Vol 17, 2022-2023

POWER

The Undergraduate Journal of American Studies

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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

It is with immense pride and enthusiasm that we present the 2022–2023 edition of the Undergraduate Journal of American Studies.

Within the complex tapestry of the United States, the notion of power weaves a compelling and intricate narrative. This year, we asked our contributors to keep one question in mind when selecting which paper to submit: what does it mean to hold, or not hold, power in an American context? The resulting essays within this year's edition delve into multifaceted systems of disempowerment and dispossession grounded in the realms of race, gender, and generational divides. The diverse array of perspectives presented within these pages offers insightful analyses and thought-provoking reflections. Through these pages, we invite you to embark on a journey—a journey that navigates through the corridors of power and prompts critical reflections on its manifestations, distributions, and implications within the American experience.

The cover of this year's journal depicts a ceremony held on the steps of 'Iolani Palace in Honolulu, Hawaii on August 12, 1898. This ceremony marked the end of the Hawaiian monarchy and the transfer of Hawaiian state sovereignty to the United States. The overthrowing of the Hawaiian monarchy was linked to power disparities based on race, gender, and military strength - all of which are discussed in this year's journal. We chose this image because we believe that it represents how different power dynamics can intersect in a single event.

The back cover of the journal depicts women sewing American flags at the Copeland Company in Alexandria, Virginia on June 28th, 1960. This moment, captured by John T. Bledsoe, encapsulates the labor, craftsmanship, and dedication of America's citizens in shaping symbols of national identity. Beyond the surface, it signifies the often overlooked yet indispensable roles that countless individuals, particularly women,

have played in weaving the fabric of American heritage. Their work, often uncelebrated, is a cornerstone in the construction of the nation's symbolism and identity, underscoring the complex intersections of power, labor, and representation within American history.

This journal would not have been possible without the guidance and support of the CSUS community, including but not limited to Professor Nicholas Sammond, CSUS Director, and Professor Leah Montange, Bissell-Heyd Lecturer in American Studies. Finally, we would like to thank our Associate Editor, Ashvini Giridaran, as well as our talented contributors. This journal would not have been possible without your hard work, dedication, and unshakable belief that you can take something great and make it better.

– **Rosemary Crowley & Kaitlyn Min**
Co-Editors-in-Chief

EDITORIAL TEAM

DIRECTOR'S LETTER

It is my pleasure and my privilege to offer a few introductory comments to this edition of the CSUS Undergraduate Journal, which this time is dedicated to "Power." Given the struggles for power in the United States—where the extreme right battles to take over not only Congress and the presidency, but also individual statehouses, and—in a direct threat to the intellectual endeavors we hold dear—universities and colleges. Beyond the borders of the U.S. we see power grabs, from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, to Israel's flirtation with fascism, to threats to democratic rule in a host of countries in Europe, Africa, and South America. Like an orchestra of fiddlers playing as the planet burns, it seems that the scramble for power has only escalated in the face of a looming global climate catastrophe.

So, we pause here to consider Power. And, since I am completing my term as Director of CSUS and this will be my last introduction to a volume of this journal, I would–after a few thoughts about the wonderful essays that make up this edition—offer a meditation on power as it is practiced in the United States. Because I am a media historian, I will do this through a meditation on the history of musical styles in Washington, D.C., the capital of the U.S., and what the interdisciplinary practices of Media Studies, Geography, and History might tell us about the exercise of power in early 21st century America.

None of the fourteen entries herein focuses on the confluence of music, history and geography, yet all practice the interdisciplinarity of American Studies by situating the historical events or processes they analyze within a web of social, cultural, and political forces and discourses. For example, Sabrina McLennon's "The Nexus of Media Power…" dislodges a popular fantasy of Hawaii as a lush tropical vacation destination and asks us to view it as a place and a population under siege, its landscape produced through a violent occupation and dispossession at the hands of the same United States government of

which it is now ostensibly a part. In particular, she asks us to consider and central role of newspapers in that occupation, not simply as passive observers reporting on Hawaii's takeover, but as active participants in that process. The terrain, then, is the same: what changes are the political and historical lenses through which we consider it. In "Women's Rights are Human Rights," Anya Haldemann critically examines Hillary Clinton's attempts, during the Obama years, to place women's rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy, arguing that the "Hillary Doctrine" equated women's rights with international stability and with the security interests of the United States. Haldemann effectively traces the disjunction between Clinton's performance of feminism in her staffing and public appearances and her realpolitik statecraft as the representative of a world power and power broker far less interested in women's rights. It is possible, then, to admire the rhetoric of a world leader while holding them to account for betraying that rhetoric and the people they claim to speak to and for.

