# SYNCHRONOUS

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# **SYNCHRONOUS**

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## **Co-Editors-in-Chief**

Emma Lowenberger Kaitlyn Min

#### Letter from the Editors

We are proud to present the 2021–2022 edition of the *Undergraduate Journal of American Studies*. As always, we aim to encapsulate the many varied disciplines present within American Studies: political science, history, geography, English, cinema studies, and beyond.

The theme of this year's journal is 'synchronous'. Originating from the Greek words *sun* (together) and *khronos* (time), synchronous means "existing or occurring at the same time." Our world, and the United States, in particular, have never been more synchronous, more interconnected. Although often portrayed as a homogenous nation, the American experience is a fractured one, dictated by race, class, gender, and sexuality. These experiences exist alongside each other forming a rich dialogue around what it means to be American.

This year has been filled with a seemingly nonstop barrage of unprecedented events, even as we struggle to regain a sense of normalcy following the equally unprecedented past few years. America today seems more turbulent, divided, and disarrayed than ever. And through the urgency presented by a lack of precedence, we are compelled to look to the past for guidance; understand how institutions were shaped in order to produce the America of today, reevaluate the 'objective truths' of history, and understand the ways in which we are all connected while simultaneously acknowledging the various factors which force division among us. We all experience life synchronously with one another, and

yet, this collective experience can do little to bind us in the face of our unique and fractured histories, oppressions, beliefs, and lives.

We are honored to feature the work of each author as they showcase their analytical prowess in evaluating the systems and structures that affect the social conditions under which we live, and furthermore, as they showcase their own unique visions of how they see the world. Their hard work and dedication throughout this process is a product of the endless support of our faculty: Mio Otsuka from the Centre for the Study of the United States, Professor Alexandra Rahr, Bissell-Heyd Lecturer, and Nicholas Sammond, CSUS Director, without whom, the 16th volume of the Undergraduate Journal of American Studies would not be possible. For all of your help and guidance, we thank you.

With sincere gratitude,

Co-Editors Kaitlyn Min & Emma Lowenberger

#### **Message from the Director**

Welcome, readers, to volume sixteen of the *Undergraduate* Journal of American Studies at the University of Toronto. As is the journal's tradition, the articles herein cover a wide variety of topics and articulate a range of perspectives. Yet they are united by the overarching theme of the "Synchronous." Each argument works to articulate a relationship between the historical moment it considers and the time in which we find ourselves now. Having weathered, for now, a regressive and cynical call to "Make America Great Again"—one designed to silence the claims of women, indigenous folk, queer, Black and Latinx communities—we choose to believe that to confront the best and worst of our histories is not to dishonor those who came before us as much as it is to honor and uphold the ideals that they espoused (though too often betrayed). More than that: we are called upon to simultaneously honor those ideals—justice, reparation, enfranchisement, empowerment—and to question and refine them. The theme of synchronicity, of history present in the moment, is a fitting frame for a vision of the world we choose to inhabit, a vision that reaches across disciplinary boundaries. And the articles in this volume—which cover topics from the unspoken history of a cemetery to the long durée of a weaponized future in Silicon Valley—exemplify how we choose to do American Studies at the University of Toronto.

When I reflected on the theme of the "Synchronous," and of the fraught historical moment we occupy, for some reason a speech from William Shakespeare's 1602 *Troilus and Cressida* came to mind. These lines are spoken by Ulysses to Achilles during the Trojan War:

Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back, Wherein he puts alms for oblivion, A great-sized monster of ingratitudes: Those scraps are good deeds past; which are devour'd As fast as they are made, forgot as soon As done...

His pride wounded, Achilles has refused to join the fray and demands that before he will fight, Agamemnon, leader of the Greeks, must honor him and his past deeds. Ulysses replies with these words, suggesting that the fault lies not with Agamemnon, but with time itself. Our greatest accomplishments are all, in time, forgotten. One acts, not for eternal glory, but because one feels one should, one must.

These sentiments apply well to the world we live in today. Our past accomplishments, no matter how substantial, now mean little in the face of a concatenation of catastrophes: from global climate change to multiple overlapping pandemics, to an invasion that threatens to become a world-ending conflict. It may seem to some that we are caught between a politics of despair and one of desperation, between a sense of doomed fatalism and an ill-fated desire to "fight like hell," as a deluded insurrectionist declared on January 6, 2021. Yet there is reason to hope, reason to choose neither of those paths. Against all odds and the predictions of the punditocracy, democracy hasn't quite ended in the United States—it has not been replaced with something worse...nor with something better...yet. And, though the world is engulfed in flood and flame, some argue against despair and for an all-out effort to beat back the flames and stem the tides, if only because we must try. We hope to find another, better way that would honor that which has come before us and that which may follow—not for our own glory but for a greater imperative of justice. Because we must.

This volume offers a vital contribution to public discourse at a moment when it is in peril, when the fight for power extends to epistemology itself, to claims as to what is real and true in the world and what is not. Declaring that you will "Make America Great Again" is to suggest that America has fallen from grace, that its greatest achieve-

ments are being forgotten, ignored or erased. This is a logic that tries, for example, to replace the academically rigorous *The 1619 Project* with a poorly conceived and executed *1776 Project*. Yet a virtue of the United States as a place and as a concept (and, as more than one article in this volume details, too often its excuse for behaving badly) is that its citizens persistently argue about what it means to improve, to be better and truer to the ideals on which the nation was ostensibly founded, by questioning those ideals and questioning the logics, circumstances, and historical actors that brought them about. The inclusion of heretofore excluded or marginalized voices in that argument—rather than their consignment to an idealized past in which they are to remain silent—begins to fulfill that democratic promise.

To return to *Troilus and Cressida*, Ulysses tries to persuade Achilles to set aside his wounded pride and fight for what he believes/pretends is a just cause. He says,

O, let not virtue seek Remuneration for the thing it was... For beauty, wit,
High birth, vigour of bone, desert in service,
Love, friendship, charity, are subjects all
To envious and calumniating time."

In other words, it ultimately doesn't matter whether you act or you don't, because time will consume your deeds regardless...so why not act?

Flash forward 368 years. In 1972, poet and playwright Amiri Baraka released his 1970 poem *It's Nation Time* on a Motown album of the same name. In verse dense, elliptical, and insistent, Baraka recapitulated a debate ongoing in Black intellectual and activist circles of the time: in the face of legal, structural, and cultural exclusion, appropriation, and too often annihilation by the dominant white culture, what might Black nationhood look like? An actual separate nation, a Liberia? An internal colony, or a mental space apart, or a future ideal? The Reverend Jesse Jackson took up Baraka's demand and turned it into call-and-response at rallies and

at the 1972 concert Wattstax, asking crowds, "What time is it? What time is it?" to which they roared back, "It's Nation Time!" What was Nation Time? What is Nation Time? It is not mine to say. Perhaps Nation Time is an act out of time, to create a nation that has not, seemingly cannot, but must exist. Perhaps Nation Time is a call to ask what this nation was, what it is now, and whether it can serve us well in the face of global cataclysm? Synchronously: Then, Now, And Tomorrow. The essays in this volume are written for then, for now, and with an eye on our future.

The Centre for the Study of the United States (CSUS) at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, is this country's preeminent place for making sense of the United States' place in the Americas and in the world. It is a meeting place for scholars in fields as diverse as political science, economics, cinema studies, women and gender studies, history, English, geography, and art history, brought together by a shared intellectual interest in the United States, and in the Americas. We host a wide range of public lectures and intellectually stimulating events each year. We offer a thorough and far-reaching undergraduate program in American Studies. We act as a clearinghouse for graduate students whose focus is the Americas. And, as you will see, we help in our small way to support an outstanding undergraduate student journal in American Studies, one which advertises the breadth and depth of our students' interests, and their intellectual vision.

I offer my heartfelt thanks and congratulations to each of the volume's contributors and to its fantastic editorial team, which has assembled these contributions into a persuasive, timely, and elegant case for trying, because we must. My gratitude to all of you who made this journal happen!

Nicholas Sammond Director Centre for the Study of the United States and the American Studies program

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## Racism in Arlington National Cemetery

BY OMAR DANAF

Since its creation during the Civil War, Arlington cemetery has remained at the forefront of the nation's identity, being regarded as a unique window into American history. This essay will analyze the complex racial dynamics at play in Arlington cemetery during the Civil War and in its aftermath, covering the Reconstruction Era to the outbreak of WWI in 1914. This paper will seek to analyze both the physical features of Arlington cemetery and the ideological beliefs that guided their implementation in the cemetery. I will argue that Arlington cemetery officials repeatedly sought to reproduce the racial inequalities that were deeply entrenched in American society during and after the civil war, producing a segregated landscape reflective of America's white supremacist beliefs. As a result of this, Arlington cemetery is a window into America's social climate at the time, as its importance in the American imagination led cemetery officials to recreate social dynamics that white Americans would approve of. I will analyze why government officials chose to initially build a national cemetery in Arlington,

focusing on the rationale behind the bureaucratic decisions informing the creation of the monument. This essay will then investigate the relationship that African Americans living on the Arlington plantation had with government officials, probing cemetery officials' mistreatment of formerly enslaved persons during and after the Civil War. Lastly, I will explore how American citizens and officials interacted with Arlington in the aftermath of the Civil War, specifically their usage of Arlington as a stage to project America's unequal social system.

The initial idea for Arlington cemetery arose out of a desire from Union officials to establish the Union's supremacy over the Confederacy by permanently turning Robert E. Lee's plantation into a cemetery and subsequent memorial to the Union's Civil War dead. Thus, the desire to embarrass the Confederacy took precedence over critiquing the system of slavery that was responsible for the war between the North and South. Tasked with creating new war cemeteries following the outbreak of the Civil War, Union military officials chose to build a war cemetery on Robert E. Lee's Arlington slave plantation "without hesitation," seeking to permanently disfigure Lee's 1100-acre estate. The official tasked with Arlington cemetery's creation and maintenance during the war, Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, sought to prevent the Lees from ever returning to the property. To this effect, he ordered the burial of Union remains "within a few feet of the front door of the man he blamed for their deaths."2 As the top official directly in charge of Arlington cemetery, Meigs was pivotal in both the creation and maintenance of Arlington cemetery during the Civil War, "hav[ing] singular authority" over design choices and the administration of the cemetery.3 According to the Quartermaster's descendants, Meigs directly linked his choice

<sup>1.</sup> Ken Burns, et al, "Most Hallowed Ground: Arlington," *The Civil War*, season 1, episode 7, PBS, 1990.

<sup>2.</sup> Ken Burns, "Most Hallowed Ground."

<sup>3.</sup> Micki McElya, The Politics of Mourning: Death and Honor in Arlington National Cemetery (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 129.

to locate a cemetery at Arlington to his "intense hatred" for Robert E. Lee and other Southerners who served the Confederacy, viewing Lee's plantation as the ideal grounds for an 'anti monument' to the Confederacy.<sup>4</sup> In this sense, Arlington cemetery initially functioned as a critique of the Confederacy's bloody rebellion, with Meigs using the physical bodies of the Union soldiers buried to assign blame for the war to Robert E. Lee and other Confederate leaders. Ultimately, Meigs and other cemetery officials were not concerned with castigating the system of slavery while creating Arlington cemetery, illuminating Meigs's exclusive consideration of white Americans in the cemetery's construction.

While Arlington originated as a slight to the Confederacy, Union officials responsible for the cemetery did not seek to replace the unequal power relations that enslavement had produced. Instead, they viewed African Americans living in the nearby Freedman's Village contraband camp as chattel to be used in constructing the cemetery. In addition to being a burial ground for Union dead, Lee's expansive Arlington plantation was seen as "an ideal solution" to Washington's overcrowding of black refugees fleeing the Confederacy at the outset of the war. Military officials relocated thousands of former slaves to the Lee Plantation, viewing it as a "nearby laboratory" to test Federal reconstruction policy.<sup>5</sup> Central in the formation of Freedman's Village was the belief from Union officials that African Americans were not capable of "responsible freedom," instead requiring strict supervision from whites to prevent the "dependency and indolence" that Union leaders believed was intrinsic to African Americans.6 This racist ideology dominated Arlington cemetery during the Civil War, with Meigs insisting that former slaves in Freedman's Village "'return to their former healthy avocations as field hands'" and perform the painstaking work of constructing and maintaining Arlington cemetery. Meigs

<sup>4.</sup> Burns, "Most Hallowed Ground," The Civil War.

<sup>5.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 61.

<sup>6.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 62.

<sup>7.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 61-2.

argument shows how Union officials utilized the same racist ideologies their Southern counterparts had used to justify slavery, showing how Arlington was indirectly built off of the slavery system it supposedly stood in opposition to. As a result of these factors, Arlington was simply seen as a stage to taunt the Confederacy, with Union officials having no intentions of drastically altering the interactions whites had with African Americans, showing how Arlington functions as a window into the social climate of the North during the Civil War.

As Americans from both sides of the Civil War started to assign increased significance to honouring Civil War dead, officials in charge of Arlington and white interest groups worked in concert to expel African Americans from the area, making Arlington a window into postwar race relations. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Americans from the North and South attached increased gravitas to Arlington cemetery, with its prominent location near the nation's capital making the cemetery an important landmark for government officials, residents of the capitol, and tourists alike. Fueling this increased interest in Arlington was a nation "struggling to make sense" of the bloody civil war that had devasted America's population, with whites from both the North and South being united in a strong urge to commemorate the hundreds of thousands of dead from their communities.8 In this postwar context, African Americans living at Freedman's Village "came to be seen as a public nuisance" by cemetery officials who subsequently initiated attempts to "disband the community" to make way for cemetery expansion.9 Overzealous cemetery officials found an ally in local white Arlingtonians living near the 1100-acre plantation, collaborating to "curb black political power" in Arlington, with segregationist Democrats launching an extensive lobbying effort to phys-

<sup>8.</sup> Susan-Mary Grant, "Raising the Dead: War, Memory and American National Identity," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005): 516.

McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 63.

ically remove blacks from the area near the cemetery. 10 This movement coalesced around Custis Lee's successful 1882 suit against the federal government for illegally occupying his grandfather's slave plantation after the conclusion of the Civil War, receiving a favourable verdict from the Supreme Court that required the Federal Government to compensate him \$150,000 for the property. 11 Custis Lee's Supreme Court victory stands in stark contrast to the institutional discrimination that government officials used to justify their forced relocation of the African American community bordering Arlington cemetery, illustrating how American society still did not afford the same basic rights to blacks that were afforded to whites. Arlington cemetery legitimized the American racial hierarchy that remained firmly entrenched after the Civil War, as private citizens and the government both relentlessly exploited the African Americans who had built Arlington cemetery.

Through their physical separation of African Americans from the main section of Arlington cemetery, government officials demeaned the memory of the black Union soldiers buried at Arlington, excluding people of colour from their memorialization of the Civil War. Arlington cemetery's physical landscape remained deeply segregated during and after the Civil War, with U.S. Colored Troops (USCT) being buried in "the far north-eastern edge of the plantation," separated by over half a mile from the well-manicured section of Arlington cemetery reserved for white soldiers. The absence of coloured soldiers from Meigs' symbolic field of dead trivialized the contributions African Americans made to the Union war effort, by implying that black soldiers did not share the bravery and heroism that was central in their white counterparts' memorialization in the main cemetery.

