The Politics of Urban Climate Change Policy: Toward a Research Agenda

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Abstract
Urban politics research has not kept pace—empirically or theoretically—with city governments’ engagement with climate change policy. Thousands of cities globally have made commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and are taking steps toward these goals. In the United States, research has examined the motivations for such actions and has described some of the implementation challenges cities are encountering, but we lack a theoretically informed understanding of how these actions intersect politically with existing interests, institutions, and fiscal realities in cities. This article identifies five political entry points that are specific to urban climate change policy and can provide a foundation for empirically and theoretically valuable research. The pursuit of such an interdisciplinary urban research agenda for climate change would enhance our understanding of when and how cities are successful in addressing climate change and would provide new answers to long-standing questions in urban politics.

Keywords
climate change, urban governance, urban policy, politics of policy

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Climate change will be, and in many cases already is, on urban policy agendas. Globally, thousands of city governments are formally engaged with climate change policy networks and have made commitments to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Arup 2014; Bulkeley 2013). Cities are actively adapting to climate change through infrastructure and emergency response planning (Carmin, Nadkarni, and Rhie 2012; Hughes 2015). The actions cities are taking to respond to climate change have placed them on the world stage. At the World Summit on Climate and Territories in July 2015, a lead-up meeting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Paris (Conference Of the Parties 21), city leaders were told by UN Assistant Secretary-General Janos Pasztor that they are “on the frontlines of the climate challenge” and that national governments “need your support to raise ambitions.” Indeed, more than 1,000 city leaders attended the Climate Summit for Local Leaders held on December 4, 2015, at COP 21. The lead climate change negotiators for the United States and China recently highlighted the role cities play in implementing federal climate change programs, and the momentum created by their independent actions and commitments for a historic agreement between the two countries (Davenport 2015). We can only expect cities’ engagement with climate change to increase, as demand from national governments, state and provincial governments, foundations, and citizens for cities to address climate change is on the rise.

Beyond its practical significance, the leadership of city governments on climate change introduces new interests, information, intergovernmental relationships, and ideas to urban politics, generating important new research questions. Responding to climate change could reshape the physical, institutional, and social underpinnings of cities in fundamental ways, and thus presents a set of challenges not found in other policy areas such as education, economic development, or housing. For example, in 2007, New York City, under the leadership of Mayor Michael Bloomberg, released PlaNYC, a comprehensive plan that lays out the city’s approach to addressing housing, transportation, energy, water, air pollution, and green space. In this plan, they recognize the connection each of these sectors has to the city’s levels of GHG emissions and write, “collectively these initiatives all address our greatest challenge: climate change” (The City of New York 2007, p. 133).

However, urban politics scholarship has generally not kept pace with climate change policy developments in practice. As a community, we have been slow to take up the challenge of understanding the politics of urban climate change policy: the extent to which addressing climate change at the local level intersects with existing interests, institutions, and ideas about the city. Are current theoretical frameworks adequate given the wide-ranging effects
to urban economies and communities implicated by effective climate change mitigation policy? An interdisciplinary focus on the politics of urban climate change policy is needed.

Focusing on the United States, and on government-led initiatives, I briefly outline what governing climate change in the city entails, focusing on mitigation efforts (reducing GHG emissions), and the important contributions that have been made already to our understanding of local policy adoption. I then focus on five specific political features of urban climate change mitigation policy—what I term “political entry points”—that could provide a foundation for a more robust research agenda: the mayoral champion, intersectoral coordination, jurisdictional fragmentation, long-term versus short-term interests, and new revenue demands. While this is not an exhaustive list of the challenges and tensions apparent in urban climate change policy work, the questions raised provide opportunities for theoretically informed, interdisciplinary urban politics research that also contributes to the practice of governing climate change in the city.