If an analysis of Hillary Clinton's statecraft requires an aerial/global view of the political landscape, considering how faith shapes lives and landscapes requires our feet on the ground. In "'Black Faith' Can Move Mountains," Ashvini Giridaran carefully reads Barry Jenkins' 2018 meditation on the writings of James Baldwin, If Beale Street Could Talk, for how it moves a standard narrative of oppression and victimization. In Giridaran's reading of the film, it is "Black faith"—understood as having its origins in the Christian church but extending into a pride and experience in being Black—that leads the protagonists through their struggles and toward Black joy. James Baldwin, who had his roots in the Baptist church and was as a youth a Pentecostal preacher, epitomizes this Black faith. A bisexual man, he found no sanctuary in the church, yet he carried within him a sense of his family's, and his own, profound relationship to faith, and to the celebration of life in the Black community.

These submissions, merely a sample of what awaits you within, are drawn from our affiliated disciplinary partners, History, Political Science, and Religion. Each of the fourteen essays that grace this

volume approaches their topic from a unique disciplinary vantage point, yet each moves beyond its discipline, and in that does what is best about American Studies: it connect us to vital stories and arguments about what it means to be of the United States, to be affected by the United States, and to engage in the critical study of its politics, its culture, its social groups, and its mythology. Whether we understand the country as a landscape, as a moment in history, or as the push and pull of a people for power, the U.S. becomes an avenue toward a greater understanding of ourselves as actors on the world stage.

Now, in the space remaining, I would like to reflect on power in the United States through the lenses of music, geography, and history. I take as my object in this exercise the U.S. capital, Washington D.C. To do this, we have to contend with some of the peculiarities of that town. Just as "Moscow" is a metonym for Russia and "Paris" stands in for France, "Washington" is more than the U.S. capital: it connotes an America that is a white, powerful, democratic-capitalist world player. Our mental image of Washington is of a collection of politicians—primarily white, male, and wealthy—who determine the destiny of the nation and of the world. That image, though, is at odds with what Washington, D.C. is as a city, as a place. For example, although overall numbers have been declining, Washington has been a majority Black city since at least 1960. Built on the shores the Potomac River, the city was not the country's first capital; rather it was chosen as a compromise location between northern and southern (slaveholding) states. Its layout, a lattice of circles and spokes, was designed by the French emigrant Charles L'Enfant and is rumored to be disorienting by design—it is difficult to move toward any destination in the city in a straight line—in order to confuse invading troops. Oh, and the people who live there, in spite of being U.S. citizens, have no senator and only one representative who cannot vote on legislation. The citizens of the capital of the world's purportedly greatest democracy are themselves disenfranchised.

Washington, D.C., was also the inspiration for Huddie Ledbetter's (aka Lead Belly's) 1937 song, "Bourgeoise Blues," which he

wrote in response to the segregation he encountered when he came to record his songs for the Library of Congress. We don't like to think about the nation's capital, a majority black city, as segregated, but in the 1930s it was. As Lead Belly put it:

Them white folks in Washington they know how
*To call a man a n****r just to see him bow*
Lord, it's a bourgeois town
Uhm, the bourgeois town
I got the bourgeois blues I'm
Gonna spread the news all around

Ledbetter also noted that the city's "colored" residents also rejected him and his wife, which is perhaps why he used "bourgeoise" as a synonym for both racism and classism, linking the two:

Me and my wife went all over town
And where we go, the colored people turn us down
Lord, in a bourgeois town
It's a bourgeois town
I got the bourgeois blues, I'm
Gonna spread the news all around

D.C. is also the birthplace of the great composer and performer Duke Ellington, in 1899, and some of those people could have been Ellington's well-to-do family. Like the streets of Washington, nothing is as straightforward as it seems.

