that an Allende Presidency would seriously hurt US national interests" U.S. Department of State, "Hinchey Report: CIA Activities in Chile", U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act (September 18, 2000) See also Fergusson, 2004, pp. 61-104 for his chapter on "The Imperialism of Anti-Imperialism".

The end of the Cold War had taken this option off the table while Vietnam, and the exposure and widespread public discussion of some of the Cold War operations discussed above, have dampened the American public's appetite for such blatantly neocolonial activities. As such, it became more expedient for American policy makers to work through the International Monetary Fund.

The solution has been to attach increasingly stringent and pervasive conditions to the loans that the IMF extends. First inserted into the Fund's Articles of Agreement in 1969,³⁵ IMF loan conditions have steadily increased in their stringency and scope since the mid 1980s.³⁶ When one considers the rapid disappearance of Import Substitution policies in Latin America from 1985 onward and the subsequent adoption of neoliberalism, it becomes clear that the use of the IMF's structural adjustment programs and loan conditions have actually proven far more effective and

³⁴ Ibid., 78.

³⁵ The conditions referred to here are those aimed at altering the macroeconomic character of country. Obviously some conditions have always been contained in IMF loans, since the alternative would have been to give money out for free.

³⁶ Axel Dreher, "The Development and Implementation of IMF and World Bank Conditionality, Discussion Paper", *Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv*, (2002), 20-21. Since the 1990s in particular, the same time period in which Thacker noted the increasing politicization of the IMF, loans have become particularly predatory. During the Asian financial crisis, for instance, Dreher notes how the IMF: "faced a rising demand for their money and governments which were desperate enough to agree on virtually all kinds of conditions to get the required international reserves. Again they reacted with an increase in the number of conditions. In 1997, there were on average 20 conditions included in programs with Asian countries, compared with an average of 16 conditions for all countries. Prior to the Asian crisis, these countries have been successful without much help from the IFIs [International Financial Institutes]. It seems that the IMF seized the chance to imprint their policy on the Asian economies," (Ibid., 22).

wide-ranging than the cruder and more blatant interventions conducted between the 1940s and the 1970s. Furthermore, the economic philosophies of the Chicago School, championed by Milton Friedman³⁷ and used by the American government as a tool of foreign policy in Chile, Mexico and elsewhere, have had a decisive impact on economic practice and theory.

³⁷ This is not meant to suggest that any national government has taken Friedman's actual policy prescriptions very seriously, since they effectively constitute the abdication of all fiscal and most monetary economic policies. Friedman's principle accomplishment was discrediting the Keynesian consensus of the 1960s and rehabilitating the idea that, if all government interference were removed, the market would magically solve all problems. The theoretical validity of his findings is only caricatured here, but a general idea of their practical applicability is revealed with reference to Friedman's own writings. "Truly important and significant hypotheses" he wrote, "will be found to have "assumptions" that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions." Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 14. In Friedman's defense he does qualify his statement by arguing that no theoretical assumption can be "realistic" and that a theory should be judged on its predictive powers (Ibid., 15). Yet as economist Erik Reinert puts it "Friedman established a negative relationship between science and reality" and championed "the idea that distance from reality strengthens the science of economics". Erik S. Reinert, *How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor*, (New York: Public Affairs), 272. A good example of how Friedman's assertions about the necessary abstraction of economic theories is provided by Victor Norman, an international trade theorist, when he states that "One of the nice things about economics as a science is that it is just a way of thinking, factual knowledge does not exist" (Ibid., 34). For readers who feel that the example of the "Chicago Boys" in Chile contradict the assertion that no one has taken Friedman's policy prescriptions seriously, see Reinert, 273.

Friedman's aggressive proselytizing in favour of the market has infected the "science" of economics with a set of unrealistic assumptions about the way economies function,³⁸ with precipitous results for the fashioning of policy.