<sup>10.</sup> Lindsey Bestebreurtje, "Beyond the Plantation: Freedmen, Social Experimentation, and African American Community Development in Freedman's Village," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 126, no. 3 (2018): 349.

<sup>11.</sup> Anthony J. Gaughan, "The Arlington Cemetery Case: A Court and a Nation Divided," *Journal of Supreme Court History* 37, no. 1 (2012): 18.

<sup>12.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 102.

In addition to their physical isolation, black soldiers were buried with other African Americans who did not serve in the Union army, with cemetery officials "lumping together all black people" in a plot of land that failed to acknowledge the USCT's contribution to the war effort. 13 By burying black Union soldiers amongst civilian labourers cemetery officials avoided portraying them as the "agents of freedom" that white soldiers were hailed as, instead hastily burying all African Americans in a plain and unkept plot of land devoid of any memorialization. 14 The exclusion of African Americans from Arlington's core fueled racial resentment in the aftermath of the Civil War, as African Americans were seen as disproportionately benefiting from the Union's abolishment of slavery without substantially partaking in the bloody conflict to end it. 15 Meigs' initial decision to separate African Americans from their white compatriots would be an integral feature of Arlington for nearly a century to come, with Arlington remaining segregated until President Truman desegregated the military in 1948. Ultimately, Arlington cemetery's ardent commitment to racial segregation facilitated the exclusion of African Americans from the memorialization process that honoured and valorized the service of white veterans, having a significant impact on the public's remembrance of the Civil War.

Arlington cemetery prioritized sectional reconciliation over promoting racial equality in the aftermath of the civil war, with government officials memorializing and even honouring Confederate soldiers through the addition of a Confederate section to Arlington, further perpetuating America's exclusionary racial hierarchy. As white Americans sought to rebuild their broken nation, a common link used to bring white Northerners and Southerners together was the mutual respect both sides had for the "sacrifice of Union and Confederate soldiers," consequently elevating the service of Confederate soldiers.

<sup>13.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 103.

<sup>14.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 127.

<sup>15.</sup> Grant, "Raising the Dead," 521.

federate soldiers and valorizing their violent revolt against the Union. 16 As a result of this drive to heal the deep fissures in American society, government and cemetery officials were extremely sympathetic to Southern interest groups that sought to erect memorials to the Confederate dead buried in Arlington, with President McKinley himself authorizing the reinterment of nearly 300 Confederate soldiers in their own exclusive section of Arlington at the request of these groups. 17 Through the creation of a section dedicated solely to Confederate dead at America's premier national cemetery, President McKinley sent a strong message to the nation that sectional reconciliation took precedent over dismantling the deeply rooted belief in white supremacy that had enabled America's centuries-long enslavement of millions of African Americans. McKinley's promotion of sectional reconciliation was not an isolated event, with progressive Theodore Roosevelt specifically honouring Confederate soldiers in his 1902 memorial day speech at Arlington cemetery, symbolically sending "a large floral arrangement" to the Confederate section every year during his presidency. 18 This process triggered a long tradition that extends to this day of U.S. Presidents sending a wreath to Arlington's Confederate section on Memorial Day, honouring the Confederate rebels who had taken up arms against the American soldiers that Arlington stood in memorial to. These traditions show how Arlington is a stage for the federal government to thrust its initiatives into the public spotlight, as the federal government used it to promote sectional reconciliation and convince Southerners that it had abandoned Reconstruction.

Through America's repeated engagement in foreign wars after the Civil War, military service became deeply connected with nationalism, redefining the military service of African Americans as a sacrifice to America in the American

<sup>16.</sup> John Pettegrew, "'The Soldier's Faith': Turn-of-the-Century Memory of the Civil War and the Emergence of Modern American Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 31, no. 1 (1996): 54.

<sup>17.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 151-2.

<sup>18.</sup> McElya, The Politics of Mourning, 159.

imaginary. Despite this, Arlington remained deeply segregated in the post-Civil War period, with segregationist social practices being prioritized over America's evolving military culture. The nature of American military conflicts changed drastically after the Civil War, as American troops were no longer fighting on their own lands for the survival of the ways of life they deemed essential to their existence. As a result of this, government officials sought to construct "a new civil religion" to reshape the public's conception of military service from its initial interpretation as an obligation to local interests that had become popular during the Civil War. 19 As the military turned their attention to the Western hemisphere they sought to create a more inclusive remembrance of previous conflicts to encourage nonwhite soldiers to enlist in the military, redefining military service as "a sacred experience" in which all races could display their honour and dedication to America through sacrifice. 20 This belief became prominent after the 1898 Spanish-American war, as the existence of a foreign enemy had a "tremendously unifying effect on the country" as Americans from a variety of racial and economic backgrounds united to fight America's new foreign foe.21 Scholar Robin Hanson argues that this shift occurred as America increasingly became "a nation of immigrants" amidst its population surge in the late 19th century, with increases in multiculturalism necessitating the need for officials to move away from an exclusive military tradition that catered predominantly to White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.<sup>22</sup> This shift in both government rhetoric and public opinion ensured that the sacrifices African Americans made in foreign wars were genuinely respected by many white Americans, however, it did not result in a radical reshaping of Arlington's racialized landscape, as African Americans would still be relegated to the segregated and unkept Northwestern

<sup>19.</sup> Grant, "Raising the Dead," 521.

<sup>20.</sup> Grant, "Raising the Dead," 521.

<sup>21.</sup> Pettegrew, "The Soldier's Faith," 63.

<sup>22.</sup> Robin A. Hanson, "The National Cemetery: Race and Sectional Reconciliation in a Contested Landscape," (PhD diss., Saint Louis University, 2008), 96-8.

section of Arlington until 1948. Ultimately, this shows how Arlington was representative of deeply entrenched racial inequalities within American society, as widely accepted segregationist practices took precedence over the new civil religion military leaders promoted.

Arlington cemetery was designed to exclude black Americans from its memorialization of white service members, reproducing white supremacist social dynamics deeply entrenched in American culture during and after the Civil War. Policymakers viewed Arlington cemetery as a vehicle to broadcast their social initiatives to the nation and repeatedly favoured promoting sectional reconciliation over racial equality, allowing Arlington's racial discrimination to remain unchallenged for decades. During this time period, cemetery officials viewed Arlington primarily as a memorial to white Americans, allowing Confederate monuments to be erected in Arlington while systematically denying black veterans representation in Arlington's main cemetery. This process is indicative of Arlington's preoccupation with hiding America's faults from the public, preferring to tuck away America's racist treatment of blacks by refusing to overtly acknowledge black contributions to the Civil War. As Arlington remains an extremely important memorial within the American imaginary, it is essential to interrogate the sociopolitical beliefs that have influenced its creation, as this will allow the American public to better understand how this cemetery is deeply intertwined with American culture.

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## From Green to Red, White, and Blue: Irish American Racial Exclusion and Integration

BY KAITLYN MIN

This research essay will examine the experience of Irish immigrants in the United States following the Great Famine in the 1840s to the 1920s. The socio-economic composition, magnitude, and circumstances of the wave of Irish immigration following the Great Famine differed immeasurably from preceding Irish immigrants, which, in turn, stilted Irish immigration and prompted xenophobic animosity from native-born Americans. My research will delve into the forces and conditions that facilitated Irish inclusion and exclusion, charting the inseparability of the relationship between the Irish becoming American, and the Irish becoming Caucasian. Specifically, this essay will argue that capitalism, republicanism, imperialism, and religion were major factors in both fracturing whiteness by ethnic lines and eventually integrating Irish-Americans socially and culturally.

While the focus of this essay is on Irish immigrants following the Great Famine, it is useful for contrast to examine Irish immigration prior to the 1840s as it is revealing on the processes of racial formation. In the seventeenth century, between 50,000 to 100,000 Irish immigrants settled in the American colonies. 1 These predominantly Catholic, "young, single, rootless males" immediately assimilated into the general population and, as a result, few historical records remain of them.<sup>2</sup> In the eighteenth century, around 500,000 Irish immigrated to the American colonies and then after the American Revolution, to the United States.3 The majority of these immigrants were Protestant and more than half were Presbyterians "from the northern province of Ulster." By 1790, between 14 and 17 per cent of the white population were of Irish heritage although many no longer thought of themselves as Irish.5

As large waves of Irish immigration began in the 1840s, previous Irish immigrants and their descendants sought to distinguish themselves from new Irish immigrants by adopting the ethnic label 'Scotch-Irish'.6 At the same time, the Scotch-Irish became "increasingly difficult to distinguish from the native-born Protestant population." By positioning themselves counter to "other, less respectable Irishmen,"8 the Scotch-Irish were reforming the boundaries of whiteness and asserting themselves as rightful claimants. Nativists, some even having Irish heritage, saw incoming Irish immigrants as culturally, socially, and most importantly, ethnically different from themselves. It is through this discrepancy that we can analyze racial formation not simply as the categorizing of shared physical features but the binding of fates based on shared features—perceived or real—against the backdrop of historical context.

Whiteness was not only culturally and politically defined but gained legal salience as the criteria for fitness for self-governance and citizenship. The Naturalization Act

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<sup>1.</sup> Kevin Kenny, The American Irish: a History (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 7.

<sup>2.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 7.

<sup>3.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 7.

<sup>4.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 7.

<sup>5.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 7-8.

<sup>6.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 27.

<sup>7.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 3.

<sup>8.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 27.

of 1790 limited citizenship by naturalization to "free white person [...] of good character."9 The law uses a definition of whiteness that's remarkable for both its "fierce exclusivity" of non-white groups and "staggering inclusivity" of whites, 10 showing a lack of forethought of the potential immigration that the U.S. would be subject to and the future plasticity of the idea of 'whiteness'. The founding fathers certainly never could have expected the millions of Irish who would cross the Atlantic to become Americans. The expansive definition of white represented "the unquestioned hegemony of a unified race of 'white persons'"11 produced by a society that had yet to see the boundaries of whiteness seriously tested and, as a result, this hegemony proved profoundly fragile. Prior to 1875, there were no federal immigration laws and instead, individual states and cities were in charge of handling immigration.<sup>12</sup> New York City, the primary port of arrival for Irish immigrants, had virtually no immigration regulations during this period.<sup>13</sup> This policy of open borders and the laws governing citizenship facilitate the arrival of unforeseen numbers of immigrants beginning with the Irish in 1845. The arrival of "highly undesirable but nonetheless "white" persons from Ireland"14 shattered the image of a unified white race into a "fragmented, hierarchically arranged series of distinct 'white races'" 15

It is difficult to overstate just how unprecedented the wave of Irish immigration following the Great Famine was in socio-economic composition, magnitude, and circumstance. From a pre-famine Irish population of 8.5 million,

<sup>9. &</sup>quot;Naturalization Act (1790)," Encyclopedia.com, March 28, 2022, https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/naturalization-act-1790

<sup>10.</sup> Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race, 1st Harvard University Press pbk. ed., (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), 39-40.

<sup>11.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 43.

<sup>12.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 103.

<sup>13.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 103.

<sup>14.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 7.

<sup>15.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 43.

between 1.1 and 1.5 million people died from "starvation or famine-related diseases" and a further 2.1 million emigrated with 1.5 million of them arriving in America. <sup>16</sup> Not only did Irish immigrants arrive in large numbers but they "accounted for a higher proportion of American immigrants than ever before or since." <sup>17</sup> Truly grim was the state of affairs back in Ireland that, despite most arrivals being close to penniless, they did not include the poorest of the Irish population who were simply unable to afford the fare to America which "varied between £3 and £5 in this period." <sup>18</sup>

The vast majority of immigrants were rural dwellers who had previously worked as farmers on small to medium landholdings. However, upon arrival, a disproportionate number chose to settle in urban or industrial areas so that by 1870, "three-quarters of the American-born Irish," were occupants of these growing metropolitan spaces, compared to the three-quarters of the broader American population who homesteaded rurally. In particular, Irish Americans were concentrated in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco. 1

Furthermore, the vast majority of these immigrants left Ireland involuntarily, fleeing from the Great Famine, rather than by choice. *The Boston Pilot*, which catered primarily to Irish Americans and described itself as "an organ of the Irish race on the Continent," refers to Irish immigrants as exclusively as emigrants.<sup>22</sup> This linguistic choice reflects how many Irish immigrants saw themselves as exiles that had been banished from Ireland. This dynamic explains why many Irish Americans held close ties with their homeland and were consequently viewed with suspicion by nativists who saw their Irish nationalism as evidence of their inability

<sup>16.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 89-90.

<sup>17.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 90.

<sup>18.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 98.

<sup>19.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 99.

<sup>20.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 105.

<sup>21.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 105.

<sup>22. &</sup>quot;1863! Our New Year Prospectus," The Boston Pilot, 13 December, 1862.

to assimilate.

Immediately upon arrival, Irish Americans were defined in racial terms. The treatment and portrayal of Irish Americans in American political culture highlight the "tension between the imperatives of democracy and the imperatives of capitalism."23 W. E. B. Du Bois first coined the concept of the "public and psychological wage" of whiteness to explain why white workers did not unite in common interest with Black workers to organize for better wages and working conditions in the Reconstruction-era South.24 While white workers received low monetary compensation, they were given certain benefits and higher status due to their race. White workers identified with white capitalists on the basis of shared race rather than with Black workers on the basis of shared class. Thus "the wages of both classes could be kept low" as the possibility of solidarity was extinguished and they feared being replaced by each other, 25 and it is these aforementioned wages of whiteness that help explain the economic forces which pushed for Irish Americans to be embraced as white in order to win their "allegiance to capitalism."26

As capitalist economic growth was sustained by large numbers of low-skilled immigrant workers, those same workers were seen as unsuitable for civic life. The wages of whiteness conferred "a degree of political entitlement" that threatened the very notion of a self-governing republic.<sup>27</sup> The ideal participatory democracy imagined by the founders required a great deal from its citizens. They believed that self-government "demanded an extraordinary moral character in the people" because an elected government depended on public virtue—the "willingness of the individual to

<sup>23.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 20.

<sup>24.</sup> W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880, First edition (London: Taylor and Francis, 2017), 625-626.

<sup>25.</sup> Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America, 626

<sup>26.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 20.

<sup>27.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 20.

sacrifice his private interests for the good of the community."28 An individual's public virtue stemmed primarily from private virtues such as "restraint, temperance, fortitude, dignity, and independence."29 Above all, republics would be ruled by "law and reason, not arbitrary will or passion." To extoll the virtuous citizen necessitated exclusion as fitness for self-government could only be seen in contrast to unfitness. Citizenship then becomes a question of moral capacity and criteria for citizenship becomes a question of who possesses such capacity. The denial of citizenship to non-whites rested upon their supposed lack of capacity for reason and public virtue. Similarly, as the supposed inferiority of the Irish cemented in the American consciousness, nativists began questioning their fitness for self-government and thus their claim to whiteness. Complementary to this notion, an article in the Atlantic Monthly expressed the commonly-held sentiment that the Celt "lacks the solidity, the balance, the judgement, the moral staying power of the Anglo-Saxon,"31 demonstrating some of the major characteristics associated with Irish Americans through the lens of this tension.