Flash forward about 40 years. In 1975, the funk legends Parliament released an album in honor of (Black) Washington titled *Chocolate City*. Name-checking cities with either Black majorities or significant Black populations and communities—many of which had recently lived through rebellions in the face of state violence—the song links demographics to democracy, declaring Washington the Black capital and its residents the majority power bloc:

The last percentage count was eighty
You don't need the bullet when you got the ballot

Are you up for the downstroke, CC?
Chocolate City
Are you with me out there?

It reminds us that if the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had really delivered on its promises, the ballot might have replaced the bullet as an instrument of change. Going on to imagine what a fantastic Black government would look like, they name Muhammad Ali (world champion and draft resister) as President, Reverend Ike (who preached a gospel of "prosperity theology") Secretary of the Treasury, the incisive comedian and social commentator Richard Pryor as Secretary of Education, musical genius Stevie Wonder as Secretary of Fine Arts (itself an imaginary position) and the First Lady of Soul Aretha Franklin as First Lady. Parliament makes it clear that while this is a fantasy, it is "no dream:"

Are you out there, CC?
A chocolate city is no dream
It's my piece of the rock and I dig you, CC
God bless Chocolate City and it's (gainin' on ya!) vanilla suburbs
Can y'all get to that?

It's an alternate reality terrifying to some members of the white majority and blissful to those of us who cherish change. It is an act, to nod to one of the essays in this journal, of Black faith.

In the same vein, the Go-Go scene of the late 1970s and 1980s, led by bands such as EU, Trouble Funk, and Rare Essence, celebrated life in the streets of D.C., in its nightclubs and private parties. At the tail end of the Cold War, Trouble Funk released the party anthem "Drop the Bomb" (1989), but it referred not so much to the threat of nuclear annihilation, or urban rebellion, as it did to dropping an undeniable beat on the dance floor. In the face of domestic oppression and the possibility of worldwide destruction, they celebrated Black life and Black joy.

Yet while it is vital to understand Washington, D.C., as a center

of Black culture and social life, there were (and are) other musical genres and movements that flowed out of the city. Fifteen years later, for instance, the punk band Fugazi preached anarchy and collective refusal to its fans in Washington D.C. and nationwide. (Some of its members had also shared the stage with Trouble Funk.) For Fugazi, life in the nation's capital, with its endless parade of hopes raised and dashed, inspired an ethic of refusal and reinvention. As they put it in their 1989 song "Bad Mouth,"

> *You can't be what you were*
> *So you better start being*
> *Just what you are*
> *You can't be what you were*
> *The time is now, it's running out*
> *It's running out, it's running, running, running out...*

Time *is* running out, at least here. During the last five years, my tenure as Director of the Centre for the Study of the United States, we have lived through and been a part of tumultuous events, movements, and crises. We have, together, weathered a global pandemic and the rise of a populist neofascism that it has pulled to the surface. We have witnessed the police murder of George Floyd—and Breonna Taylor, Philando Castile, Tamir Rice, and so many others—and the popular, cross-racial and cross-class uprisings that sprang up in response to that state violence. We have confronted anti-Asian hate spurred on by Donald Trump's racist comments about China and COVID-19, which he called the "kung flu." And we have begun to confront a climate catastrophe and a political system and infrastructure that are woefully unprepared to deal with it. In each of these cases, the Centre for the Study of the United States has been there, its faculty, staff, and students ready to engage experts on these topics, to debate about causes and solutions, and to never cease bringing our talents and our intellects to bear on those problems. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to be a part of this endeavor.

To end this essay, let's return to Washington, D.C., in June of 2020. Former President Donald Trump stands in front of Lafayette

Church, bible in hand and military leaders at his side. He is there to challenge protestors (and the mayor of the city) who had painted, in large letters, “Black Lives Matter” on two blocks of 16th Street, which intersects Pennsylvania Avenue at the White House. Trump invokes military powers he does not have and attempts to equate the BLM movement with neofascist groups such as the Proud Boys, darkly hinting at an anarchist conspiracy against his government. No such conspiracy existed, of course, and his equivalency was false. Regardless of all his falsehoods and grandstanding, the pavement itself spoke the words that many had said out loud during protests. It was a simple, obvious claim: so often discounted, so often disenfranchised, in an act of faith, a population with a voice and without a vote had spoken, had inscribed that sentiment on the street. It remains up to us to make sense of its import, its resonance, for those who call themselves American and those of us who are compelled to study them. I have no doubt that this edition of the UJAS, “Power,” will be invaluable in that process. Enjoy.

