

THE UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES

vol. 11

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CO-EDITORS

Angela Nader
Teodora Avramov

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Emmett Choi
Kelsey Wiseman
Michael Cowan
Sam Caldarone

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Ian Sullivan Cant

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MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR

It is my real pleasure to welcome you, readers, to the eleventh volume of the Undergraduate Journal of American Studies at the University of Toronto. As usual, the articles in this volume cover a wide variety of topics and articulate a wide variety of perspectives. But it is perhaps appropriate, in a year in which Donald Trump was elected President of the U.S., that many of the articles in these pages centre on big and important questions of politics and political history—of F.D.R. and Kennedy, of the Cold War and the Iraq War.

I want, especially, to thank and congratulate both the individual contributors and the editorial team who assembled the various contributions into a coherent whole. Writing well is not easy, but it is both important and deeply satisfying. To paraphrase Alexis de Tocqueville's famous comment about the freedom of the press in America, authors (like these undergraduate students) have an amazing ability to put the same thought in a thousand minds at the same time. Such is the power of ideas. And such is the promise of an academic journal that serves as a vehicle for such smart, talented, idea-laden undergraduates as these.

The Centre for the Study of the United States (CSUS) at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto is our country's preeminent place for making sense of our southern neighbour. It is a place where scholars in fields as diverse as political science, economics, cinema studies, women and gender studies, history, English, geography, art history, and many others come together through a shared intellectual interest in the United States. We host dozens of public lectures and intellectually stimulating events each year. We mount a complete undergraduate program in American Studies. We act as a touchstone for graduate students whose focus is the United States. And, as you will see, we help bring to fruition an undergraduate student journal in American Studies which advertises the breadth and depth of our students' interests.

Congratulations all.

Robert Vipond
Interim Director
Centre for the Study of the United States and
American Studies program

CO-EDITORS' MESSAGE

On behalf of the Centre for the Study of the United States at the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs, we are pleased to present to you the 11th volume of the Undergraduate Journal of American Studies.

The production of this year's journal happened alongside the 2016 American presidential election, one of the most historic elections in modern history. In January, as we began our work, the Democratic and Republican primaries dominated news cycles. At the time, Republican candidate Donald J. Trump seemed like a curious anomaly. The media pored over each outlandish statement he made during rallies and debate nights, but many dismissed the idea of Trump becoming the presumptive Republican nominee, let alone president of the United States of America. Now, in November, as we put the finishing touches on our journal, Donald Trump has officially won the Electoral College, and has become president-elect of the United States.

To reflect this contentious year in American politics, we have chosen a presidential theme for this year's journal. Enclosed, you will find, in chronological order, essays starting with executive orders as laid out in the Constitution, to analyses of Presidents Lincoln, Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, Bush, and Obama. Many thanks are due to the writers of these excellent pieces for their submissions and help in subsequent edits, as well as to our associate editors Emmett, Kelsey, Sam, and Mike for their hard work in all aspects of journal production. We would also like to thank CSUS program coordinator Stella Kyriakakis for her counsel throughout this process. Finally, thank you to our graphic designer Ian Sullivan Cant for bringing the vision of our journal to fruition.

In the coming days, the entire world will have questions regarding the repercussions of a Trump presidency. Will Trump undo President Obama's executive orders with orders of his own? Will his policies trigger an economic recession? Will he round up minorities, as he pledged to do during his presidential campaign? Right now, these questions are unanswerable. Still, we can look back through history in order to piece together the puzzles of our present condition. These essays cover past events that are worth revisiting, including the Great Depression, the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War, the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, among other topics. Not only are each of these essays exemplary in their own right, but together, they can remind us of what the nation has been through, what it needs to avoid in the future, and perhaps, what lies ahead in this truly unprecedented moment in American history.

Angela Nader and Teodora Avramov
Co-editors-in-Chief

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THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

by

ADITYA RAU

The United States has been described as "the image of democracy itself,"[1] both politically dynamic yet firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution. Indeed, the American government speaks to democratic ideals, as it necessitates a representative government that is accountable to its electorate. At the heart of this political system is the separation of powers between Congress and the executive branch. The founding fathers established the presidency as one "that was strong enough to act decisively but checked by means of constitutional constraints."[2] As American democracy has evolved, so too has the role of the president, the relationship between Congress and the executive branch, and the impact of the presidency on American democracy. Political scientists have recognized these structural shifts and, in doing so, have noted the emergence of a "modern presidency."

The modern presidency, though cognizant of its constitutional limitations, has come to play a more independent role in American politics today. This dichotomy alludes to the "ambivalence of the framers,"[3] who envisioned an independent executive, yet one that was not monarchical in

nature. The modern presidency's greater independence is the result of the delegation of legislative power over time, an increase in the bureaucratic power of the executive, and expanded national policy authority as exercised through the veto and war powers. This paper will argue that an increase in the modern presidency's bureaucratic power, as well as Congress' delegation of legislative power to the executive, infringes upon Congress' representative function. Furthermore, it will contend that while an expanded executive and national policy authority reflects the present day societal needs, Congress' relinquishment of its primary function—law-making—has positioned the presidency as a threat to American democracy. This paper will first consider the ambiguity of presidential power as laid out in the Constitution. Next, it will examine the ways in which the modern presidency is a reflection of the framer's vision of a unitary executive. Finally, this paper will examine the impact of the veto and war powers on American democracy.

The manner in which the framers envisioned, and the Constitution presents, presidential power is ambiguous. This ambiguity raises the question, is the modern presidency true to its origins or is it merely a reflection of a changing political landscape? Article Two, Section One of the Constitution creates the office of the presidency and establishes the president as the head of the executive branch. However, whereas legislative power is bequeathed to Congress in the Constitution, there is no such granting of executive power.[4] The absence of this descriptor suggests that the founders recognized the need for an independent executive that was able to implement legislation in a variety of ways.[5] This is evident in that Alexander Hamilton, a founding father, stressed the need to have a unitary and "energetic executive."[6] Moreover, he believed that an independent executive would more effectively carry out "decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch."[7] This vision of a presidential figure is one that still stands in American society today. Although the president is solely the embodiment of "the legitimating democratic sovereignty of 'We, the People,'"[8] American citizens are quick to give up the entirety of their share of "democratic agency"[9] to the executive branch. Furthermore, the founders recognized that Congress' ability to enact universal laws demanded the existence of an executive that could act unilaterally, swiftly and with discretion.[10] Considering this perspective, it is likely that the modern presidency's more pronounced participation in American democracy is still in line with the founders' intentions.

However, not all founding fathers agreed with this notion of presidential power. Thomas Jefferson and George Mason, among others, disagreed with Hamilton's vision of a unitary, empowered, and engaged executive, as they feared that it would "degenerate…into a Monarchy."[11] Accordingly, the Constitutional Convention of 1787 produced an executive

that would be able to unilaterally while still being checked by other branches of government.[12] What's more, following the Revolutionary War, states attempted to elect supposedly "weak" executives who would be subordinate to the legislature.[13] At the time, legislatures were a "relatively new institution,"[14] created to address the "relatively modern view"[15] that political power concentrated in the hands of one, or a few, would be detrimental to democracy.

Jeffersonian Republicans' call for the president to be limited by a set of congressional checks and balances tells us more about the founding fathers' vision for the executive office. Going further, determining if the framers value executive efficiency over democratic accountability is critical to fully understanding the founder's vision for the role of the presidency. The Constitution's ambiguity in its establishment of the presidency speaks to the founders' recognition of the American government's structural impermanence. Hamilton himself stated that the modern presidency must adapt to "the probable exigencies of the ages."[16] The modern presidency has used constitutional ambiguity to its advantage, aggressively asserting its presence through the veto power, appointment power and policy initiation from within the executive bureaucracy.[17] One should also note that shifts in the socio-political sphere have demanded greater executive jurisdiction. First, these shifts include an expansion in government bureaucracy, which in turn necessitates a larger and more involved executive. The second shift has been "the internationalizing of US politics,"[18] which has required a trusted head of state who has the ability to act swiftly in moments of international duress. Third, there has been an attitude shift among citizens, whereby the presidency is seen as "nearly all there is to democratic politics.'"[19] The modern presidency can, then, be seen as a more vivid expression of the founders' original intentions for the executive branch. Constitutional ambiguity surrounding the executive branch has allowed for the modern presidency to more aggressively assert itself in American politics, and challenge the legislature's functions through the exercise of presidential prerogative. An absence of deliberation, inherent to the separation and balance of powers, suggests that the modern presidency threatens democracy.

This lack of deliberation is further compounded by the delegation of legislative power to the modern presidency. This is exemplified in the president's appointment power and the issuing of executive orders, as well as in the passage of vague legislation that leaves room for executive interpretation and execution.[20] This shift in policy-making and execution means that the executive bureaucracy must play a greater role in influencing legislative outcomes. As a result, "the executive office of the president [is] viewed as a manager of processes cutting across programs."[21] The modern president's ability to shape the executive bureaucracy is evident through the

president's ability to use the appointment power—the power to appoint key officials to executive departments and agencies. This strategy is an example of "Unitary Executive Theory"—whereby appointed bureaucrats are seen as appendages of the president.[22]

The executive branch serves to "enhance the president's ability to counter the centrifugal tendencies of the departments and their political constituencies as expressed through Congress."[23] For example, the Office of Management and Budget has long been considered the executive's "principal instrument for watching over the economy [and] as the instrument of the president's program expressed in financial terms."[24] As the political arena continue to expand in size, the appointment power is necessary for the creation of a "vigorous executive"[25] that is able to meet a growing set of political wants and needs. Members of the executive bureaucracy, such as policy czars, have no constitutional mandate. Instead, they serve at the pleasure of the president, which, in turn, raises questions concerning the democratic nature of the president's actions. While the appointment of policy czars speaks to executive expediency and suggests that a president does not want his agenda to "fall prey to interagency squabbling, wandering agendas or bureaucratic inertia,"[26] it has also given the modern presidency a "corporate presence."[27] So, in attempting to expedite its policy agenda, the modern presidency has undermined congressional activity and, in doing so, threatened to change the face of American democracy.

The modern presidency's ability to advance its own agenda is strengthened by the executive power to act unilaterally, backed by the full force of law, when circumstances deem it necessary. This is evidenced in the issuing of executive orders. Executive orders are one of the modern president's many "power tools,"[28] as they allow the president to act "without aid, interference or consent from the legislative branch."[29] While the Constitution does not specifically bestow this capacity on the executive, presidents have relied on an "an expansive reading of Article Two [of the Constitution]"[30] to counteract the legislative department, "extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."[31] Thus, it can be argued that on a constitutional level, the framers intended for executive orders to allow the president to circumvent "slow, public and pluralistic"[32] legislative operations. The importance of presidential executive orders continues to be seen today, most recently in the 2014 State of the Union. During this speech, President Obama recognized the importance of congressional action but noted that in cases of "congressional logjamming,"[33] wherever he could "take steps without legislation to expand opportunities for more American families,"[34] he would do just that. Clearly then, the modern presidency and the constitutional presidency are, in this case, one and the same. Thus, it would be fair to make the case that the use of executive orders does not

threaten democracy but instead, simply allows for greater efficiency and effectiveness during times of political stagnation.

There are two ways in which the president can issue executive orders. First, with the support of the legislature, "yielding the strongest possible presumption of validity."[35] Or second, "in contravention of legislative action,"[36] in which case the president's position is weakest. When presidents use executive orders, they often argue that the nation is constantly in a state of flux that threatens national interest and national security.[37] It is curious to note that modern presidents have issued fewer executive orders than past presidents. For example, President Roosevelt and President Truman issued 3522 and 907 orders, respectively.[38] In contrast, President Obama has issued 168 executive orders as of January 20, 2014, the fewest of any two-term president.[39] Thus, perhaps the argument that modern presidents threaten democracy by issuing executive orders without reservation is, in essence, a form of political moral panic. Considering the comparably modest number of executive orders President Obama has issued, perhaps this shows that presidents have not misused this power but rather, used it appropriately and supposedly to good effect.

However, one can present the argument that executive orders, coupled with the Supreme Court's reluctance to strike them down, pose a threat to democracy because of the ways in which they circumvent Congress' legislating function. Government mechanisms that run contrary to public administration pose a threat to the "legitimacy and effectiveness of public administration."[40] Since a "body of administrative law properly defined is an important… claim to [political] legitimacy,"[41] weakening the foundation of Congress can have dire consequences for American democracy. The negative consequences of this reality were seen in the issuing of Executive Order 9066, which called for the internment of Japanese Americans.

In addition to undermining Congress' legislative function, which runs the risk of disregarding citizens' interests, the use of executive orders is also dangerous because "courts have historically granted the president wide deference."[42] That is, the Supreme Court rarely strikes down executive orders. In part, this is because it is challenging for a court to determine the legitimacy of an executive order due to the ambiguity of executive orders as laid out in the Constitution.[43] Because of the Supreme Court's reluctance to intervene in executive orders, a president can advance a personal agenda while disregarding congressional, and by extension, citizens' interests. The absence of congressional representation, deliberation and accountability are cause for pessimism when considering the impact of the modern presidency on American democracy.

Presidential prerogative has widespread impacts and consequences, and is often the subject of debate. In particular, the veto power and war

power have raised questions about the extent to which the modern presidency has inserted itself into policy-making and, in doing so, threatened American democracy. The presidential veto serves to protect the executive from the threat of legislative manipulation.[44] The veto power is part of a constitutional system of checks and balances that, according to Madison, serves "as a check to precipitate unjust and unconstitutional laws."[45] The veto is, then, a legislative and revisionary power, though many Americans today perceive it as a "power of refusal, purely negative in nature."[46] Its function as a revisionary tool is evident in that Congress can override the veto and then the president must state his or her objections in writing.[47] Still, while the modern presidency is restricted in its use of the veto, presidents have used this legislative tool to "push raw policy preferences, not merely to block laws of dubious constitutionality [or partisan content]."[48] Moreover, modern presidents actively use the veto to "shape the content of legislation."[49] The veto power can, then, be seen as an instrument that undermines congressional law-making capabilities. This argument stands in stark contrast to the notion that democratization, and the people's consideration of the president as "an indispensable check [not influenced by] any section of the constituents or [by] temptations of a private nature"[50] legitimizes using the veto. In this sense, the use of the veto stands as a threat to an American democracy that represents the needs of the people. However, if the citizenry views the president as "the only representative of all the people,"[51] then democracy's representative function is met. Thus, while the argument can be made that, in theory, the veto is a dangerous political tool, the veto can also be considered a necessary tool in the system of checks and balances and the separation of powers between the Congress and executive office, both of which are intrinsic to American politics.

Evidently, the veto power and its impact on democracy have long been the subject of scholarly disagreement. Similarly, the presidents' use of the "war power" is also frequently the subject of debate. The war power is established in Article Two of the Constitution, which establishes the president as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces "when called into the service of the United States."[52] Article One of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, effectively calling the president into service as commander-in-chief.[53] Modern presidents have, however, often disregarded the congressional authority needed to engage in foreign conflict. For example, President Truman sent troops into Korea "on the basis of inherent executive authority without any participation by Congress."[54] The argument for presidential use of the war power is rooted in the president's identity as the head of state. The president is responsible for foreign policy; as such, he has the right to deploy forces when he deems it necessary.[55] The

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recognized the transfer of this constitutionally assigned congressional power from the legislature to the executive branch during American participation in the Vietnam conflict. The committee stated that "the real power to commit the country to war is now in the hands of the president... and the intent of the framers of the Constitution as to the war power substantially negated."[56]

The opposing view to a modern president's unilateral use of the war power is that "use of the armed forces is not reserved to Congress alone but is a concurrent responsibility."[57] Yet, when modern presidents have acted unilaterally, congressional support has often followed soon after. For example, both Presidents George Bush and George W. Bush gained congressional support for their decisions to commit the military to conflict in Iraq in 1998 and 2002, respectively.[58] Moreover, in cases in which executive action has been required prior to an opportunity for congressional approval, Congress has often decided to "express its support retroactively."[59] Thus, perhaps it is fair to say that in giving up significant control over appropriations and declarations of war, Congress is responsible for positioning the modern presidency as an institution adverse to democratic principles, representation and deliberation. The judiciary has done little to meet this political challenge, concluding that if the president and Congress are acting in joint accord, then legal complaints are considered non-justiciable.[60] Therefore, the modern presidency's threat to democracy can, in fact, be seen as a product of American democracy itself.

The modern presidency calls for a revision of American democracy. The evolution of the executive office is due, in part, to a liberal reading of presidential powers as outlined in the Constitution. According to the Constitution, the presidency was designed as a system of checks and balances, as evidenced by the separation of powers. While the modern presidency alludes to the framers' intentions, shifts in the political landscape and individual perceptions of the presidency have strengthened the modern president's ability to act unilaterally. Moreover, a broad understanding of the executive branch's power to issue executive orders and use the veto has facilitated the modern presidency's aggressive insertion into the legislative process. This compromises the deliberative process of American democracy. Furthermore, Congress often surrenders its legislative and representative functions to the modern presidency. The delegation of legislative power from the Congress to the executive branch has positioned the modern presidency as a threat to democracy. President Reagan described American democracy as "the most deeply honorable form of government ever devised by man." Perhaps the American political system needs to remind itself of this simple truth if both its political structure and its democracy are to be resilient for years to come.

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

By the President of the United States of America.

Whereas, *on the Twenty-Second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a Proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things the following, to wit :*

"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as Slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforth, and **FOREVER FREE,** *and the* EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, *including the military and naval authorities thereof,* WILL RECOGNIZE AND MAINTAIN THE FREEDOM *of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.*

"That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States, and the fact that any State, or the people thereof shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony be deemed conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof are not then in rebellion against the United States."

Now, therefore, I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, *by virtue of the power in me vested as* **Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy** *of the United States in time of actual armed Rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said Rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaim for the full period of one hundred days from the day of the first above-mentioned order, and designate, as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:* ARKANSAS, TEXAS, LOUISIANA (*except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, La Fourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of Orleans*), MISSISSIPPI, ALABAMA, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, NORTH CAROLINA, AND VIRGINIA (*except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth*), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this Proclamation were not issued.

And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that **ALL PERSONS HELD AS SLAVES** *within said designated States and parts of States* ARE, AND HENCEFORWARD **SHALL BE FREE!** *and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the Military and Naval Authorities thereof, will* RECOGNISE AND MAINTAIN THE FREEDOM *of said persons.*

And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, UNLESS IN NECESSARY SELF-DEFENCE, *and I recommend to them that in all cases, when allowed, they* LABOR FAITHFULLY FOR REASONABLE WAGES.

And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

And upon this act, SINCERELY BELIEVED TO BE AN ACT OF JUSTICE, *warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of* ALMIGHTY GOD.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my name, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[L. S.] *Done at the* CITY OF WASHINGTON, *this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.*

By the President:

William H. Seward
Secretary of State.