Whereas previous centuries had relied upon distinctions of 'civilized' versus 'savage' peoples to create and enforce a racial hierarchy, the nineteenth century saw the growing prominence of scientific racism.<sup>32</sup> One of the key tenets of scientific racism was "the belief that the outer physical characteristics of human populations were but surface manifestations of inner realities" so that physical features were linked with "behavioral, intellectual, temperamental, moral, and other qualities." There became a focus on identifying a set of physical characteristics such as "eye and skin color,

<sup>28.</sup> Gordon S Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 68.

<sup>29.</sup> Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 50.

<sup>30.</sup> Mortimer N.S. Sellers, *American Republicanism: Roman Ideology in the United States Constitution* (Houndmills, Hampshire, England: Macmillan, 1994), 244.

<sup>31.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 49.

<sup>32.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 31.

<sup>33.</sup> Audrey Smedley and Brian D. Smedley, *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview*, Fourth edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2012), 25.

facial configuration, and physique" that supposedly marked someone as Irish.<sup>34</sup> Irish Americans were described as "brutish," "low-browed," "ape-like"35 with "coarse skin," "broad teeth", and a "pug nose."36 Scientific racism provided justification for creating a hierarchy within whiteness as "natural fragmentation."37 Further, the term 'Anglo-Saxon' gained prominence and began replacing 'white' when discussing fitness for self-governance. The term served to differentiate the "virtuous, self-governing Anglo-Saxon citizens from pathetic Celtic newcomers" and exclude them from "the glories of national destiny."38 Many of the characteristics and stereotypes associated with Irish Americans were carried over from Britain. Just as industrialized Britain contrasted itself with 'backwater' Ireland, nativists found Irish immigrants lacking in skills and capital compared to the native-born population.

Additionally, Irish Americans were seen as transmitters of disease and illness but above all, of moral degeneracy. Certainly, many of the arrivals were in poor health following months or years of food scarcity and a perilous six-week journey across the Atlantic.<sup>39</sup> Conditions on the ships were extremely cramped and unsanitary, which led to startlingly high rates of mortality and earned them the name 'coffin ships.'<sup>40</sup> In 1847, the worst year of the Great Famine, mortality rates on the 'coffin ships' rose to 20 per cent.<sup>41</sup> These miserable conditions could help explain why despite the sheer numbers and relative literacy of the Irish crossing the Atlantic, only two eyewitness accounts of the crossing exist and they are of "highly questionable origins."<sup>42</sup> Once off the

<sup>34.</sup> Dale T. Knobel, *Paddy and the Republic: Ethnicity and Nationality in Antebellum America*, 1st ed (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1986), 88.

<sup>35.</sup> Knobel, Paddy and the Republic, 88.

<sup>36.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 44.

<sup>37.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 38.

<sup>38.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 206.

<sup>39.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 102.

<sup>40.</sup> O'Neill, Famine Irish and the American Racial State, 33.

<sup>41.</sup> O'Neill, Famine Irish and the American Racial State, 33.

<sup>42.</sup> O'Neill, Famine Irish and the American Racial State, 33.

ships, many Irish immigrants ended up living or forming slums such as the notorious Five-Points in New York City.<sup>43</sup> The crowded, squalid, and unsafe living conditions were a hotbed for "tuberculosis, pleurisy, pneumonia, [...] yellow fever, cholera, and other diseases."<sup>44</sup> These slums were of growing concern to urban observers who thought that they "threatened to infect both the respectable poor and the middle classes" with their bad habits.<sup>45</sup> The logic of contagion was transferred from diseases to poverty, crime, and immorality to present Irish Americans as epidemics threatening the rest of the city.

Irish Americans were dehumanized as 'savages' or 'animals' due to their association with violence and criminality. While Irish Americans were over-represented in jail and prison populations, this was largely a reflection of the poverty that many Irish Americans faced. In the 1840s and 1850s, over half of all arrests in New York City were of Irish Americans and they were convicted at five times the rate of the general population, creating a cultural reputation which led to discrimination, suspicion, and harsh responses from law enforcement. The Irish American propensity for violence was portrayed as pathological and innate with the *New York Tribune* writing that the Irish were "a race with more wholesome and probably unreasonable terror of law than any other."

Paradoxically, Irish Americans were seen as lazy and indolent but at the same time, willing to work labour-intensive jobs for extremely low wages. A large reason for Irish immigrants' disproportionate urban-industrial settlement was due to their limited employment prospects. Prior to the

<sup>43.</sup> Tyler Anbinder, "From Famine to Five Points: Lord Lansdowne's Irish Tenants Encounter North America's Most Notorious Slum," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (2002): 368.

<sup>44.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 107.

<sup>45.</sup> Michael B Katz, *The "Underclass" Debate: Views from History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 8.

<sup>46.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 108.

<sup>47.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 108.

<sup>48.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 49.

1870s, Irish Americans were "confined to manual labour" that "the native-born and even other immigrants would not touch."49 The majority of male immigrants worked as "canal, railroad, building-construction, or dock laborers" at some point.<sup>50</sup> Irish American women worked primarily in domestic service which involved "extremely long hours, typically from 4 or 5 in the morning until 9 or 10 at night."51 The wave of Irish immigration fleeing famine was perfectly timed to coincide with "a spectacular rate of industrialization in the United States" that created a "voracious appetite for cheap labor" in many urban-industrial areas<sup>52</sup> and, in the process of industrialization, "all industries, including mining and agriculture, mechanized" and tradesmen were "sapped of their utility and, therefore, their power."53 As a number of skilled craftsmen lost their jobs, the demand for unskilled labour grew. This drew the ire of native-born workers who saw Irish Americans as the cause of their unemployment and unfair competition. However, employment for unskilled labourers was "sporadic, with payment often on a daily rather than weekly basis" and many construction projects halted during the winter causing cyclical unemployment.<sup>54</sup> By the 1850s, Irish Americans made up "an estimated 70 per cent of the recipients of charity"55 which stoked "fear of promoting dependence" and discouraging hard work.<sup>56</sup> By examining the purpose that these seemingly contradictory perceptions served, we can see that they reinforce the same status quo and were thus not incompatible in the minds of many.

Class markers and innate racial characteristics were tightly bound together in the perception of Irish Americans. Prevailing attitudes towards poverty divided the poor into

<sup>49.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 68.

<sup>50.</sup> Kirby A Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 318.

<sup>51.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 110.

<sup>52.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 41.

<sup>53.</sup> O'Neill, Famine Irish and the American Racial State, 192.

<sup>54.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 110.

<sup>55.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 107.

<sup>56.</sup> Katz, The "Underclass" Debate, 7.

those worthy and unworthy of charity and sympathy.<sup>57</sup> The 'deserving poor' were those whose poverty was seen as no fault of their own such as the elderly, disabled or chronically ill. By contrast, the undeserving poor were impoverished due to their moral failings such as laziness, "willful error", or the pervasiveness of bad habits like alcoholism.<sup>58</sup> The characteristics of the undeserving poor were the same used to stereotype Irish Americans so "to be Irish was, by definition, to fall into the ranks of the undeserving poor."<sup>59</sup>

Finally, religion played a key role in characterizing Irish American identity as the vast majority of Irish Americans were Roman Catholic compared to the mostly Protestant general population. "Irishness in the nineteenth century came to be almost synonymous with Catholicism."60 Religious discrimination was not new to the Irish who had faced centuries of religious persecution under British rule, most notably through the Penal Laws. Beginning in the late seventeenth century, a series of laws were passed that prohibited Catholics from studying law or medicine, speaking Gaelic, voting, owning a horse over £5, possessing weapons, playing Irish music, buying land under lease, travelling more than five miles from their house, or holding public office. 61 While anti-Catholicism in the United States did not rise to the level of legal discrimination, anti-Catholic sentiment was pervasive. Beginning in the 1830s, the "escaped nun genre" gained increasing popularity and fueled anti-Catholic sentiment. 62 Books such as Six Months in a Convent by Rebecca Reeds and The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk claimed to provide accounts from self-described convent escapees about the horrors within the Catholic Church such as "sexual

<sup>57.</sup> Katz, The "Underclass" Debate, 6.

<sup>58.</sup> Katz, The "Underclass" Debate, 6.

<sup>59.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 146.

<sup>60.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 114.

<sup>61.</sup> Charles Ivar Mcgrath, "Securing the Protestant Interest: The Origins and Purpose of the Penal Laws of 1695," *Irish Historical Studies* 30, no. 117 (1996): 25-46. doi:10.1017/s0021121400012566.

<sup>62.</sup> Jennifer Nugent Duffy, Who's Your Paddy?: Racial Expectations and the Struggle for Irish American Identity (New York, USA: New York University Press, 2013), 56.

orgies," "murder of offspring," and prison-like conditions. <sup>63</sup> Catholicism was seen as incompatible with participation in a democracy as "a republican form of government implies freedom and self-reliance" whereas Catholics must "obey their priests as demigods." <sup>64</sup>

Yet even as the Irish were denigrated in racial terms, they were deemed white "as a matter of law" when whiteness was the most important status that a person could possess. <sup>65</sup> Irish immigrants' civil and political rights relied on their legal status of whiteness which afforded them privileges such as voting denied to non-white groups. Thus Irish racialisation in America was primarily a cultural and social construct that barred them from full or ideal American citizenship rather than a legal status that denied them personhood.

Irish Americans' legal status as white allowed them to wield political power to shape their destinies in ways that were denied to non-white groups. The most notable way was through their access to citizenship under The Naturalization Act of 1790 which instantly made them a powerful voting bloc. Even as nativists decried that Irish Americans were unsuitable for democratic participation, at the ballot box, their votes counted just the same. Irish Americans became closely linked with the Democratic Party and built hugely influential political machines in many cities such as New York City's infamous Tammany Hall. 66 These political machines became known for fraud and corruption, exchanging "votes for jobs and services by way of schools, hospitals, and orphanages" but, were also incredibly effective in turning out voters.<sup>67</sup> Their key role in deciding elections forced politicians and even the Democratic Party at large to appeal to Irish American interests.

Just as the Scotch-Irish defined themselves in opposition to the Famine Irish, those seeking to reaffirm their whiteness

<sup>63.</sup> Duffy, Who's Your Paddy?, 56.

<sup>64.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 70.

<sup>65.</sup> O'Neill, Famine Irish and the American Racial State, 7.

<sup>66.</sup> Duffy, Who's Your Paddy?, 57.

<sup>67.</sup> Duffy, Who's Your Paddy?, 57-58.

sought to contrast themselves with non-whites. The integration and acceptance of Irish Americans not only prompted them to oversee the discrimination and exclusion of non-European ethnic groups but required it, as their successful assimilation came at the expense of non-white groups, in particular, African-Americans and Chinese immigrants.

Irish Americans were often compared to African Americans as they often did the same jobs and lived in the same neighbourhoods. Upon arrival, Irish immigrants were rivalled only by African-Americans as "the most impoverished members of society. He Journal of Civilization," drawn by Thomas Nast depicts this dynamic clearly. It portrays two men sitting on opposite sides of




Figure 1: Harper's Weekly cover

a balanced scale representing the 'South' and 'North'. On the South side of the scale sits a barefoot Black man labelled 'Black' and on the North side sits an Irish American man labelled 'White' who is depicted with monkey-like features in a Leprechaun outfit. The caption states "The Ignorant Vote— Honors Are Easy" which implies that neither Irish Americans nor African-Americans should be allowed to vote.

Irish Americans also competed with African Americans for employment as manual labour and domestic service had previously been "relegated to free Blacks." Irish Americans were often "willing to work for less than free persons of

<sup>68.</sup> Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (London: Routledge, 2009), 47-49. 69. Kenny, *The American Irish*, 99.

<sup>70. &</sup>quot;The Ignorant Vote—Honors Are Easy." Cover of Harper's Weekly, December 9, 1876.

<sup>71.</sup> Duffy, Who's Your Paddy?, 61.

color" and consequently replaced them in many industries.<sup>72</sup> *The Colored American*, a newspaper that catered to free Blacks, wrote that the Irish were "crowding themselves into every place of business and of labor, and driving the poor colored American citizen out."<sup>73</sup> By 1855, New York City's 23,300 unskilled laborers were eighty-seven percent Irish American and only three percent African American which constituted an almost complete reversal to some years prior.<sup>74</sup> Once established in these industries, Irish Americans rose to the forefront of the labour movement and played prominent roles in the foundation and leadership of many trade unions.<sup>75</sup> These trade unions did not allow non-white workers to join and thus excluded Black workers from the benefits of unionization.<sup>76</sup>

With some notable exceptions, most Irish Americans did not support the abolition of slavery as they feared that "the abolition of slavery would lead to a great inpouring of cheap black labour from the South." To this end, the Emancipation Proclamation and the Conscription Act passed in 1863 resulted in the New York City draft riots where mostly Irish American workers attacked "symbols of power and privilege in the city, especially those connected with conscription and the anti-slavery Republican party." African Americans were a particular target of anger as mobs beat, lynched, and assaulted Black workers and set fire to the Colored Orphan Asylum. <sup>79</sup>

In their willingness to enforce white supremacy and their aggressive exclusion of non-white groups, Irish Americans aligned themselves with "the nation's Anglo-Saxon stewards" and achieved "racial parity." The very same

<sup>72.</sup> Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White, 127.

<sup>73.</sup> Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White, 127.

<sup>74.</sup> Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White, 127.

<sup>75.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 112.

<sup>76.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 112.

<sup>77.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 125.

<sup>78.</sup> Kenny, The American Irish, 125-126.

<sup>79.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 52.

<sup>80.</sup> Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 222.

stereotypes that were used to characterize Irish Americans—violent, lazy, immoral, dirty, savage—were applied by Irish Americans to other racial groups. Whiteness was the access point to attaining full citizenship status but the key was their participation in white supremacy to differentiate themselves from non-white groups—those unfit for self-government.

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# Zodiac (2007) and the Police Procedural Film Post-9/11

BY AISHA ASSAN-LEBBE

#### Introduction

In an early montage in David Fincher's 2007 crime film masterpiece, Zodiac, the United States' foremost police and intelligence agencies attempt to decipher a code which the Zodiac Killer had sent to The San Francisco Chronicle in August 1969. The film cuts between a copy of the cipher left on the wall of a suburban home and brief shots from the Naval Intelligence Centre, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. These vastly disparate settings, packed with formally dressed men, each staring intently at the code, appear systematic and sombre in stark contrast to the quiet domestic environment that opens the sequence. Completely undercutting the presumed strength of these security institutions, however, the sequence culminates with a return to suburban California, specifically the kitchen table of schoolteachers Donald and Bettye Harden in Salinas. The film goes on to reveal that ordinary civilians solve the cipher with the utmost ease, suggesting that the

security arms of the executive branch in this cinematic world are incompetent and have only the veneer of organization. This early comic sequence, depicting ineptitude within the intelligence and law enforcement arms of the nation, establishes the bureaucratic focus of Zodiac. As a film based on the real-life events of the failed search for a killer who garnered significant public attention through his communication with the media, Fincher offers a critique of institutional negligence and hubris within policing agencies. Amidst an era of police procedural cinema valorising law enforcement in the early years following the attacks on 11 September 2001, Zodiac reworks generic expectations and conventional attitudes towards policing to leverage an institutional critique. While 9/11 is not the principal focus of the film and only allegorically informs it, Fincher pushes the bounds of the police procedural category to grapple with a more critical rendition of policing.