Under the influence of men such as Milton Friedman,³⁹ modern neoclassical economics has effectively become a running justification for the continuance of American imperial practices. This is not, as Marxists and socialists have long claimed, reducible to simple factors such as class interests or conscious government policy,⁴⁰ but in practice it has allowed the United States to act as a colonial power in Latin America. Reinert writes that:

³⁸ One could easily take this point too far and to some extent the caricature of Friedman presented is intended as a stand in for a wide phenomenon that it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss. Indeed many of the problems with neoclassical economics predate Friedman by centuries and stem from Adam Smith and David Ricardo. "Production, knowledge and inventions disappear from Adam Smith's economic theory because he reduces both production and trade to 'labour hours'. In 1817 Ricardo followed in Smith's footsteps, creating an even more abstract theory based on 'labour' – a concept devoid of any qualities – as the measuring rod for value." As a result the production process has been "reduced to the application of identical labour hours" and "The world economy could thus also be reduced to the buying and selling of goods that had already been produced" (Reinert, 41). Reinert labels this the "equality assumption" of modern economics and bemoans the fact that capitalism has been regarded as a system of trade rather than one of production.

³⁹ It should be noted that to some extent this essay is necessarily unfair to Friedman because he is being used as a symbol of a wider movement toward "market fundamentalism".

⁴⁰ Of course the Chilean example demonstrates, this is not as ridiculous an assumption as many mainstream commentators seem to think. After all, the policy prescriptions pushed onto developing countries by the IMF are typically ignored by politicians in the rich countries. For some specific examples see Reinert p 22.

“ Colonialism is above all an economic system, a type of close economic integration between countries. It is less important under which political heading this occurs – under nominal independence and 'free trade', or not. What is important is what kind of goods flow in which direction... Colonies are nations specializing in bad trade, in exporting raw materials and importing high technology goods, whether these are industrial goods or from a knowledge-intensive service sector. ⁴¹ ”

Despite their various failings, the Import Substitution strategies that prevailed in Latin America during the 1980s were reminiscent of the strategies used by Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln to lay the groundwork for the United States' transformation from colony to industrial superpower. In the 19th century, Americans looked to the British example, and as one congressman wryly observed, the British were more inclined to export the theories of Adam Smith than to actually follow them. "Don't do as the English tell you to do," advised a popular American saying in the 1820s, "do as the English did."⁴² Having ignored the pleas of Latin America's fragile democracies in the late 1940s for economic assistance on the scale of the Marshall Plan, the United States has pursued policies that actively discourage Latin American nations from developing in exactly the manner once used in the past by the Americans themselves. This is not a flaw of "free trade"⁴³; trade between the United States and Europe or Canada is often highly beneficial to both recipients.

⁴¹ Ibid., 133.

⁴² Ibid., 23.

⁴³ Free trade itself is, after all, more of a rhetorical trope than an actual policy.

But by forcing open markets, often overnight, the International Monetary Fund destroys any prospect of developing an advanced manufacturing or technological sector. Instead Latin American countries are told to specialize in their “comparative advantage”, i.e. raw resources and agriculture. Because of neoclassical economics’ focus on trade over production, this policy seems perfectly sensible since all economic activities are, in practice, treated as though they obey the same laws. In reality, the sorts of wage and productivity increases that can pull an entire society out of poverty and can open the road to technological development and specialization will never occur in countries that are prohibited from moving beyond agriculture and raw resource extraction, a process which inevitably requires protectionist policies.⁴⁴ The IMF and American economics in general have created a situation where poor countries specialize where they have a comparative advantage in cheap labour⁴⁵.