A. Lincoln

FIGHT FOR FREEDOM:
HOW THE CIVIL WAR SHAPED EMANCIPATION

by

GEORDIE JEAKINS

"And by the virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free."[1] These words, uttered by the President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, on January 1, 1863, fulfilled a lofty vision. The Declaration of Independence famously proclaimed that all men are created equal, but that ideal had been forsaken in the form of slavery for almost a century following that great event. With the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation, this injustice had come to an end. The Proclamation was not all-encompassing in breadth and scope, as it did not end slavery in the four slaveholding states of the Union, or guarantee equality for these freed slaves. Nevertheless, it represented a monumental triumph, and laid the groundwork for future gains by the African American population. This groundwork, however, was not an act of spontaneous magnanimity, but rather a result of a series of events that prompted the president to advance the cause of emancipation. The Proclamation was the product of a nation torn asunder, desperately trying to force itself back

together, during a time when compromise was becoming less attainable. The Civil War had eroded the middle course concerning slavery, allowing President Abraham Lincoln to take steps towards the emancipation of slaves, primarily for strategic war reasons.

At the outset of the Civil War, it was clear that emancipation was not a Union war aim. President Lincoln and the majority of the Republican party certainly were opposed to slavery on moral grounds. Lincoln admitted this fact in his Cooper Union Address, but pledged to keep from meddling with slavery in the South.[2] Lincoln belaboured this point constantly. Emancipation may have been desirous, but national unity was paramount. As the Secession Crisis unfolded, Lincoln held to this line. In a letter to the eventual vice president of the Confederate States of America, Lincoln stated, "You think slavery is *right* and ought to be extended; while we think it is *wrong* and ought to be restricted. That I suppose is the rub. It certainly is the only substantial difference between us."[3] Lincoln affirmed his views on slavery's unethical nature, but stated flatly that his wish was that slavery only be contained and left alone. He implored his former friend and ally to help produce reconciliation. It was not to be. Vice President Stephens would restate the fundamental importance of slavery, declaring it the cornerstone of the Confederate government.[4] Clearly, there could be no compromise with a rebellion that was convinced its former government was bent upon the destruction of slavery. Nevertheless, Lincoln continually sought to accommodate the seceded states, going so far as to endorse a congressional resolution that explicitly forbade the federal government from interfering with slavery in the Southern states.[5] This earnest hope that the Union could be preserved through compromise demonstrated that the issue of slavery was always second to the unity of his country. At this time, he hoped that, by dropping any pretensions about abolition, the Union would be restored. When this became a moot point, Lincoln was able to change his position

The beginning of the Civil War brought a policy change for President Lincoln. Whereas before, he was content to entice the secessionists back into the Union fold, Lincoln now attempted to use the threat of emancipation to coerce slave states to forsake the rebellion. This new policy, however, was gradual and cautious. The Union leadership was careful not to alienate the slaveholding Border States, whose support would likely determine the outcome of the Civil War.[6] The prospect of a quick knockout blow was dashed by the Confederates at the First Battle of Bull Run, forcing Lincoln to proceed slowly.[7] Lincoln was forced to countermand a proclamation of martial law in Missouri, a Union slave state, by General John C. Fremont. The General's order—which freed the state's slaves—Lincoln considered to "*purely* political, and not within the range of *military* law or

necessity."[8] The president's uneasy coalition against the Confederacy would not be broken over emancipation in a Border State. Too much depended upon maintaining a unified front.

Nevertheless, military realities convinced President Lincoln that emancipation would be beneficial for the war effort. The Confederate economy and war effort was heavily reliant upon slave labour. Lincoln recognized the disastrous effects emancipation would have upon the South. By emancipating Southern slaves, he would not only decrease the strength of the Confederacy, but also increase the strength of the Union. It was the poor performance of the Union army in the early stages of the war that pushed Lincoln to consider emancipatory measures to bolster his nation's fighting power. Lincoln signed into law the First Confiscation Act, liberating slaves in Confederate war service, and the Second Confiscation Act, freeing all slaves in territory controlled by Union forces.[9] Congress also passed the Militia Act, allowing freed slaves to enter the military. These acts were the first steps towards total emancipation and, later, abolition. These first steps were resounding successes, and it quickly became apparent that the freed slaves would be an invaluable contribution to the war effort. Most military and civilian officials still considered blacks to be unsuitable for combat, but they made their impact felt in carrying out manual labour tasks around camp.

Freed black slaves would not remain in the ditches for long. The call for soldiers to fill the Union ranks was greeted with enthusiasm by blacks, who had as much, if not more, reason to fight Confederates. Frederick Douglass, in his editorial, "Men of Color, to Arms!," gave voice to this sentiment by saying that "a war undertaken and brazenly carried on, for the perpetual enslavement of colored men, call logically and loudly upon colored men to help to suppress it."[10] In his mind, and the minds of many freed slaves, no doubt, "liberty won for us by white men would lack half its lustre."[11] The contribution of free blacks to the Union War effort was impressive. When contemplating broader emancipation in the South, Lincoln certainly kept this strategic dimension in mind. Free black labour and manpower was a useful tool to use against the South. No matter how much Lincoln sympathized with emancipation, it was always a subordinate consideration to the preservation of the Union. If emancipation was going to occur, it would be for the benefit of the Union first and foremost; the benefit for the slaves themselves was of secondary importance to the president. In a letter to Horace Greeley, Lincoln stated plainly, "My paramount object in this struggle *is* to save the Union, and is *not* either to save or to destroy slavery… What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union."[12] This utterly pragmatic consideration held sway in the President's mind.

The successful defence at Antietam gave Lincoln the cover he needed to finally make emancipation a clear goal.[13] On September 22, 1862, he issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which gave the rebelling states one hundred days to disband and cease their rebellion. If any state failed to do this, Lincoln threatened to declare all slaves within that state to be free and recognized as such by the government.[14] The declaration allowed Lincoln to give one more chance at peaceful reconciliation, but also gave him the cover to enact emancipation on the grounds that the Southern States had failed to obey the order to discontinue their rebellion. When the Confederacy failed to heed the deadline of January 1, 1863, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, fulfilling his threat.[15] Emancipation, which would not have been seriously contemplated even a year before because of the response it might have engendered among the Border States, had finally become a reality. The dreams of black slaves and abolitionists was a dream no longer. However, the official rationale put forth by Lincoln for emancipation was still the preservation of the Union, which was threatened by these rebellious states. Furthermore, he also was conscious of the important economic and military advantage that emancipation would give the Union. By allowing these freed slaves into the Union army, President Lincoln was strangling the South and empowering the North.

Ironically, similar ideas were also beginning to be voiced in the South. The bolstered Union army began to methodically push deeper into Confederate territory through 1863 and 1864.[16] Just as Lincoln and other Union leaders saw freed slaves as a valuable source of manpower, so too did some Confederates consider their slaves as an answer to the war's backsliding. Confederate General Patrick R. Cleburne considered the enlistment of black slaves to be crucial to the war effort. By offering freedom and further reward, Cleburne believed that slaves would willingly fight for the Confederacy. He implored his superiors to enact this policy so as to guarantee independence. Cleburne summed up the argument by stating, "As between the loss of independence and the loss of slavery, we assume that every patriot will freely give up the latter."[17] Renown Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, added to the argument, by pointing out that emancipation will occur one way or the other. Either the Confederacy can emancipate some slaves to fight in their ranks, or let the Union roll over their overstretched army and emancipate all the slaves. He argued that "[emancipation] will be the result of the continuance of the war, and will certainly occur if the enemy succeed, it seems to me most advisable to adopt it at once, and thereby obtain all the benefits that will accrue to our cause."[18] The political leadership would not heed these arguments, however. The Confederate Congress issued a resolution which conflated the preservation

of slavery with Confederate independence.[19] The prejudice of the South was too great to overcome even partial emancipation, despite the obvious military advantages it would convey. Nevertheless, the mere consideration of emancipation in the South further points out the effect that the Civil War had upon the issue of slavery. To many Confederates, slavery could be relinquished if it would ensure national independence. The secession and the Civil War had been fought, to a great extent, over the opportunity to extend slavery. Now, with the end approaching, some had considered not just the abandonment of that hope, but the very idea of maintaining slavery at all. Emancipation ultimately came to naught, but it demonstrated just how much individuals were willing to compromise on their nation's values, if it contributed to victory in the Civil War.

By effectively eliminating the possibility for compromise over slavery, the Civil War pushed President Abraham Lincoln to carry out emancipation, chiefly for a strategic advantage. The Civil War forced both the North and the South to make a difficult choice between slavery and the nation. Lincoln's single-minded determination to reunite the nation pushed him to gradually emancipate slaves. He was always cognizant of the timing of such an act, knowing that overzealous action would alienate the Border States and political allies.[20] When it became politically possible, however, Lincoln did not hesitate to take emancipatory action to weaken the Confederacy, and strengthen the Union war effort, his chief concerns. The act was embraced by freed slaves, and bolstered the Union significantly. The Confederacy, on the other hand, could not relinquish slavery in order to save the nation, and, as a result, ended with neither. Nevertheless, the mere fact that many influential Confederates even considered some form of emancipation showed the effects that the Civil War had upon long-held political platforms in the South, just as it did in the North. National survival, whether it be reunification for the Union or independence for the South, created the possibility for strange bedfellows. However, it was Abraham Lincoln, in that famous Proclamation, who took the goal to heart, sending echoes throughout history.

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THE GOLDEN RECOVERY:
HOW FDR'S ABOLITION OF THE GOLD STANDARD ENDED THE GREAT DEPRESSION

by

MARIA MONICA LAYARDA

The recent Great Depression in 2008 has surged public and scholarly interest in the Great Depression. Not coincidentally, the Obama administration appointed prominent Great Depression scholars, most notably Ben Bernanke and Christina Romer, to economic leadership positions to lead the way to recovery. There are evident parallels between the two financial crises.[1] Episodes of drastic assets decline in both 1929 and 2008 caused substantial aggregate demand (AD) shocks to the real economy. Confidence fell, spending plunged, production halted, and unemployment soared. Despite notable differences, the Great Depression and its astounding recovery remain a crucial lesson to policymakers today. The unprecedented scale of the Fed's monetary stimulus injection under Bernanke in part reflects the Fed's determination to avert macroeconomic disasters.

Contrary to prevalent myth, the critical turning point towards recovery began not on the eve of the Second World War, but six years before with the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). By the time FDR came to office on March 4, 1933, the economy was deep in the worst economic

depression in modern history. Between 1929 and 1933, the US real gross GDP shrunk by thirty percent, industrial production by fourty-seven percent, and wholesale price index by thirty-three percent.[2] In the spring of 1933, FDR ended the US commitment to the gold standard (GS). At this point, the economy stopped declining and began climbing up. For the next four years, the United States experienced its most rapid peacetime growth. Real output grew by a total of thirty-nine percent, averaging at over nine percent p.a.[3] The crucial question is *why* and *how* did the US economy recover rapidly in 1933? Examining the 1933–37 period, this paper argues that the answer lies in FDR's radical divorce, in principle and in practice, from the gold ideology.

FDR's abandonment of the GS led to recovery in two interlocking ways. First, the drastic conversion from GS, the norm of the day, sent a strong signal of the new FDR government's commitment to domestic economic recovery over currency stability, which had dominated Hoover's agenda. This "regime change" was so revolutionary that it was able to restore substantial public confidence in the future of the economy. In turn, this generated inflationary expectations, which lowered real interest rates. The expectation shift was evident in the surge of expectation-sensitive stock prices, investment, and spending on durable goods. Second, free from exchange rate constraints imposed by the "gold fetters," the FDR government could pursue expansionary monetary policies to maintain the credibility of its new expansionary regime and sustain rapid recovery well until 1937.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Given its "Holy Grail of macroeconomics"[4] status, much has been written on the Great Depression. Among the most authoritative works is Friedman and Schwarz' *A Monetary History of the United States* (1963). Taking a strict monetarist view, they regard the Great Depression as purely a monetary phenomenon. Not surprisingly, they conclude that "the rapid rate of rise in the money stock certainly promoted and facilitated the concurrent economic expansion"[5] during the recovery period. While monetary forces are certainly crucial in understanding the depression, the demand side of the story of the crisis has become orthodoxy. Most recovery explanations incorporate the role of AD stimulus.

Arguing that the collapse of spending was the key cause of the depression, Romer (1992) argues that AD stimulus, achieved mainly through monetary rather than fiscal expansion, was key to recovery. Most economists today largely agree that the role of fiscal policies in the recovery was limited, not because it failed, "but because it was not tried."[6] Fiscal deficits were insignificant relative to depression.[7] Indeed, focusing just on the timing of

recovery, fiscal policy did not appear to be a key cause since recovery began in March 1933, months before FDR made any substantial fiscal move. Romer concludes that the conventional increase of monetary stock provided AD stimulus, which led to recovery by lower real interest rates and stimulating investment and spending on durable goods.

In their seminal work, Temin and Wigmore (1990) agree with Romer's demand-driven framework. They, however, argue that the source of the AD stimulus was not monetary expansion, but an expectation change caused by FDR's regime shift, symbolized by dollar devaluation.[8] Taking this a step further, Eggertsson (2008) argues that FDR's radical abandonment of the three "almost universally accepted policy dogmas at the time [gold standard, principle of balanced budget, and commitment to small government]"[9] engineered an expectation shift, which was the most important cause of recovery.

ANALYSIS

From the beginning of his presidency, FDR made it clear that reflation—to restore prices to pre-1929 levels—would be his overriding economic priority. The radical abolition of the GS served as a potent symbol of his new expansionary regime. On March 6, 1933, his second day in office, FDR passed the Emergency Banking Act. The Act was designed to overhaul the banking system, and by granting the president power to suspend international gold payments, it effectively suspended the GS.[10] On March 8, 1933, at his first presidential press conference, FDR declared that the GS suspension was to be part of a new "permanent system" of "managed currency."[11] Throughout April, FDR passed a series of laws to formalize the GS suspension.[12] Though the United States later returned in 1934 (at a devalued rate), FDR had effectively broken the gold fetters in 1933. His policy actions throughout his first term made clear that the dollar was subservient to the domestic economy. By the end of his first year, FDR had ended the stubborn deflationary trend, which reached twenty-six percent in Hoover's last year. FDR first recorded thirteen percent inflation.[13] *Figure One (Panel A-F)* illustrates a dramatic rise across commodity prices, investment index, and industrial production throughout 1933 as the economy began to recover.

The exact timing and the rapid rate at which the economy reversed its course in March-April 1933 cannot be accounted for by a strict monetarist explanation. At this point, the new administration simply had not had the chance to enact a conventional monetary policy. The money stock remained as shown in *Figure One Panel D*. Moreover, by March, short-term nominal interest rates were already near zero. The yield on the three-month Treasure bills had reached 0.05 percent in January 1933.[14] Given that nominal interest rates could not fall further and the money supply also remained unchanged,

the shift in expectations resulted from FDR's radical abolition of the GS provides a better explanation for this critical turning point. Given the normative status of the gold dogma at the time, FDR's controversial policy came as a real shock to the public. Even FDR's budget director thought it was "the end of Western civilization."[15] Dramatic actions triggered dramatic consequences.

By shaking the foundation that had become defining characteristic of the previous administration, FDR led the American public to believe that his new economic regime would lead to different economic outcomes. Hoover's staunch commitment to defend the gold standard had prevented him from using monetary (or fiscal) policies to support the domestic economy. Consequently, for as long as the country remained wedded to the gold, people expected business as usual, which in 1933 meant continued contraction and deflation. By disposing of the centrepiece of the old regime, obtaining monetary independence, and freeing himself of the golden fetter that tied Hoover's hands, FDR engineered a drastic shift in public expectations. The Thomas Inflation Amendment in April 1933 affirmed FDR's intention to raise prices and expand the economy. The law gave FDR broad power over the currency and the Fed. It also compelled the Fed to buy three million dollars in Federal bonds to increase the money supply.[16] This sent another signal to the public that the domestic economy had triumphed over exchange rates. News records and business analyses from 1933 show that FDR's strategy was a success. He broke the self-fulfilling deflationary spiral.[17] In May 1933, the *Economist* concluded, "The only topic of conversation in New York during the past week has been 'inflation.'"[18]

The impact of the expectation shift triggered in 1933 was enormous. Consider the Fisher Equation r = ¡ - π, where *r* denotes real interest rate, ¡ denotes nominal interest rate, and π denotes inflation rate. While ¡ is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), *r* can go below zero. Since 1933 and throughout recovery, inflationary expectations stimulated the economy by increasing π and thus depressing *r* to the negative level, even as ¡ remained stable at the ZLB.

A lower interest rate has an expansionary impact on the economy by lowering the cost of borrowing (issued in nominal terms). This, in turn, stimulates AD by inducing investment and durable good spending, as people expect higher real returns from their assets in the future. This mechanism is illustrated in *Figure Two* as an upward AD shift to AD1. Moreover, as people became confident about the future of the economy, and expected higher income in the future, permanent income hypothesis predicts another boost in spending, denoted by an extra shift from AD1 to AD2.

In 1933, this is exactly what happened. *Figure Three* shows ex ante rates plunged as inflationary expectations soared following FDR's abolition of the gold standard. The increase of agricultural price in contracts signed in

1933 reflects a real anticipation of higher prices.[19] Data in *Figure Four* shows that the expansionary impact of the fall in real interest rates was transmitted to the real economy exactly as predicted by the AS-AD model. Interest-sensitive spending (investment and consumer durables) jumped in response to the fall in ex ante real interest rates. Indeed, comparing *Figure One* and *Figure Three* reveal a similar strong correlation between real interest rates and forward-looking variables (such as investment, commodity, stock market, and industrial production). This AD boost effectively ended the depression. The causal role of expectation shift in kick-starting recovery is more pronounced consider that expectations-sensitive spending on durable goods soared in 1933, but real consumer expenditures, such as on income-sensitive service did not pick up until 1934.[20] In 1933, income had not changed and price took time to adjust. What greatly changed were expectations.