Adapted from the true crime works of San Francisco Chronicle cartoonist Robert Graysmith, Fincher's drama is based on the killer that terrorized the San Francisco Bay Area in the late 1960s to early 1970s, a string of killings that remain unsolved to this day. The film is divided into a three-part structure first detailing the killings. The second part focuses on the investigation by the San Francisco Police Department, namely two buddy cops, Inspectors Dave Toschi (played by Mark Ruffalo) and Bill Armstrong (Anthony Edwards). When the detectives fail to identify a person of interest, the case becomes cold and is later picked up by Graysmith as the case becomes an object of fixation, consuming his marriage and career. Despite circumstantial evidence that points to a person of interest, Arthur Leigh Allan (John Carroll Lynch), the absence of physical evidence does not implicate him.

This paper unfolds in three parts. First, the paper explores the idea that the attacks on 9/11 allegorically inform the film. While it is unclear if this move is intentional, this aspect of the *Zodiac* remains under-examined in the commentary on the film. The second part discusses the institu-

tional critique leveraged by the film, specifically the fact that the police are incompetent at their jobs and that bureaucratic culture is to blame for these shortcomings. Still, as explored in the third part of the paper, the film clearly validates the importance of due process and this idea is especially evident in the allusions to the rogue cop film, *Dirty Harry*.<sup>1</sup>

## Zodiac as post-9/11 film

To begin, the events of 9/11 suffuse *Zodiac* despite the fact that the film is set decades prior. There is no identification of the criminal in Zodiac, a scene which is traditionally included in the crime genre to offer viewers a moment of cathartic release. Only once does the film adopt the point of view of the villain when he hunts a woman and her infant child on a freeway west of Modesto. Instead, the film seemingly uses multiple actors to portray the killer which gives a sense of multiple people taking credit for the crimes. Furthermore, in an exhilarating scene where a camera is placed in the mail cart at the San Francisco Chronicle, there is a sense that the Zodiac is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere at once. On a more subtle register, these decisions metaphorize the faceless, domestic threat from within that loomed over post-9/11 America. This diffuse sense of criminality finds expression in what the film theorist Dennis Broe discusses as an especially pointed trend in films from the post-9/11 era, a period defined by "endless war."<sup>2</sup>

The Zodiac's desire for publicity and pervasive presence in the media eerily recall the mastermind criminal and perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Laden. In letters to the *SF Chronicle*, the Zodiac professes a desire for what seems to be divine redemption, a kind of rebirth in paradise for which he will require slaves in an afterlife. The media spectacle of the Zodiac such as sending letters to the press is

<sup>1.</sup> *Dirty Harry*, directed by Don Siegel (1971, Warner Bros. Pictures, 2013), 1 hr., 42 min, streaming video.

<sup>2.</sup> Dennis Broe, "Genre Regression and the New Cold War: The Return of the Police Procedural," Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media 45, no. 2 (2004): 82.

uncannily evocative of the publicised search for Bin Laden. While there are no overt discussions or explicit references to Bin Laden, the spectacle of his publicly-mediated relationship with the state finds expression in *Zodiac*. In a similar vein, the opening scene of the film uses establishing shots of San Francisco to demonstrate its significance to U.S. history: the first killing takes place on the 4th of July 1969. Still, the film does not set out to be patriotic. The events of 9/11 may inform the film but where one might expect a more straightforward ode to the figure of the lawman, *Zodiac* departs from expectations in showing cops who are unable to bring about a resolution to the case.

*Zodiac*, as with many films produced in the post-9/11 era discussed by Broe, violates the traditional climatic structure that the theorist discusses as characteristic of the times. According to Broe, the Cold War era produced police procedurals where cops are efficient bureaucrats establishing certain guilt. 9/11 marked a pointed change for the figure of the criminal in the police procedural where the surveillance state was upheld and valorised in the name of domestic security.<sup>3</sup> *Zodiac,* however, does not follow this predictable structure. In contrast to conventional police procedural films, Zodiac shows the cops unable to bring about justice. In Zodiac, these conventions are violated: the detectives retire; the killer who the film implicates, Allen, dies of a heart attack; and the real hero of the story, Graysmith, is hardly a professional lawman. Fincher subverts generic expectations by disrupting this conventional filmic trajectory and in place of competent law enforcement officials, highlights fracture points within the police force.

### Institutional neglect and incompetence

In *Zodiac*, the police are the image of incompetence. A montage cutting between Investigators Toschi and Armstrong and *San Francisco Chronicle* journalist Paul Avery

<sup>3.</sup> Broe, "Genre Regression and the New Cold War," 82.

(Robert Downey Jr.) and Graysmith making similar advances in the case undermines the effectiveness of the police department in solving the case. There are many instances where the cops make thoughtless and comical blunders: the Zodiac hearing the recording and tracing equipment during a call-in with the attorney Melvin Belli (Brian Cox), sending off Belli with a showy police presence after the Zodiac agreed to a private rendezvous with him, and the police literally stopping but not apprehending mere moments after he kills a cab driver. This depiction of the police as comically incompetent at their jobs undercuts the traditional narrative of the efficacy of law enforcement.

A consistent focus of the film is the competition and lack of cohesion within police departments across jurisdictional lines due to the fact that the Zodiac committed killings across Northern California. The cops are unable to set aside their egos to accomplish any substantive progress in solving the case. This is exemplified in an extended scene between Inspector Armstrong and Sargeant Jack Mulanax (Elias Koteas) of Vallejo county where they partake in verbal ping pong about not having a fax machine, how to send over case files, and arguing over whose jurisdiction has handwriting reports and DNA samples. Bureaucratized culture is to blame for these shortcomings. Zodiac depicts a cop-adjacent character, Graysmith, whose pursuit of justice is frustrated by bureaucracy, restraints on the police force, and the burden of proof required to establish certain guilt. Unencumbered by bureaucratic restraints, it is the amateurs, including Donald and Bettye Harden and Graysmith that make substantive progress towards solving the case. As an amateur sleuth, Graysmith is able to transcend jurisdictions in the film's three-part structure where hubristic cops could not set aside their egos.

Fincher's use of a yellow, vintage-looking colour palette also establishes the film's critical focus on bureaucracy. Yellow is the colour of the school bus, the taxi, and the pillars in the *San Francisco Chronicle*. The colour-grading conveys a distinctly 1970s style that corresponds with Graysmith siev-

ing through dated files and old footage. This stylistic choice is underscored by the decision to use enhancements on the digital film to create a grainy image evocative of 35mm film (Dickson).<sup>4</sup> The pairing of colour scheme and editing, therefore, conveys the "drudgery" of investigative work.<sup>5</sup> As a film concerned with bureaucracy and archives, the tonal style underscores the investigation as drab and monotonous rather than a high-end, action-packed pursuit of the criminal, further resisting the idolization of lawmen.

# Themes of extra-legal activity and procedural abuses

Zodiac makes no room for pop vigilantism or extra-legal tactics. Nowhere is this theme more palpable than in the repeated allusions to *Dirty Harry*. Toschi served as the inspirational basis for Dirty Harry and Bullitt, two films which were instrumental in birthing the rogue cop subgenre. 6 As media scholar Matthew Sorrento notes, Fincher works "in opposition" to this landmark film. Indeed, Zodiac serves as a rebuke of the Vietnam-era avenger Callahan in a scene about 90 minutes into the film when Inspector David Toschi attends a theatrical screening of Dirty Harry. By design, Dirty Harry's narrative parallels Toschi's current investigation into the Zodiac killings. During the showing, a visibly agitated Toschi leaves the theatre to wait in the lobby and smoke a cigarette. As the audience files out of the theatre, the police commissioner approaches Toschi. "That Harry Callahan did a hell of a job closing your case!" he says to Toschi, referring to the film's infamous conclusion where Harry Callahan (Clint Eastwood) throws his badge into a nearby body of water. Callahan's shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later style

<sup>4.</sup> Sam Dickson, "Zodiac and the Ends of Cinema," Senses of Cinema 78, (2016).

<sup>5.</sup> Thomas Leitch, "Bullitt and the Police Film," In *Crime Films*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 237.

<sup>6.</sup> Matthew Sorrento, "Night of the Hunters: David Fincher's Zodiac and the New Serial Killer Film," In *The New American Crime Film*, (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co. Publishers, 2012), 68.

allowed him to bypass bureaucratic thickets. The Zodiac case still unsolved, Toschi retorts: "Yeah, no need for due process, right?" As a film concerned with the search for a killer that never fully reaches fruition, Fincher is more preoccupied with this political critique.

The film takes great pains to show Toschi and Armstrong amassing evidence and going through the process of obtaining a search warrant for Allen's trailer. They failed, ultimately, because the search warrant had to be based on probable cause which the issuing judge did not believe existed. Finally, when they do obtain the warrant is when Allen moves to a different jurisdiction with a judge who is willing to issue the warrant. While the police are unable to find the killer, Graysmith's informal investigation indicts Allen but authorities cannot apprehend him. Similarly, Toschi encourages Graysmith to rely on handwriting samples and DNA reports as opposed to his personal convictions or biases and when Graysmith veers off this course declaring he has solved the case Toschi reprimands him, saying "easy, Dirty Harry." These examples demonstrate the film's commitment to due process. As well, in the final scene of the film when Graysmith stares into Allen's eyes at the hardware store in which he is employed, there is a sense that Graysmith has confirmed for himself that Allen is the Zodiac, a wish he expressed to Avery much earlier in the film. The film immediately closes and in a textual epilogue, reveals that Allen died from a heart attack before investigators could question him and that the case remains unsolved across several jurisdictions in the Bay Area.

Although due process acts as an impediment to solving the crime, maintaining and upholding developed laws and rules ought to take precedence in the worldview of the film. In the post-9/11 period, this argument was hugely subversive. Zodiac grapples with many motifs of the post-9/11 era including proceduralism and administrative shortcomings. Fincher thus leverages a political critique by championing due process instead of vigilante justice as compared to *Dirty Harry*. According to film theorists, *Dirty Harry* was "fas-

cistic" in its political alignment by endorsing the extra-legal methods of its protagonist. In *Dirty Harry*, the Zodiac escaped because of checks on police power and bureaucratic constraints brought on by the Civil Rights movement. According to Leitch, the archetypal cop tends to be depicted as an unwitting force of good whose motivations and desires for justice are uncomplicatedly allied with social justice imperatives. Very rarely in police films are cops portrayed as morally complex. Even in the more rare uses of the rogue cop, their vigilante ways are implicitly endorsed because they ultimately bring the criminal to justice.

Fincher's position is allied with the countercultural movement and this standpoint is especially palpable in the film's musical score and use of a countercultural lexicon. Zodiac's soundtrack consists of popular rock songs from the era, a deliberate reverberation of civil disobedience. Donovan's peace-and-love anthem "Hurdy Gurdy Man" opens and closes the film. The first scene in the movie begins with the song "Easy to be Hard," from the countercultural musical *Hair*, floating out of a car radio as two lovers, the first victims, meet for a nighttime tryst. In place of ominous music and loud noises to frighten the audience, popular guitar rock from the 1960s offers the backdrop to which victims are killed. The countercultural movement, notable for its anti-cop leaning, is an unusual decision for a police procedural film. When the Zodiac taunts the police, he refers to them in derogatory epithets: "you pigs racing in your cars." Thus, the film is clear to adopt the ideological standpoint of the counterculture where one might expect a more straightforward celebration of policing. Moreover, Fincher refuses generic expectations that audiences are conditioned to expect, resisting narrative closure, clear motivations behind the acts of violence, and any decisive revelations of guilt or innocence. The police film typically affirms this political ortho-

<sup>7.</sup> Michele Schreiber, "Tiny Life: Technology and Masculinity in the Films of David Fincher," *Journal of Film and Video* 68, no. 1 (2016): 7.

<sup>8.</sup> Leitch, "Bullitt and the Police Film," 227.

<sup>9.</sup> Leitch, "Bullitt and the Police Film," 229.

doxy in following a predictable structure where the cops are successful at their jobs and the deliverance of justice is swift.

#### Conclusion

Fincher's 2007 film Zodiac is rarely considered in the context of its post-9/11 era of production. While the film has no overt anti-cop stance, the film's three-part structure makes this case by showing progress made by the police and then the amateur detective Graysmith who takes up the case years later. Despite the fact that the events of 9/11suffuse Zodiac, Fincher's lawmen are flawed on a structural level, unable to bring about justice. Instead of endorsing extra-legal methods of investigation, Fincher's characters work strictly according to the rules and Fincher mounts this critique through stylistic choices, including editing, colour palette, and musical score. Zodiac functions as a metaphoric representation of bureaucratic failure, a hugely subversive move in the post-9/11 cinematic landscape that is decidedly ripe fodder for recuperating the police force and the surveillance state it attends. The guest for moral certitude and establishment of guilt and innocence proves inconclusive. The films go against the grain by mounting institutional critiques of law enforcement agencies and thus contribute to resisting the hagiography of police, especially so in the years following 9/11.

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# Behind the Curtain: The Silicon Valley Mythos

BY EMMA LOWENBERGER

In 2014, at the infamous *TechCrunch* Disrupt conference, former Google and Facebook engineer Justin Rosenstein said, "We in technology have a greater capacity to change the world than the kings and presidents of even 100 years ago." At the time, what was thought of as a laughable demonstration of an individual's obnoxiousness and inflated sense of self-importance, did little more than add to the canonical understanding that the wealthy young men at the forefront of Silicon Valley were, themselves, obnoxious and self-important. What has changed in the 8 short years since Rosenstein declared himself a proverbial king of the world, is the cultural understanding of just how much power is wielded by those at the helm of the most influential technol-

<sup>1.</sup>Brad Reed, "Watch this ridiculous speech that would make even Mike Judge's Silicon Valley characters blush," BGR, May 6, 2014, https://bgr.com/general/worst-tech-speech-ever/

 $<sup>2.</sup> Jon\ Terbus \Bar{h}$ , "The 14 Most Bullshit Motivational Slogans in Silicon Valley," GQ, October 13, 2014 https://www.gq.com/story/the-most-bullshit-motivational-slogans-in-silicon-valley

ogy companies in the world and, moreso, just how much of this power congregates in the northern California region of Silicon Valley. Encompassing almost 2,000 square miles, the sprawling campus' of hundreds of tech companies represent trillions of dollars in investments and billions of worldwide users.<sup>3</sup>

Understood as having relatively plastic borders, 'Silicon Valley' often molds to the map of industry elites, the definition changing depending on the source. Often, the term is used to refer to the American tech industry as a whole, with no distinction between a startup adjacent to the MIT campus and a corporate giant operating in San Jose.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the culture of this microclimate reinforces these transient borders. Silicon Valley is no longer thought of as a place with the resources to foster and inspire innovation in those willing to work hard, but rather, where natural innovators are destined to end up. Reid Hoffman, co-founder of the \$26 billion networking platform LinkedIn, notably declared, "Silicon Valley is a mindset, not a location."

Though Silicon Valley was once openly a testament to the forces of prestigious academic institutions and the scientific prowess and investment capabilities of the U.S. government, the digital revolution paved the way for a model of "disruption," transforming our understanding of revolutionary innovation into something that is only hampered by institutional regulation and only possible when done outside of the system. Though tech gurus like Rosenstein sell a narrative of an awesome self-made technocratic power, and founders like Hoffman reject the institutional structures of Silicon Valley to portray an imaginary landscape with the power to transcend borders, Silicon Valley is a microclimate which

<sup>3.</sup> Troy Segal, "Silicon Valley," Investopedia, March 15, 2022, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/siliconvalley.asp#toc-where-is-silicon-valley-in-california

<sup>4. &</sup>quot;About Silicon Valley," ICANN, accessed April 4, 2022, https://archive.icann.org/en/meetings/siliconvalley2011/about.html

<sup>5.</sup> Terbush, "Motivational Slogans."