While no modern economy can hope to grow without international trade, economic development can only be pursued through a balanced trade policy that protects important national industries. In cases where countries at different levels of economic development trade without sufficient protections, there tends to be a “winner-killing” syndrome, sometimes called the Vanek-Reinert effect: “the first casualty of free trade, the first industry to close, tends to be the most advanced industry in the least advanced country.” The poor country loses its capability to maintain its most dynamic economic sectors and its available capital gets sunk into economic static economic sectors. In effect, the

⁴⁴ Reinert, 137-144, 146, 150, and especially 160-162.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 160.

country develops a comparative advantage in cheap labour or raw resource extraction and loses its capability to lift itself out of poverty by emulating the policies history employed by developed countries.⁴⁶

By forcing a neoliberal economic paradigm onto large swaths of the developing world, the United States has seriously harmed the economic growth of large regions of the world. The human devastation wrought by these policies is massive. In Peru, for instance, an ambitious program of industrialization supported by tariffs and subsidies pulled up wages after the Second World War, only to be curtailed by an IMF structural adjustment program in the 1970s. Wages in Peru subsequently plummeted under the IMF imposed fiscal regime even as exports rose. Unfortunately, the Peruvian example is typical: “contrary to popular belief, the past 25 years have seen a sharply slower rate of economic growth and reduced progress on social indicators for the vast majority of low and middle-income countries.”⁴⁷ Across the board, growth rates in income per capita during the period from 1980 to 2005 have been half or less for all but the very poorest countries in the world, where the improvements have been completely miniscule.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Erik Reinert, “Globalization in the periphery as a Morgenthau Plan” in *Globalization, Economic Development, and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective*, ed. Erik S. Reinert (Northampton, Mass: Edgar Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2004), 163.

⁴⁷ Mark Weisbrot et al, “The Scorecard on Development: 25 Years of Diminished Progress” *Center for Economic and Policy Research* (September, 2005), 3.


⁴⁸ Ibid., 5.

Since 2008, however, the foundations of America's financial hegemony have been severely shaken. Though the United States remains the richest and most powerful economy in the world today, the foundations of its international power have been shaken. Other regions of the world are also rapidly developing along economic lines and are beginning to provide alternative economic paradigms to the dominant neoliberal one propagated by the United States. Meanwhile, throughout the last decade, a wave of nationalist Latin American politicians have swept into power, demonstrating America's reduced clout within its historical backyard. The reign of neoliberalism has not ended history in the manner predicted by some of its fiercer advocates, and today, the nations of Latin America are caught in the grips of a potent backlash against American economic imperialism. Leaders such as Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales are expressions of a rapid loss of faith in South America's traditional elites, and a growing hatred of what is rightly perceived to be a policy of continual economic interference in Latin American affairs on the part of the United States and its proxy, the International Monetary Fund.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ "Adopting the Washington Consensus was costly to the reformers" notes Eduardodo et al p. 44.

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09

Three Conceptualizations of Militarism and Social Control in 1960s America

By: Alex Ognibene

The following are three short essays on militarism and social control in 1960s America. These responses attempt to depict a variety of ways in which the Cold War affected American social makeup both in a variety of domestic spheres and in international arenas.

THE MILITARY-CONTAINMENT-COMPLEX

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Cold War paranoia had engendered a widespread perception that communism existentially threatened the American world order. The face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union took on new urgency as a wave of decolonization swept the Third World, altering the geopolitical landscape of the conflict, and opening up new frontiers for ideological competition. Uncertainty abroad was compounded by domestic unrest so severe that the Los Angeles Police Chief proclaimed America to be experiencing “an age of discontent and discord.”¹ Anti-war protests, riots, urban decay, racial tension, and the women’s movement all hinted at an unraveling of America’s social fabric.² In this context, Eisenhower’s notorious “military-industrial-complex” can also be understood as a military-*containment*-complex. The Vietnam War, which sought to contain the global spread of communism, was paired with equally repressive forms of containment at home. The environmental and biological risks of nuclear testing were contained in the sacred spaces and bodies of Native Americans. Urban renewal, suburbanization, and the war on crime simultaneously sought to reestablish traditional structures of authority by containing dissent and isolating minorities in cities.

¹ Christian Parenti, *Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis* (New York: Verso, 1999), 17.

² *Ibid.*, 4.