Inflationary euphoria sparked by FDR's regime change, however, was bound to be transient without actual monetary expansion and inflation. Indeed, the conventional monetary increase that became feasible after the abolition of the gold standard was crucial to maintain inflationary expectations, keep real interest rates low, and sustain recovery. Between 1933–37, the money supply M1 grew rapidly at an average rate of ten percent p.a.,[21] as a result of two factors. First, it grew because of the 1934 Gold Reserve Act that steeply devalued dollar against gold and transferred all gold ownership, including the Feds', to the Treasury[22]. Second, it grew because of FDR's deliberative policy *not* to sterilize the surge of gold inflow from Europe following Hitler's rise in 1934 and use it to expand bank reserves.[23] Romer calculates that without this money supply rise, "real GNP in 1937 would have been nearly twenty-five percent lower than it actually was."[24]

While the substantial expansion of the money supply, amounting to nearly fourty-two percent over the four years,[25] could not further depress short-term nominal interest rates, it did at least two crucial things. First, as Romer and Eggertsson note, the increase in the money stock was critical to FDR's economic regime credibility and thus necessary to maintaining inflationary expectations and keeping real interest rates low. Second, an increase in the money stock was also necessary to prevent nominal (and thus real) interest rates from rising throughout the recovery period, at a time when the economy was growing at phenomenal rates and demand for liquidity has likely increased. The fact that the economy promptly descended into a severe downturn in 1937–38 following a monetary contraction (after the Fed doubled reserve requirements and Treasury began sterilizing gold in 1936) provide more strong evidence that monetary expansion had been necessary to the rapid recovery in the intervening time.

This essay has evidently shown that the breaking of the "golden fetters" provided a large demand stimulus that ended the Great Depression in

the United States. FDR's radical regime change caused an instant and equally radical shift in expectations that kick-started the economy's recovery. Conventional monetary expansion, even at the ZLB, proved effective in maintaining the momentum for the rapid recovery through expectation management. This paper also illustrates that recovery was a direct result of FDR's policy actions, and not the result of an automatic self-correcting mechanism. The Obama administration proved to have learned this lesson when it intervened in the economy extensively in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis.

FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure One



Source: Gauti B. Eggertsson, "Great Expectations and the End of the Depression," *American Economic Review*, 98 (2008): 1477.

Figure Two



Figure Three



Source: Gauti B. Eggertsson, "Great Expectations and the End of the Depression," *American Economic Review*, 98 (2008): 1479.

Figure Four



FIGURE 10

REAL CONSUMER EXPENDITURES ON DURABLE GOODS AND EX ANTE REAL RATES, 1930–1941



REAL FIXED INVESTMENT AND EX ANTE REAL RATES, 1930–1941

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ENDNOTES

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THE AMERICAN COVER-UP OF UNIT 731 WAR CRIMES

by

ALISSA XINHE WANG

The label "factories of death,"[1] coined by historian Sheldon Harris, vividly captures the nature of the Japanese biological warfare experimentation facility, code-named Unit 731. Led by General Shiro Ishii, Unit 731's military scientists performed gruesome biological experiments on human subjects in order to develop biological warfare (BW) capabilities. Live human experimentation was conducted on Chinese civilians and Russian and American prisoners of war. Atrocities included deliberately infecting subjects with deadly disease, performing vivisections, dismembering body parts, along with other inhumane experiments that led to an unimaginable degree of suffering. The end of World War Two, however, did not bring Unit 731 war criminals to justice, as the leading scientists, including Ishii himself, escaped punishment. Aiming to monopolize Japanese BW data, the American government promised Unit 731 military scientists immunity from postwar prosecutions in exchange for their valuable data. Because of this deal, the American government muted the discussion of the Unit 731 case in the Tokyo trials, and dismissed the

legally established war crimes charges of the Khabarovsk trial as illegitimate and fabricated Communist propaganda.

This gives rise to the critical question, how do we make sense of these American actions? The widely accepted conclusion in existing historiography focuses mainly on American national security interests. This consensus is well summarized by Harris' argument in his authoritative book on Unit 731 and the American cover-up, *Factories of Death*. He argued that "the questions of ethics and morality as they affected scientists in Japan and in the United States never once entered into a single discussion."[2] This explanation, however, is incomplete. This paper aims to make sense of American actions towards Unit 731 through an examination of the role of norms.[3] American actions towards Unit 731 spanned a critical historical and political transition from World War Two to the early Cold War. Throughout this time period, not only was national security a primary concern, the norm of human rights was also rising in prominence. The American cover-up will thus be framed at the intersection of the international norm of human rights and the norm of US national security. Ultimately, this case illustrates the malleability of international human rights norms, as they can coexist with, be sacrificed to, and be manipulated in ways that adhere to national security norms. The intricate interactions between national security and human rights will be traced through a chronological examination of American actions towards Unit 731, from the American discovery of Japanese BW in World War Two to their subsequent cover-up actions in the Tokyo and Khabarovsk trials. First, the initial American interest in Unit 731 was shaped by the complementary interaction of the norms of international human rights and American national security during World War Two. Second, the end of World War Two and the onset of the Cold War led to a clash between the normative demands of human rights and the practical demands of American national security, which ultimately led to the sacrifice of humanitarian values. Finally, the American rejection and dismissal of the Soviet Union's charges at the Khabarovsk trial was based on a manipulation of the norm of human rights to advance the aims of American national security.

DISCOVERY: 1939–1945

Washington first found out about Japanese biological warfare in 1939.[4] By 1941, enough information was collected by American intelligence to indicate that the Japanese had significant biological warfare experimentation detachments.[5] Details specific to Unit 731 and human experimentation also began to be uncovered at this time.[6] The US war secretary appointed a special working group committee to thoroughly investigate Japanese activities in the field of biological warfare, and the committee urged immediate

defensive efforts to study the subject and thus reduce the likelihood of its use.[7] American President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the Federal Security Agency to establish a War Research Service to study biological warfare and to build protective measures.[8] During the course of World War Two, American interest in Japanese BW increased dramatically.

What accounted for these initial American interests can be explained by the international human rights norms at the time. Roosevelt's wartime advocacy of human rights and national security as complementary aims in American foreign policy allowed for a mutually reinforcing interaction between the two norms. In his 1941 speech, Roosevelt stated that the "aim of peace should be to secure for all people four freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear."[9] Promoting human rights abroad became closely tied with the promotion of peace and thus, human rights was placed at the top of allied war aims.[10] Within this World War Two historical context, Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were the enemies of world peace, and thus the source of fear and insecurity at home.[11] As Frieden, Lake and Schultz suggested, "by connecting human rights to the epic struggles against totalitarianism that defined much of the twentieth century, Roosevelt laid out the case that promoting human rights abroad was in the self-interest of both Americans and the citizens of other countries."[12]

This normative context can be applied directly to the analysis of the initial American interest in Japanese Unit 731 activities. Upon discovery of the Japanese BW project, American policymakers regarded Unit 731 both as a threat to American national security, due to the potential of the Japanese to engage in BW against the United States, as well as an issue of humanitarian concern against unethical Japanese practices. First and foremost, Unit 731 posed a threat to American national security due to the threat of potential of biological warfare attacks on the United States. War secretary Henry Stimson established the element of fear in his letter to the National Academy of Sciences president. In it he wrote, "Because of the dangers that might confront this country from potential enemies employing what may be broadly described as biological warfare, it seems advisable that investigations be initiated to survey the present situation and the future possibilities."[13] Similarly, American insecurity was illustrated by the imminent threat outlined by Howard Cole, America's Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) intelligence chief. Cole claimed that Japan had a large BW capability and that the "Japanese are cultivating large quantities of virus for spreading bubonic plague, pneumonia, relapsing fever, cholera and other epidemics among Chinese or Allied troops."[14]

However, even though the element of fear of BW attacks played a significant role in shaping American interests in Unit 731, it was not the exclusive factor. The discovery of Unit 731was also associated with humanitarian concerns in line with the human rights norm at the time. In 1942, Roosevelt

issued a public warning to the Japanese regarding the use of unconventional warfare like chemical and biological weapons. Roosevelt made clear that "if Japan persists in this *inhuman form of warfare* against China or against any other of the United Nations, such action will be regarded by this government as though taken against the United States, and retaliation in kind and full measure will be meted out."[15] Beyond public statements, humanitarian values also played a role in American internal communication. Cole, in his report regarding biological warfare, warned that "[Japan] will not hesitate from humane motives to use this weapon…"[16] Similarly, the US War Department issued an urgent warning regarding biological warfare in 1944, stating that "neither Germany [nor] Japan will be influenced by humanitarian values in making their decisions to employ biological warfare."[17] These concerns with the enemies' lack of humanitarian values intensified the element of fear in national security considerations. In addition, by assuming a lack of moral values in Germany and Japan, American policymakers were speaking from a self-assumed position of moral superiority, implying that they themselves are the upholders of human rights. Overall, humanitarian values essentially reinforced national security concerns, and their complementary interaction shaped a strong American interest in Unit 731 activities.

DILEMMA AND DECISION-MAKING: 1945–1948

With the end of World War Two, American policymakers were faced with the postwar question of how to treat Unit 731 war criminals. During the early Cold War years from 1945 to 1948, American policymakers pursued a deal with Ishii, exchanging BW data for immunity from prosecution in the Tokyo trials (1946–1948). However, this decision was not achieved without an initial dilemma. This dilemma and the subsequent decision-making process is well illustrated by a recommendation from the American Army Civilian Affairs Division in 1947:

> It is recognized that by informing Ishii and his associates that the information to be obtained regarding BW will be retained in intelligence channels and will not be employed as war crimes evidence, this government may at a later date be seriously embarrassed. However, the Army Department and Air Force Members strongly believe that this information, particularly that which will finally be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the effect of BW on humans, is of such importance to the security of this country that the risk of subsequent embarrassment should be taken.[18]

It is possible to make sense of the nature of this dilemma and the subsequent decision-making process by examining the conflict between the norms of international human rights and American national security in the early Cold War context. During this time, the demands of human rights clashed against the demands of national security. Ultimately, the normative

values of human rights, though factored into American decisions, diminished in significance and were outweighed by national security demands. The postwar human rights movement, which was built upon the shared experience of World War Two atrocities, focused on criminal punishment of wartime atrocities, as shown by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.[19] Naturally, this norm demanded putting Unit 731 war criminals to trial. However, these normative demands were no longer supported by the goals of national security. In terms of national security, the basis of fear in the early Cold War was no longer German Nazism and Japanese imperialism. Germany and Japan became defeated nations, and no longer posed any threat to US national security. Instead, there was another new fear: the new source of American insecurity was the Soviet Union's limitless ambitions. One of the clearest expressions of fear of this new enemy is seen in the Clifford report to Truman in September 1946. Clifford opened the report with the statement that "the gravest problem facing the United States today is that of American relations with the Soviet Union. The solution of the problem may determine whether or not there will be a third world war."[20] In addition, the report stated that the "fear of Germany and Japan is gone, but our suspicion of the Soviet Union—and suspicion is the first step to fear—is growing."[21]

Applied specifically to the case of Unit 731, national security interests dictated the need to monopolize Japanese experimentation data and more importantly, to avoid the risk of this data falling into Soviet hands. This is illustrated by the American perception of growing Soviet military power, with explicit reference to biological warfare capabilities. A 1948 CIA report predicted that "by 1955, Soviet strategic air power will have been greatly augmented and weapons of mass destruction (atomic, biological and chemical) will presumably be available."[22] The document also outlined the subversive threat posed by biological warfare capabilities, as it stated that the threat from the Communist Party in the United States "will become more formidable with the progressive development of techniques of biological warfare."[23] Thus, American policymakers attached military significance to Japanese biological warfare data. It is in this context that the normative values of human rights were outweighed by practical strategic demands of American national security, as America was threatened by a hostile Soviet Union.

MANIPULATION: 1949

After the successful initial cover-up of Unit 731 war crimes in the Tokyo trials, American policymakers were confronted with a challenge from the Soviet Union. In December 1949, the Soviet Union prosecuted twelve Unit 731 scientists for war crimes. In addition, responsibility was attributed to

Emperor Hirohito and public criticism was made against Japanese imperialism.[24] However, Soviet efforts to publicize the results of the trial to the Western world did not succeed. Faced with concrete evidence, the American government further covered up Unit 731 war crimes by dismissing these legally established findings as "communist propaganda" and pointed to their resemblance to Stalinist "show trials," discrediting their validity.[25] These actions of further cover-up reflect the manipulation of the human rights norm to suit the aims of national security.

The Khabarovsk trial in December 1949 took place during an especially pronounced period of Cold War tensions. By the end of 1949, the norm of American national security shaped new interests. Two relevant developments were of great significance to the case of Unit 731. First, the Soviet Union broke the US nuclear monopoly by beginning an ensuing nuclear arms race and intensifying overall military competition. Second, the People's Republic of China was established in October as a Communist nation that leaned to the Soviet side. These developments had a direct and significant impact on the strategic significance of the case of Unit 731 to American national security interests. Most directly was the increased military significance of Japanese biological warfare data. Due to the huge Soviet leap in military technology, there was a need to secure monopoly on Japanese biological warfare data. More importantly, however, was the growing geopolitical significance of Japan as a counterbalance to the newly established Communist China in the Far East. A revealing CIA report from September 1949, when the establishment of Communist China was imminent, outlines these security concerns. The report concluded that the long range US security interest in the Far East is "to prevent the development of a Soviet-controlled industrial-military power complex" and that "the maintenance of the alignment of Japan with the US is, therefore, the crux of the US security problem in the Far East."[26] The increasing geopolitical significant of Japan was further illustrated in a National Security Council report from the same time, which concluded that "in the Far East, where adverse factors are already in vigorous operation, the most likely trend will be toward a more rapid extension of Communist influence on the continent. In this connection, the situation in Japan will become increasingly important. The re-establishment of Japan as a viable state becomes essential to the maintenance of a minimum US security position in the region."[27] It is clear that developments in 1949 have led to a new and vital importance of Japan to US national security. Acting with accordance to the national security norm thus required securing Japan as an ally. Since the Khabarovsk trials broadened the scope of Unit 731 to the responsibility to Emperor Hirohito and Japanese imperialism, the crimes of Unit 731 were presented as Japanese national crimes.[28] Therefore, rejecting the charges and protecting Unit 731

war criminals became an act of protection against the Japanese state, and thus an important action in securing Japan's loyalty as an American ally. For this reason, American protection of the case of Unit 731 took on a vital geopolitical significance.

During the same year of 1949, the norm of human rights also experienced some significant developments in the United States. Truman's 1949 inauguration speech clearly outlined a new definition of human rights tailored to the threat of communism. In line with Roosevelt, Truman drew on the "most frightful events in history" of World War One and World War Two as a shared experience, and declared that the most important need of the time "is for men to learn to live together in peace and harmony."[29] Truman stated that the Americans "believe that all men have a right to equal justice under the law and equal opportunity to share in the common good… the right to freedom of thought and expression" and that these human rights were to be the critical gateway to world peace.[30] The innovative element in Truman's presentation of human rights, however, was the threat of communism. He declared that the obstacle to world peace was the "false ideology" of communism, an ideology opposed to human rights and thus threatening to the kind of world peace desired by Americans.[31] In December 1949, the same month as the Khabarovsk trials, Truman proclaimed "International Human Rights Day" with great publicity.[32]

It is evident that by late 1949, the norms of human rights and national security have once again established an intricate relationship. In response to the Khabarovsk charges, the norm of human rights was manipulated in a way that adheres to the goals of national security. By presenting communism and human rights as diametrically opposed to each other, communism was presented as a "false ideology" that opposes world peace and lacks legitimacy. In the rejection of Khabarovsk findings, an allusion to Stalinist show trials and Communist propaganda is a powerful reference to the nature of the Soviet state as an opponent of human rights, and thus an enemy of all of humanity and world peace. This reference to human rights served the important purpose of delegitimizing Soviet claims. In this way, American policymakers used the norm of human rights to shift attention away from *what* the claims were, to *who* made those claims. In this case, the fact that the trials have been carried out by the Soviet Union itself was powerful enough to delegitimize its validity. In this sense, the normative aspect of human rights was set against what was presented as the anti-humanitarian, "false ideology" of communism. This manipulation allowed the Americans to justify their attack on the validity of Khabarovsk charges, which ultimately served the purpose of the demands of national security.

CONCLUSION

As a result of American actions, Unit 731 war criminals, to this day, have not been brought to justice. These military scientists have taken up high ranks in Japanese academic and political circles.[33] Currently, legal battles are still being fought between those searching for justice and compensation for Unit 731 victims and those who escaped punishment. These situations lead back to a central question: why did the world's greatest power, while proclaiming to be the champion of human rights and upholder of humanitarian values, engage in a deliberate cover-up of some of the most atrocious crimes against humanity? The limited volume of existing historiography has mainly focused on the importance of national security dictated by Cold War tensions. This conclusion, though factually accurate, misses an important point. American actions did not occur in a normative vacuum, and forces in the international arena, such as the rising prominence of human rights, are far from irrelevant. While the role of human rights as a norm has changed throughout the course of American actions, it was always present. The constant existence of human rights in influencing American actions did not mean, however, that they actually led to a greater protection of human rights. Often deviating from its original purpose, the case of Unit 731 shows first and foremost that the normative basis of the human rights norm is highly malleable. This paper sought to provide a more complete explanation of otherwise inconceivable American actions by tracing the evolution of the intricate relationship between the two norms of national security and human rights. The case of Unit 731 can reciprocally provide valuable insights into the nature and role of norms like human rights and national security play in shaping states' interests and actions. Most importantly, this discussion aimed to broaden the context in which this historical case is often examined, and open up an opportunity for further debate.

ENDNOTES

1 Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover-up* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

2 Leonard Brody et al., "U.S. Responses to Japanese Wartime Inhuman Experimentation after World War II," *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics* 23 (2014): 221.

3 The role of norms is emphasized in constructivist literature in international relations. Existing scholarship has not only established that norms matter, but raised important questions such as how and why they matter. Taking this approach provides a more complete explanation of American actions.

4 Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 91.

5 William H. Cunliffe, "Select Documents on Japanese War Crimes and Japanese Biological Warfare, 1934–2006," National Archives, accessed March 25, 2015, http://www.archives.gov/iwg/japanese-war-crimes/select-documents.pdf.

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9 M. Glen Johnson, "The Contributions of Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of International Protection for Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly* 9 (1987): 21.

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11 Ibid., 21.

12 Frieden, Lake and Schultz, *World Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), 471.

13 Williams and Wallace, *Unit 731*, 93.

14 Ibid., 105.

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17 Ibid., 103.

18 Jing Bao Nie et al., *Japan's Wartime Medical Atrocities: Comparative Inquiries in Science, History, and Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 100.

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25 Jing Bao Nie, "The West's dismissal of Khabarovsk Trial as 'Communist Propaganda': Ideology, evidence and international bioethics," *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry* 1 (2004): 32–42.

26 "ORE 69–49, Relative U.S. Security Interest in the European-Mediterranean Area and the Far East (1949)," National Archives Online Public Access, accessed March 25, 2015, http://research.archives.gov/description/6924355.

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28 *Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army,* 405–410.

29 "Truman inaugurated 33rd US President," *Atlanta Daily World,* January 21, 1949, 1.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 "A Proclamation," The American Presidency Project, accessed March 28, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87226.

33 Daniel Barenblatt, *A Plague upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ Warfare Operation* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 225–226.