<sup>6.</sup> Jill Lepore, "The Disruption Machine," *The New Yorker*, June 16, 2014 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-machine

was founded, fostered, and bankrolled by the very bureaucratic institutions that it claims to oppose. In this paper, I argue that the political and ideological imperatives that have shaped how Silicon Valley has been built, managed, and imagined, all contribute to the mythos that Silicon Valley is a climate built on disruption and personal ingenuity, and reject the singular bureaucratic and institutional resources that made the region a technological superpower. To support this argument, I will conduct an historical analysis to examine how this mythos came to be, specifically focussing on the region's history with bureaucratic structure and investment, the 'Silicon Valley Leader' archetype that has come to define the region, and the resulting prominent narrative of 'salvation,' which not only works to validate this mythos but, ultimately perpetuates a dangerous reliance on a microclimate whose power has superseded that of the institutions who built it.

In 1885, following the death of their only child, United States Senator, Leland Stanford and his wife, Jane, founded Leland Stanford Junior University as a memorial for their young son, their vision articulated as a promotion of "public welfare by exercising an influence [on] behalf of humanity and civilization." On the southern end of the San Francisco peninsula in Santa Clara County, the family endowed over 8,000 acres of farmland to create the Palo Alto campus with the intention of fostering "useful" graduates to contribute to the wave of innovation already sweeping the nation. As early as the mid-19th century, the region of Santa Clara became home to many technological innovations as a result of this flourishing university combined with investment from the American government and the corporate sector.

<sup>7. &</sup>quot;A History of Stanford," Stanford University, accessed April 4, 2022, https://www.stanford.edu/about/history/

<sup>8.</sup> Stanford University, "A History of Stanford."

<sup>9.</sup> Corey Protin, Matthew Stuart and Matt Weinburger, "Animated timeline shows how Silicon Valley became a \$2.8 trillion neighborhood," *Business Insider*, December 18, 2020, video, 3:54, https://www.businessinsider.com/silicon-valley-history-technology-industry-animated-timeline-video-2017-5

Proximity to the coastline compelled investors to choose the Bay Area to be among the first of the major cities to build a telegraph line. 10 Later, with the approval and investment of the California Legislature, the California Telegraph Company constructed intricate networks and, at the turn of the 20th century, became the first region to connect overseas with Hawaii.<sup>11</sup> In 1912, eight years before the rest of the country would adopt radio technology, Charles Herrold, a former student of Stanford University, founded a radio station and became the first regular radio broadcaster in the U.S. 1213 Even through the early developmental period between 1920 and 1922, Herrold's head start in radio broadcasting allowed for the Bay Area to remain a trailblazer in the field, boasting more radio broadcasting stations than any other city in the U.S. <sup>14</sup> In 1933, the U.S. government purchased Moffett Field in Santa Clara County as a place to dock Navy airships, and in 1939, it became a focal point of the American aerospace industry with the development of the Ames Research Center, drawing scientific talent from across the nation to work in the area. 1516 The region, primed with both the development of technological resources and the reputation for innovation, in 1939 would also see one of the first and most significant indications of the establishment of Silicon Valley as Stanford graduates Bill Hewlett and David Packard founded the Hewlett-Packard Company<sup>17</sup> in a single-car garage, now a historical symbolic landmark of "the Birthplace of 'Silicon

<sup>10.</sup> Protin, et al, "Animated timeline."

<sup>11.</sup> Alice L., Bates, "The History of the Telegraph in California," *Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California* 9, no.3 (1914): 181-187 https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41168703.pdf

<sup>12.</sup> John F. Schneider, "The Stations That Didn't Survive: 1920-1925," *Bay Area Radio Museum*, accessed April 4, 2022 https://bayarearadio.org/sf-radio-history/early 13. "Charles David Herrold, 1875-1948," Charles Herrold, America's First Broadcaster, accessed April 4, 2022, https://www.charlesherrold.org/know.html 14. Schneider, "The Stations."

<sup>15.</sup> Protin, et al, "Animated timeline."

<sup>16. &</sup>quot;History of NASA's Ames Research Center," NASA, last modified January 11, 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/history/history.html

<sup>17.</sup> Protin, et al, "Animated timeline."

#### Valley."18

The circumstances of the true inception of 'Silicon Valley' are widely debated. The description of key players and the consequences of their work vary from source to source. However, what remains undisputed is the role of Stanford academia and the university's proximity in facilitating a tangible space where innovation is boundless and the ideas of an individual are capable of materializing. Affectionately referred to as 'the father of Silicon Valley," Stanford engineering professor Frederick Terman played an exceedingly influential role at the university and throughout the broader Bay Area region throughout the mid-20th century. Personally attributed with endowing the entrepreneurial spirit associated with students in the Stanford engineering program, he encouraged students to found their own companies and was often himself an investor. He was also largely responsible for ensuring a strong, and often mutually beneficial, connection between the U.S. government and Silicon Valley startups, as he spent his time as Provost of Stanford securing grants from the Department of Defense in order to fund the engineering projects and entrepreneurial ambitions of Stanford graduates. 1920 The mid-20th century saw the beginning of Santa Clara's ascent to the technological epicenter of the world as Stanford alumni and faculty left the university to found research and business entities in the broader region. In 1956, Stanford professor William Shockley founded Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories and invented the first silicon transistor,<sup>21</sup> a device we now recognize as an early version of the computer processor.<sup>22</sup> Years after many of his employees left to start their own semiconductor businesses, reporter Don Hoefler's 1971 piece on the semiconductor industry

<sup>18. &</sup>quot;A home for innovation," HP, accessed April 4, 2022, https://www.hp.com/hpinfo/abouthp/histnfacts/publications/garage/innovation.pdf

<sup>19.</sup> Annalee Saxenian, "The Genesis of Silicon Valley," Built Environment (1978-) 9, no. 1 (1983): 7–17. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23286110

<sup>20.</sup> O.G. Villard, Jr, "Frederick Terman Biographical Memoir," Stanford University, accessed April 4, 2022 http://large.stanford.edu/history/kaist/docs/villard/

<sup>21.</sup> Protin, et al, "Animated timeline."

<sup>22.</sup> Protin, et al, "Animated timeline."

referred to Santa Clara as "Silicon Valley, U.S.A." This first noted use of the term stuck, branding this region of the southern Bay Area as the authority on innovation, thus inaugurating our contemporary perception of Silicon Valley.<sup>23</sup>

While Bill Hewlett and David Packard are early stereotypes of the 'two guys in a garage' myth of Silicon Valley's genius and success, these beginnings of the technological epicenter were not yet predicated on engaging in systematic "disruption," or perpetuating a mythos of complete independence, but rather understood as groups of well-educated professionals who required external funding in order to materialize their "impossible" ideas. Furthermore, the success of Silicon Valley at this time was understood as being precisely due to its heavily structured bureaucratic involvement and history, as the primary source of funding for these innovators was courtesy of the U.S. government's research and development spending during the Cold War.<sup>27</sup>

While this extensive history of the close intertwining of innovators and bureaucratic entities should establish the existence of the "multigenerational networks" that afford Silicon Valley the resources to foster innovation, the way this climate was built and the way it is imagined are entirely disconnected. Imagined as both the technological frontier and the disrupter of industry norms, the Silicon Valley mythos of disruption and personal ingenuity rejects its own history. In 2010, the founder of *TechCrunch*, Michael Arrington, published an anti-government manifesto on his own site, the core of which was simple; keep the government out of tech

<sup>23.</sup> Protin, et al, "Animated timeline."

<sup>24.</sup> Heidi Hackford, "The Valley and the "Swamp": Big Government in the History of Silicon Valley," Computer History Museum, October 10, 2019, https://computerhistory.org/blog/the-valley-and-the-swamp-big-government-in-the-history-of-silicon-valley/

<sup>25.</sup> Francine Hardaway, "From the Field: A Short History of Silicon Valley," *Rebus Press*, accessed April 4, 2022, https://press.rebus.community/media-innovation-and-entrepreneurship/chapter/from-the-field-a-short-history-of-silicon-valley/

<sup>26.</sup> Hardaway, "From the Field."

<sup>27.</sup> Hackford, "The Valley."

<sup>28.</sup> Hackford, "The Valley."

and stop trying to regulate Silicon Valley.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, this government involvement is not only a relic of the past that was used to establish the region, but is currently responsible for creating much of the technology that made many of the "self-made" billionaires of Silicon Valley, billionaires. 30 The mythos of an independent innovation sector or the individual "entrepreneurial cowboy"31 entails the purposeful misrepresentation of bureaucratic involvement. Silicon Valley, as a climate, has always been predicated on the idea of hard work and innovation, but the contemporary imaginary of the region seeks to disconnect the work from the environment that makes it possible, suggesting that Silicon Valley is as difficult a space as any for the innovator; that they've been left to their own devices on the frontier of technology. Furthermore, the separation of Silicon Valley from the deep pockets of bureaucratic investors also reinforces the frontier notion of risk, depicting the massive returns enjoyed by innovators as a reward for wagering their livelihood on themselves in order to do what has never been done, when in actuality, the personal risk is slim and the business practices are recycled; ducking regulation and exploiting labor.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, as the saturated buzzword "disruption" has come to be the driving force behind the mission statement of Silicon Valley, the incentive to portray a libertarian technocracy is even higher. The notion of "disruption," although overused to the extent that it is now bankrupt of all mean-

<sup>29.</sup> Michael Arrington, "Here's How The Government Can Fix Silicon Valley: Leave It Alone," *TechCrunch*, June 7, 2010, https://techcrunch.com/2010/06/07/hereshow-the-government-can-fix-silicon-valley-leave-it-alone/

<sup>30.</sup> Adrian Rehn, "Why Silicon Valley's "Self-Made" Millionaires are Really "Government-Made" Millionaires," MIC, March 25, 2014, https://www.mic.com/articles/86111/why-silicon-valley-s-self-made-millionaires-are-really-government-made-millionaires

<sup>31.</sup> Henry Farrell, "Silicon Valley paints itself as a hotbed of free enterprise. Here's how the government helped build it," Washington Post, July 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/17/silicon-valley-portrays-itself-hotbed-free-market-enterprise-new-book-explains-how-government-helped-build-it/32. Nitasha Tiku, "An Alternative History of Silicon Valley Disruption," Wired, October 22, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/alternative-history-of-silicon-valley-disruption/

ing,33 is most often used to signal a radical change; the innovation of innovation itself.<sup>34</sup> Although the term is now often invoked by the media to mockingly reflect the absurdity of the mantra, 35 the sense of liberty and inventiveness it evokes is still significant to the Silicon Valley imagination and how they depict themselves as thriving entirely independently of the resources they've been afforded. The iconic moments in technological history that live in the memory of every billionaire hopeful who dreams of their replication; the moments when not just the tech industry was disrupted, but the way we lived our lives was disrupted, were not in fact the result of a clever interloper, but were instead representative of billions of dollars and decades of complex coordination and collaboration between the U.S. government and institutions of research and academia (i.e. Google's search algorithm,<sup>36</sup> Apple's introduction of the iPhone and its corresponding touchscreen technology, SIRI, etc...).<sup>37</sup> One cannot disrupt the machine if they are part of the machine, and the way Silicon Valley has imagined a climate built from disruption and personal ingenuity is dedicated to ensuring, not just that we are never truly able to grasp the influence of the man behind the curtain, but that we never detect him at all.

While the narrative of the solitary genius is arguably enough to engage us in the mythos of Silicon Valley, the most notable founders and CEOs are often defined by archetypal tropes that elevate them to a seemingly untouchable caliber of genius and, as a result, discount the resources which fostered their innovations. The Hewlett-Packard initiated legend of 'two guys in a garage' has repeated itself time and time again. The algorithm that would become the foundation for one of the largest ever tech companies in history

<sup>33.</sup> MaryAnne M. Gobble, "The Case Against Disruptive Innovation," *Research-Technology Management* 58, no.1 (2015): 59-63, https://doi.org/10.5437/08956308X5801005

<sup>34.</sup> Tiku, "Alternative History."

<sup>35.</sup> Terbush, "Motivational Slogans."

<sup>36.</sup> David Hart, "On the Origins of Google," National Science Foundation, August

<sup>17, 2004,</sup> https://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc\_summ.jsp?cntn\_id=100660

<sup>37.</sup> Rehn, "'Self-Made' Millionaires."

was written on the whiteboard of a sophomore dorm,<sup>38</sup> the world's largest video sharing platform was founded after three twenty-something guys were having difficulty finding clips of Janet Jackson's infamous SuperBowl XXXVIII half-time performance,<sup>39</sup> and in an uncanny coincidence, the idea for the first Apple computer came to life in the garage of a single-story house in Los Altos.<sup>40</sup> In the beginning, this archetype is entirely derivative of the 'American Dream,' suggesting that every Silicon Valley leader emerged from the uncultivated corners of the nation and, with a little bit of luck or hard work, that could be us. They are imagined as exceptional because they transcended the unexceptional.

However, while the bootstraps work ethic is an integral part of their humble beginnings, the myth of the Silicon Valley leader is paradoxically one of both inhuman work ethic and ease. The icons at the helm of multi-billion dollar tech companies follow the same archetype; generally social outcasts whose communicative abnormalities are made up for with their extraordinary penchant for ideas and innovation. It is not just that they worked hard, but that the way they're made allows them to work harder, easier. Thus, with the concerted emphasis on their free-range beginnings, follows the further development of bureaucratic rejection; the trope of 'the dropout.' Hinged on the idea of the wunderkind; a young mind whose ambitions and intelligence eclipse that of the institution trying to educate them, the Silicon Valley

<sup>38.</sup> Kathleen Villaluz " Watch Mark Zuckerberg Return to His Old Dorm Room Where Facebook Began," *Interesting Engineering*, May 24, 2017, https://interestingengineering.com/watch-mark-zuckerberg-returns-his-old-dorm-room-where-facebook-began

<sup>39.</sup> Jim Hopkins, "Surprise! There's a third YouTube co-founder," USA Today, October 11, 2006, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-11-youtube-karim\_x.htm

<sup>40.</sup> Brandon Griggs, "Steve Jobs' boyhood home becomes historic site," *CNN Online*, January 4, 2016,https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/tech/innovation/steve-jobs-historic-home/index.html#:~:text=The%20single%2Dstory%20house%20 at,computers%20in%20the%20mid%2D1970s.