Containment of global communism was America’s primary Cold War objective. The United States established nearly two hundred military bases around the world to project its democratic and capitalist values.³ Vietnam emerged as a test case for the containment doctrine in the aftermath of the Indochinese War, when nationalist guerillas resisted French re-colonization at the expense of some 1,300,000 lives.⁴ The resulting Geneva Peace Treaty entrenched Vietnam’s independence and right to self-determination, but left the country temporarily divided.⁵ Fearing that a unified Vietnam would bring communist revolutionary Ho Chi Minh to power, President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles undertook an unprecedented nation-building project in South Vietnam.⁶ The United States poured \$1.65 billion into South Vietnam between 1954 and 1960, hoping to prevent the Viet Cong from installing a communist regime and facilitating the spread of communism, like “falling dominoes,” to Japan, the Philippines, and all of Southeast Asia.⁷ By the time Kennedy was elected president in 1960, the United States was heavily invested in the Vietnamese conflict without having any tangible interests at stake. The Gulf of Tonkin incident and outbursts from Republican Senator Barry Goldwater prompted Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, to deploy American forces in 1964.⁸ Over 180,000 American troops were on the ground in 1968, by which point the war had spiraled out of control, and face-saving, body counting, and manicuring public sentiment had supplanted

³ Brian Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

⁴ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ *Idem.*

⁷ *Idem.*

⁸ *Idem.*

the goal of containment.⁹ The effectiveness of America's containment strategy was further mitigated by the asymmetric nature of the Vietnam War. Vietnamese guerillas tactfully exploited gaps in U.S. conventional capabilities, leading one platoon commander to remark: "without a front, flanks, or rear, we fought a formless war against a formless enemy."¹⁰ Even Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" and pursuit of "peace with honor" could not prevent Vietnam's ultimate fall to communism.¹¹ America left Indochina in 1973. The expansion of the war into Cambodia, the squandering of \$150 billion, the unmatched scope of the bombardment, and the loss of 58,000 American soldiers, however, rendered the U.S. exit anything but honorable.¹²

The same Cold War paranoia that thrust the United States into Vietnam provoked an unprecedented period of domestic nuclear testing and development, which built upon the foundations of the earlier Manhattan Project.¹³ The risks of nuclear experimentation were contained near Los Alamos Laboratory, New Mexico, and the Nevada Test Site, which one Department of Defense representative declared "really wasn't much good for anything but gunnery practice."¹⁴ The lands surrounding the Test Site had the most concentrated Native American population of any region in North America, and had been inhabited by the Pueblo Indians for over a millennium.¹⁵

These Native lands and bodies essentially became sites of concentrated nuclear contamination. Between 1952 and 1992 the United States detonated almost 1,000 nuclear bombs at the Nevada Test Site.¹⁶ Explosives testing disperses shrapnel and fallout over an enormous area. Atoms, the smallest of spaces, require a vast expanse for their containment once split.¹⁷ The human consequences of nuclear containment include abnormal cell growth, interference with genetic structures, mutations, extreme deformities, and reproductive failure.¹⁸ Native Americans in New Mexico now experience significantly higher rates of cancer than other ethnic groups—a marked difference from the previous century when cancer rates among indigenous populations were so low that Native Americans were thought to be immune to the disease.¹⁹ A fourfold excess of thyroid cancer has been documented at Los Alamos, where staple crops of the Northeastern Pueblo continue to reveal significantly elevated rates of radionuclides such as strontium-90, cesium-132, and plutonium.²⁰ Traces of tritium have also been found in groundwater samples from San Ildefonso.²¹ Nuclear waste is physically contained near the Nevada Test Site, which will accommodate 70,000 additional tons at Yucca Mountain, one of the Pueblo's most sacred spaces.²² Existing holding casks and cooling ponds have already leaked extensively.²³

⁹ Idem.

¹⁰ Idem.

¹¹ Fred Turner, *Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory* (New York: Anchor Books, 1996), 43.

¹² Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

¹³ Joseph Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 99.

¹⁴ Valerie Kuletz, "Invisible Spaces, Violent Places: Cold War Nuclear and Militarized Landscapes," in *Violent Environments*, eds. Nancy Lee Peluso and Michael Watts (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2001), 250.

¹⁵ Ibid., 241.