A KENNEDY QUESTION

by

CHRISTOPHER MCGOEY

President John F. Kennedy (JFK) was widely loved by the American people and heavily engaged in the direction of foreign policy. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency after Kennedy was assassinated, and he was a distinctly different leader. Johnson made a number of meaningful alterations to American policy commitments. Historians have long debated how much these deviated from decisions Kennedy would have made. Perhaps the most popular of these questions surrounds the Vietnam War. Johnson escalated American involvement in Vietnam in 1964 following a series of aggressive incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin. Many historians wonder if Kennedy would have taken the same steps, considering the declining situation in Vietnam at the end of 1963. This paper will attempt to resolve if John F. Kennedy would have committed further American aid and personnel to Vietnam after the fall of 1963. This paper will establish that a particular set of principals guided Kennedy's policy in Vietnam: the president was willing to commit American resources to Vietnam if he believed a political victory remained possible, but was staunchly opposed to doing so if the

political situation was in decline. Following, this paper will examine four major policies that escalated American commitments in Vietnam, and establish that Kennedy endorsed them with considerable reluctance, and only because he believed that a political victory remained possible and the use of American resources would not be in vain. Lastly, this paper will establish that the autumn of 1963 and death of Ngo Dinh Diem shattered Kennedy's confidence in the political situation in South Vietnam. This analysis will largely focus on an analysis of primary documentation and written record to establish its conclusions. This analysis will attempt to avoid speculating on unofficial spoken rhetoric (press interviews, etc.), and instead offer insights predominantly based on rhetoric enshrined in policy or official documentation. Based on this structure of analysis and evidence provided, this paper will conclude that John F. Kennedy was not certain of the stability of the political situation in South Vietnam after the death of Ngo Dinh Diem and, considerate of the principals that guided his foreign policy, and all prior decisions in Vietnam, it is highly unlikely that Kennedy would have committed further American resources and personnel to South Vietnam after 1963.

In John F. Kennedy's 1961 inaugural address he declared that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty."[1] This statement had resounding implications on his foreign policy. Kennedy became a vocal figurehead for an American policy to combat and curtail the expansion of Communist spheres of influence. This "Kennedy Doctrine" was a decidedly "us-versus-them" conceptualization of global politics. Famed historian George C. Herring emphasizes the importance of international credibility to the Kennedy administration. The "Kennedy Doctrine" conceptualized global political conflicts as arenas that produced distinct "victors" and "losers." John F. Kennedy emphasized the importance of the United States' credibility to its allies and American "victory" in these arenas was a guiding principal of his foreign policy.[2]

John F. Kennedy was deeply involved in the direction of his foreign policy. The president assembled large conglomerates of intellectuals and industrialists into policy think tanks. These "whiz kids," as they were popularly known, played a major role in directing policy. The Kennedy administration became recognized for a committee-style of decision making. However, regardless of this structural arrangement, it is critical to note that many historians believe Kennedy remained the most essential figure in defining the direction of foreign policy. David Halberstam argues that Kennedy effectively acted as his own secretary of state and attempted to engage closely with every major foreign policy decision. He trusted his own judgment more closely than any of his "whiz kids," and the ultimate

direction of foreign policy was his to define.[3] It is critical that this paper emphasize that Kennedy, regardless of this structural relationship with his advisors, had supreme agency in the decision-making process. Therefore, an analysis of the president as an individual within the policy process is essential to answering the questions this paper hopes to address. No other figure directed Kennedy's decision-making as closely as himself.

Kennedy was familiar with the history of Vietnam. As a congressman and senator in the early 1950s, Kennedy was a vocal critic of Western policy in French Indochina (Vietnam). He travelled to Southeast Asia in 1951 and reported on the state of the French colonial administration in Indochina. Kennedy suggested the French must "give clear indication that, despite their gallantry, they are fighting not merely for themselves, but for the sake of strengthening a non-Communist native government."[4] He argued that the French could not maintain political order and defeat the rise of communism "only through reliance on force of arms."[5] JFK expanded on his arguments in a 1954 address to the Senate, turning attention towards the beginnings of American support for Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. He suggested that a pro-western and democratic government required the popular "support of the native peoples"[6] to survive in Vietnam; and "to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina" without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive.[7]

Kennedy inherited a complex and precarious situation in South Vietnam in 1961. In the year prior, a full-scale civil war erupted when an organized National Liberation Front emerged in Southern Vietnam. These "Viet Cong" opposed the democratic government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Kennedy's predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, had established a major relationship with Diem and funneled hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign aid to South Vietnam. Diem was a difficult man and the emergence of the Viet Cong was a telling sign of his political popularity. Nonetheless, the political consensus was that Diem remained "the best hope for defeating the Viet Cong threat."[8] Kennedy maintained American support for Diem when he came in to office.

With consideration of Kennedy's background on Vietnam and general foreign policy "doctrine," the choice to maintain American support for Diem distinguishes a lot about Kennedy's feelings about Vietnam going forward into 1961. If Kennedy believed that Vietnam would be "won" or "lost," in accordance with the "Kennedy Doctrine"; and that supporting a regime in Vietnam without the prospect of victory was futile, this decision marks that Kennedy still believed in the potential of a democratic victory in Vietnam. Additionally, Kennedy's remarks about the French colonial administration in Vietnam imply that he had a particular vision of a strategy for Vietnam. Arthur Schlesinger argues that Kennedy believed the "main communist

reliance in the coming period would be on neither nuclear nor conventional but on guerilla war"[9] and that Kennedy believed that guerilla warfare, like that in Vietnam, could only be combated "by a flexibility and mobility that matched the guerillas themselves."[10] Kennedy believed that guerilla war was a political, not a military, conflict. The president believed that "the Viet Cong could never be defeated unless the Saigon regime could enlist the support of the peasants." To do so "depended on swift and sure intelligence [and collaboration] from the countryside." [11] Taken together, these suggestions and inferences define the direction Kennedy had chosen to pursue in Vietnam. Kennedy would support the Diem regime in a political and military contest with the Viet Cong. However, Kennedy placed a distinct emphasis on the political war. The president endeavored to expand the political influence of Diem and fortify his base of support. Kennedy would not support the military campaign if he believed the political situation was crumbling, or would not succeed.

Throughout 1961–1963 the John F. Kennedy administration massively expanded financial aid to Vietnam as well as American advisory personnel on the ground in Vietnam. By November 1963, the Kennedy administration had increased American advisory personnel in South Vietnam from Eisenhower's nine hundred advisors, to a total of sixteen thousand. This massive escalation implies that Kennedy was open to expanding the American war in Vietnam. However, the Kennedy administration never made a commitment of combat soldiers to Vietnam. This paper will examine four major "escalation policies" for Vietnam: National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52, NSAM 65, NSAM 111, and the establishment of the Strategic Hamlet Program in 1962. This paper will distinguish that Kennedy was willing to endorse escalation with military provisions if he believed they would positively impact the political contest in South Vietnam. Despite the perceived military connotation of his escalation, Kennedy never intended to deviate from a politically oriented strategy in South Vietnam and did not intend to endorse sending American combat troops to South Vietnam at any point.

In National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 52 Kennedy formally endorsed a "Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam,"[12] proposed and developed during the spring of 1961. NSAM 52 endorsed an "assessment of the military utility of a further increase in G.V.N forces from one hundred seventy thousand to two hundred thousand,"[13] and approved "specific military actions [outlined] at the National Security Council Meeting on April 29,"[14] referring to a sizeable increase of American personnel in Vietnam that included stationing US Special Forces soldiers in Vietnam for training operations. John Newman argues that Kennedy's approval of NSAM 52 had "far-reaching" implications and was

the "most substantial step yet towards deepening American involvement in the war."[15] National Security Action Memorandum 52 seemingly began to lock President Kennedy into a militarily oriented commitment in South Vietnam. However, an examination of Kennedy's role in the development of NSAM 52 clearly shows that the president was reluctant to move forward with the provisions of the document.

NSAM 52 was an evolution of the "Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam" presented by Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale and endorsed by Kennedy earlier that year. Lansdale established a precedent for many of the provisions made within NSAM 52. The general recommended financial support for a massive increase to Diem's Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) of twenty thousand men. Lansdale offered a troubling assessment of the political climate in South Vietnam and argued that it would require "extraordinary" social, political, and military reforms to combat the Viet Cong insurgency. Kennedy responded to Lansdale's recommendation of a force increase by asking, "if the situation in Vietnam was now so serious [...] why the recruitment of troops and the training of police [...] would be of any use."[16] The president doubted the efficacy of increasing security forces to combat political dissent, likening the temporary benefits of increasing security to "taking a drink. The effect wears off, and you have to take another."[17] The president was reluctant to endorse a relationship where the United States funded force increases while the political situation dwindled.

In the weeks prior to the signing of NSAM 52, a deep divide erupted between the president and his Joint Chiefs of Staff. In April, Kennedy was publically humiliated by the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. The president lost faith in his military advisors and became reluctant to endorse new military commitments. However, simultaneously, the public failure of the incident conditioned with the administration's commitment to global credibility created an impetus to "take a stand somewhere,"[18] possibly Vietnam. Kennedy was uncertain of what course he should follow, but required convincing before he was willing to commit the United States further to South Vietnam.

Kennedy sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson on a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam. Johnson met with President Diem in Saigon. The vice president was confident in Diem and boldly declared the South Vietnamese president the "Winston Churchill of Asia."[19] The vice president cabled Washington arguing that "it was by no means inevitable [Vietnam] be lost," and "the country can be saved—if we move quickly and wisely."[20] Johnson's assessment was rash, but it exuded the kind of certifiable confidence and prospects of victory that Kennedy required to endorse further American support in South Vietnam.

With some degree of certainty in the state of the political climate in South Vietnam, Kennedy was willing to approve the funding and force

increases outlined in NSAM 52. The president conditioned his approval "subject to amendments or revisions which he may wish to make,"[21] indicating that he was not entirely in support of the direction NSAM 52 established in Vietnam, but was willing to move forward so long as he remained confident in the political climate.

In the summer months following NSAM 52, the Viet Cong campaign escalated rapidly. ARVN casualties in the field almost exceeded the first force increases provided for by US aid. David Halberstam was embedded in South Vietnam and reported, "The government situation in the countryside was extremely shaky." He suggested the "Government army was ill-prepared to fight back" against the Viet Cong, as "it lacked the mobility to catch the elusive guerillas; it was disorganized and [...] the Army lacked leadership and lacked a will to fight."[22] These devastating reports suggested that some kind immediate change was needed in Saigon to turn the tide of the war back in the favor of Diem.

Kennedy dispatched a team of economists and policy experts to South Vietnam to assess Diem's regime. They were to assess which areas of Diem's policy were in need of reform to turn the tide of the war. Led by Dr. Eugene Staley, the team reported on their findings in July. The crumbling military situation in South Vietnam framed many of their observations and led the team to produce suggestions that predominantly favoured increasing US aid to South Vietnam. Kennedy was openly negative in his reading of the report. He insisted, "facts need to be checked."[23] The president demanded a second opinion and insisted that someone "well known to him"[24] visit South Vietnam to develop an alternate appraisal. Kennedy's reception implies that he did not want to increase American commitments to Vietnam—perhaps known to those close to him—and that he had hoped this mission would provide a substantive strategy that could halt the rising tide in Washington to send in American troops.

The failure of the Staley mission to produce a substantive alternate strategy left few alternatives for Kennedy. In order to ensure the security of the Diem regime and American credibility amidst the increasing Viet Cong action, he would need to supplement the military aid provided under NSAM 52. Kennedy authorized National Security Action Memorandum 65 in August. The NSAM provided further "equipment and assistance in training"[25] for the thirty thousand man increase to the ARVN. The nature of this assistance was left somewhat ambiguous. This rhetorical ambiguity was likely a compromise. The NSAM allowed for the necessary security provisions to be put in place, and gave the Joint Chiefs some elasticity to define how and what equipment and assistance to provide. However, the president conditioned that this aid would not include US troops in active combat rolls and stipulated that this document ensured that the force level of the ARVN

for the next year had a hard cap at two hundred thousand men. This served to appease both Kennedy and his Joint Chiefs, while Kennedy's specific conditions allowed him to remain in control of and fundamentally limit force increases at a hard cap. With these provisions, security was temporarily secured, but Kennedy was clearly reluctant to continue following this trend, "like taking a drink."[26]

Kennedy selected General Maxwell Taylor—someone "well-known" to the president—to lead a fact-finding mission in South Vietnam that October. The selection of Taylor, specifically, highlighted the direction Kennedy wanted to pursue in Vietnam. Kennedy had recently appointed Taylor as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The president believed Taylor was unlike most of his military counterparts. Kennedy respected Taylor as "an expert on unconventional warfare" and respected him as "an intellectual who quoted Thucydides."[27] Kennedy, who this paper has established believed guerilla warfare was the most critical contest of the Cold War, clearly selected Taylor intentionally. According to Kennedy's appraisal of the General, Taylor was more likely to produce an "unconventional" strategy for South Vietnam. By appointing Taylor, the president believed he could break the trend of recommendations of military force increases and establish a new strategy that reflected his own wishes.

The instructions Kennedy issued to Taylor made the president's intent quite clear. Kennedy dictated: "While the military part of the problem is of great importance in South Vietnam, its political, social, and economic elements are equally significant and I shall expect your appraisal and your recommendations to take full account of them."[28] Arthur Schlesinger argues that Kennedy's instructions were a reflection the criteria Kennedy used to assess the French administration in Indochina on his 1951 trip.[29] Kennedy was clear that he wanted Taylor to establish if a "solid foundation [still] existed for additional US aid."[30] Kennedy was clearly becoming aware of at least some parallels between the present South Vietnamese government and the French colonial administration from his own trip and was intent on determining "whether Vietnamese nationalism had turned irrevocably against us"—as it had with the French—"or still might serve as the basis for the fight against communism."[31] It is unlikely that Kennedy, as he became aware of parallels to the French system—that he had condemned for its attempts to use military force to combat a political problem—was likely to endorse any policy that he perceived to be similar.

John Newman argues that, despite Kennedy's clear and distinct instructions, Taylor "came back to Kennedy with the same old combat troops solution, spruced up with a humanitarian cover."[32] In his final report, Taylor recommended the "prompt introduction of a flood relief task force,"[33] composed of "US military forces."[34] This "flood relief" force was a poorly

disguised petition for the introduction of American combat troops. Taylor came to this recommendation after meeting with Ngo Dinh Diem, who suggested that he could not maintain his security objectives for the coming months without the aid of American combat troops. The gravity of this pronouncement resonated with Taylor. The general believed that combat troops were necessary to maintain American interests. The flood season provided the perfect cover to put American combat troops in the field, as "flood relief workers," without any major political fallout. In addition to these troops, Taylor recommended the provision of "US military helicopters up to about three companies" to improve the mobility of the ARVN forces. The ARVN lacked any substantial compliment of pilots, so this recommendation inherently involved the commitment of a company of American pilots to staff helicopter wings. Taylor insisted on immediacy of action and warned that "the possibility of emphasizing the humanitarian mission will wane"[35] if Kennedy waited.

Kennedy received Taylor's report dishearteningly. Taylor had, throughout the rest of his report, addressed the social, political, and economic problems of South Vietnam, but his military suggestions obscured any really substantive consideration of these elements. David Halberstam argues that Taylor categorically failed to live up to Kennedy's expectations as an original thinker.[36] Kennedy immediately sought a second opinion, making his disapproval of Taylor's recommendations, as well as suggestions to introduce combat troops, quite clear.

The president asked John Kenneth Galbraith, the American ambassador to India and a political expert on Southeast Asia, to assess the situation in South Vietnam. Galbraith argued that the United States was "married to a failure"[37] in Ngo Dinh Diem. This statement almost certainly shook Kennedy's confidence in Vietnam, but it also highlighted that the president could do very little to escape the ties to its credibility in Vietnam if the administration pursued withdrawal.

Kennedy approved National Security Action Memorandum 111 in November. NSAM 111 endorsed Taylor's "flood relief" recommendations, with some edits. Robert McNamara drafted and edited the document. McNamara described the editing process as an effort to ensure that the NSAM was what "Kennedy wanted to hear." The document ensured that "flood relief" soldiers were deployed in a purely support and logistical capacity and "that the decision to commit major ground forces could be deferred."[38] McNamara's final edit also removed any rhetorical commitments to "preventing the fall of South Vietnam to Communism."[39] The Action Memorandum was titled the "First Phase of [the] Viet-Nam Program."[40] These edits, if they reflected what the president wanted to hear, were telling of his personal motives. Kennedy was reluctant to endorse

further commitments, but felt that he had to in order to protect American credibility. This NSAM would ensure temporary security, but allowed the president to defer—and possibly never authorize—combat troops to Vietnam. For all intents and purposes, this NSAM was the beginning of Kennedy's major personnel commitments to Vietnam, but the title suggested that Kennedy was actively searching for a "second" and decidedly different way to combat the mounting pressures in Vietnam.

Kennedy sent Roger Hilsman, the director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Saigon after he signed NSAM 111. He was to investigate and develop a strategy that could counter the political influence of the Viet Cong. Hilsman met with Sir Robert Thompson in Saigon. Thompson described the success of British forces that combated guerillas in Malaya through the "relocation of peasants into fortified villages."[41] Thompson inspired Hilsman to propose a "Strategic Concept for South Vietnam"[42] oriented around this strategy. Hilsman proposed that the Vietnamese peasantry should be collected into "Strategic Hamlets": "each strategic village will be protected by a ditch and a fence of barbed wire. It will include one or more observation towers [...] the area immediately around the village will be cleared for fields of fire and the area approaching the clearing, including the ditch, will be strewn with booby-traps."[43] Hilsman believed that the program would solve numerous problems in South Vietnam. The hamlets could provide modern, industrial amenities to the impoverished peasantry and physically separate them from contact with the Viet Cong. In principal, the program would attempt to separate the peasantry, both physically and ideologically.

Kennedy quickly adopted Hilsman's Strategic Hamlet Program as the "second phase" of his Vietnam program. The Strategic Hamlet Program represented the kind of unorthodox strategy that Kennedy hoped Taylor would have produced. Hilsman's recommendations combined the principals of the "Kennedy Doctrine," to better the lives of populations that lived in impoverished "villages and huts,"[44] with specific, practical recommendations for South Vietnam. When Lyndon Johnson visited Saigon, he described the greatest social problems plaguing South Vietnam as "hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease."[45] Hilsman endorsed this program as a way to combat these problems directly. On the whole, resettlement of the rural populace would allow Diem to form a new "socio-political base"[46] among the peasantry, the demographic most at risk of adopting Viet Cong sympathies. Kennedy endorsed the program in early February 1962 and it was almost immediately implemented in South Vietnam. The first Hamlets were completed in early April.