**Cities, GHG Emissions, and Mitigation Policy: Identifying the Research Needs**

Climate change mitigation refers to “human efforts to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014). Globally, cities are responsible for more than 70% of energy-related GHG emissions (International Energy Agency 2009). These emissions come from energy production, the use of natural gas and heating oil in buildings and industrial processes, and fossil fuels used for transportation by cars, trains, trucks, and buses. The particular sources of GHG emissions in cities can vary significantly. Car-dominated cities will have a greater proportion of GHG emissions arising from transportation than densely built cities with robust public transportation systems. Alternatively, cities that rely heavily on fossil fuel-based energy sources, or have a manufacturing-based economy, are likely to have a greater proportion of their GHG emissions attributable to energy use. Cities often distinguish between GHG emissions arising from internal government activities (e.g., city-owned buildings and vehicle fleets) or from activities in the broader community (e.g., energy use in homes and fuels used in private vehicles).

Mitigation policy, therefore, can take a variety of forms (Bulkeley 2013). Introducing more renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, can reduce GHG emissions generated from energy production. Mandating or incentivizing energy efficiency fixtures and cooling systems in buildings reduces demand. Investing in alternative transportation modes, such as mass...
transit and bicycling, can reduce GHG emissions from gasoline and diesel engines. Decisions about how solid waste is transferred and disposed, and the size and distribution of green space in the city, can also reduce or capture GHG emissions. City governments may opt to focus on behavioral change such as carpooling, recycling, or resource conservation.

Achieving large reductions in GHG emissions in cities—such as the 80% reductions many city governments have pledged to achieve—is likely to require a suite of alterations to urban infrastructures, institutions, and behaviors: Energy systems, the built environment, decision-making processes and partnerships, and consumption patterns are all potential targets for urban climate change mitigation policy. The intersecting and complex demands of climate change are unique from those in other policy areas. Given this challenging, and ultimately global, task, why have some city governments been so ambitious and eager to engage?

**Why and How Cities Are Mitigating Climate Change**

When climate change first came to policy makers’ attention in the 1980s and early 1990s, mitigation was the initial focus and, given the level of collective action that is required to significantly reduce global GHG emissions, an international response initially seemed most appropriate. The first attempt at crafting a global solution came in the form of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC was signed in 1992, with 195 signatories committing to the goal of “stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC 1992, p. 4). Binding GHG reduction targets were then developed as part of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997; however, several countries, including the United States, failed to ratify this treaty domestically due to entrenched political interests. As a result, international efforts to reduce GHG emissions have by most accounts been deemed ineffective (Hoffmann 2011).

In the face of policy stagnation at the international and, in the case of the United States, national levels, many city governments have been developing plans of their own. A relatively large body of research—led primarily by public policy and public administration scholars—has examined the characteristics and motivations of city governments that are taking action to address climate change. This largely quantitative research has shown fairly consistently that cities that are larger, better educated, wealthier, and home to active environmental groups are more likely to have a climate change plan in place, while cities with a manufacturing base or other source of carbon-intensive activities are less likely to have a climate change plan in place (Krause 2011a, 2011b, 2012b; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011; Zahran et al. 2008). Leadership
within city government and institutional mechanisms for interest group and community engagement can also make the adoption of climate change plans more likely (Bae and Feiock 2013; Feiock, Francis, and Kassekert 2010; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011). Cities often tailor their climate change plans to produce benefits beyond GHG reductions such as cost savings, growth management, or political recognition (Betsill 2001).

Cities are taking cues from higher levels of government and transnational networks: Cities in states and counties with supportive frameworks for local climate change action are generally more likely to have adopted a climate change plan (Homsy and Warner 2015; Krause 2011a). Transnational organizations, such as ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection and the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, provide opportunities for cities to gain technical expertise and learn from other cities’ experiences (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Lee 2012). Membership in these organizations is often used as a proxy for climate change policy adoption in empirical analyses (e.g., Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011), but evidence for whether such networks have a tangible influence on local decision making is mixed (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Krause 2012a).