¹⁶ Ibid., 240.

¹⁷ Kuletz, "Invisible Spaces, Violent Places," 249.

¹⁸ Ibid., 251.

¹⁹ Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands*, 140.

²⁰ Ibid., 141.

²¹ Ibid., 150.

²² Kuletz, "Invisible Spaces, Violent Places," 254.

²³ Ibid., 258.

Contained nuclear testing and storage in these allegedly “unpopulated areas” has realistically defiled indigenous bodies, communities, and sacred landscapes.²⁴ Pueblo advocate Herman Agoyo has accordingly remarked that nuclear projects have “harmed human beings and the planet beyond any calculation.”²⁵

The containment policy that underpinned American foreign policy during the Cold War was also applied domestically to defend existing power hierarchies and to isolate or eliminate social pathologies. White flight to the suburbs and black migration into urban centers produced a geography characterized by socioeconomic and racial segregation. As white Americans moved out of cities, they took with them their jobs, tax revenue, and political clout. Urban centers became sites of disinvestment and pathology. The government attempted to contain unrest in downtown cores by initiating a series of urban renewal projects. These projects had the unintended effect of exacerbating housing shortages and severing minority access to social and political services. Federal funds allocated to rebuilding cities were diverted at the micro-level to infrastructural projects like highway loops, luxury condos, and convention centers.²⁶ Displaced blacks and the urban poor were resettled in high-rise housing complexes that further isolated them from participation in normal social life.²⁷ Hundreds of urban riots broke out between 1965 and 1970.²⁸

²⁴ Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands*, 137.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 100.

²⁶ Brian Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 17 November 2011.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Parenti, *Lockdown America*, 6.

Under the Nixon administration, “enforcing law and order” emerged as another form of containment intended to re-impose racial and class control.²⁹ Nixon created the Office of Drug Abuse and Law Enforcement, which dispatched commandos to ghetto listening posts with orders to hunt down “the vermin of humanity.”³⁰ Nixon also passed tough on crime measures that weakened defendants’ *Miranda* rights in federal cases, permitted wire-tapping and bug-planting, and resulted in a surge of incarceration.³¹ Respite could not even be found within the confines of the American prison system, where flourishing inmate activism was contained by guard brutality, arbitrary detentions, and behaviour modification treatments.³² Marion Federal Penitentiary, which used electronic surveillance, brain washing, sensory deprivation, and chemical therapies on prisoners, is representative of wider societal intolerance for structural critique, and of the perceived need to contain and pacify dissenters.³³

Containment—of international communism in Vietnam, of the risks of nuclear testing in the Southwest, and of minorities in urban centers and prisons—demonstrates a common theme that is not manifestly articulated by the term “military-industrial-complex.” The logic of containment, and the broader American pattern of orienting against an enemy-other, remains instructive today for understanding the configuration of the American-led “War on Terror” and the Islamophobia it has nurtured in domestic American society.³⁴

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

³¹ Parenti, *Lockdown America*, 8.

³² Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Jennifer S. Light, “Urban Security from Warfare to Welfare,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26.3 (September 2002), 607.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL-SYNERGY

When Eisenhower revealed in his farewell address the existence of an ambiguous “military-industrial-complex,” he hinted at a situation whereby massive Cold War expenditure on defense and aerospace industries had created a self-sustaining process of militarization and preparation for war.³⁵ Eisenhower’s terminology, however, does not adequately reflect the extent to which militarism, industry, politics, and society had integrated, resulting in the multidirectional transfer of knowledge and expertise. The “military-industrial-complex” can thus be understood as a military-industrial-*synergy* that developed standardized models of organization and practice to solve the space age problems of the 1960s and 1970s.