Reports throughout much of 1962 and 1963 suggested that the Strategic Hamlet Program was a rave success. Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president's brother, "made the strategic Hamlet Program his personal project."[47] Nhu

"published glowing reports of spectacular success" that American advisors received "uncritically,"[48] and passed along to Washington. With these rave reports, the United States committed the majority of its efforts in Vietnam to the Hamlet Program for the next two years. By the end of 1962, Robert McNamara suggested, "every quantitative measurement we have shows we're winning this war."[49] Arthur Schlesinger argues that Kennedy, "who had other matters on his mind, accepted the cheerful reports from men in whom he had great confidence,"[50] uncritically. Faced with glowing reports that suggested his politically oriented strategy was succeeding, Kennedy announced in his 1963 State of the Union address that, "the spear point of aggression has been blunted in South Vietnam."[51]

The Strategic Hamlet Program is now widely recognized as a failed initiative, but it was not until quite late in 1963 that the Kennedy administration began to realize that the system was failing. Robert McNamara met with Ngo Dinh Diem in the fall of 1963 to address a rising tide of political unrest in the countryside. A potent opposition had arisen to Diem among South Vietnam's Buddhists. The situation gained international attention when Thich Quang Doc, a Buddhist monk, set himself on fire, burning in the middle of Saigon.[52] In their meeting, Diem suggested that he was willingly allowing for a large number of the Strategic Hamlets to fail. "If two fell, eight others would survive and grow stronger,"[53] was his way of thinking. These statements, combined with Diem's insistence to combat the Buddhists with force, shook the Kennedy administration's confidence in the Vietnamese president. It became clear that Diem himself was possibly the greatest problem for American interests in Vietnam and the United States was invested in a failing military situation.

Journalist Homer Bigart had famously described the American commitment to Vietnam as one where the United States would "sink or swim"[54] with Ngo Dinh Diem. As Kenneth Galbraith had suggested, the United States had oriented the vast majority of its strategy around the figure of Diem and, as the fall of 1963 was making abundantly apparent, Diem was crumbling. David Halberstam argued that the Buddhist resentment of Diem represented more than just a religious conflict: "it was also a protest against an authoritarian regime [...] a conflict between the have and have-nots, but more than anything else it seemed to me a conflict between twentieth-century Asians and the generation that preceded them."[55] Diem became a figurehead of Vietnamese uncertainty and a punching bag for critics of Western democracy—by extension, the United States. Halberstam reported that many Buddhist circles, encouraged by the growing tide of popular resentment towards Diem were preparing to orchestrate a gesture that would bring down the Diem government—"we shall throw them a banana peel for them to fall on."[56]

Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated on November 2 1963. This came as a shock to Kennedy and provided a potent realization of the crumbling American stake in Vietnam. Arthur Schlesinger suggests that Kennedy genuinely believed that Diem was the best—perhaps only—hope for South Vietnam. Throughout the summer of 1963, American advisors had pleaded with Diem to rethink his brutal and authoritarian tactics in dealing with the Buddhists. Even as the crisis in the fall reached a boiling point, Kennedy believed that Diem's political identity could be salvaged. When the president heard that Diem had been deposed in a coup and executed, Schlesinger reports that Kennedy "stormed" out of the Oval Office, dejected and defeated.[57] The assassination was almost certainly a realization that the American effort in Vietnam, as Kennedy had seen it, was doomed.

The parallels to the French colonial administration that Kennedy critiqued were all too apparent. In practice, the Strategic Hamlet Program lacked "any political component."[58] The Hamlets only served to enhance the division between the rural peasantry and urban elite. David Halberstam condemned the hamlets as "a gentleman's agreement with the Vietcong" that were "providing a vacuum in which the guerillas could work."[59] Galbraith had warned Kennedy that he would "bleed as the French did" in Vietnam.[60] Kennedy was almost certainly afraid of repeating the mistakes that he condemned the French for.

Some evidence suggests that Kennedy began to contemplate withdrawal from Vietnam in his last days in office. Robert McNamara presented a report suggesting that "it should be possible to withdraw the bulk of US personnel" by 1965 and that the administration could consider plans to "withdraw one thousand personnel by the end of 1963."[61] These recommendations were deeply unpopular, but John Newman suggests that Kennedy fiercely defended the thousand-man withdrawal idea.[62] Lyndon Johnson effectively halted this course in 1964. It remains difficult to discern if Kennedy really intended to withdraw American support entirely by 1965, however, as this paper has established, Kennedy was clearly strongly averse to any plans that would further commit American financial and military investment to South Vietnam. Kennedy likely realized the hypocrisy of his role in establishing policy in Vietnam that so closely resembled the French. The death of Diem represented the defeat of Kennedy's political ambitions in Vietnam. It is almost certifiable that Kennedy would not have endorsed introducing combat troops to Vietnam. This paper established that Kennedy was willing to endorse expanded commitments to Vietnam, only when he believed they ascribed to a particular set of principles that he believed would aid the political situation under Ngo Dinh Diem. "To pour money, material, and men into the

jungles of Indochina,"[63] in an attempt to remedy the political vacuum left by the death of Diem would go against every decision and principal Kennedy had acted on in Vietnam.

Before this paper concludes, it is necessary to define and attend to some areas it has not addressed. The issue at the core of this paper has aroused almost unparalleled speculation in American history. The absolute wealth of arguments surrounding Kennedy and Vietnam are truly impossible to address in the space of twenty pages. For the sake of brevity, the author chose to limit the scope of this thesis to address a practical question: how likely Kennedy was to introduce further American aid and personnel to Vietnam after 1963. This is a meaningful distinction that allowed for this analysis to avoid a great deal of counterfactual speculation. Moreover, this paper chose to focus on a handful of key decisions and documents to support its conclusion. This paper acknowledges that a number of statements were recorded that suggested Kennedy wanted to expand the effort in Vietnam. It is difficult to certify how well Kennedy's public statements communicated his real intentions in Vietnam. Much of what he said publically was intended for political maneuvering. This paper chose not to focus on these personal details and instead consider formal policies, where the written historical record could certify Kennedy's approval—as well as any formal conditions of approval. The author believes that this was the best way to approach this question.

In conclusion, this paper has established that it is highly unlikely that John F. Kennedy would have committed further American resources to Vietnam after the autumn of 1963. Certain principals guided Kennedy's foreign policy decisions. The president was heavily influenced by a sense of duty to American credibility abroad, but was aware that the efficacy of American intervention had limits. In every decision to escalate American commitments to Vietnam from 1961–1963, Kennedy clearly exhibited a reluctance to commit further resources unless he was certain of some degree of political stability in South Vietnam, and unless he believed that some prospect for victory still existed. The administration placed a considerable degree of confidence in Ngo Dinh Diem. Kennedy remained personally confident in Diem until the autumn of 1963. Diem's callous responses to domestic instability in South Vietnam were clear warning signs. Diem was assassinated in November 1963. It is almost certifiable that this event shattered Kennedy's confidence in the political stability of South Vietnam. The potential for a US-backed South Vietnamese victory seemed slim. Considering how reluctant Kennedy was to commit American resources unless he was certain that there was some political stability, and some prospects for victory, it is highly unlikely he would have committed further resources to South Vietnam after the death of Diem. To do so would go against the principals that guided every prior decision in Vietnam.

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THE COLD WAR'S DECISIVE TURN: NIXON, KISSINGER, AND TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY

by

JONAH GOLDBERG

INTRODUCTION: NIXON'S CHINA GAMBIT

By the time of his presidential inauguration in 1969, Richard Nixon's anti-communist credentials were impeccable. He had built his political reputation on taking a tough stand against communism, both as a member of Congress and as vice president. Yet it was Nixon, as president, who was instrumental in establishing America's relationship with a major communist power, the People's Republic of China. Many have argued that only Nixon could have gone to China because any liberal politician would have been attacked for being soft on communism. Why, then, did Nixon break with the approach taken by successive administrations, both Democratic and Republican, to isolate China on the world stage? Why did such an ardent anti-communist like Nixon seek to pursue reconciliation with such a radical regime? The reality was that Nixon, at his core, was a realist. As president, he chose to focus on national security and power politics over ideology. Along with his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, Nixon believed that America could use a new relationship with China in order to

fundamentally alter the Cold War dynamic to the benefit of the United States. In light of the rift that had developed in the communist world between the Soviet Union and China, Nixon and Kissinger believed that the time was ripe to take advantage of what Kissinger called triangular diplomacy. The administration believed that if the United States could build a closer relationship with both Moscow and Beijing than they had with each other, they could induce concessions from both sides and serve as the indispensable power on the world stage. The impetus for closer relations came through inciting fear in both Moscow and Beijing that the United States would ally with the other communist power, and provoking anxiety in China that a Soviet military offensive was imminent, making cooperation with the Americans seem essential. The administration also sought to elevate China's status on the world stage to position it as a counterforce to the Soviet Union, thereby preventing a hegemon from dominating the communist world. This narrative fits perfectly with more traditional explanations for the Sino-American rapprochement. While Nixon's public explanation focused primarily on the need to bring China out of its "angry isolation,"[1] China would have to be reintegrated into the international system if the United States was to elevate its status and use China as a counterforce to Soviet power. In addition, the desire to take advantage of China diplomatically, including over Vietnam, is directly connected to the need to turn China into a cooperative world power. Finally, the White House also recognized that China's rise as an economic and nuclear power was inevitable, and decided to help elevate China's status sooner to further divide the communist world. Thus, while Nixon's public explanations for America's rapprochement with China focused on pragmatism, there can be no doubt that America's primary motivation for ending its diplomatic freeze with China was carefully calculated self-interest.

NIXON'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: DÉTENTE, A NEW WORLD ORDER, AND TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY

Kissinger's memoirs indicate that triangular diplomacy was the most important factor in the Nixon administration's decision to reestablish bilateral relations with mainland China. The Nixon administration's vision of triangular diplomacy in Cold War relations between the United States, Soviet Union, and China embodies an intensely realist approach to international relations. In essence, Nixon and Kissinger believed that if the American government could have a closer relationship with both the Soviet Union and China than they had with each other, the two Communist powers would have a strong incentive to deal constructively with the United States.[2]

According to Kissinger, "in a subtle triangle of relations between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each as we increase our options toward both."[3] Such a scenario was only made possible by the bitter relationship that had emerged between the Soviet Union and China in the early 1960s. While historians have competing ideas about what caused the split, there is a general consensus that by the time the Nixon administration came to power in 1969, relations between the Soviet Union and China had reached a new low. This antagonism provided Nixon and his aides with the best opportunity to exploit the Sino-Soviet division and change the dynamic of the Cold War since China fell to communism in 1949.[4]

Before establishing relations with China, Nixon had already begun to transform America's foreign policy. His strategic plan was conducive to a shift on China because of the three key tenets of the administration's foreign policy: it was realist and would relentlessly pursue America's national interests, it did not favour any conflict among the world's major powers, and it was anti-hegemonic, and therefore sought to elevate a Soviet-hostile China as a counterforce to the power of the Soviet Union.[5] The idea of pursing closer relations with both the Soviet Union and China was consistent with President Nixon's policy of détente, which sought to reduce international tensions and introduce a "stable structure of peace" to the international system.[6] While diplomatic relations between the United States and Soviet Union had existed in one form or another throughout the Cold War, no bilateral relationship had existed between the United States and mainland China since 1949. Nixon believed that a stable and less antagonistic international order was necessary in a post-Vietnam era, in which America could no longer "impose its…will on East Asia,"[7] nor be the world's policeman entering into any conflict to halt communist expansionism. Part of that stability meant balancing the influence of China against that of the Soviet Union, and keeping the both states focused on the military threat each posed to the other. However, such a scenario would necessitate an antagonistic relationship between the two powers, and the further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1960s helped to facilitate a triangular relationship and the anti-hegemonic goals that the Nixon White House had envisioned for the communist world.

Sino-Soviet relations worsened further in 1979, and it was this situation that the Nixon administration would come to exploit and use to advance triangular diplomacy. In 1969 there were several military clashes on the Sino-Soviet border, and Brezhnev's heavy handed approach in Czechoslovakia in 1968 heightened fears that the Soviets might invade mainland China.[8] China would ultimately be forced to embrace the United States to balance against the perceived Soviet threat, which the Americans

continually emphasized. Kissinger contends that this was the moment in which he envisioned the true potential of triangular diplomacy.[9] The full extent of the rift between the Soviet Union and China was revealed in 1969, when Mao's self-appointed successor, Lin Biao, announced to the Communist Party leadership that the United States and Soviet Union represented an equal threat to the security of the People's Republic. Both Nixon and Kissinger recognized the speech's importance, and saw it as a signal that China's leadership might be willing to shift their approach toward the United States.[10] Triangular diplomacy could only succeed if the Chinese saw the Soviets and Americans as equal threats, and Lin's speech indicated that that was the case. This appeared to be the opening for triangular diplomacy that the administration had been hoping for. As one intelligence briefing suggested to Nixon in 1969, "the deepening strains between Moscow and Beijing would send both adversaries running to America's doorstep."[11]

The Nixon administration was ultimately very successful in taking advantage of triangular diplomacy in the early 1970s, as both the Soviet Union and China made conciliatory gestures toward the United States after Nixon's initial outreach to Beijing. Due to Nixon's overtures, "never again would an important decision be made in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington without the leaders …factoring in the consequences for all three."[12] After Kissinger's first visit to China was made public, a nervous leadership in the Kremlin became more cooperative with Washington. The China shift was quickly "paying dividends," as the Soviets "responded to the Sino-American rapprochement by being more forthcoming about the US-USSR summit and other negotiations, such as those over Berlin" and arms reduction.[13] [14] The shift in the Soviet approach was largely due to a "paranoia over China" among the Soviet leadership,[15] and there was a "clear implication…that Moscow was paying for 'diddling' [with] Nixon," as their lack of initial cooperation led Nixon straight toward Beijing.[16] The Nixon administration would come to devote "the months following the China summit to negotiations with the Soviet Union about Berlin, SALT, Vietnam, and the Soviet-American summit."[17] The American rapprochement with China therefore clearly played a role in driving the Soviets back to the bargaining table. As Nixon himself said to his chief of staff in 1971, "the whole Chinese operation…was about the Russian Game."[18]

The Americans were even more successful in playing the "Soviet card" with China to turn the People's Republic into a "strategic partner."[19] The United States used the triangular relationship from the very beginning of bilateral negotiations. According to Goh, "Nixon and Kissinger felt it necessary to devote considerable effort to playing the Soviet card during the rapprochement in order to persuade Chinese leaders to develop closer ties with Washington."[20] The administration used the developing détente between

the Soviet Union and the United States in the latter stages of the Nixon presidency to push the Chinese to pursue a closer relationship with Washington, and emphasized the military threat Moscow posed to China as a parallel incentive for a closer bilateral relationship.[21] Winston Lord, then Kissinger's assistant, submits that the subtext to the changing relationship with both powers was clear. Just as progress was made with the Soviets by the improving relationship between Beijing and Washington, so too did improving relations with the Soviets influence the Chinese. In referencing the American approach toward China, Lord described it as follows: "we are making some progress with the Soviets, and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us, so that we don't get ahead of you in relations with the Russians."[22] Kissinger would emphasize that point as he sought to exploit an advantage for the United States. This was how Nixon and Kissinger envisioned the implementation of the triangular policy to work: when the United States developed closer relations with one power, the division between the Soviet Union and China would be a strong incentive for the other power to pursue closer relations with Washington. Playing the "China card" with Moscow and the "Soviet card" with Beijing would leave the United States as the central pivot in the relationship.[23] Because the Soviets and Chinese were at odds with one another, neither could afford to have the Americans become too close to one power at the expense of the other's influence. As one internal White House memo suggested, "given the fact that the Soviets and Chinese appear now to regard one another with more active hostility than they regard the US, it is possible that each will become more active in seeking to prevent the other from aligning too closely with the US, and to use its own relations with the US as a means of checkmating the other's policies."[24]

The Nixon administration would repeatedly play to the fear of the Chinese government about the Soviet Union's aggressive intentions, and the developing détente between the United States and Soviet Union, to push China into more cooperative relations with the American government. Kissinger suggested to Beijing that "in the wake of the Sino-American rapprochement, Moscow had reached agreement with Washington on Berlin and SALT…because of its 'desire to free itself in Europe so it can concentrate on other areas,' namely China."[25] Alexander Haig, then a senior Kissinger aide, even promised in advance of Nixon's visit to "unilaterally and without any reciprocity" provide the Chinese government with intelligence involving Soviet threats against China.[26] The fact that American officials promised such intelligence before a new diplomatic relationship had been fully established suggests that the Nixon administration made conscious efforts to increase paranoia among Chinese officials and build "a sense of shared danger."[27] Nixon and Kissinger "were prepared to lean covertly toward Beijing

in order to strengthen the image of the Soviet Union as a shared adversary," and Kissinger's "progressive construction of this threat would bring the Nixon administration closer to a US-China coalition against the Soviet Union."[28] The administration's ultimate aim was to "exploit Chinese worries about Soviet intentions in order to tie Beijing into a strategic relationship with the United States, so that the China card could be played more effectively in persuading the Soviet Union to develop détente and restraint."[29]

Nixon and Kissinger were so successful in using triangular diplomacy and heightening fear of the Soviets among Chinese officials that by 1973 "Beijing now appeared to recognize that it was in China's interest for the United States to maintain its power to counter Soviet pressures internationally."[30] Moreover, America's newfound cooperation with the Soviet Union, triggered in part by Nixon's overtures to China, played a role in increasing cooperation from Beijing. As Goh proposes, "as the momentum of triangular politics grew, so too did the Chinese leaders' desire for closer relations with the United States to counteract US-USSR ties."[31] Nixon and Kissinger's most important long-term objective was to "gain some years for the Chinese-American relationship to mature as a counter-weight to Soviet power."[32] This led Ross to conclude that America's "China policy was fundamentally shaped by the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and the corresponding value of strategic cooperation with Beijing."[33] In turn, China would come to develop a security "dependence on the United States."[34]

Importantly, Goh suggests that the Nixon administration was not fully committed to a triangular relationship in which relations improved in every direction. Washington, Goh claims, "did not necessarily wish for better Sino-Soviet relations."[35] According to the Nixon-Kissinger "model of triangular politics, while the United States did not seek a Sino-Soviet war, it did require some frigidity in Sino-Soviet relations because the pivotal American position would be beneficial only so long as the Chinese and Soviets regarded each other as a greater threat than the Americans."[36] This would allow for the United States to manage the new equilibrium from the centre.[37] These new relationships were built primarily upon fear, and the Nixon administration used China's fear of the Soviet Union in order to forge a new relationship that ensured that the communist world remained divided and the United States remained the indispensable power. China was introduced into the dynamic to restrain the Soviet Union, somewhat defuse the tense Cold War atmosphere, and provide the United States with an ally in checking Soviet aggression. It also prevented a potential Soviet attack on China. Some scholars suggest that Mao recognized the United States was "opportunistically exploiting the Sino-Soviet split in order to achieve its ultimate aim of defeating its superpower rival."[38] Nonetheless, he knew that China needed at least tacit cooperation with Washington for the sake of

security. One scholar suggests that "China's sole objective was to develop an anti-Soviet coalition."[39] This pro-American triangular relationship, if kept in place, would ensure that the Americans never again faced the prospect of a hostile monolithic communist bloc in Europe and Asia as they had in the 1950s when the Soviets and Chinese were allies. The hope was that neither Communist power would risk doing something to endanger their relationship with the United States and drive the other members of the triangular relationship closer together.