Scholars have also highlighted the challenges cities face when moving from a climate change plan to the implementation of policies and programs necessary to meet the city’s goals (i.e., the “stubborn gap between the rhetoric and reality of local climate policy”; Betsill and Bulkeley 2007, p. 448). Indeed, as Sharp, Daley, and Lynch (2011) pointed out, adopting a climate change plan or pledging to reduce GHG emissions is a relatively low-cost policy action for city governments. In a survey of municipalities in Indiana, Krause (2011b) found that while 20% have a stated GHG reduction goal, only 5% have taken the step of performing a GHG inventory, developed a reduction plan, or given climate change a designated budget. Unclear sources of authority, an inability to agree on objectives, and financial stress have been shown to hinder progress (Bulkeley 2013; Moser and Ekstrom 2010, 2012; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011). As a result, cities may focus on meeting climate change goals by reducing emissions attributable to government activities first before focusing on community-wide emissions (Francis and Feiock 2011). In some cases, civil society groups have played a central role in implementing projects in the city that reduce GHG emissions (Aylett 2013). There is an emerging sense that unique configurations of factors allow cities to effectively implement policies and programs that reduce GHG emissions (Ryan 2015).

The Need for a More Political Perspective

The research described above has generated important insights into the characteristics and motivations of cities that are taking steps to address climate
change. However, significant gaps remain. Thus far, analyses of urban climate change policy have typically used quantitative analyses to describe broad patterns in adoption, motivation, and success. These are important foundations, but going forward more in-depth and nuanced examinations of the politics surrounding urban climate change policy and governance are required. We know very little about the political dynamics engaged in the urban climate change policy process, and the form and implications of the resulting governance processes and outcomes (Portney 2013; Ryan 2015). Even our understanding of best practices is generally constrained to the planning stage (e.g., Clean Air Partnership 2007). While a picture is emerging that portrays urban climate change policy as challenging and complex, frameworks and theories for understanding and explaining the political patterns that underpin mitigation policy adoption and implementation are underdeveloped, and it is not immediately obvious that existing theories of urban politics will suffice.

There is a need to better understand—both empirically and theoretically—the political dimensions of urban climate change mitigation policy. To do this, research must identify the important mechanisms and strategies that are employed by various actors to achieve commitment to urban climate change policy and ensure or impede implementation. We need to understand what is at stake and how interests are mobilized, who wins and who loses, and what types of institutional innovations are required to govern climate change in the city. For the remainder of this article, I will highlight five political entry points that scholars are presented with as cities engage with climate change mitigation policy. These entry points provide opportunities for research that is well positioned to contribute to our understanding of both urban politics and climate change policy.

**Five Political Entry Points in Urban Climate Change Mitigation Policy**

*The mayoral champion*

Mayors often play an important role in championing climate change plans and policies for their cities. There are a growing number of national and international platforms through which mayors are encouraged to demonstrate their commitment to addressing climate change, highlight the actions their cities are taking, and access technical support and resources (Engel 2006). Forums and intercity networks, such as the C40 Climate Leadership Group, the World Mayors Council on Climate Change, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, have all helped to promote mayors as
climate change policy champions. Mayors can use their commitment to climate change to demonstrate their progressive vision and leadership, and to gain national and international recognition. Such leadership can be crucial for the development of a climate change plan for the city (Bae and Feiock 2013; Center for Clean Air Policy 2009; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011).

However, while executive leadership may be important for adopting a climate change plan for the city, a mayoral champion is not always adequate for successful policy implementation. During implementation, the locus of power can quickly become city council and city administrators who are charged with passing new ordinances (such as energy saving requirements) or providing new services (such as providing additional bus routes or enforcing energy efficiency standards). While mayors provide leadership and can help to establish policy agendas, they often have limited direct influence on city council and city administrators.

Explanations of mayoral success have focused on personality, institutional and political environments, and historical development (Greasley and Stoker 2009). Yates (1977) argued that mayors have very little control over municipal administrations generally, but that the influence of mayors is determined by a combination of their personal leadership style and their political environment. Indeed, the formal powers granted to a city’s mayor have been shown to influence whether he or she succeeds in forwarding and implementing his or her personal goals (Mullin, Peele, and Cain 2004). Similarly, Ferman (1985) found that mayors must be able to strategically align their actions to the city’s political environment to be effective. Others see historical development and the opportunities it presents to mayors as the determination of mayoral success (Flanagan 2004). Ultimately, however, theoretical explanations of the role of mayoral leadership (and of leadership in general) in urban politics, and its relationship to various institutional structures in city governance, remain underdeveloped (Greasley and Stoker 2009).