- **Nicholas Sammond**
Outgoing Director of the Centre for the Study of the United States

Source: Library of Congress, William P. Gottlieb
Portrait of Huddie Ledbetter, better known as Lead Belly, performing at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., between 1938 and 1948

Source: Flickr, rockcreek
July 25th, 1992. Flyer for a protest featuring Fugazi, Bikini Kill, and other bands. Lower Senate Park.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Nexus of Media Power and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Annexation of the Kingdom of Hawai'i

SABRINA MCLENNON

Source: Hawaii State Archives. Call Number: PP-35-8-008
12 August 1898. Ceremonies marking the raising of the United States flag at the Old Government Building (Iolani Palace).

Contrary to the idyllic cyan waters, green pā'ū skirts, and palm-fringed beaches painted in the Western imagination, the colonial history of Hawai'i defines itself by the violent cultural, spiritual, and linguistic dispossession of the Kanaka Maoli (Real and True People). Denoting native Hawaiians with genealogical ties to the land, Kanaka Maoli maintained a rich culture, distinct customs, and an oral-based tradition, before the colonist invasions of Hawai'i. Throughout this essay, Hawaiian *mo'olelo*, a method of oral storytelling of Indigenous Hawaiian history and literature will be evoked to highlight its role in preserving Indigenous knowledge systems. However, the establishment of the first American printing press in 1822 solidified newspapers as the primary communication medium and a key tool for imperialist propaganda. Hawaiian *mo'olelo* also experienced a shift towards written documentation following the rise of print. Newspapers are defined as published articles with titles and mastheads, appearing serially and regularly on news-print.[1] This study of the nexus of media power and US foreign policy in nineteenth-century Hawai'i, will center on Native Hawaiian archival sources to excavate the illegal US occupation of Hawai'i and explore the use of media as a weapon of colonial control. The advent of US imperialism in Hawai'i prompted distinct structural shifts in Hawaiian *mo'olelo* and weaponized American-owned print media to fuel colonial narratives and impact public opinion. Respectively, Kanaka Maoli employed cultural, legislative, and active resistance against the US occupation and annexation of the Kingdom of Hawai'i in 1898.

For context, a culmination of events led to the US-backed coup d'etat of the Hawaiian monarchy of 1893. Notably, under the pressure of missionaries, King Kalākaua signed the Bayonet Constitution of 1887, a document that effectively stripped the executive powers of the sovereign, reduced the qualifying Hawaiian "resident" definition to three years, and imposed significant income and property requirements for voting.[2] In 1891, Queen Lili'uokalani took office and attempted to promulgate a new constitution, as demanded by the Hawaiian people.

1. Helen Geracimos Chapin, *Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2017), 1.
2. Noenoe K. Silva, "The Antiannexation Struggle," in *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2004), 124-128.

In fear of a power shift, a handful of American businessmen overthrew the Hawaiian government - with the aid of US Minister John L. Stevens - and established the Republic of Hawai'i. Despite the protests of native Hawaiians and the Queen's appeal, President McKinley signed a treaty of annexation in 1897. Under US constitutional and international law, the annexation of the Kingdom of Hawai'i constitutes an illegal act. According to J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, under international law, the annexation of any foreign country was required to be recognized by treaty.[3] Given that Hawai'i annexation occurred via a joint-senate resolution from pro-annexationists to President McKinley, international law would deem its action illegal. The apology issued by the US Congress to the Hawaiian people further discloses the US government's complicity in the overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani. The Apology Resolution states: "Congress... apologizes to the Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i on January 17, 1893, with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination." Thus, the apology from the US government unequivocally allows us to situate the impact and illegality of the overthrow and by extension the prolonged US occupation. Thus, acknowledgment of the Hawaiian right to self-determination, within a system governed by laws, establishes beforehand Kanaka Maoli's entitlement to federal recognition and independence.