ALTERNATIVE MOTIVATIONS AND TRIANGULAR DIPLOMACY

While the Nixon administration's primary motivation for engaging with China was to reconfigure the Cold War dynamic through a "strategic triangle,"[40] there were other factors that played a role in their decision. One was laid out by Nixon himself in an article he wrote for *Foreign Affairs* in 1967. In essence, Nixon argued that leaving China outside of the world community was simply was not working. He believed that it was time for America's foreign policy to "come urgently to grips with the reality of [Communist] China."[41] The world, Nixon argued, "simply [could not] afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations…[living] in angry isolation."[42] Here Nixon's rationale fits perfectly with his policy of triangular diplomacy. Bringing China back into the community of nations was essential if the United States was to position China as a legitimate counterforce to the Soviet Union. While it was true that Nixon believed that the American approach of isolating China had failed, he also wanted to bring China out of isolation so that the United States could exploit its newfound legitimacy to alter the Cold War dynamic. In addition, Mao's China had been erratic and belligerent, and bringing it into the mainstream would mean that China would have to moderate its policies to uphold the stability of the world system that it would come to benefit from. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China began to do just that, thanks to Nixon's efforts to bring China back into the world community.

The Nixon administration also hoped to exploit a new relationship with the People's Republic for the sake of diplomacy. Beyond serving as a counterforce to the Soviet Union, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that China could play a role in maintaining stability in the international system. China's isolation had proven to be harmful to American interests throughout Nixon's career. Had China been fully integrated into the international system in the aftermath of the Communist victory in 1949, MacArthur's proposal to push past the thirty-eighth parallel in the Korean War would never have succeeded at the United Nations, and a wider war would have

been avoided. The lessons of Korea pointed to the importance of diplomacy, and there was hope that a new relationship with China might help lead to a diplomatic solution to the war in Vietnam.[43] The war in Vietnam had escalated in part because the Johnson administration was concerned about American credibility in East Asia in the face of Mao's "radical ideological offensive," and apprehension that China might enter the conflict, as was the case in Korea.[44] The fact that the US government did not have diplomatic relations with China simply heightened that anxiety. As one scholar contends, "the US perception of China played a crucial role in prompting the Johnson administration to stand firm in Vietnam."[45] Nixon recognized that reality, but he also hoped that China might prove helpful in ending the war in Vietnam because of the closeness between Beijing and Hanoi. As Nixon noted in his memoirs, "without continuous and massive aid from either or both of the Communist giants, the leaders of North Vietnam would not have been able to carry on the war for more than a few months."[46] The main problem was that after the Sino-Soviet split the North Vietnamese played one power off of the other, with both Moscow and Beijing determined not to allow Vietnam to fall under the influence of the other. This complicated the situation, as it would be much harder for the United States to pressure one major power to encourage North Vietnam to end the war if they could simply turn to the other power. Nonetheless, Nixon recognized that being able to at least engage China in a dialogue, as the Americans were already able to do with the Soviets, might reinvigorate the stalled negotiations with North Vietnam.

Nixon and Kissinger also had another motivation for bringing China back into the community of nations. As a nation of eight hundred million people, the Nixon administration realized that China's economic growth was inevitable. So too did it appear as though Mao's determination would lead to China becoming a major nuclear power, and thus it would be dangerous to leave them in isolation.[47] Bringing China back into the mainstream would provide the People's Republic with an opportunity to grow its economy and emerge as a more powerful player on the international stage. Here again the Nixon administration's triangular diplomacy initiative clearly played a role in shaping America's policies. While a resurgent China would eventually become an economic competitor, a stronger and more prosperous China would serve as a more effective counterforce to the Soviet Union. A more economically successful China would make the People's Republic a stronger actor on the international stage, which is exactly what the Nixon administration hoped to do with its triangular diplomacy initiative. This helps to explain why the United States removed much of its economic sanctions against China under the Nixon administration, including lifting the trade embargo in 1972, and fully normalized relations under President Carter in 1979.[48]

CONCLUSION: THE COLD WAR TRANSFORMED

As recent scholarship has demonstrated, the immediate goals of the Nixon administration's decision to pursue a rapprochement with China were to boost the momentum of détente with the Soviets and position the People's Republic as a counterforce to Soviet power in the communist world. By improving relations with both Beijing and Moscow and taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split, the Nixon administration was able to position the United States as the indispensable, central player in triangular relations among the United States and the world's two great communist powers. Nixon's success in doing so during a time in which the relative influence of the United States was in decline on the world stage, due in part to the failures in Vietnam and a troubled domestic economy, made triangular diplomacy all the more important. While momentum in the improvement of relations between Washington and Beijing and Washington and Moscow stalled soon after Nixon's historic visit to China in the midst of the Watergate scandal and the declining power of the presidency, the reestablishment of relations between the United States and China would eventually allow Presidents Carter and Reagan to target the Soviet Union in ramping up the Cold War and focusing on defeating only one of the world's two great communist powers. There can be no doubt that a rapprochement between the Soviets and China would have changed the calculus of the Cold War completely, and the Nixon administration's decision to further divide the communist world by using triangular diplomacy and forming a de facto alliance with the People's Republic was the most decisive event in the forty-plus year struggle that was the Cold War.

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TAKE THE PARTY AND RUN:
HOW THE YOUNG AMERICANS FOR FREEDOM STOLE THE GOP AND REDEFINED AMERICAN POLITICS

by

BRENDAN HILLS

In 1961, M. Stanton Evans, one of the founding members of the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) as well as the writer of the "Sharon Statement," stated that the members of the YAF would be "...the group which, in fifteen or twenty years, will be assuming the seats of power in the United States."[1] Twenty years later, Ronald Reagan, a member of the YAF himself, would be sworn in as president of the United States, fulfilling Evans' political prophecy from two decades prior. The YAF, in the span of twenty years, had gone from a group of one hundred students in Sharon, Connecticut, to taking over the Republican party, and finally to taking the White House. The YAF's goal was always to obtain political power for their organization, and in so doing to put into action their conservative ideals. In this way, the YAF's goals were distinctly different from those of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), in that their main goal was not to demand immediate change in society, but rather to obtain the means by which they could influence the nation through political power. The 1960s saw a conservative revival in the form of the New Right, which paralleled the rise of

the New Left movement, but it was only through the Young Americans for Freedom that conservatives would be able to sway first the Republican Party, and then the nation, to the right.

This paper will examine the conservative movement of the 1960s, and will seek to explain how the Young Americans for Freedom, as the primary organization that represented conservative ideals in the 1960s, initially arose, came to hold influence within American politics, and ultimately was able to redefine the American political spectrum for decades to come. This paper will begin by examining the early resurgence of conservative ideals in the 1960s. Many Americans felt increasingly uncomfortable in a nation dominated by New Deal-era economic policies, and under the threat of a seemingly surging communist movement, turned to conservative principles as their answer to the day's issues. Next, this paper will examine the early years of the Young Americans for Freedom, and will identify how the organization formed a strategy of obtaining power through organizations in order to further its agenda. Where movements like the SDS focused on immediate social change, the YAF looked to sustained and prolonged political change to implement conservative ideals. This paper will then turn to the presidential election of 1964, and will examine the ways in which the YAF entered the political scene through its support of Barry Goldwater. The YAF made Goldwater a viable presidential candidate, but Goldwater also made the YAF an influential organization. Finally, this paper will examine the YAF in the wake of Goldwater's defeat in 1964, and determine how the organization was able to continue exerting influence over the GOP without Goldwater. The latter half of the decade would see the demise of the SDS, thus striking a blow to the left's organized momentum, as well as the emergence of a new political favourite for the YAF. While the 1960s are popularly regarded as a period dominated by the left, the decade would end with a Republican president, and a renewed conservatism that would ultimately impact the decades that followed.

In order to understand the YAF's popularity in the 1960s, one must first examine the origins of the resurgent conservative movement itself. At the beginning of the 1940s the state of California had a total population of nearly seven million people; by the beginning of the 1960s, this number had increased to over fifteen million.[2] California had more than doubled its population in the span of two decades, with Orange County in particular growing from one hundred and thirty thousand to over seven hundred thousand in the same span of time.[3] The reason for the growth was in large part due to the expanding presence of the military in the American West, particularly the aerospace industry, which required skilled labour and generated higher-end middle-class incomes for its workers.[4] The region's reliance on what the population perceived as anti-communist industries (i.e. the American

military), as well as the rugged individualistic culture that the fantasy of "the West" had instilled in so many Americans, created a breeding ground for conservative ideals.[5] The same demographic changes, thanks to the same industries, were occurring all across the American South and West following the conclusion of the Second World War; what has become known as the "Sunbelt" was a hotbed for individualism, anti-communism, and as a result conservatism.

The Sunbelt states came to resent the Eastern establishment as they saw it, particularly the East's reliance on federal spending through New Deal-era policies.[6] It should be noted that while Sunbelt states resented the East for its liberal, left-wing policies, they themselves benefitted immensely from federal spending in the form of military and government contracts in the region; while it must be said that many private enterprises existed in the region, still much of the region's prosperity came from the federal government's presence.[7] It was in this region, what Rebecca Klatch calls in her book *A Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right and the 1960s*, "Goldwater country," that the conservative movement would take hold.[8] In fact, Klatch interviews in her book many different members of both the SDS and YAF, and the YAF members state that, having grown up there, the "…conservative climate in southern California 'might be the single greatest contributing factor' to the development of his [the YAF member interviewed] beliefs."[9]

Americans in the Sunbelt would largely support the burgeoning conservative movement, but it was in Sharon, Connecticut that the conservative movement would take shape in the form of the YAF. In order to understand the origins of the YAF, one must first examine its central architect: William F. Buckley Jr. Buckley, the son of a wealthy family, graduated from Yale University in 1950, and would go on a year later to publish a book he entitled *God and Man at Yale*.[10] Buckley criticized the teaching of atheism and collectivism at Yale, stating that ignoring the importance of free markets and religion was antithetical to understanding the success of Western civilization.[11] This book would become the manifesto of the conservative movement. In addition to his strong support for Christianity and free market economics, Buckley was also an ardent anti-communist. In an article published in *The New Guard* the official publication of the YAF, in October 1961, he stated that: "The House Committee on Un-American Activities, I venture to say, is responsible for the development of more serious information…than the typical department of political science in the typical university."[12] Buckley was wealthy, an intellectual and relatively well-known after the publicity his book had garnered him. These factors, in conjunction with his views on economics, religion and communism, made him the perfect candidate for leading a growing conservative movement. Buckley and a few like-minded colleagues would form the first of such conservative

organizations, the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists (ISI) in 1952, an intellectual organization dedicated to fostering conservative research and thought on university campuses, and the *National Review*, a magazine dedicated to conservative publications, in 1955.[13]

Following the failed attempts by smaller, candidate-focused youth movements (e.g. Youth for Nixon, Youth for Goldwater) to elect a conservative president in 1960, Buckley moved to form one central conservative youth organization.[14] ISI was formed for the purpose of fostering a conservative intellectual awakening on campuses, while a new organization would be dedicated to political action.[15] It was on the Buckley family estate in Sharon, Connecticut in September 1960 that over one hundred conservative student leaders from across the nation met to draft the "Sharon Statement" and form the Young Americans for Freedom.[16] The statement outlined key conservative tenets, in particular individual rights and free market economics, as well as stating that the United States should aim for victory over, rather than containment of, communism.[17] The YAF had been founded, and even though the statement did not explicitly outline the plan for how they would act upon the principles espoused by it, Buckley would write after the conference: "What is so striking in the students who met at Sharon is their appetite for power."[18] It was evident, right from the establishment of the YAF, that its members were most interested in attaining political power to further their conservative agenda. James Hijiya, in his piece entitled "The Conservative 1960s," quotes YAF's Lee Edwards who stated that members of the YAF were encouraged to "…place themselves not only in the US House of Representatives, but in the television networks, in the universities, in corporations and companies and, perhaps, most important of all, in the Federal government."[19] The YAF's main focus was not only to support political candidates who espoused conservative principles, but also for its members to establish themselves in other organizations to further the group's conservative agenda. The YAF however, first required a viable political candidate to support in order for them to demonstrate their legitimacy as a conservative organization, but also to expand their influence. They found their man in Barry Goldwater.

Barry Goldwater, a senator from Arizona, did not come from an old Eastern, Republican family like the Rockefellers. Rather, Goldwater's family was self-made—Goldwater himself was only a third generation American.[20] Their central beliefs were in individualism and self-determination, ideals that appealed to the new conservative movement of the 1960s. While a modest attempt at having the senator nominated for the Republican ticket in 1960 had been made, the YAF had at the time only recently formed and was not able to launch a full campaign; by the end of the year they were

stronger and ready to try again. Buckley's brother-in-law, Brent Bozell, assisted Goldwater in writing *The Conscience of a Conservative,* which would become the conservative manifesto of the decade.[21] This book would have a huge influence on young conservatives, as Goldwater would outline his political beliefs, which coincided almost exactly with the points made in the "Sharon Statement."[22] Goldwater also took aim at the establishment Republicans, singling out Nixon and Eisenhower and labeling them "progressive conservatives."[23] This would have signalled a major shift in political stance at the time for the GOP, as a presidential hopeful was publicly declaring his distaste for the past two leaders of the Republican party. The YAF saw Goldwater as their solution for how to shift the Republican party to the right, and thus they set to work organizing one of the largest grassroots campaigns in the history of US politics.

The YAF began seeking the Republican nomination for the 1964 presidential election for Goldwater almost immediately after his previous loss. By early 1964 however, despite Goldwater's reluctance, the YAF and other conservative organizations (namely the John Birch Society) had stepped up their campaigning efforts and were now running a massive, organized grassroots campaign in support of Goldwater.[24] The YAF, because of its central and hierarchal structure, was able to organize events across most of the country in shows of support for Goldwater; their grassroots activism, along with constant attacks by establishment Republicans like Nelson Rockefeller (the favourite up to this point), led Goldwater to officially agree to enter as a candidate that summer.[25] Through the continued efforts of the YAF, Goldwater would win the nomination for the Republican party that July, which was a major victory for the conservative movement. The YAF was in large part responsible for Goldwater's nomination, but winning the presidency was a different matter entirely. It is clear however, that many prominent members within the YAF understood that Goldwater's chances for winning the presidential race were slim. Buckley himself acknowledged during a speech delivered to the YAF annual convention in September, 1964 that the Goldwater campaign was doomed to fail, as he asked the members of YAF in attendance not to lose hope after the "… impending defeat of Barry Goldwater."[26] Indeed, Goldwater would be defeated that November by Lyndon Johnson, but where the election had been a defeat for the Republican party, it had in many ways been a victory for the conservative movement. A concerted effort by the YAF to organize and carry out a massive grassroots campaign had left behind a "conservative machine" which could still function for future candidates.[27] In addition, conservative Republicans had made names for themselves, through YAF promotion, and would return in the future to seek election. While the YAF had lost the presidential race, it had won the Republican party, and

had become a legitimate institution in its own right. The YAF now needed to maintain its political relevancy through the rest of the decade, which would be accomplished through the collapse of the SDS and through YAF's support for a new conservative candidate.

Up to the mid-1960s, the YAF and the SDS had remained at opposite sides of the political spectrum, but both groups would participate in debate and discussion with one another.[28] In the second half of the decade however, the SDS had become increasingly violent to the point that the YAF's appeal continued to grow as an anti-protest movement in addition to being a conservative movement.[29] This helped the YAF remain relevant between political campaign years, as it allowed those who disagreed with the actions of the SDS to join a movement that opposed their form of protest. The SDS had become so radical that in the summer of 1967, after riots had broken out across hundreds of cities in the United States, the president of the SDS at the time, Greg Calvert, stated: "We are working to build a guerrilla force in an urban environment. We are actively organizing sedition."[30] Statements such as these surely would have frightened those who would consider themselves moderates, perhaps pushing them to take action against the protests of the SDS by joining the YAF. The violence would continue to escalate, culminating in the split of the SDS in 1969, and ultimately leading to their demise as an organization of the New Left. Throughout this period, the SDS made repeated threats to the YHF, and was the victim of several violent offences during the latter half of the 1960s by radical New Left groups. Nonetheless, the YAF maintained its composure and never resorted to similar actions.[31] This demonstrated the professionalism and legitimacy of the YAF during this time period. Meanwhile, the SDS lost momentum, became radicalized and eventually collapsed. In this way, the YAF would emerge from the 1960s as the primary political youth movement, while the SDS, and indeed the reputation of similar New Left youth movements, would be tarnished and dismantled.

It was not simply its professionalism and lack of violent behaviour that would see the YAF through to the end of the decade, but also its continued involvement in election politics. Towards the end of the Goldwater presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan delivered a rousing television address in support of Goldwater titled "A Time for Choosing," or more simply, "The Speech."[32] This speech actually came to be the highlight of the Goldwater campaign, with Richard Nixon stating that "… Reagan demonstrated that he possessed what Goldwater lacked—'the ability to present his views in a reasonable and eloquent manner.'"[33] The contest for the Republican nomination would be split between Nixon and Reagan in 1968, but both candidates ultimately were conservatives, just

different kinds; where Reagan had the support of the grassroots movements (particularly the YAF), Nixon had the backing of the conservative leadership.[34] The YAF had shifted the entire party to the right, forcing future Republican candidates to take a conservative stance in order to receive much of the backing that the YAF and organized movements like it offered. Nixon may not have been considered a true conservative to many members of the YAF, but the fact that Nixon was considered moderate or centrist in his principles is indicative of the major political shift that had occurred. It would take another decade before the YAF would finally take over the White House. Ronald Reagan won the presidential election in 1980, a victory made possible by the major political shift that had occurred as a result of the early YAF; conservatism had become the new centre in American politics.[35]

Though the Students for a Democratic Society and the New Left movement are typically associated with the 1960s, it was truly the Young Americans for Freedom and the conservative movement that would define the succeeding decades of American politics. The burgeoning conservative movement grew out of the Sunbelt states, uniting voters who believed strongly in self-determination and the free market but were also anti-New Deal and staunchly anti-communist. William F Buckley Jr., a wealthy, respected conservative academic, was able to organize the creation of a youthful conservative movement in the form of the YAF. The YAF, from the outset, was dedicated to achieving political and organizational power, as opposed to the SDS and New Left groups, which only sought immediate social change. The YAF campaigned diligently for Barry Goldwater, whom they saw as a viable conservative candidate. The grassroots political movement that the YAF utilized would be employed again by Reagan to win the presidency two decades later. Following the Goldwater campaign, the Republican party had shifted far to the right, becoming the conservative party that the YAF had initially sought to make it. Through their continued involvement in the political process, the YAF was able to maintain a conservative presence in the GOP, assisting and campaigning for the candidates who supported conservatism. The 1960s were a tumultuous time in the United States, yet of all the movements that the time period is most known for, the YAF is seldom remembered to the same extent that the SDS is. The Young Americans for Freedom changed the political landscape of their time, and their influence still exists today, evidenced by the increasingly polarized and conservative policies that the GOP continues to promote.