The championing of climate change by mayors provides an opportunity to answer questions about the ability of mayors to spearhead major changes to urban systems and steer cities in new directions. However, we may expect that cities with more powerful mayors, who have demonstrated a commitment to climate change, are able to more effectively pursue mitigation policies. This relationship, however, may be contingent on a number of factors such as the presence of competing economic priorities, the types of resources a mayor has access to (financial or institutional), and state and federal policies and priorities (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). We may also expect the relationship between mayoral powers and climate change policy effectiveness to be rather weak. Reducing GHG emissions requires a significant commitment from private sector and community actors in cities. Successful mayoral climate change
agendas may be determined more by the potential and strategies for collaboration than on the use of formal powers. Similarly, a relatively weak mayor who is actively engaged in global city networks and has access to greater technical and political expertise may subsequently be more effective at pursuing climate change policy than a mayor with more formal powers who is not engaged in such networks.

**Intersectoral coordination**

Meeting urban climate change mitigation goals requires coordination within city governments and between city governments and outside actors (Cutter et al. 2014). For example, reducing GHG emissions attributable to water management practices may require coordination between the water utility and the sanitation department; increasing public transportation ridership numbers may require coordination between transportation and zoning; implementing energy efficiency upgrades may require coordination between city engineers, housing authorities, and developers.

This need for coordination is often explicitly acknowledged in urban climate change plans (Hughes 2015). However, achieving coordination among sectors and departments can be a daunting task for local governments. City governments are highly fragmented internally in ways that can shape and constrain their efforts to reduce GHG emissions (Aylett 2014). Indeed, the development of an Integrated Resources Plan in Los Angeles to coordinate water supply and wastewater management functions was innovative enough to win a prize from the U.S. Water Alliance in 2011. The challenges of coordination extend beyond urban bureaucracies, however. A broader set of actors—from the private sector, civil society, and other levels of government—participate in urban governance and shape outcomes in the city (Pierre 2011; Sellers 2002a; Stone 2015). Coordinating mechanisms—formal or informal—are required if the public and private sectors are to move in the same direction and contribute to the implementation of climate change policies and programs.

Cities are experimenting with different models of such coordination. For example, New York City established the Green Codes Task Force in implementing the city’s climate change goals, which is composed of representatives from government, industry, and civil society. The Green Codes Task Force identified opportunities to amend the city’s building and construction codes in ways that would reduce energy use. However, questions remain about how and where such coordination arises in cities pursuing climate change solutions, which actors are engaged, and to what purpose.
Regime theory has struggled to explain the emergence and dynamics of the types of public–private coalitions that could sustain a progressive urban agenda such as addressing climate change (Mossberger 2009). Urban governance scholars have demonstrated the tangible implementation gains that come with good local governance through collaboration (Rich and Stoker 2015; Scholz and Wang 2006), but many predict that such collaborations will be increasingly task-specific and, critically, will include actors from other levels of government (Bramwell 2012; Bramwell and Pierre 2013; Pierre and Peters 2012). Scholars continue to emphasize the “iron law” of resource mobilization: “for any governing arrangement to sustain itself, resources must be commensurate with the agenda being pursued” (Stoker 1995; Stone 1993, in Stone 2015, p. 103). The resources required to address climate change are likely to be city-specific, and their mobilization may require new skills and expertise on the part of city governments.

The emergence of urban climate change mitigation policy and political action presents an opportunity to gain deeper insight into how—and by whom—resources for progressive urban policy agendas are mobilized and sustained. Are coalitions organized specifically around climate change or is the landscape more fragmented? If the latter, city governments may need to engage in “meta-governance” (Pierre and Peters 2012, p. 81), or the “organization of the conditions for governance” (Jessop 2002, p. 49), though it is not immediately clear that they are experienced in such domains (McGuirk 2000). Indeed, this may be a reason why city governments have generally been more successful when targeting city operations rather than the community at large. Understanding the ability and strategies of city governments to actively construct or influence governing coalitions for climate change mitigation—ones that are able to mobilize the necessary resources—would provide important insights for scholars and practitioners.

**Jurisdictional fragmentation**

One reason for the prominent role of cities in climate change governance is the perception that cities have jurisdiction over a large portion of global GHG emissions due to their ability to influence energy use, transportation and commuting patterns, land-use planning, building design, and waste management. Indeed, urban climate change plans typically specify and highlight the actions and commitments to be taken by the city government in these areas.