<sup>41.</sup>Steve, Silberman, "The Geek Syndrome," Wired, December 1, 2001, https://www.wired.com/2001/12/aspergers/

dropouts are actually very few (around 4%).<sup>42</sup> However, it is not treated as a coincidence that many of Silicon Valley's most iconic innovators (Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey) didn't finish college,<sup>43</sup> as its culture encourages and celebrates the "cult" of the dropout.<sup>44</sup> PayPal founder Peter Thiel offers \$100,000 dollars to entrepreneurs under the age of 19 under the condition that they're not in school, musing, "How well would [the students of a top university] have done had they not gone to college... My suspicion is that [the universities] are just good at identifying talented people rather than adding value."<sup>45</sup>

While we may not know what the graduates of top universities would have otherwise done with their time, we do know that those who finished have done exceedingly well, as at least 45% of Silicon Valley co-founders went to a top U.S. university.46 This dropout trope does not necessarily reject the existence of bureaucratic resources, but it does perpetuate the idea that The Founder does not need them, neglecting the way that Silicon Valley is both historically and presently managed. Through the mid-20th century, as Silicon Valley experienced a boom in technological advancement and startups, graduates from Stanford University acted as reliably intelligent employees to fill out the quickly expanding businesses. 47 Similarly, in contemporary Silicon Valley, the influence of academic institutions holds a similar weight. A degree, or even enrollment at a prestigious university, is often a heuristic used by companies to discern which candi-

<sup>42.</sup>Jamie Beaton, "The idea that degrees don't matter is a Silicon Valley Fantasy," *TechCrunch*, February 25, 2022, https://techcrunch.com/2022/02/25/the-idea-that-university-degrees-dont-matter-is-a-silicon-valley-fantasy/#:~:-text=The%20answer%2C%20in%20large%20part,signal%20of%20their%20academic%20abilities.

<sup>43.</sup> Chandra Steele, "Tech CEOs Who Ditched College for Start-Up Life," *PC Magazine*, August 10, 2015, https://www.pcmag.com/news/tech-ceos-who-ditched-college-for-start-up-life

<sup>44.</sup> Beaton, "Degrees."

<sup>45.</sup> Steele, "Tech CEOs."

<sup>46.</sup> Beaton, "Degrees."

<sup>47.</sup> Protin, et al, "Animated timeline."

date is most likely to succeed in their position.<sup>48</sup>

In the climate of disruption and personal ingenuity, the figurehead has to have come from outside of the system, and cannot be a product of a world-class education and the sway that it carries in a job interview or an investors' pitch. The innovator can come from anywhere; achieve greatness anywhere; they truly encapsulate that 'Silicon Valley is a state of mind.' They do not stand on the shoulders of giants, they are giants; so that when the Silicon Valley innovator ascends to the mantle of grotesque wealth and power, we know it was their own doing, and we know they deserve it.

Finally, the rejection of institutional bureaucracy in order to present the image of a climate built on disruption and personal ingenuity is not just at work in order to inflate the egos of the Silicon Valley innovators who want to believe they've made their own way, it also serves as the justification for Silicon Valley's narrative of salvation. While providing essential utilities to the individual user is a contributing factor to the way Silicon Valley imagines itself, 49 the authority and power it has amassed seeks to disrupt the world order in a much more significant way, culminating in one of the core ideological imperatives which defines the climate; that we need to be saved from the institutions who could not save us, and furthermore, that Silicon Valley will deliver. We need not look further back than the COVID-19 pandemic for an example of such technological intervention. Steadily through the pandemic, the news media saw a flood of work concerned with 'how much worse' things might be without this technology.<sup>50</sup> While much of the outpouring of gratitude for technology was specifically concerned with the trivial salvation from the boredom of unoccupied time,<sup>51</sup> looming

<sup>48.</sup> Beaton, "Degrees."

<sup>49.</sup> Franklin Foer, "What Big Tech Wants Out of the Pandemic," *The Atlantic*, July/August 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/07/big-tech-pandemic-power-grab/612238/

<sup>50.</sup> Noam Cohen, "Silicon Valley is Saving Our Asses- for Now," Wired, March 27, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/silicon-valley-is-saving-our-asses-for-now/51. Shira Ovide, "Your Pandemic Tech Habits," New York Times, March 19, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/19/technology/pandemic-tech-habits.html

above our reliance on these platforms was their true indispensability, representative of Silicon Valley's intervention in a government that was both incapable of containing the virus and unable to provide the necessary infrastructure to support the outbreak.<sup>52</sup> In order for technology to save the people from an inept government and equally unprepared institutions, they must imagine themselves as being explicitly separate from those institutions.

Furthermore, the narrative that Silicon Valley has the power to do the work which others cannot is not new, and for years has been at work trying to facilitate an existential reliance on the efforts of the region. Bill and Melinda Gates shell out millions of dollars every year to fight world hunger and various illnesses,53 Khan Academy seeks to provide free education to any child with a laptop, effectively ducking the complexities of education reform,<sup>54</sup> and since the mid-1980s, Silicon Valley businesses have been working on a way to undercut the exploitative costs of healthcare and take over the sector.<sup>55</sup> Now, tasked with solving the single greatest threat to our collective livelihood, the handling of the climate crisis has been delegated to the 'next entrepreneurial revolution,"56 as sluggish environmental legislation has not met the urgency of the challenge. Again, this narrative of salvation is entirely ignorant of how the climate has been built and continues to be managed. Not only does the American government continue to pour money into the region,<sup>57</sup> but the only reason tech companies are able to remain so large and accumulate enough wealth to attempt to tackle these issues is because

<sup>52.</sup> Foer, "Big Tech."

<sup>53.</sup> Charles Kenny, "Can Silicon Valley Save the World?" Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/24/can-silicon-valley-save-the-world/54. Kennt, "Can Silicon Valley Save the World?"

<sup>55.</sup> Michael Abramowitz, "High-Tech Firms Devise Plan to Cut Health-Care Costs," Washington Post, June 15, 1986,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1986/06/15/high-tech-firms-devise-plan-to-cut-health-care-costs/46ef9f0a-a9cc-44f4-8f9e-3b14e4a3f1fe/56. Tim O'Reilly, "Climate Change Will Reshape Silicon Valley As We Know It," Wired, March 8, 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/climate-change-silicon-valley/

<sup>57.</sup> Tiku, "Alternative History."

the U.S. government is so weak on enforcing antitrust laws,<sup>58</sup> fostering unfettered monopolization, and effectively allowing the power of Silicon Valley to eclipse the power of the government.

However, should Silicon Valley responsibly wield this power and actually operate as a beacon of salvation, this developing reliance may not be such a dangerous thing, but for two primary reasons, it is. First, in tandem with the rise of 'disruption' culture has arisen the mantra, "move fast and break things," a motto intended to encourage achieving your goal in the fastest possible way, by any means necessary.<sup>59</sup> While some have speculated that it is an empty slogan, predominantly intended to add to the disruptive mythos of the region, 60 the mindset is noted as having been the downfall of too many startups, especially ones working on innovations in health and human safety, 61 and in the delegation of these existential issues, we cannot afford a rushed job. In an article analyzing the 'fail fast' idea, Rob Asghar draws on a concern introduced by author Dan Pink, "The problem with making an extrinsic reward the only destination that matters is that some people will choose the quickest route there, even if it means taking the low road."62 Leading to the second reason, which illustrates the danger of this reliance; Silicon Valley operates as an extremely lucrative business. Although framed as being for the good of the people, in the instances where Silicon Valley can actually act for the good of the people, it does not, instead prioritizing a standard economic model of "centralized profit motives," and exploitative

<sup>58.</sup> Margaret O'Mara, "How antitrust laws can save Silicon Valley — without breaking up the tech giants," *Washington Post*, July 10, 2019, https://www.washington-post.com/outlook/2019/07/10/how-antitrust-laws-can-save-silicon-valley-without-breaking-up-tech-giants/

<sup>59.</sup> Terbush, "Motivational Slogans."

<sup>60.</sup> Rob Asghar, "Why Silicon Valley's 'Fail Fast' Mantra Is Just Hype," *Forbes*, July 14, 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/robasghar/2014/07/14/why-silicon-valleys-fail-fast-mantra-is-just-hype/?sh=3d74a3e024bc

<sup>61.</sup> MaryAnne M. Gobble, "Rethinking the Silicon Valley Myth," Research-Technology Management 61, no.1 (2018): 64-67 https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1 080/08956308.2018.1399028

<sup>62.</sup> Asghar, "Fail Fast."

labor.<sup>63</sup> Propped up by the mythos of disruption, personal ingenuity, and the innovator working outside the bounds of the system in order to save the system, the notion that we can be saved by Silicon Valley both validates the mythos, and places far too much faith in it, creating a dangerous reliance on a microclimate with too much power to be reined in and too little incentive to use that power wisely.

To revisit Reid Hoffman, the co-founder of LinkedIn who declared Silicon Valley, "a state of mind," he has also expressed being a staunch believer that the startups left standing are exclusively a result of their own merit, "Starting a company is like throwing yourself off the cliff and assembling an airplane on the way down."64 In actuality, the physical climate of contemporary Silicon Valley is not too dissimilar from that of the past; innovators congregating their businesses and investments in a relatively small region in order to take advantage of the well-funded resources that support a successful startup. Where these multigenerational networks should be a representation of the incredible investment from bureaucratic institutions which created the world's epicenter of innovation, the Silicon Valley mythos that this climate was built solely on disruption and personal ingenuity, rejects the singular bureaucratic and institutional resources that made the region a technological superpower; holding onto the notion that a Silicon Valley startup is still just like freefalling from a cliff.

<sup>63.</sup> Susie Cagle, "Silicon Valley is About Business, Not Change," *New York Times*, July 22, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/22/is-silicon-valley-saving-the-world-or-just-making-money/silicon-valley-is-about-business-not-change

<sup>64.</sup> Terbush, "Motivational Slogans."

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
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## 'Good Girl Gone Bad?'

An Analysis of the Press' Coverage of the "Disney Girl Celebrity" and Her Transformation Into the "Former Disney Girl Celebrity" Through the Magazine Headlines of Britney Spears, Hilary Duff and Lindsay Lohan

BY CAITLIN JOY

As Morgan Genevieve Blue dissects in *Girlhood on Disney Channel: Branding, Celebrity, and Femininity* since the mid-2000s the Disney Channel (abbr. DC), a television network belonging to The Walt Disney Company and predominantly marketed towards eight to sixteen-year-old girls, has foregrounded teenage girl performers in their properties.<sup>1</sup> During her stint working for Disney, the "Disney girl celebrity" became a figure featured across Disney's multimedia properties: she does live performances and appearances in company events and on funded tours and her image features on various forms of merchandise such as clothes, makeup, accessories, books, video games, school supplies, room decoration and everyday items.<sup>2</sup> During this time period, she demonstrates a specific kind of girlhood outside of Disney works just as she does within them: a lighthearted yet inti-

<sup>1.</sup> Morgan Genevieve Blue, Girlhood on Disney Channel: Branding, Celebrity, and Femininity, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 1-2.

<sup>2.</sup> Blue, Girlhood on Disney Channel, 9-10.

mate, relatable yet aspirational girlhood in which problematic matters like politics and sexuality are absent.<sup>3</sup>

Britney Spears sang, danced, and acted on The All-New Mickey Mouse Club (MCC), a variety show on the Disney Channel, in the mid-1990s. A few years after the show ended, she signed to Jive Records as a recording artist.<sup>4</sup> The label demanded as part of their contract, Spears perform the "Disney girlhood" she had on MCC in her first album, ... Baby One More Time (1999) as well as on the accompanying tours, live appearances, and other promotional materials. 5 Spears was the first "Disney girl celebrity:" a girl celebrity who is a representation of "Disney girlhood." Hilary Duff starred as Lizzie McGuire in the eponymous Disney Channel television show that was among the first set of original live-action shows on the network from 2001 to 2004.6 Lizzie McGuire launched Duff as the second "Disney girl celebrity." In 2003, she featured in the DC original movie ("DCOM"), The Lizzie McGuire Movie, and from 2002 to 2008, she was signed to Disney's Hollywood Records.7 Lindsay Lohan made her acting debut in Walt Disney Pictures' The Parent Trap (1998), then featured in the DCOMs Life-Size (2000) and Get a Clue (2002) as well as Walt Disney Pictures' Freaky Friday (2003), Confessions of a Teenage Drama Queen (2004), and Herby: Fully Loaded (2005).8 Following the commercial and critical success of Freaky Friday, Lohan became the third established "Dis-

<sup>3.</sup> Blue, Girlhood on Disney Channel, 2-3.

<sup>4.</sup> Nora Clark Crutcher, "Mutual Appreciation: Britney Spears and the Media Machine," (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2010), 4-6. www.proquest. com%2Fdissertations-theses%2Fmutual-appreciation-britney-spears-media-machine%2Fdocview%2F750172973%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D14771.

 $<sup>5.\</sup> Crutcher, "Mutual Appreciation," 5-11.\ www.proquest.com\%2F dissertations-theses\%2Fmutual-appreciation-britney-spears-media-machine\%2F-docview\%2F750172973\%2Fse-2\%3Faccountid\%3D14771.$ 

<sup>6.</sup> Jon Bream, "The Royal Line: From Hilary Duff to Olivia Rodrigo, We Look at the Disney Princesses Who Became Pop Stars," *Star Tribune*, Apr 08, 2022. www.proquest.com%2Fnewspapers%2Froyal-line%2Fdocview%2F2648293685%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D14771.

<sup>7. &</sup>quot;Hilary Duff," IMDb, accessed November 4, 2022, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0240381/.

<sup>8. &</sup>quot;Lindsay Lohan," IMDb, accessed November 4, 2022, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0517820/.

ney girl celebrity," and like Duff, was required to demonstrate "Disney girlhood" outside of her professional life.

To examine how the American press presented Spears, Duff and Lohan, I have surveyed several headlines from cover stories written about them over a five-year time span, from their first feature in a mainstream magazine to the year they voiced their disconnection from the "Disney girl celebrity" identity. The time span of headlines surveyed was from 1999 to 2003 for Spears, 2003 to 2007 for Duff, and 2004 to 2008 for Lohan; each time span begins with their representation as a "Disney girl celebrity" and covers their course growing out of that identity. As a "Disney girl celebrity," each girl is attractive because she is at the same time, a girl and a celebrity: intimate information about how she navigates each identity due to their co-existence is the press' primary area of interest. Due only partially to how much the girl possesses a body that is associated with biological womanhood, the "Disney girl celebrity's" relation to sexuality is specifically the subject of the most interest. If the girl celebrity performs "good girlhood" characterized by traditional American gender expectations, the press will represent her as a "role model" to other girls and young women. If, as she transitions away from Disney, she performs "bad girlhood" characterized by transgressive bodily and sexual practices, the press will narrativize her personal life as 'destroying' her career and future, while foregrounding it and sensationalizing it, particularly the "bad choices" she makes and the issues she struggles with, as spectacle.