During the 1960s the government looked to defense industries for advice on how to solve domestic problems ranging from unemployment to urban decay.³⁶ The failures of urban renewal, paired with massive research and development spending in the Sunbelt, rendered defense intellectuals a convenient source of urban crisis solutions.³⁷ Defense intellectuals began to market themselves as a new class of urban experts when law and order in cities broke down, and urban crisis was cast as a national security issue. They applied their military-related expertise to the management of cities.³⁸ Conferences, advisory committees, and think tanks proliferated.³⁹ President Johnson’s Law Enforcement Assistance Administration spent billions

of dollars in an effort to reshape, retool, and rationalize American policing.⁴⁰ The failure of policing required a new “military corporate model,” to modernize law enforcement by transferring the coordinated and hierarchical commands of business and military spheres to the civilian realm.⁴¹ In 1967, President Johnson’s Crime Commission found that many departments were “not organized in accordance with well-established principles of modern business management.”⁴² Similarly, Mayor Lindsay of New York called for the adoption of the “streamlined, modern management thinking that Robert McNamara applied in the Pentagon.”⁴³

The contextualization of urban crisis as a security issue mandated synergistic transfers of knowledge and expertise for the purpose of bolstering “civil defense.”⁴⁴ The discourse of Vietnam permeated discussions on law enforcement, as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover declared America to be facing a period of “ideological and revolutionary violence,” from actors who “style themselves as urban guerillas.”⁴⁵ The synergy between military and social control mechanisms is well illustrated by an article titled *Police-Military Relations in a Revolutionary Environment*, which outlined the necessity of “maintaining law and order, whether in California, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, or the rice paddies and jungles of Viet Nam.”⁴⁶ Securitization of American social relations catalyzed an enormous reshuffling of defense professionals.

³⁵ Ibid., 607.

³⁶ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 17 November 2011.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Light, “Urban Security from Warfare to Welfare,” 608.

³⁹ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 17 November 2011.

⁴⁰ Parenti, *Lockdown America*, 6.

⁴¹ Ibid., 16.

⁴² Idem.

⁴³ Light, “Urban Security from Warfare to Welfare,” 611.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 609.

⁴⁵ Parenti, *Lockdown America*, 17.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 18.

Adam Yarmolinsky moved from his position as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense to the position of Deputy Director of Johnson's Task Force on Poverty.⁴⁷ Harold Finger, former Director of the Space and Nuclear Propulsion Office, became the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology at the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.⁴⁸

It was not only defense intellectuals who transferred between spheres. Movement of people was coupled with synergistic sharing of technology and intelligence. As the Cold War progressed, companies like Lockheed and RAND realized that their long-term viability was dependent upon selling innovations beyond military markets.⁴⁹ Defense industries nurtured new demands for urban security, as cities spent millions of dollars on technologies such as command centers, satellite reconnaissance, helicopters, cable television, and automated databases.⁵⁰ Special Weapons and Tactics units, or SWAT teams, were the vanguard of police militarization.⁵¹ First pioneered in Los Angeles, SWAT teams proliferated across the nation, taking non-conventional approaches to law enforcement, and brandishing advanced weapons such as M-16s and Colt AR-15s.⁵²

The same synergy between military and civilian spheres that was evident in law enforcement and urban management initiatives spurred the massive development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear testing and development was so integrated with the national economy that it became a self-sustaining creator of jobs and markets.⁵³ The nuclear economy was particularly interwoven with local economies of Native Americans living near test sites in Nevada and New Mexico. Nuclear testing has destroyed subsistent indigenous economies, making Native American survival contingent on the mining of radioactive substances and the storage of nuclear waste.⁵⁴ The Cold War nuclear economy still exists today. As Secretary of State, Colin Powell proposed the creation of a "Bull's Eye" to integrate the Southwest's high-tech weapons testing and evaluation centers.⁵⁵ Moreover, a proposed monitored retrievable storage facility near Los Alamos promises annual revenues of at least \$10 billion for Native communities whose livelihoods are now inextricably linked to the defense industry.⁵⁶

Evidently the military-industrial-complex has resulted in synergistic transfers of knowledge and practice across disparate spheres. Military models influenced the handling of social problems and urban crises, creating a defense economy that spanned from urban centers like New York and Los Angeles to the "unpopulated areas" of New Mexico and Nevada.⁵⁷ Understanding the full extent of the military-industrial-*synergy*, however, requires an examination of how

⁴⁷ Light, "Urban Security from Warfare to Welfare," 610.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 610.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 608.