An oral memory-based culture, Hawaiian society experienced a shift towards the written word, following the creation of a Hawaiian alphabet by American Calvinist missionaries in 1819.[4] Traditionally passed down orally from *ha'i mo'olelo* (storyteller) and *kumu hula* (dance master) Hawaiian *mo'olelo* adapted to the technology of writing and print brought by US imperialism. As described by ho'omanawanui, within *mo'olelo* "memorization and replication [were] paramount, as personal, family, community, and national histories were recorded,

3. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, "Colonialism in Equality: Hawaiian Sovereignty and the Question of U.S. Civil Rights," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 107, no. 4 (2008): 635–50.
4. Ku'ualoha ho'omanawanui, "I Kū Mau Mau (Standing Together): Native Hawaiian Literary Politics," in *The Cambridge History of Native American Literature*, ed. Melanie Benson Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 213-215.

stored and transmitted in and through Kanaka Maoli bodies."[5] As such, the significance of *mo'olelo* is carried through its ancestral heritage and is thus identified as paramount to Hawaiian identity. According to hoʻomanawanui, by 1822, the creation of the first printing press in Hawaiʻi further incited the recording of *mo'olelo*.[6] Consequently, while Kanaka Maoli utilized print to advance the exchange of *mo'olelo* across the nation, Indigenous empowerment within the imperial paradigm is illusory. Although written documentation abetted the preservation of the Kanaka Maoli tradition, the eventual ban of the Hawaiian language after the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 is evidence that writing technology never sought to preserve the Indigenous structure of life. As a result, the shift towards written Hawaiian *mo'olelo* expression foreshadows the inceptive impact of US imperialism on Kanaka Maoli tradition.

By the mid-nineteenth century, American-owned newspapers in Hawaiʻi emerged as intrinsic to forging colonial narratives and molding public opinion, both domestically and abroad. Thus, American-owned print media's racial biases abetted the rise of American domination in Hawaii. Notably, Helen Geracimos Chapin's text *Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawaii* addresses the categories of Hawaiian newspapers and the American media's essential monopoly on immediate news coverage. According to Chapin, newspapers in Hawaiʻi fell under one of four categories: establishment, opposition, official, and independent.[7] The most numerous, establishment papers - or mainstream press - reflected the dominant and controlling interests in Hawaiʻi.[8] Within establishment papers, Chapin lists three main categories: Hawaiian published periodicals by Protestant missionaries, newspapers in English by the Protestant mission, and secular newspapers in English representing the *haole* elite.[9] As a result, Chapin provides acute evidence of the information control held by Americans

5. Kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui, "I Kū Mau Mau (Standing Together)," 214.
6. Kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui, "I Kū Mau Mau (Standing Together)," 213.
7. Chapin, *Shaping History*, 2-3.
8. Helen Geracimos Chapin, "Newspapers of Hawaiʻi 1834 to 1903: From "He Liona" to the Pacific Cable," *The Hawaiian Journal of History*, (1984): 47-55.
9. In Hawaii, the *haole* elite were mainly American descendants of missionaries and plantation owners.

via the English-written newspaper medium. Moreover, Protestant missionary control of Hawaiian-language print media reveals a religious agenda littered with a civilized ethos, and driven by the cultural and linguistic displacement of native Hawaiians. Consequently, positioned as the chief authority on the island, establishment newspapers expressed prevailing American interests and ideals; they thus helped to shape major historic events in Hawai'i.

In addition, prejudicial news reporting was used as a tool of US imperialism to sway public opinion on the Kingdom of Hawai'i. Particularly, the defamatory coverage of Queen Lili'uokalani, the last Hawaiian sovereign before annexation, embodies the racial biases held by American print media. Noenoe K. Silva explores the racist "savage pagan" narrative advanced by the press: "disgusting orgies… polluted [the] palace" and Queen Lili'uokalani "had no 'real hereditary royalty' and was in fact the illegitimate child of a mulatto shoemaker" claimed Sereno Bishop, a missionary and writer for United Press.[10] Bishop's portrayal of the Queen strips Hawai'i of respect and defines the culture as lewd, uncivilized, and primitive to the American audience. In addition, the undignified caricatures of the Queen that appeared on the covers of *Judge* magazine reinforced the use of photojournalism as a tool of American imperialism. Magazine images mobilize racial stereotypes and references to barbarity portray the Queen to portray her as unfit to govern.[11] Consequently, beliefs of Manifest Destiny and white Anglo-Saxon superiority were imbued across print media.