However, while cities may have jurisdiction over important sources of GHG emissions, this does not mean they have the capacity to act autonomously or that their incentives or opportunities for doing so are entirely locally determined. State and federal policies and funding programs can significantly...
shape the opportunities local governments have to innovate and implement new initiatives (Frug and Barron 2008; Sellers 2002b). Metropolitan or regional fragmentation can also inhibit effective local action on issues, such as transportation, energy sourcing, and land use, due to conflicting aims and resources held by other cities (Feiock 2004; Judd and Swanstrom 2012).

The tensions that arise when climate change plans are developed by cities but implemented in a fragmented metropolitan landscape raise questions about how cities interpret and exercise jurisdiction, how jurisdictional conflicts are resolved, and what strategies cities may develop for wielding influence beyond their formal jurisdiction. Regional approaches to addressing climate change are emerging such as the Los Angeles Regional Collaborative, which includes not just city governments but also universities and environmental organizations. In the case of watershed management, this type of collaborative institution, designed to facilitate collective action, is most likely to emerge when the benefits of collaboration outweigh the costs (Lubell et al. 2002). Research is needed to better characterize what the costs and benefits to action on climate change are for cities—or are perceived to be—to understand whether these conditions similarly influence the emergence of regional, intermunicipal cooperation on climate change.

Collaborative intermunicipal climate change institutions are likely to interact with existing regional bodies, such as the federally funded and mandated metropolitan planning organizations, which have responsibility for transportation planning in the United States. As the institutional “ecology” governing urban GHG emissions becomes more complex, actors may adopt new strategies to maximize benefits and minimize costs (Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010). A better understanding of the political drivers and consequences of intermunicipal cooperation, and regional scale solutions to pressing urban policy problems, is needed (Savitch and Vogel 2009; Swanstrom 2001).

**Long-term outcomes and short-term preferences**

The benefits of reducing GHG emissions (a more stable climate) will take years to realize and may not even be perceptible. Ambitious GHG emissions reduction projects that require new or reconfigured infrastructure, retrofitted buildings, or accumulated behavioral changes can take years or decades to complete. In some cases, it may be future generations that benefit from a city’s efforts to reduce emissions. Problems, such as climate change with longtime horizons and, at times, controversial politics, can be particularly subject to the short-term and reactive tendencies of urban policy making. Addressing climate change requires that city decision makers give priority to projects that not only have long-term implications but also are likely to have long payoff
times. Ideas around policy learning and adaptation, and the formation of a policy agenda, have been slow to be tested in, or adapted to, the urban context (Sapotichne and Jones 2011; Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe 2007).

Intertemporal decision-making trade-offs in particular are not well studied in cities, and climate change governance provides an important avenue for greater insight into how and when cities prioritize the long-term payoffs of addressing climate change. Jacobs (2011) argued there are three hurdles to future-oriented policy making: problems of electoral risk, problems of predicting long-term policy effects, and problems of institutional capacity. For cities, the level and source of electoral risk faced by officials, a given agency’s ability to predict long-term policy effects, and sources of institutional capacity in city governments are rarely static. A city’s initial mission to reduce GHG emissions is likely to be reframed and adapted over time as political conditions and leadership shift. For example, when New York City Mayor Bill DeBlasio took office in 2014, he adapted the city’s existing climate change efforts to his political agenda (affordable housing) rather than the other way around. Institutional differences between cities, beyond just capacity, may also play an important role in determining the balance between short-term and long-term orientation of policy making. For example, the institutional structures of city governments have been shown to shape the degree to which elected officials are accessible and responsive to interest groups and public opinion (Gerber 2013; Gerber and Phillips 2003; Lubell et al. 2009; Portney and Cuttler 2010).

Finally, it is increasingly clear that a shift is underway: Where environmental policies, such as reducing GHG emissions, were once thought of as a liability to cities operating in highly competitive environments (e.g., Peterson 1981), there is growing evidence that such “extra-economic” factors (i.e., being a “sustainable city”) are helping to brand cities and urban spaces in ways that are advantageous in a global marketplace (Jessop and Sum 2000) and thus provide a link between short-term and long-term interests.