In 1999, Britney Spears was featured on the cover of *Rolling Stone*, with the headline "Inside the Heart, Mind & Bedroom Of a Teen Dream." Speaking to Projansky's theory that anxieties about girls' sexuality generates a 'dangerous' eroticism about them, Spears' innocent, pre-sexual girlhood was perceived as dangerously erotic. The image of the girl celebrity is incompatible with adult womanhood and sex-

<sup>9.</sup> Sarah Projansky, Spectacular Girls: Media Fascination and Celebrity Culture, (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 49.

uality thus producing a desire to know her sexual and bodily practices. The potential sexuality of Spears was particularly attractive because of the dichotomy between her appearance and her girlhood: her music, dancing, and clothing were sexualised, while her personal life was asexual and oppositional to sexuality. February 2000 People's "Pop princess: Too Sexy Too Soon?" voices anxiety about the singer's sexualised performance, echoing concerns present in public discourse about its potential sexualising effect on her girl audience. Fisher provides background for these prominent concerns, explaining that girl celebrities are frequently bound to an issue present in society that authorities are anxious about - in this case, the self-sexualization of girls - and blamed for that issue's existence. 10

June 2001 Us Weekly's "'It's Hard to Wait': Sexy, Rich and Powerful: What It Feels Like for a Girl"



**Figure 1:** April 1999 Rolling Stone cover



**Figure 2:** February 2000 People cover

and November 2001 Entertainment Weekly's "The Confessions (And Confusion) Of a Teenage Sex Kitten" communicate two attitudes about the girl celebrity: erotic interest in her sexual practices and disinterest in her financial success. These headlines are dialogic with Spears' public relationship with "Disney boy celebrity" Justin Timberlake, former cast

<sup>10.</sup> Anna Watkins Fisher, "We Love This Trainwreck! Sacrificing Britney to Save America," In *In the Limelight and Under the Microscope: Forms and Functions of Female Celebrity*, ed. Su Holmes and Diane Negra, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 305



Figure 3: June 2001 Us Weekly cover



**Figure 4:** November 2001 Entertainment Weekly cover


member of MCC and member of pop boy band NSYNC, which was subject to much national interest. 11 Lucia argues that investment in girl celebrities' serious romantic relationships is symptomatic of alleviation from the reconciliation of her sexuality: the girl celebrity's sexuality is disempowered through her domesticity, and therefore, the relationship is the subduer of the girl. 12 Spears and Timberlake broke up in early 2002, as represented in Us Weekly's April 2002 "It's Over," September 2002 "Did She Betray Him?" and December 2002 "The War Is On." The September 2002 headline is dialogic with national speculation, supported by Timberlake and denied by Spears, that Spears' infidelity had motivated the breakup. The December 2002 headline is dialogic with Timberlake's confirmation of that speculation in his album Justified (2002), and Spears' clothing expressing anti-relationship statements. 13 The maligning of Spears for transgres-

<sup>11.</sup> Crutcher, "Mutual Appreciation," 4-7.

<sup>12.</sup> Cynthia Lucia, "Hollywood's "Proper Stranger": Natalie Wood's Knowing Innocence and Uncertain Experience," In *Star Bodies and the Erotics of Suffering*, ed. Rebecca Bell-Metereau and Colleen Glenn, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015), 223-224.

<sup>13.</sup> Crutcher, "Mutual Appreciation," 12-16.







**Figure 6:** September 2002 Us Weekly cover



**Figure 7:** December 2002 Us Weekly cover

sive sexual and bodily practices in relation to the support of Timberlake codifies the punishment of the former "Disney girl celebrity's" transgressive sexual and bodily autonomy. Us Weekly's September 2003 "Britney's Revenge," dialogic with Spears beginning to engage in 'casual' sexual relationships in the public eye, further illustrates the condemnation

of the transitive "Disney girl celebrity's" transgressive sexuality and by association, her transitive self and work.<sup>14</sup>

In 2003, Vanity Fair featured contemporary girl celebrities including Hilary Duff on its cover, accompanied with the headline "It's Totally Raining Teens: And It's, Like, So A Major Moment In Pop Culture." The group was dominated by "Disney girl celebrities:" the headline, though using pejorative language that trivializes the girl



**Figure 8:** September 2003 Us Weekly cover

celebrities' work, focuses on the professional successes of Duff and her fellow girl celebrities. While Spears was a dichotomy of sexuality and pre-sexuality, no attribute of Duff for over half of the time span covered deviated from "Disney

<sup>14.</sup> Crutcher, "Mutual Appreciation," 15-17.



Figure 9: July 2003 Vanity Fair cover

girlhood." This girlhood and traditional American girlhood are compatible. Duff represented the nation's values (hard-working, ambitious, upright) and gender expectations (passive, delicate, feminine). March 2004 Cosmogirl's "Why

She's More Like You Than You Think" presents Duff as a girl celebrity that is relatable and aspirational, that girls should want to look up to. October 2004 Hollywood Life's "So Much To Do, So Little Time" foregrounds her professional successes and intonates them to be valuable. A 2004 edition of Twist's "Hilary vs. Lindsay" solidifies Duff as a "good girl" by positioning her in opposition to "bad girl" Lindsay Lohan.



**Figure 10:** March 2004 Cosmogirl cover



**Figure 11:** October 2004 Hollywood Life cover



Figure 12: 2004 Twist cover

Duff was an embodiment of traditional American girl-hood and significantly, unlike Spears or Lohan, possessed a body that resembled a biological girl's not an adult woman. However, there was discernible interest in her sexual practices. Lucia dissects the erotic appeal of a girl who appears to

<sup>15.</sup> Jodi Bryson, "The very fortunate Hilary Duff." *Girls' Life*, August-September 2005, 48-51. Gale In Context: Canada. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A134954345/CIC?u=utoronto\_main&sid=bookmark-CIC&xid=846f9c2d.

be a "good girl" that is behind closed doors, sexually experienced. The potential transgressive sexuality of an otherwise asexual Duff was fetishistic, therefore, as a paradoxical consequence of her asexuality, Duff was fetishized. The "Disney girl celebrity's" embodiment of girlhood, likewise, would have been eroticized as the qualities of girlhood; sub-

missiveness, innocence and purity; are linked to sexuality and consequently, girlhood in culture is linked to eroticism.<sup>17</sup> Duff dated Joel Madden, lead singer of the pop-punk band Good Charlotte and 9 years her senior, from 2004 to 2006<sup>18</sup> as captured by June 2005 Seventeen's "The Truth About Her And Joel Madden" and June 2006 Teen People's "Hilary & Joel: Their first-ever photo shoot." These headlines are dialogic with the transgressive nature of the two's long-term romantic relationship: the potentiality of Duff's sexual practices in relation to an older "bad boy" celebrity as well as her exploring her own sexual and bodily autonomy through music and clothing during this time, were attractive as she was ageing out of the "Disney girl celebrity" identity. 19 She and Madden broke up in the fall of 2006, and this severance as well as her return to her pre-Madden "good girl" identity,



**Figure 13:** June 2005 Seventeen cover



**Figure 14:** June 2006 Teen People cover

<sup>16.</sup> Lucia, "Hollywood's "Proper Stranger,"" 226-234.


<sup>17.</sup> Meenakshi Gigi Durham, The Lolita Effect: The Media Sexualization of Young Girls and What We Can Do About It, (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2008), 110-113.

<sup>18.</sup> Bream, "The Royal Line."

<sup>19.</sup> Bryson, "The Very Fortunate Hilary Duff," 48-51.

resulted in supportive representation.<sup>20</sup> October 2006 Seventeen's "'I Did Lose A Lot Of Weight'" apologizes for and therefore disconnects Duff from, her body and self during her relationship with Madden and August 2007 Seventeen's "Who's She Crushing On Now???" looks forward to Duff's







**Figure 16:** August 2007 Seventeen cover



**Figure 17:** June 2004 Interview cover

"good girl" future.

Though featured on the gatefold cover of Vanity Fair's "It's Totally Raining Teens," Lindsay Lohan's first cover appearance was in June 2004's Interview, next to the headline

"Why Is America Falling In Love With Lindsay Lohan?" after gaining critical acclaim for her performance in Mean Girls (2004). Lucia informs the consequential representation of Lohan in the press: the girl celebrity's body is both a site of eroticism and of anxiety about sexuality. Depending on if she resembles a biological woman, she will be a priori associated with "good girlhood" or "bad girlhood." Like



**Figure 18:** July 2004 Rolling Stone

<sup>20. &</sup>quot;Hilary Duff Vs Joel Madden; Battle of the Exes," *Chicago Tribune*, Apr 03, 2007. www.proquest.com%2Fnewspapers%2Fhilary-duff-vs-joel-madden-battle-exes%2F docview%2F420534875%2Fse-2%3Faccountid%3D14771.

<sup>21.</sup> Lucia, "Hollywood's "Proper Stranger,"" 223.



**Figure 19:** September 2004 People cover

Spears, Lohan's body was perceived as a woman's when she was a girl, and consequently, she was linked to sexuality and "bad girlhood." July 2004 Rolling Stone's "Hot, Ready and Legal!" glorifies the ethical sexualization of 'adult' Lohan, while September 2004 People's "Young, Rich & In Love" celebrates Lohan's serious romantic relationship with "'Disney' boy celebrity" Wilmer Valderrama, actor on the teen sitcom That '70s Show, which domesticated

her sexuality.

Two headlines from 2005 are synecdochal of Lohan's representation in the press from that year on: May Us Weekly's "Extreme Diets: How Lindsay & Nicole got skinny – but have they gone too far?" and June Elle's "Lindsay Lohan confronts the rumours: 'I like men, partying & attention... what's the problem?'" As Lohan professionally parted ways with Disney, her "bad girl" identity determined by her sexuality, began to be reified by her transgressive sexual



Figure 20: May 2005 Us Weekly cover



Figure 21: June 2005 Elle cover

and bodily practices. Before her "badness" was theoretical, in 2005, her 'casual' sexual relationships, excessive alcohol and drug use, and eating disorders made it practical.<sup>22</sup> On the structuring of the "bad girl" / "good girl" binary, Jackson and Vares define the "bad girl" as she who acts in transgression of postfeminist boundaries of female respectability, who does not accept the limits of free choice and manage her expressions of self, and therefore must be othered.<sup>23</sup> Much like how Spears was tied to the national issue of the self-sexualization of girls, Lohan was tied to the rise of anorexia and bulimia in girls, as well as dependencies on alcohol and illicit substances. Lohan, irreconcilable with her "Disney girl celebrity" past, would go on from 2006 to 2008, to be characterized alternatingly as a "bad girl" and a "bad girl trying to be good."24 February 2006 Vanity Fair's "'I knew I had a problem and I couldn't admit it': Confessions of a Teenage Movie Queen" positions Lohan as working out of her "bad girl" identity with context for why it came to be; June 2007



**Figure 22:** February 2006 Vanity Fair cover



**Figure 23:** June 2007 People cover



**Figure 24:** February 2008 Marie Claire cover

<sup>22.</sup> Lindy Christine Wille Simonsen, "I Know what Lindsay Lohan did Last Night: Celebrity Gossip and its use of Disciplinary Power Over Women," (PhD diss., The George Washington University, 2009), 33-58. www.proquest.com%2Fdissertations-theses%2Fi-know-what-lindsay-lohan-did-last-night%2F-docview%2F287966629%2Fse-2.

<sup>23.</sup> Sue Jackson and Tiina Vares, "'Too Many Bad Role Models for Us Girls': Girls, Female Pop Celebrities and 'sexualization," *Sexualities* 18, no. 4 (2015): 483-484. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363460714550905.

<sup>24.</sup> Simonsen, "I Know what Lindsay Lohan did Last Night," 33-58.

People's "What Happened to Lindsay Lohan? From adorable child star to out-of-control party girl arrested for a DUI. Can anyone save her?" paints her as incapable of becoming the "good girl" she once was even if given the appropriate support; and February 2008 Marie Claire's "On Rehab, [Samantha] Ronson, And Reclaiming Her Career" hesitantly positions her as post-"bad girlhood."

As the headlines representing "Disney girl celebrities" Britney Spears, Hilary Duff, and Lindsay Lohan demonstrate, the American press' support of a girl celebrity's self and future are contingent upon whether she continues to demonstrate "Disney girlhood." Those that do are "good girls" in opposition to "bad girls" that promote transgressive sexual and bodily practices to their girl audiences. A contradiction of the press denouncing the "former Disney girl celebrity's" transgressional identity, is their placing upon the girl celebrity an identity of transgressive sexuality when she is enacting "Disney girlhood" as a "Disney girl celebrity." Even if the girl celebrity's body resembles a biological girl's, the anxiety over her sexuality whether real or potential, together produce an eroticism about the pre-sexual "Disney girl celebrity." How the girl celebrity is represented by the press as she grows out of being the "Disney girl celebrity" reflects American society's valuing of the girl herself as well as the "Disney girl celebrity" figure. Studying how the press understood and presented Spears, Duff, and Lohan when they demonstrated the "Disney girl celebrity" identity, illustrates how the press viewed and constructed the figure of the "Disney girl celebrity" and how the media discourse within which every subsequent "Disney girl celebrity" would be entered into. Likewise, studying how the press negotiated and presented the inceptive batch of "Disney girl celebrities" growing out of that identity illustrates the framework of which every subsequent "Disney girl celebrity's" doing the same, would be narrativized in relation to, affecting how later "Disney girl celebrities" would.

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## Patterns of Behaviour in the Preservation of Power: US Interventionism in Latin America

BY ASHVINI GIRIDARAN

When an American reporter asked Chilean poet, Pablo Neruda, about his impression of the United States after his first reading at the US capitol, he said, "Your country - how shall I say it? - seems more prepared for peace than for war. Peace and poetry..." Seven years later, in 1973, Neruda passed away. His death came 12 days after the Latin American 9/11 - a CIA-backed military uprising against then Chilean president, Salvador Allende, who was an ally of Neruda. Neruda's words were shockingly divergent from the true reality of America's behaviour in 'peacekeeping,' especially in the region of Latin America. His statement reflected his impression of America being a nation more inclined to preserve peace and choose benevolence over malice; however, the political turmoil which surrounded his ultimate fate paints the picture of a global power that went out of its way to use its

<sup>1.</sup> Jonathan Crow, "Pablo Neruda's Historic First Reading in the US (1966)," *Open Culture*, June 10th, 2014, https://www.openculture.com/2014/06/pablo-nerudas-historic-first-reading-in-the-us-1966.html.

resources to spark violence, rebellion, and carnage within a smaller nation. This dichotomy attests to the underlying deceptiveness in America's foreign policy towards Latin America over the course of history. Its interventions in the region were spurred by its own private motivations and the fruit of its actions harmed Latin Americans. A repetitive pattern of American-implanted leaders building authoritarian regimes and resultantly hindering the quality of life among citizens manifested itself across many of the region's nation-states. Notably, this occurred in Nicaragua and Chile with the rise of the US-aided Somoza and Pinochet governments respectively; they consequently used their powers to instil despair among citizens for more than a decade. Overall, the legacy of US interventionism in Latin America is a destructive one of sowing violent regimes that, in turn, engendered oppression and promoted impoverishment among those who were not wealthy, disregarding the dignity of their lives. In particular, this is proven to be true through the experiences of Chile and Nicaragua in the mid-twentieth century and beyond.