Contrary to mainstream US-Hawaiian historiography, Kanaka Maoli employed forms of resistance to US imperialist foreign policy. For example, in response to the power held by establishment papers, Hawaiian-owned opposition newspapers emerged saliently in 1836.[12] While Hawaiian-owned print media grappled with commercial success, the unifying nationalistic sentiment woven through its publications inspired the largest newspaper readership in Hawai'i.[13]

10. Noenoe K. Silva, "The Queen of Hawai'i Raises Her Solemn Protest," in *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2004), 184.
11. Silva, "The Queen of Hawai'i Raises Her Solemn Protest," 173-175.
12. Chapin, "Newspapers of Hawai'i 1834 to 1903," 61.
13. Chapin, "Newspapers of Hawai'i 1834 to 1903," 66-67.

As such, given that establishment newspapers existed since 1834, the emergence of opposition papers just two years after exemplifies Kanaka Maoli resistance to colonial narratives. Created in 1861, the newspaper *Ka Hoku o ka Pakipika* (Ka Hoku) emerged as a key site of resistance to Western hegemony through its publication of *mo'olelo*.[14] While establishment newspapers reflected predominant Anglo-Saxon and Christian views, Hawaiian language newspapers also held large circulation and readership. Moreover, the writing of *mo'olelo* arose as a form of cultural anticolonial resistance. By communicating through *mo'olelo*, Kanaka Maoli evaded missionary surveillance and actively participated in cultural and linguistic preservation. ku'ualoha hoʻomanawanui explains the threat posed by *mo'olelo* publications: "The reaction from the missionary quarter was to attempt to silence those communications."[15] Consequently, the publication of *mo'olelo* is viewed as a native Hawaiian cultural shield against settler colonialism, and evidence of Hawaiian political consciousness.

Furthermore, Queen Liliʻuokalani's memoir *Hawaii's Story* constitutes a written body of American imperialist resistance. Published by Queen Liliʻuokalani six months before the US annexation of Hawaiʻi, *Hawaii's Story* contests the colonial construction of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi and asserts the distinct culture, history, and customs of its native inhabitants. In addition, the Queen's narrative outrightly rejects the legality of US annexation. According to Tom Smith, the Queen's incorporation of Western concepts to assert Hawaiian sovereignty, in her memoir, exemplify a postcolonial strategy of resistance: "[The Queen] rendered her argument intelligible to Americans to whom she hoped to convey the injustice of her overthrow, while also asserting cultural distance through *kaona* (hidden meaning) and untranslatable words and concepts."[16] Thus, the Queen's decision to inscribe *kaona* subject formation in English, while appealing directly to an American audience concretizes her role as a strategic political actor in Hawaiian affairs. Moreover, the memoir's distinct iconography

14. Kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui, "I Kū Mau Mau (Standing Together)," 213-215.
15. Kuʻualoha hoʻomanawanui, "I Kū Mau Mau (Standing Together)," 218.
16. Tom Smith, "Hawaiian history and American history: integration or separation?" *American Nineteenth Century History* 20, no. 2 (2019): 161–182.

and cover design directly challenge the US colonial construction of Hawai'i. According to Lydia Kualapai, by providing photos of the 'Iolani Palace,' portraits of the Hawaiian monarchy, and native Hawaiian cover symbols, the Queen defines Hawai'i as a stable, dignified autonomous government.[17] Consequently, the Queen's memoir advances Hawai'i's sovereignty claim and inserts itself as an anti-colonial work in the historical record. Thus, the Queen's vehement rejection of US annexation in 1898 further illustrates the various forms of resistance employed by Kanaka Maoli.