⁵⁰ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 17 November 2011.

⁵¹ Parenti, *Lockdown America*, 23.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 23.

⁵³ Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands*, 151.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁵⁵ Kuletz, "Invisible Spaces, Violent Places," 243.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁵⁷ Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands*, 137.

elements of every-day social life permeated military practice. El Toro Marine Corps Air Base in Orange County, California, defies traditional assumptions about military exceptionalism.⁵⁸ El Toro had a bowling alley, library, swimming pool, teen club, daycare, and a plethora of other amenities that gave it a “country club air.”⁵⁹ The El Toro Base thus reveals the truly multidirectional synergy that characterized American militarism, politics, and society in the 1960s.

THE MILITARY-PSYCHOLOGICAL-COMPLEX

Eisenhower’s term “military-industrial-complex” denotes a particular organization of America’s Cold War economy, society, and politics. As an enveloping concept, however, it overlooks the various ways in which “inner spaces” were militarized and psychology was securitized.⁶⁰ The military-industrial-complex can also be understood as a military-*psychological*-complex because it endeavored socio-psychological control through the propagation of fear, manipulation of public sentiment, and a preoccupation with winning hearts and minds.

Controlling popular sentiment through fear and pacification were core goals during the Cold War, and especially during the decade-long Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s. The Cold War obliterated the boundary between civilian and military identities and organized civil society for the production of violence.⁶¹ The “ambient militarism”

of the Cold War engendered mass paranoia, cultivated morale, and crafted a public wartime “state of mind.”⁶² The Civil Defense Administration induced hysteria in the 1950s when it distributed millions of pamphlets warning of nuclear attack, and organized test drills, such as public evacuations, for disaster preparedness.⁶³ Three days of exercises across eighty cities in 1955, known as Operation Alert, “enacted simulations of a nuclear attack in an elaborate national sociodrama that combined elements of mobilization for war, disaster relief, the church social, summer camp, and the county fair.”⁶⁴ New technologies like cable television and nuclear weapons additionally expanded the government’s psychological arsenal.⁶⁵ In 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff even touted the “psychological implication” of atomic bombs.⁶⁶

As the American campaign in Vietnam trudged on, mobilizing public opinion became an essential political objective. Americans paid little attention to the Vietnam crisis before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and overwhelmingly supported the subsequent American bombing of North Vietnam.⁶⁷ Grassroots antiwar organizations proliferated during the late 1960s, yet a majority of Americans continued to endorse the mission.⁶⁸ The Tet Offensive shocked the American psyche, undermining previous assurances from officials, including General William Westmoreland, that the end of the war had “come into view.”⁶⁹

⁵⁸ Ibid., 457.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 466.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 470.

⁶¹ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 17 November 2011.

⁶² Orr, “The Militarization of Inner Space,” 463.

⁶³ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Turner, *Echoes of Combat*, 52.

⁵⁸ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 17 November 2011.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Jackie Orr, “The Militarization of Inner Space,” *Critical Sociology* 30.2 (March 2004), 455.

⁶¹ Ibid., 478.

Most Americans wished for disengagement in 1969, and elected President Nixon on the platform of “peace with honor.”⁷⁰ Growing opposition to the war was effectively manipulated by Nixon, who interpreted his mandate to withdraw America from the war as a justification for expanding it into Cambodia.⁷¹ The lasting psychological effects of the Vietnam campaign were manifest in the refusal of many Americans to concede that the United States lost the war, or to acknowledge that failure was attributable to a wider range of factors than Congress and the media stabbing the war in the back.⁷²