First and foremost, the US's selfish desire to secure its own interests in Chile enabled the creation of an autocratic government in the region that used its power to marginalize the vulnerable. Fundamentally, the actions America took as a result of its personal intimidation of the Allende government and its socialist policies is what pivotally allowed for the rise of the dictatorial leader, Pinochet. In the aftermath of the democratically-elected Chilean president Allende completing the nationalization of copper mines in Chile and acquiring control over foreign-owned sections of the industry, the United States instigated a psych-war against the Allende government, utilising its monetary resources to undermine democracy via the local press, conservative unions, and oppositional forces to create a national crisis, prompting the military's uprising.<sup>2</sup> The use of its resources in Chile was a

<sup>2.</sup> Greg Grandin, "Don't Do What Allende Did," *London Review of Books*, LRB, Ltd, 2012, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v34/n14/greg-grandin/don-t-do-what-allende-did

direct response to Chile's socialist policy. When Chile, under Allende, chose to pursue the route of nationalisation, American stakeholders in the copper industry stood to incur losses. Thus, US intervention in the nation was out of its own desire to ensure the 'containment' of socialist policies within Latin American nations overall and prevent the accrual of any further loss to American investors as a result of nationalist policies. In subverting the forces of democracy in Chile including the press and governmental opposition - the US vitally instilled division within the nation, prompting the rise of anti-Allende sentiment and unification of the movement's supporters. In essence, America sowed the seeds for the insurrection against Allende and the resultant Pinochet government which was notorious for its commission of human rights abuses against its citizens. The ascent of the Pinochet government led to a system of government where the vulnerable faced systematic oppression. At one point in the article "Is Pinochet the Model," Codevilla describes the human rights abuses incurred by those who dared to oppose the Pinochet regime. In particular, he cites the 1986 Molotov Cocktail incident in which military members allegedly "caught a couple with a Molotov cocktail and used it to set them on fire." In reality, a patrol officer had in fact ordered officers to douse student protestors in gasoline and set them on fire as a consequence of their self-expression that violated the parameters of the government.3 Over the course of its seventeen-year tenure, the Pinochet regime went on to commit over 1056 more human rights abuses. The regime's treatment of teenagers - particularly students - in this example, is indicative of how little value the government merited human life. Its violent reaction to those seeking to make their voice heard attests to the severity of its totalitarianism and its sole regard for its own security in society; it is so desperate to ensure the totality of its own power that it quashed the voices of the innocent in society barbarically. Despite

<sup>3.</sup> Angelo Codevilla, "Is Pinochet the Model?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (1993): 131. https://doi.org/10.2307/20045819.

its economic advancements, the Pinochet government had very little regard for the lives of its people. In Chile, the US cultivated havoc and thereby fostered the creation of the 17-year Pinochet dictatorship which exerted despair among the needy members of the Chilean people.

Similarly, US involvement in Nicaragua vitally consolidated the power of the Somoza dynasty which in turn used its power to promote the impoverishment of the poor in Nicaragua. The US's desire to be able to exert influence in Nicaragua - home to valuable space for a future canal - enabled the presidency of Anastasio Somoza García. After the US withdrew troops from the region of Nicaragua in 1933, it installed a personally-trained national guard in the region. In 1937, the US-appointed Somoza as the new president of Nicaragua and his family remained in power until 1979. During a visit to the US, Somoza presented himself as the United States' best friend."4 Somoza's announcement is an allusion to the Good Neighbour Policy which promised the US's good favour by way of no military intervention in Latin American countries given that they were able to support the US's interests, which were often economic. Somoza's rise to power and his family's maintenance of it was fundamentally a result of US interests in the region, whether they be economic or political, later, during the times of the Cold War as socialism was adopted by more Latin American nations. It is by the same hand by which the Somozas rose to prominence that they also fell; in 1979, after the assassination of the last Somoza president, the US helped a provisional junta government take over. Thus, it is through the US's aid, that the Somoza regime was enabled. Ultimately, this corroboration of power by the US for Somoza gave him full control to maintain a cultural ecosystem of vast inequality in the nation, where the needs of the poor and working-class citizens were not being met while powerful oligarchs thrived. This was best exemplified in the aftermath of the Great Managua

<sup>4.</sup> Paul Coe Clark, The United States and Somoza, 1933-1956: a Revisionist Look, (New York: Praeger, 1992), 86.

Earthquake of 1972 - when it was exposed that relief money raised from other nations for the Nicaraguan people was personally pocketed by government officials. Under the Somozas' Nicaragua, a 'power base' of a few elite families who owned most of the economic resources thrived, while those such as the urban workers suffered the consequences of their greed through the collapse of poorly developed infrastructure as a result of the Earthquake. In essence, US involvement in Nicaragua propped up an authoritarian regime that left its own citizens in a deprived state.

Ultimately, US involvement in Latin America has been largely for the nation's own self-interests. As exemplified through the country's interventions in Nicaragua and Chile, the US habitually institutes its own forces whether they be monetary resources or political tools to ensure the preservation of its own power and status in a global society. Citizens - especially those that are marginalized - must then endure the results of policies and actions put into place by these regimes. In the end, the fruit of US interventionism below the border is fundamentally harmful in fostering the growth of dangerous governments that use their power in corrupt ways, resulting in the despair of citizens. Rather than an institution of peace, in Latin America, the US is often a harbinger of trouble and conflict.

<sup>5.</sup> Janel M. Curry-Roper, "Nicaragua: Land of Conflict," *The American Geographical Society's Focus on Geography* 38, no. 3 (1988): 18.

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# The Evolution of How We View the American Revolution in Lepore's "The Whites of Their Eyes"

BY ROSEMARY CROWLEY

"Every generation tells its own story about what the Revolution was about," writes American historian Jill Lepore in the prologue of her 2010 book *The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History.* The American Revolution took place over two centuries before the Tea Party movement began in 2009, yet its legacy and that of its most important figures, the Founding Fathers, continues into the twenty-first century. Names of early American politicians are mentioned when arguing for, or against, a variety of issues, from potential tax increases to the legalization of same-sex marriage, to the adoption of a new teaching curriculum. Lepore's goals in *The Whites of Their Eyes* are to create "a history of the Revolution" as well as a history of the debate over what the Revolution means to modern America. She accomplishes this by researching and analyzing the legacy of America's origin story and how it's been used throughout

<sup>1.</sup> Jill Lepore, *The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 7.

<sup>2.</sup> Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes, 18.

history and in the present day by both conservatives and liberals to promote and justify political and social changes.

In the late 2000s, the Global Financial Crisis was the most significant recession in American history since the Great Depression nearly a century earlier. Many Americans lost their jobs, their businesses, and their homes. This also happened during an extraordinary shift in political power just mere months before the 44th president, Barack Obama, was elected and took office. Many Americans were scared and uncertain about the future as well as angry that they were suffering the consequences of events they didn't cause. They blamed the banking institutions for their unethical practices that had caused the recession and they blamed the government for failing to regulate the banks. When the Reinvestment Act of 2009, which provided a total of \$831 billion in relief and stimulus, was passed, the American masses felt that their taxpayer dollars were being misused and handed over to people and institutions who didn't deserve them. When the Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan, which intended to use government money to help Americans avoid foreclosure, was announced the same month, CNBC business commentator Rick Santelli spoke for thousands one Thursday morning in February 2009 when he yelled "How many of you people want to pay for your neighbor's mortgage?"3 The question was rhetorical. Santelli knew that very few people wanted to pay off the debts of a person they don't know, but what became known as "the rant heard round the world" was a call to arms rather than food for thought. "We're thinking of having a Chicago Tea Party in July," he velled. "All you capitalists that want to show up to Lake Michigan, I'm gonna start organizing."4 And thus, the Tea Party movement was born.

This part of Santelli's rant recalled the Boston Tea Party, a 1773 protest against British taxation of the American colonies in which protesters dumped more than an estimated ninety-two thousand pounds of tea into Boston Harbour. According to the observations Lepore makes in her book, a major part of the Tea Party

<sup>3.</sup> Rick Santelli, "Rick Santelli and the "Rant of the Year,"" YouTube, uploaded by Todd Sullivan, 13 April 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEZB4taSEo-A&ab channel=ToddSullivan.

<sup>4.</sup> Santelli, "Rick Santelli and the "Rant of the Year.""

movement was to invoke the spirit of the American Revolution. According to members of the Chicago Tea Party, both the Boston Tea Party and the twenty-first-century Tea Party movement had the same goal – to end unfair taxation by the government. However, there was a key difference between the two. In 1773, American colonists didn't have representation in the British Parliament or any say in the foreign laws that governed them. Despite this, they were still responsible for supporting it financially. In contrast, the primarily white Tea Party movement did have representation in government and had just recently exercised their right as citizens to vote. The 2008 presidential election had the highest voter turnout in forty years, making it one of the most democratic elections in American history. Regardless, members of the Tea Party continued to reference and compare themselves to a group of people who overthrew a regime they deemed oppressive.

The name this conservative movement took is a prime example of a reference to the Revolution era. Another is the name that Santelli's rant took. "The rant heard round the world" clearly references one of the opening lines of Ralph Waldo Emerson's 1836 poem "Concord Hymn" about the Battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775.6 This poem, and this line in particular, is well-known as it is frequently studied in American classrooms. It is immediately recognizable to the general public, and by substituting the word "rant" for "shot," the comparison inevitably equalises the 21st-century plight of disenfranchised conservatives with the historical weight and significance of the American Revolution.

Santelli concludes his rant with one last statement. "If you read our Founding Fathers, people like Benjamin Franklin and Jefferson, what we're doing in this country now is making them roll over in their graves." Over and over, this recycled method of implying that the Founding Fathers created an absolute roadmap for how modern-day laws and policies ought to be constitutionally interpreted, in conjunction with the continuous evocation of the colonial idea of American oppression, across time politicians have

<sup>5.</sup> Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes, 7.

<sup>6.</sup> Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes, 3.

<sup>7.</sup> Santelli, "Rick Santelli and the "Rant of the Year.""

been able to mould the details of the American Revolution to suit whatever revolution they believe themselves to be presently driving. Lepore herself writes, "When in doubt, in American politics, left, right, or center... deploy[s] the Founding Fathers."

Lepore ties this method in with the concept of historical fundamentalism. Historical fundamentalism is "the belief that a particular and quite narrowly defined past [...] is ageless and sacred and to be worshipped; that certain historical texts [...] are to be read in the same spirit with which religious fundamentalists read religious texts; that the Founding Fathers were divinely inspired." This concept supports the belief that America is so exceptional that just the names of its founders and foundational documents hold immense power and influence. In many debates over issues such as voting, the role of government, individual freedoms, interpretations of the Constitution, and, in this case, taxes, names such as George Washington and Thomas Paine are invoked by the speaker, demonstrating an explicit assumption that a long-deceased historical figure would agree with them if they were still alive. Furthermore, rather than just using this as a presumption that they work to respect the Founders' wishes, these invocations of historical figures are often framed as bolstering the legitimacy of a political position.

Ultimately, the Founding Fathers were products of their time and were unconcerned with issues that are now highly debated but didn't concern them in the late eighteenth century. However, this didn't stop Suffolk University economist David Tuerck from wearing a tie emblazoned with an image of George Washington while opposing same-sex marriage. "It's time for us to rally around a new cause, which is to return America to the principles for which our forefathers fought and died. It's time for a new American Revolution" Tuerck declared in 2004. There are a plethora of issues with this logic. First, the definition of marriage was not a mainstream political or cultural issue in the 1770s like it was in 2004, so it is unlikely it would have ever been considered a serious issue of the state. Additionally, the assumption of the Founders' opinions on

<sup>8.</sup> Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes, 14.

<sup>9.</sup> Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes, 16.

<sup>10.</sup> Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes, 4.

the matter in a 21st-century context will remain forever unknown, as all modern-day interpretations of their beliefs serve merely as a projection of one's own political agenda.

Secondly, the America of the twenty-first century is a very different country from eighteenth-century America. The racial and religious make-up of the nation has become much more diverse. The 1790 census only included three racial categories – free whites, slaves, and free people of mixed race, while the 2010 census included sixty-three different racial categories. The majority of the three hundred and thirty million people who currently live in the United States are not descended from Revolutionary War soldiers, but instead, from people who were owned by them or who have immigrated since.

Finally, this particular situation raises a serious issue with the way the Revolution, and particularly, the Founding Fathers, are remembered. George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, John Hancock, and Benjamin Franklin were all slave owners. These men should not be considered the moral standard the United States measures itself against. For example, Jefferson is considered one of the most important Founding Fathers. He wrote the Declaration of Independence, which declared the United States a nation independent from Great Britain and ironically stated "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights." Jefferson later served as the first Secretary of State, the second vice president, and two terms as the third president. However, he also famously had several children with one of his slaves, Sally Hemings, who was thirty years his junior and the younger half-sister of his late wife.

It is impossible to ignore that Jefferson is a very important and influential figure in American history yet, the Texas School Board opted to remove him from the curriculum in 2010 due to his sup-

<sup>11.</sup> Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Rich Morin, and Mark Hugo Lopez, "Chapter 1: Race and Multiracial Americans in the U.S. Census," *Pew Research Center*, 11 June 2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2015/06/11/chapter-1-race-and-multiracial-americans-in-the-u-s-census/#:~:text=The%20first%20 census%20in%201790,were%20included%20in%20subsequent%20counts.

<sup>12. &</sup>quot;Declaration of Independence: A Transcription," National Archives, accessed 7 March 2022, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript.

port of a secular government.<sup>13</sup> The cited reasons are demonstrative of the cherry-picking mentality Americans have long used when trying to decipher what the Founders' vision for the nation was. First, their stated reason is that Jefferson openly supported the separation of church and state. Texas is a very religious state located in the Bible Belt. Seventy-seven percent of adults over the age of eighteen living in Texas identify as Christian, with thirty-one percent identifying as Evangelical Protestant.<sup>14</sup> Considering religion a vital part of their identity, the state wanted to ensure that the next generation was educated about this identity and continue it.

Another reason is the belief that children should not be taught to hate their own country. This belief became very popular during the Trump administration and continues to be during the debate on teaching America's past and present racism and forced marginalisation of minorities in schools. According to Trump's 1776 Commission, children should not be taught "that the men and women who built [America] were not heroes, but rather villains." Jefferson has lost popularity as a historical hero in recent years. Perhaps, due to the public nature of his violent bigotry. It is more difficult to ignore the actions of a man who kept his biological children enslaved on his plantation as opposed to a figure like Washington who, for example, freed all his slaves after his death and consequently remains a celebrated and heroic historical figure.

However, it is much more important to acknowledge and learn about the uglier and more controversial parts of America's past rather than ignore them altogether. No matter the discomfort this might cause those who consider themselves proud American patriots, these events have had a massive influence on the evolution of events and ideas in America throughout history. The fact that ten of the nation's first twelve presidents were slave owners was used by the Confederacy during the Civil War to justify their secession from the Union. In their minds, they were fighting for their freedom in the spirit of the patriots several decades earlier. If America never addresses this complicated past, then it can never learn from

<sup>13.</sup> Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes, 13.

<sup>14. &</sup>quot;Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Texas," Pew Research Center, accessed 7 March 2022, https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/texas/. 15. "The 1776 Report," The President's Advisory 1776 Commission, January 2021.

its mistakes, heal from the trauma, pay reparations where they are due, and hopefully, one day, move on.

In this prologue to "The Whites of Their Eyes," Lepore studies the legacy of the American Revolution and the birth of the nation. By discussing the impact on contemporary political, economic, and social issues such as the new conservative curriculum created by the Texas school board and the Tea Party's reaction to how the brand-new Obama administration chose to address the 2008 financial crisis, Lepore informs the reader how relevant this era continues to be despite taking place over two hundred years ago. Referencing a Revolutionary event such as the Boston Tea Party or invoking the name of a Founding Father when arguing a case continues to hold weight in American society and politics. Despite the recycled nature and repetition of this tactic, the hypocrisy by which the Founders' words and presumed beliefs are bent to perfectly suit the issue of the moment, and the justification of bigotry which often results, the fabric of American culture continues to allow and perpetuate letting dead men run the United States of America.

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