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MISSION ACCOMPLISHED
SEAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

A MEDIA CIRCUS AT BAGHDAD:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, THE AMERICAN PRESS, AND THE SELLING OF THE IRAQ WAR

by

BENSON CHEUNG

"Journalism is printing what someone else does not want printed; everything else is public relations." ~Attributed to George Orwell[1]

The Iraq War in 2003 was a controversial war in many ways, not least because of the heavy criticisms lobbed at the Bush administration for fabricating a misleading pretext for war, and the US media establishment for how they did not critically assess the government's positions. Hegemony theorists believe that this is because "government influence is so hegemonic over elite press reporting and opinion on foreign policy that the elite press simply mirrors the government line."[2] The implications of this argument—that the government has absolute control over agenda-setting—raises disturbing implications for the functioning of a healthy democracy, and therefore must be investigated in full.

From a period between 9/11 and May 1, 2003, when President George W. Bush declared the active combat stage in Iraq over, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Bush administration engaged in heavy public relations to garner public support for the war while there is evidence that the media overall had a pro-war bias. However, although their combined effects seemed to produce significant results on generating public support for

toppling Saddam Hussein, there were other factors besides a top-down imposition of biased news making the political-media-public relationship much more complex than what hegemony theorists believe. As such, alternative media models can be considered to be "better fits" for the Iraq War case than hegemony theory.

EXECUTIVE AGENDA-SETTING

Given that the core of hegemony theory is that "political leaders make sure that there is agreement on first principles and public debate is confined within narrow ideological boundaries so that a broad and vigorous democratic discussion challenging fundamental assumptions becomes difficult,"[3] it would make sense to investigate whether Bush made an effort to set the agenda on militarily invading Iraq before looking at the media's role. Bush's administration was indeed responsible for trying to shift the public discourse spotlight onto Iraq—via rhetoric and an efficient public relations campaign—over the issues of WMDs and Saddam Hussein's brutality.

After the 9/11 attacks, Bush evidently tried to capitalize on the issue of terrorism to shift the national discourse from defeating al Qaeda to attacking Iraq by linking the two separate objectives in the public's mind. In the summer of 2002, while Congress debated the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, Bush's communications from June to November 2002 showed that he attempted to bridge the twin scourges of terrorism and Iraq with a sleight of hand, as a textual analysis of these communications demonstrated. From June 6 to September 11, seventy-seven percent of Bush's communications were about homeland security as opposed to 13.5% about just Iraq; yet, from September 12 to November 5, just 1.2% of his communications were about homeland security, while 69.1% referred to both homeland security and Iraq and 29.6% with Iraq as the sole focus. This demonstrates a conscious merger between the two topics as Bush associated homeland security with Iraq in the same breath.[4]

In a textual analysis of Bush's major address between 9/11 and May 1, 2003, it is revealed that mentions of Iraq barely registered before September 11, 2002 as terrorism remained the main focus, yet the number of references to Iraq skyrocketed after that date. While the absolute number of terrorism references dropped, the number of references nevertheless echoed the much greater number of Iraq references, suggesting "that terrorism and Iraq would appear together in speeches." At the same time, "seven of 13 speeches from September 2002 to May 2003, place September 11 and Iraq in the same paragraph, while four speeches place them in the same sentence,"[5] indicating that Bush was well aware of the press's habit of quote-mining soundbites, so placing terrorism and Iraq in close proximity, especially when

lumping together rogue states with international terrorism as the "axis of evil," would make the public artificially associate them together as one related threat.

Once Bush decided that Saddam Hussein had to go, his administration set off to work trying to create a unified front for attacking Iraq. In late August and early September, Vice President Dick Cheney and other administration officials made public appearances on national TV to question Saddam's intentions, culminating in Bush's UN speech arguing Iraq violated UN resolutions.[6] It appears this "media blitz" was tightly coordinated by Chief of Staff Andrew Card, as part of his public relations campaign to discredit Iraq and bolster the case for war. He also "monitored much of the public comments of senior administration officials and worked to keep them in line with the daily message," including forcing Donald Rumsfeld to quietly retract an op-ed supporting unilateral war after Bush was advocating multilateralism.[7]

There were other non-administration groups that worked closely with the administration to promote the case for war in the media, appearing as "independent" commentators. Many conservative think tanks such as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) pooled together their network of experts to give their pro-war opinions on national TV and newspaper editorials, with the assistance of a public relations firm.[8] Other individual pundits "had a direct line to the Office of the Secretary of Defense through Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Review Board."[9] In tandem with the think tank experts' campaign, the Pentagon mustered its network of affiliated military personnel—including "war heroes, military strategists and advocates, and defense-industry contractors and lobbyists," anyone not directly or actively part of the military—to act as TV military analysts, or in the Pentagon's own words, "message force multipliers."[10] Hence, Bush's message was reinforced in the eyes of the public as these incognito partisan commentators independently appeared to back the president's claims—they were so relentless in media appearances that, in "a Lexis-Nexis search with the terms "Iraq" in the headline," the AEI alone scored over 1200 hits for TV and newspaper appearances combined in the year before the invasion.[11]

The Pentagon also implemented the embedded reporting system for the invasion itself, which assigned journalists to specific military units for a particular amount of time. Although reporters were subjected to a 50-point censorship program, such formalities were not necessary.[12] The embedded journalist program was wildly successful from this perspective. As a result of the psychological bonding between troops and embedded journalists under combat duress as predicted by the social penetration theory, the journalists are acculturated into the military subculture, sharing its values and

beliefs.[13] This camaraderie somewhat undermined the journalists' pure objectivity, as a study has shown that the journalists' positive tone towards the military actually "increased over time, suggesting that relational attachments born of "swift trust" accelerate biases."[14]

The limited scope of individual embedded journalists also meant that much of their correspondent reports were myopically focused on individual or unit experiences, rather than being analytical of the broader strategic situation.[15] Almost 3/4s of the available slots were given to American media, most of which were purely domestic service; the two national papers and five major cable news networks were among the top ten outlets by number of slots given,[16] in effect producing a domestic echo chamber of purely US-centric points of view. Considering the wide reach of embedded reporting via these major outlets, it is perhaps conceivable that the limited focus of on-the-ground reporting—psychologically guaranteed to portray the military positively—had harmed critical reporting by squeezing out analyses of the war at large. As Deepak Kumar commented, "it must have been clear to the war planners that this situation would create identification with the soldiers and lead to voluntary self-censorship by the journalists."[17]

Thus, in just over a year, the Bush administration deployed a variety of political communications tricks and strategies to make the case for war, including playing rhetorical games, coordinating officials and partisan commentators, and embedding reporters.

MEDIA BIAS

Given that the Bush administration was engaged in conscious agenda-setting activities to shape national discourse, it appears the media followed suit in picking up on the government's discursive cues, and produced biased reporting as a result.

Perhaps as a result of the Pentagon's multiplier program and Bush's public relations strategy outlined above, the coverage of the invasion build-up disproportionately featured military and governmental officials, who used their time to deliver the pro-war line. For instance, Bush appeared as a source in 59.5% of TV news during the summer of 2002, while at least one of his officials was quoted in 85.6% of stories. Although both Bush and his administration received a little less screen time in the fall (Bush being sourced in 42.9% of stories, administration officials in 63.4%), compared to even government officials from other departments and branches, the executive branch still took a lion's share of TV time.[18] Military or government-affiliated guests took up seventy-six percent of the total guests invited by four major news networks in two weeks of February 2003, virtually unanimously speaking in favour of war, as opposed to the antiwar movement taking up

only one percent of total guests.[19] Even a comparison between elite national papers and non-elite local papers reveal that not surprisingly, elite papers—the *NYT* and the *Washington Post*—quoted more official sources in their articles than the local papers because of their closer access to said officials,[20] some possibly related to the Pentagon's multiplier program.

Even when the media was not directly sourcing administration officials or the military, they had internalized the pro-war frames. An analysis of news coverage of pro-war and antiwar demonstrations from January 29, 2002 to May 1, 2003, showed that the press report antiwar protests using more negative cues—such as keywords like "violence," "unpatriotic"—associated with disorderliness (and conversely, more positive cues were used to represent pro-war protests, like "patriotic"). Issue-substantive frames like WMDs were downplayed in favour in favour of less controversial frames like specific antiwar protest initiatives; perhaps the news establishments preferred to focus on the "spectacle" of protest rather than debate the merits of the contentious issues.[21] Another analysis of news media from January to March 2003 revealed that 13.9% of newspaper stories, 2.9% of TV stories, and 8.7% of magazine stories covered anything about protestors, but of these figures, there was a negative tone present in 8.1% of newspaper stories, 1.9% TV segments, and 4.7% magazine stories. In fact, one discussion on CNN featured both journalists agreeing that freedom of speech is the military's gift, and of not anyone else, including activists.[22] As such, with substantive issues being generally ignored and antiwar protests attached with a negative stigma, grassroots oppositional voices were further drowned out by the overwhelming approval of patriotism.

The news media's editorial lines also stood by a pro-war line; in particular, the ways they framed the story's presentation accentuated the war drums. The media largely repeated the government's arguments about Saddam possessing WMDs. During UN inspectors attempted to find WMDs in from September 2002 to March 2003, while the *New York Times* attempted some form of balance between moderately supporting giving the UN inspectors a chance and insinuating Iraq was filibustering the UN, NBC consistently denigrated the inspectors, called on former inspectors to insist their successors were going on a wild goose chase, and even began the new year with the screen title "Road to War" long before the inspector program was halted.[25] Neither outlet significantly questioned whether there were WMDs to begin with at all.

During the invasion, the overall tone was one of the United States having won the war before it began due to its technological and organizational superiority over Iraq, and immense support from Iraqis for their liberation. Even when military progress stalled and images of casualties were leaked by Iraqi propagandists, the media, encouraged by the Bush

administration through its statements and emphasis on firepower, continued their optimistic coverage by reframing the war as a battle against savages, one with minor tactical setbacks but victory was assured nonetheless.[24] Because elite sources had more access to official sources, as well as more embedding opportunities, they presented a military frame as opposed to the non-elite papers' focus on "human interest and anti-war."[25] However, non-elite papers have limited circulation and therefore little impact on national discourse,[26] and neither elite nor non-elite papers focused much on the questions of responsibility or the causes of the issue.[27] Keeping in line with this military focus, the New York Times did not cover Iraqi civilian deaths (save for editorials); in contrast, British newspaper The Guardian, Pakistani paper The Dawn, and The Times of India also focused on the Iraqi side of the war.[28] Thus, not only did the most influential media coverage prefer to focus on the spectacle of warfare rather than in-depth analysis, it exposed a large number of Americans to only a heavy pro-military bias.

Through the heavy reliance on Bush and his officials as sources, utilizing pro-war frames and arguments while sidelining the opposition, and promoting American prowess, there is ample evidence to show that the U.S. media was far from objective in its Iraq War coverage.

SOME CHALLENGES TO HEGEMONY

Thus far, the analysis has supported the hegemony view of the US media; the administration and the media establishment both working to impose a propagandistic pro-war message on the people. But upon factoring in more complex details and the broader context—such as the independent strength of public opinion and the news establishment, as well as the political context of the opposition—it appears that the hegemony model does not hold entirely.

Public opinion is not merely a result of top-down policies; it can reciprocally affect policymaking at the top. Quite literally within hours of the 9/11 attacks, Bush instructed counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke to investigate potential links to Saddam.[29] Bush's eagerness to jump to an Iraqi conclusion was not surprising; his administration was directly linked to PNAC, which heavily lobbied for continued militarization and had set its sights on toppling Saddam for years before 9/11. While 9/11 was effectively what PNAC called "a new Pearl Harbor" that was necessary for America to fully remilitarize[30] and did in fact boost public support for removing Saddam because of his perceived danger to a vulnerable America, it was in fact public opinion that played a decisive role in forcing Bush to temporarily stay his hand on pursuing the Iraq thread. Given that by the end of September, ninety-one percent of the public were in favour of military action in Afghanistan

and eighty-five percent called for hunting down Osama bin Laden's death as priorities, Bush and Powell were cognizant of the fact that Americans place punishing 9/11's perpetrators far ahead of removing Saddam (whom only sixty-eight percent called for his removal), as well as needing to focus all attention on al Qaeda as the administration establish the War on Terror as a protracted war. However, Iraq remained as the secondary target for invasion after Afghanistan was dealt with.[31] With the public opinion case for targeting Iraq already so weak, the lack of concrete evidence against Saddam's involvement in 9/11 sealed the temporary downgrading of the Iraqi threat.[32]

The news establishment is also independent from the government. As successful as embedded reporting was, it was not the sole initiation of the Pentagon, but rather, it came about because of many external factors beyond the military's control. The military's press restrictions, if not indignant treatment of journalists, during the invasion of Afghanistan caused the national bureau chiefs to revolt against the military's anti-press conduct. At the same time, the military was losing control of the narrative independent journalists who went into Afghanistan without military assistance and took advantage of new, instant communications technology to rely stories contrary to the military's narrative. These pressing issues, coupled with Rumsfeld's resourceful leadership, eventually forced the military's hand the implement the embedding program for Iraq.[33]

Sometimes the media sets the frame for the White House to respond to instead of the other way around. For example, although in May 2003 the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* echoed the White House's mentions of terrorism in their briefings, in early April 2003, the newspapers' mentions of terrorism in the *NYT* and the *Washington Post* actually preceded White House briefings' mentions.[34] Taken together, it is apparent that the news establishment is not only not submissive to the executive, they can turn the tables on the executive from time to time and exert its own demands and frames.

Political norms also govern all the individual human actors, namely the residual Cold War-era norm of "militarized patriotism," that is, "to support "strong" national security policies, and second, to defer to the executive branch on war powers in times of perceived crisis."[35] Although war protestors in 2003 were silenced by the media possibly because the media was caught in spiral of silence (i.e. in this case, reporting positively on the unpopular minority view might isolate that outlet from the mainstream and lose business),[36] there was no lack of elite opposition in the earlier debate for passing the Congressional authorization of military force.

In the late summer of 2002, there was an antiwar opposition consisting of both leading Democrats and dissenting Republicans such as Brent Scowcroft attempting to pass a resolution limiting military force

in Iraq. However, when the House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt publically sided with Bush's resolution, dissenting Republicans immediately backed off from their moderate resolution for partisan reasons, while Democrats collectively fell silent due to the conforming nature of militarized patriotism—as the Republicans paved the way for a strong national security policy, Democrats had no choice but to match their opponents' fortitude or else look weak on security issues.[37] Although much of the media during this time were mildly antiwar and tried to prod Congress into debating the war,[38] they too were subjected to militarized patriotism as popular and economic pressures to be patriotic in the wake of the Democrats giving up debate, also forced the media to conform to a cheerleading role.[39]

As is apparent by now, the hegemonic model is undermined by both the press and the public having the agency to influence executive decisions and frames, while all were subjected to longstanding political norms. Were the ideal hegemonic model the case, then certainly the executive branch would have free rein over any and all possible foreign policy options, yet the reality is much more complex. If the hegemonic model is too simplistic, then a more intricate model must be found to describe the political-media-public relationship—and its implications for democratic foreign policymaking.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

An alternative to hegemony is the indexing theory, which states that "the more divided the elite groups are and the more they speak with different voices on a particular policy, the more dissent forms and questioning of the executive's policy line appears in the press."[40] This theory fits the aforementioned militarized patriotism nicely: while there was debate in Congress, the media also reported on the elite debate. However, when congressional debate became unpopular, the media joined the patriotic bandwagon as well. The political implications of this theory, if it is correct, is that because "the press may act independently of the president, but it does not act independently of official Washington,"[41] this obviously allows for a much greater room for debate and public scrutiny of the president's foreign policy. However, this still does not mean the people can really make a reciprocal impact on executive policymaking because "politicians are granted the power to set the terms and boundaries of debate in the news."[42]

Yet, the media in 2002 had a range of actions that exceeded what indexing theory permits them to do; namely, its ability to hold a general moderate antiwar stance when Congress was still divided, and try and

encourage Congress to debate the war.[43] Perhaps Robert Entman's cascading activation model might be able to explain this complexity. In this model, "policy frame cascades down from the administration, and how effective it is in shaping press coverage depends on the policy agreement among the elite; the cultural resonance that the basic ideas, concepts, and imagery find among the people; and how the events themselves play out in reality."[44]

As with the indexing model, the narrative sold by Bush was quickly picked up by the media, which transmitted a favourable view to the public. Since there was elite opposition, this gave room for the media to assert its editorial independence, yet the autonomy was not absolute: like the political elites, the newspapers generally took for granted the legal and moral necessity of invading Iraq; even the few op-eds that raised these issues did not mention Just War Theory. Because press culture tends to abide by political realism (rather than Bush's political moralizing) and objectivity, the press did not directly engage with the pro-war on the same playing field; the executive's case was strengthened by the press's omission.[45] Then, as can be seen in earlier arguments, as the elite opposition melted away, press opposition also largely died down.

However, even then, the *New York Times* continued to question whether the march to war was justified until active combat began, when it finally jumped on the patriotic bandwagon.[46] In the TV industry, Fox News' successful ratings—they captured forty-two percent of the cable news audience share during the war period—due to its hyper-patriotic tone, encouraging other moderate news networks to shift in that direction to gain better ratings.[47] Thus, although the press does not merely echo the government's arguments but can be independently proactive especially when the elites disagreed amongst themselves, the press only has as much freedom of debate as the government does.

The cascade model also depends on "cultural congruence,"[48] of both what the media takes to be its acceptable interests and what the audience is receptive to. Iraq was remarkable in coming right in the wake of 9/11, since the attack generated a massive surge of public trust in government and patriotism. American journalists are no less susceptible to increased patriotism in response to the crisis than their fellow countrymen since they are American citizens first and foremost,[49] and it is natural they too wanted to publically show their patriotism. Because the public was also in a patriotic mood—the public did not even notice that the press underreported antiwar demonstrations—the press had extra incentive to be uncritically patriotic because they fear backlash, which leads to lower ratings or sales.[50] After all, "a commercial press, by definition, will always be a patriotic press when the nation is threatened";[51] and it was in this patriotic mood that both the media and the public found patriotism to be in their mutual interest,

discouraging vocal oppositional voices. Thus, in this case, a patriotic awakening in 9/11's wake helped pave the way for a public receptive to defending America against any hostile enemy.