The most traumatizing psychological experiences of the 1960s rested with veterans and the Vietnamese. As time progressed, soldiers felt increasingly bitter about not being withdrawn from the theatre. American forces were infiltrated and betrayed by “friendly” Vietnamese, endured the oppressive heat of the Indochinese jungle, and watched their comrades die in pursuit of unclear strategic goals.⁷³ Desertion rates soared, and in 1973 alone over 363 incidents of “fragging” were documented.⁷⁴ The strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese transitioned into a strategy of uninhibited carpet-bombing.⁷⁵ The spatial-temporal rhythm of explosions inflicted massive psychological trauma without forcing the Vietnamese into submission.⁷⁶ Soldiers returned from combat depressed,

disturbed, and feeling like they straddled separate worlds.⁷⁷ Indeed, the Vietnam veteran served, “as a psychological crucible of the entire country’s doubts and misgivings about the war.”⁷⁸ After a long period of misunderstanding and isolation, the public perception of veterans softened, and selective recollections of Vietnam were strung into a coherent narrative.⁷⁹ Soldiers were recast as passive victims of destruction. Experiences of Vietnamese victims were all but forgotten. Post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychological ailments were typified as illnesses to be recovered from and forgotten, but never critically examined as artifacts of a morally ambiguous war.⁸⁰

Cities and prisons were other prominent locations of 1960s socio-psychological control, and of intense battles for hearts and minds. Fear of social upheaval and upward mobility created “emergency conditions” that facilitated the development of new control mechanisms, such as helicopters, block watches, tip-off systems, and surveillance networks.⁸¹ Soft policing strategies attempted to win hearts and minds by mandating sensitivity training and creating official channels of communication with community members.⁸² San Francisco police organized dances, parties, sporting events, and job fairs, which succeeded in this regard.⁸³ Psychological control also occupied a central role in prisons. Behaviour modification techniques were applied extensively at Marion Federal Penitentiary, a supermax prison

⁷⁰ Ibid., 49.

⁷¹ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

⁷⁴ Parenti, *Lockdown America*, 4.

⁷⁵ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

⁷⁶ Orr, “The Militarization of Inner Space,” 461.

⁷⁷ Turner, *Echoes of Combat*, 47.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 53.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 61.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 69.

⁸¹ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 17 November 2011.

⁸² Parenti, *Lockdown America*, 24.

⁸³ Ibid., 26.

that went on “permanent lockdown” in 1983. Inmates were stripped of their clothes and personal belongings, deprived access to water and electricity, tear gassed, and isolated as Marion became America’s first control unit.⁸⁴

Similar mobilization of fear and manipulation of public sentiment was practiced in the American Southwest. The federal government and the military-industrial-complex socio-psychologically controlled Native Americans near nuclear test sites by legitimating nuclear development, denying the harm done to land and people, and discrediting the concerns and knowledge of indigenous groups.⁸⁵ A 1994 report by the National Cancer Institute demonstrating a causal link between atmospheric explosive testing and cancer rates near the Nevada Test Site was kept secret by the government for three years amidst concern that it would provoke public outcry.⁸⁶ A more complex process of psychological control was demonstrated by nuclear testing’s subordination of Native American systems of knowledge. The military-industrial-complex essentially undermined entire indigenous worldviews that emphasized human participation in the ecosystem and reciprocal relations with nature.⁸⁷ Nuclear projects psychologically harmed indigenous populations, “by the nightmare fear instilled in the hearts and minds of all the world’s peoples about nuclear war and accidents.”⁸⁸ They also forced Native Americans to grapple with the permanent psychological burden of being tethered to the lethal plutonium economy.

An analysis of strategies that propagated fear, manipulated public sentiment, and attempted to win hearts and minds during the Cold War suggests that the “military-industrial-complex” can be additionally understood as a military-psychological-complex. Militarization of inner spaces and psychologies was a crucial aspect of not only the War in Vietnam and of veterans’ return home, but of city management, law enforcement, and nuclear testing.

⁸⁴ Beaton, *America in the 1960s (HIS378H1F)*, 10 November 2011.

⁸⁵ Kuletz, “Invisible Spaces, Violent Places,” 242.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 251.

⁸⁷ Masco, *The Nuclear Borderlands*, 107.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 100.

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