**New revenue demands**

Perhaps the most straightforward political entry point is produced by the fact that reducing GHG emissions, on the whole, costs money. While efficiency gains can reduce energy and transportation costs, new revenue streams must be identified, or existing revenue redirected, to fund the programs and investments needed to reduce GHG emissions. Indeed, identifying revenue sources for climate change programs has emerged as a central challenge for cities that have tried to make progress in this area (Clean Air Partnership 2007; Moser and Ekstrom 2012). The search for climate change funding is taking place in
the context of a rapidly shifting fiscal environment, in terms of both revenue quantities and sources. Cities are increasingly reliant on user fees for funding new infrastructure projects (Pagano and Perry 2008); intergovernmental grants can be particularly important for large cities in the United States (Buettner and Wildasin 2006) but are an uncertain and often conditional revenue source. Efforts to redirect existing funds can be hindered by those who have an interest in maintaining the status quo.

Funding new programs and mobilizing resources in pursuit of pressing problems is a perennial challenge for cities. As climate change rises on urban policy agendas, there are important questions to ask about how programs are funded, who bears the cost, and whether funding strategies ultimately shape the outcomes. At the international level, normative issues surrounding who should pay often dominate (and stall) negotiations. As cities seek federal, state, or private-sector funding for their climate change programs, what implications does this carry for the outcomes? Further research is required to identify the financial innovations that are necessary, or being piloted, by cities as they address climate change, and the varying and dynamic fiscal relationships between levels of government this engenders. In addition to identifying promising practices for funding climate change programs, the answers could provide broader insights into how cities are grappling with their changing fiscal and political environments and the implications of these efforts for various interest groups.

Going Forward

As stated previously, climate change is likely to become more—rather than less—common to urban policy agendas, and it is imperative that the politics and political implications be better understood. While previous research has identified the broad patterns of climate change policy adoption by U.S. cities, we lack insight into the nuanced ways in which sources of authority, institutional constraints and opportunities, and political interests shape the investments and trade-offs cities are willing to make as they pursue their climate change goals.

The five political entry points identified in this article present important governing spaces where urban climate change politics are likely to be apparent, and where urban politics research is likely to provide transferable insights. The mayoral champion, need for collaboration, jurisdictional fragmentation, long-term orientation, and additional revenue demands of climate change raise challenging and important questions for the study and practice of urban politics. History tells us that it is possible for actors to navigate and overcome such challenges to successfully implement policy,
though the particular strategies chosen may differ. Mayors can be successful in implementing policy priorities, coordination can be achieved among sectors and governments, cities can implement long-term programs and find ways to fund new initiatives. Following the successful engagement of city governments in COP 21, they may be increasingly likely to look to international actors (and cities) for guidance and support (see also Barber 2013). However, our understanding of how these processes play out in the complex policy terrain of climate change is incomplete.

Further research is required to understand how likely cities are to resolve these tensions and with what consequences. We may ask whether the five political entry points are equally applicable or important, whether some are more challenging to navigate than others, who experiences the political tensions that arise and how they overcome them, and who wins and loses as these tensions are resolved. It is also likely that the politics of mayoral agendas, collaboration, long-term commitment, and financing are highly intertwined, as cities must decide how and where to prioritize climate change actions within a broader policy agenda.

Examining the politics of urban climate change policy ultimately raises questions about the conditions under which cities are—or could be—the appropriate political venues for climate change mitigation policy and how cities could be most successful in these endeavors (by various metrics). It can also provide new answers to long-standing questions in urban politics about the source and nature of power in the policy process, steering agents and mechanisms in the city, and evolving municipal revenue strategies. Progress on such an agenda requires greater interdisciplinary collaboration: Insights from urban governance, urban economics, and community development must be combined with those from public policy, public administration, and environmental studies. Scholars of urban politics have much to gain from a closer examination of the politics of urban climate change governance.

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Notes
2. In some cases, important urban climate change governance action is arising from outside the government (Bulkeley, Broto, and Edwards 2014). However, for the purposes of this article, I focus on efforts led by city governments, though often with the support or involvement of other actors.
3. Greater optimism for the international process has followed the successes in Paris in December 2015.

References


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