As seen in this analysis of indexing and cascade models, it appears that while both of them are much more sophisticated and nuanced than hegemony, the cascade model seems to be more instructive as a model overall. Because the executive elites' message is filtered through a semi-independent media and a diverse public, it is not at all guaranteed that the message will be accepted by all. However, because this is highly unstable and contingent on so many factors, the public are ultimately disadvantaged in their amount of direct influence on policymaking.[52] Still, the cascade model shows that the executive, which is dependent on the electorate for support and re-election, cannot simply brainwash the masses nor does the president get a carte blanche on foreign policy, but must rather work hard to sense the public and media interest and milieu, and broker a message favourable to the president's foreign policy as best as they can.

CONCLUSIONS

The march to invading Iraq, and the early coverage of the war, was marked by deliberate public relations-brokering by the Bush administration, which, along with a highly biased and uncritical media, helped sway the public into supporting a unilateral invasion of Iraq. However, contrary to hegemonic theory, the media and the public are autonomous agents in their own right. As such, the hegemonic theory is replaced by more complex models like indexing and cascade, which can better explain the relationship between the executive, the media, and the public. In light of this, while it is understandable that America was subjected to many pressures from the War on Terror that shaped the way the media reported on the war in the direction of cheerleading, this does not excuse the media from failing at its civic role as the government watchdog, nor does it excuse Bush for presenting a faulty case for a major war. But future generations can learn from the Iraq media debacle by critically examining their news sources, questioning the government's reasoning, and remain objective to excessive patriotic zeal.

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THE USE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

by

JEREMIAH QUINN CLEMENT-SCHLIMM

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks counterterrorism became the top priority of US foreign policy. The Bush administration quickly responded by invading Afghanistan in 2001 and, more controversially, invading Iraq in 2003. The Taliban and Hussein governments respectively were rapidly toppled but intense insurgencies quickly coalesced against coalition forces. Initially the American military applied the "antibody theory" drawn from lessons of the US mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996–7, and followed a "light footprint" strategy.[1] The underlying philosophy of this method argued that societies, especially Muslim ones, will inevitably reject a foreign presence in their midst. Under this rubric the size of US troop deployments would be responsible for the level of resentment they faced from the population, which led to US troops being stationed in heavily fortified bases away from major population centres.[2] The result was US forces could not protect the population it was trying to pacify which helped intensify the insurgencies.[3] The US eventually switched its strategy to one of counterinsurgency (COIN) beginning in 2007 in Iraq and a few years later in Afghanistan. COIN stresses

cultural awareness, deploying enough troops to protect the population, building friendly relationships with the population, and the primacy of the political over the military.[4] This paper will examine three schools of thought regarding the decision to use and effectiveness of COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first "fatalist" school argues that COIN could never succeed in either Afghanistan or Iraq and was doomed from the start. The second "successful" school argues that COIN was a successful strategy in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but the failure to achieve stability and defeat insurgent forces is a result of other external factors, particularly corrupt or incompetent local governments and a premature troop withdrawal of US forces. The final "improvable" schools sees COIN as the right strategy, especially compared to light footprint, but COIN must still be reflected upon and improved. This paper concludes that this "improvable" school best assesses the use and impact of COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Before examining the schools themselves it is important to note that while the fatalist school is binary compared to the successful and improvable schools, they are not two distinct camps and instead should be thought of as a spectrum, from scholars emphasizing improving COIN to those emphasizing COIN's success. In discussions on different aspects of COIN, these scholars may travel along the spectrum, but can generally be placed on the spectrum as follows:



It is also worth considering the agreement amongst all the schools on three key beliefs. Firstly, all the schools recognize that COIN is a long process, and empirically there have been very few successful COIN operations. For COIN to completely extinguish an insurgency, the process would take years, if not decades. Ahmed Hashim argues that "even if and when you do succeed in devising an effective COIN plan, success either takes a long time or is not guaranteed."[5] Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Glayton similarly note that the world's armed forces never solved all the riddles associated with post-World War Two counterinsurgencies in the Philippines, Malaya,

Algeria, Vietnam, and elsewhere.[6] Secondly, the schools agree that detrimental mistakes were made by the Bush administration following the invasions, particularly in Iraq. The initial invasion force itself was remarkably small, containing only one hundred and fifteen thousand US troops, which while enough to easily topple the Hussein government was nowhere nearly enough to provide security and maintain law and order. Scholars note that in the past decade five hundred and seventy thousand troops have proved insufficient for coping with conflicts against primitive foes.[7] Additionally, many of these forces were taken away from the Afghanistan conflict, although it should have been clear that the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents were still a formidable foe. Further "de-Baathification" and the decision to dissolve the military in Iraq effectively estranged four hundred thousand soldiers and fifty thousand professionals, many of whom were highly valuable to the insurgency.[8] Cultural insensitivity and ignorance was coupled with alienating coercive tactics, such as dragnet or sweep operations. This angered the civilian population and hampered local human intelligence operations which further aided the insurgency.[9] A final error was that, despite all the warning signs, the US was slow to recognize and plan for combating the insurgency. Bruce Hoffman notes that: "The Bush administration compounded its errors by refusing to recognize the facts… fighting 'the war we wanted to fight, not the war that was.' After first characterizing [the insurgency] as the desperate efforts of a few dead-enders, it was only belatedly recognized it as a full insurgency."[10] And thirdly, all the schools recognize the both Afghanistan and Iraq are characterized by great instability. The disagreement amongst them is what or whom is primarily responsible for this lack of stability.

Proponents of the first fatalist school argue that US COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq was destined to fail. Their arguments fall into two categories: (1) problems with the US conducting COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq and (2) flaws with COIN theory. As to why the US is not suited to conduct COIN, Hashim points to American exceptionalism manifested in foreign policy moralism leading to ideological rigidity:

> [US] policymakers are addicted to a rigid and inflexible ideological frame of mind…the prosecution of effective COIN requires flexible and ruthless professionalism… I am not sure the US is capable of that. It is a self-professed, moralistic country that see the world in black and white rather than shades of gray, and it conducts crusades… It is, in effect, as currently constructed, congenitally incapable of waging effective COIN.[11]

Additionally, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq feature many competing goals for US policymakers. Anatol Lieven articulates several competing goals and argues that the US lacks institutions and leaders capable of choosing between. For example, regarding Afghanistan, policymakers must choose between the short term priority of beating the Taliban, which may require methods that alienate Pakistan, and the wider long-term goal of combating Islamist extremism, which requires fostering the relationship with Pakistan.[12] Another problem with US COIN is that it will be interpreted as a "quasi-imperial" form of expeditionary warfare and that the international coalition will be seen as infidels with values distinct from rural Afghans and Iraqis.[13] Such beliefs led Lieven to argue that peacekeeping and coalition forces must be Islamic to be legitimate.[14] Similarly, Oleg Svet argues that the decision to implement COIN fails because more guns on foreign territory *cannot* win the battle for hearts and minds, regardless of how culturally attuned or ethically upright US forces were.[15]

In addition to impossibilities with the US conducting COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq, this school puts forth arguments as to why COIN strategy itself is fundamentally flawed. Hashim argues that early US operational and tactical COIN approach was characterized by coercion, a strategy which invariably enlarges the circles of alienation with the population.[16] While the US moved to a more hearts and minds approach under General David Petraeus, Robert Engell argues that even if this approach is properly followed, it would not work. Examining Afghanistan, he argues that:

> While common sense tends to support the notion of winning hearts and minds… principles of the contemporary hearts and minds approach are based on flawed assumptions about political legitimacy… rooted in modernization theory and normative Western approach to legitimacy that fails to live up to the expectations of the local population…[but] Weber identifies three forms of legitimate authority… Acknowledging different forms of authority and legitimacy beyond the legal/rational challenges…challenges the assumptions underpinning the hearts and minds approach.17

In sum, the concept of gaining legitimacy through winning "hearts and minds" is a Western legal/rational notion which will fail in countries based on charismatic or traditional authority. This problem is further compounded in the age of global media which allows insurgents to present alternative narratives to events, including tuning tactical losses into

victories of perception."[18] Thus, the conclusion of the fatalist camp is that US COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq was doomed from the beginning.

The second successful school argues that the US successfully switched to and employed COIN in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The ongoing instability in these countries is a result of problems external to the COIN strategy, not COIN itself. Proponents in this camp point to two major successes: (1) the decline of violence and increase of security following the introduction of COIN and the "surge"[19] and (2) the results of the Anbar Awakening. To argue for the improved security situation, this school points to quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence. Quantitatively, following the Iraqi surge, American and Iraqi forces increased their control over Baghdad's neighbourhoods from thirty-two percent in May 2007 to fifty-six percent by September 2007.[20] In Anbar province attacks against US forces dropped from one thousand three hundred and fifty in October 2006 to just over two hundred in August 2007.[21] Qualitatively, Dodge notes that if you "drove through western neighborhoods in Baghdad like Mansur at the beginning of the surge [2007], you'd find empty districts. If you move through them today [2012], you find communities that have been rejuvenated. The markets are open, the shops are open, and people are there."[22] Critics of COIN and the success of the surge argue that statistics provide a misleading picture of the security situation. They argue that violence declined not because of COIN or the surge but in accordance with "sectarian cleansing logic," whereby minorities were already "cleansed" by the time of the surge. However this logic does not hold up. Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro argue that:

> On its face, the cleansing thesis has major challenges to overcome…To sustain its central claim logically requires either that combat in areas where cleansing was happening comprised the bulk of the pre-2007 violence (hence cleansing completion could end that violence) or that combat in other areas was epiphenomenal to cleansing. Neither assertion is consistent with the evidence.[23]

Scholars in this school also point to the success of the Anbar Awakening in Iraq in recruiting large numbers of local Sunni groups, which helped the US by providing intelligence, local support, and covertly killing a number of al-Qaeda operatives.[24] Biddle et. al. propose the "Surge-Awakening Synergy Thesis," which argues that a synergistic interaction between the surge and the Awakening is the best explanation a decline in violence in Iraq in 2007.[25] Wayne Bert concludes that "the phenomenal turn

around in the war brought about by the surge and the adoption of counter-insurgency strategy in 2007 and beyond is unprecedented… learning from the situation in Iraq, the Obama administration has made a sincere and apparently successful effort to implement a real counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan."[26]

Proponents of this successful school recognize that the precarious security situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, they attribute this situation to factors outside the US COIN strategy, especially the early mistakes of the Bush administration, local government incompetence or corruption, and a premature withdrawal. Michael Kirk argues that the surge was by and large successful, but that the main problem came when the Obama administration publicly announced its withdrawal timetable. Less guidance for then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki allowed him to act more authoritarian, abandon meritocracy in the Iraqi government and military (replacing competent but minority Sunnis with incompetent but majority Shias), and purge the Sunni allies recruited by US forces during the Anbar Awakening.[27] Toby Dodge similarly describes Maliki's crushing of the Awakening allies: "Once the US military handed over the [biometric data of Awakening allies] to the Iraqi government, the government wasted little time in breaking what it saw as the organizational threat the Awakening posed to the continued rule of the current governing elite."[28] Overall, this school concludes that COIN was successful and ongoing instability is a result other external factors.

The final improvable school argues that adopting COIN was the right policy decision and it has brought some success, but emphasizes that US COIN strategy must still be reviewed and improved upon. This school is closer to the successful school than the fatalist in that it attributes the successes in Afghanistan and Iraq to COIN and rejects that US military intervention in these countries will inevitably fail. The US military can be recognized as legitimate through the provision of basic economic needs, essential services, and the sustainment of key social and cultural institutions.[29] Particularly, a greater emphasis on improving the political aspects of COIN is needed. While Dodge has praised the surge, arguing that it was, "very successful in removing the key perpetrators of violence from Iraq's streets and provided security to enough areas of Baghdad to stop the spiralling cycle of violence that had driven Iraq into civil war" he also notes that a more attention is needed on the political: "For lasting stability however this new approach needed to address the main drivers of the conflict: the chronic weakness of Iraqi state capacity, both institutional and coercive; and the exclusive elite settlement that had shaped Iraq's politics since 2003, which excluded the Sunni section of society."[30] Glenn and Glayton in their report "Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan" put forward several suggestions to improve COIN in those

countries by improving the intelligence cycle and metrics (how success is measured). Regarding intelligence, they argue that (1) lower military levels, such as the company and battalion level, need more intelligence capacity, (2) tours should be lengthened to help soldiers maintain relationships with locals, (3) soldiers' database use should be improved, similar to that of police forces in western countries and (4) intelligence stovepipes need to be eliminated.31 Regarding metrics, they recommend (1) combining objectives from the top with input measures from the bottom and having effect-based metrics as the common link (2) combining qualitative and quantitative metrics and (3) red teaming.32 Alastair Finlan agrees with Dodge on the emphasis on the political and Glenn and Glayton on improving the intelligence cycle and additionally emphasizes the need to avoid an overreliance on Israeli COIN methods. While it may be tempting to apply the seemingly successful Israeli COIN lessons to Afghanistan and Iraq, COIN is not a one-size-fits-all solution. Since the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq are both ten times that of Israel and their porous borders provide unique challenges, an exact replication of Israeli methods will prove detrimental.33 Glenn and Glyaton's conclusion sums up the position of this school nicely: "There is much reason to be encouraged by coalition performances in Afghanistan and Iraq [following the adoption of COIN]… [However] history informs us that the military that fails to adapt properly is destined for failures… It is essential that we employ our improved knowledge and expertise to meet challenges."[34]

While all schools provide strong arguments in favour of their position, this paper concludes that the improvable school provides the best assessment of US COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq for several reasons. Firstly, the fatalist fundamental proposition that the US COIN mission in Afghanistan and Iraq was doomed is flawed. American exceptionalism in the form of moralism in foreign policy is a natural match for COIN. Even critics of COIN note that: "Democrats and Republicans, hawks and doves, foreign-policy professionals and laymen could all empathize with a strategy that, at the heart of it, was trying to win popular support."[35] Fatalist proponents also overemphasize the hostility that countries, particularly in the Middle East, will show to foreign military presence. This is simply not the case, as one early interaction in Iraq between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)[36] and 279 tribal leaders shows. One of the sheikhs (tribal leader) asked the CPA ambassador whether the US believed itself to be a liberator or an occupier. The CPA official answered a little of both. The sheikhs replied that if they came as liberators, they were welcomed as guests. If they were occupiers, he and his descendants would "die resisting" the Americans.[37] This sentiment is reinforced by the jubilant crowds of Iraqi civilians when American infantryman initially seized Baath ministries and

pulled down a huge iron statue of Saddam Hussein.[38] The resentment on the part of many in Afghanistan and Iraq against US forces is not a result of a fatalist impulse against an "imperial" intervener: rather it is a result of the poor decisions and actions *before* the implementation of COIN.

However, the successful school is too optimistic about the current COIN strategy of the US. While COIN was a move in the right direction from the light footprint strategy before its implementation, there is much room for improvement. The instability in both Afghanistan and Iraq cannot simply be attributed to external factors. Indeed, if the US improved its intelligence collection, better protected civilians, strengthened the capabilities and the legitimacy of local governments, and continued to update its metrics it would have seen greater and more lasting improvements. Also, Afghanistan and Iraq are different countries, where some lessons in some neighbourhoods are not applicable in the next. US COIN strategy must be constantly reflected and improved upon in order to apply the right lessons to the right areas.

In conclusion, assessing the application of COIN by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq requires a more nuanced approach. It cannot be said that the effort was doomed from the start or that the strategy itself has been completely successful. COIN has had its successes, but it also must be improved upon. With the rise of the ISIS in Iraq and Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, there has been much debate as to what has been accomplished. COIN may have been successful when it was implemented in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but given a war-weary public and a resilient foe, policymakers may be increasingly unwilling to apply it. Iraq is especially controversial, where sixty-three percent of Americans now consider the Iraq War to be a "mistake", two percent higher than top opposition to the Vietnam War in May 1971.[39] While there is much to be pessimistic about, Bert offers one positive, and hopes that the lesson will be learned for future conflicts:

> There is, however, one major gain for American foreign policy…never before has the US leadership shown this kind of seriousness about implementing counterinsurgency …one extremely bright spot in an otherwise dark and discouraging saga. The big question now is whether genuine learning has taken place in the military and the government, and whether those who favor the new orientation will be able to prevail in institutionalizing this approach to war in the national defense bureaucracy.[40]

ENDNOTES

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5 Ahmed Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 273.

6 Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Glayton, "Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan," *RAND Corporation* (November 2008): 85.

7 Alastair Finlan, "Articles: Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counter-insurgency Strategy in Iraq," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 16 (2005): 7; Max Boot, "More Small Wars: Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay," *Foreign Affairs* 93 (2014): 12.

8 Boot, "More Small Wars," 9; Bert, *American Military*, 180–181.

9 Finlan, "Articles: Trapped," 11.

10 Bruce Hoffman quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 184.

11 Hashim, *Insurgency*, 320.

12 Anatol Lieven, "Afghanistan: An unsuitable candidate for state building," *Conflict, Security & Development* 7 (2007): 483–4.

13 Robert Egnell, "Winning 'Hearts and Minds'? A Critical Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan," *Civil Wars* 12 (2010): 299.

14 Engell, "Winning Hearts," 294; In the case of Afghanistan, Lieven argues a peacekeeping force should come from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

15 Oleg Svet, "COIN's Failure in Afghanistan," *The National Interest*, August 31, 2012.

16 Hashim, *Insurgency*, 322.

17 Engell, "Winning Hearts," 282–286.

18 Ibid., 291.

19 The 2007 Iraqi Surge and the 2010 Afghan Surge saw additional US ground forces deployed into theatre as a part of COIN.

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24 Dodge, *Iraq*, 88–94.

25 Biddle et al., "Testing the Surge," 203.

26 Bert, *American Military*, 193, 155.

27 Michael Kirk, "Losing Iraq," *PBS Frontline* (2014): Film.

28 Dodge, *Iraq*, 101.

29 Ibid., 81.

30 Ibid., 107.

31 Glenn and Glayton, "Intelligence Operations," 35.

32 Ibid., 66.

33 Finlan, "Articles: Trapped," 1, 13.

34 Glenn and Glayton, "Intelligence Operations," 82, 86.

35 Svet, "COIN's Failure."

36 The CPA was the temporary American run government in Iraq before authority was transferred over to the new Iraqi Government.

37 Bert, *American Military*, 183.

38 "Liberated Iraqis Cheer Troops," *The Washington Times*, April 10, 2003.

39 Bert, *American Military*, 193.

40 Ibid., 193.

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