In addition to the Queen's claim for Hawai'i sovereignty, the Hawaiian people also employed active and legislative forms of resistance. Despite Queen Lili'uokalani's surrender to US officials to avoid mass bloodshed, Kanaka Maoli chose to engage in armed resistance against US annexation.[18] Notably, prompted by the 1893 overthrow of the monarchy, the Counter-Revolution of 1895 was an armed attempt to restore Lili'uokalani to the throne. Led by Robert William Kalanihiapo Wilcox, a prominent native Hawaiian military officer, an army of over 300 untrained civilian Hawaiians opposed the Republic of Hawai'i armed forces.[19] While the rebellion proved unsuccessful, it nonetheless constituted a major military operation. Moreover, since the Bayonet Constitution of 1887, native Hawaiian associations (*hui*) emerged as a constant force of political resistance against US imperialism. Similarly prompted by the 1893 overthrow of the monarchy, the Hawaiian Patriotic League (*Hui Aloha 'Aina*) was formed with the objective of promoting Hawaiian patriotism and opposing the Republic of Hawai'i. After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1897, two Hawaiian groups, *Hui Aloha 'Aina* for women and *Hui Kulai'aina* for men, formed a coalition and organized a mass petition drive to oppose US annexation.[20] Written in both the Hawaiian and English languages, the "Petition Against Annexation" was signed across Hawai'i five principal islands, by an

17. Lydia Kualapai, "The Queen Writes Back: Lili'uokalani's Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen," *Studies in American Indian Literatures* 17, no. 2 (2005): 49.
18. Tom Coffman, "The Queen's Dilemma" in *Nation Within: The History of the American Occupation of Hawaii* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 2009), 52.
19. Ronald Williams Jr, "Ike Möakaaka, Seeing a Path Forward: Historiography in Hawai'i," *Hülili: Multidisciplinary Research on Hawaiian Well-Being* 7, (2011): 80.
20. Noenoe K. Silva, "The 1897 Petitions Protesting Annexation," University of Hawai'i at Mānoa Library, 1998.

estimated 21,269 of 39,000 native Hawaiians that year.[21] As such, through petitioning, a majority of Kanaka Maoli continued to protest US annexation within the American legal system. Within a colonial framework, the constitutional rights accorded to US citizens, within their system of laws, could not extend to native Hawaiians; Hawaiian sovereignty did not benefit the growing US empire. As Silva explains, Congress refused the reexamination of annexation as a legal, moral, and ethical consideration. In an 1897 report, pro-annexation senators wrote, "If a requirement should be made by the United States of a plebiscite [vote] to determine the question of annexation, it would work a revolution in Hawai'i which would abolish its constitution."[22] Consequently, the US annexation of Hawai'i extended past the actions of the *haole*; Congress understood the illegality of the occupation by their refusal to take a vote and assessment of the Kanaka Maoli's determination.

In conclusion, the advent of US imperialism restructured Kanaka Maoli society through the introduction of a system of laws, print, and writing. An emblem of ancestral heritage, *mo'olelo* adaptation to written expression reveals the inceptive impact of US missionary presence. Moreover, the creation of an American printing press in Hawai'i expedited US domination as establishment newspapers held an information monopoly and reflected Anglo-Saxon and Christian views. The prejudicial news reporting by the American press, both in Hawai'i and abroad, is notably observed in publications defaming Queen Lili'uokalani. Within the inquiry of Hawaiian sovereignty, the racial mockery and dehumanization of the monarch by the American press is a strategy of US imperialism. Moreover, the legal residue of American imperialism remains. However, Kanaka Maoli utilize and continue to utilize political, written, and active forms of resistance to advocate for the preservation of their culture, tradition, and language.

21. Wynell Schamel and Charles E. Schamel, "The 1897 Petition Against the Annexation of Hawaii," *Social Education* 63, no. 7 (1999): 402–8.
22. Silva, "The 1897 Petitions Protesting Annexation."

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Source: John Roy Musick (1898)
Photo of Queen Lili‘uokalani, the first sovereign queen and the last monarch of Hawai‘i

Did the USA Provoke Japan into Attacking Pearl Harbor?

AKSHITA SRIVASTAVA

Source: National Archives, Identifier: 520590
December 7, 1941. Amidst the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, a navy photographer captured the moment when the USS Shaw exploded, with the stern of the USS Nevada visible in the foreground.

On 7 December 1941, Japanese forces attacked the naval base of Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii resulting in the deaths of 2,403 Americans and leaving a further 1,178 wounded.[1] Widely regarded as one of the most pivotal movements in American history, this was the first and only time a foreign nation had successfully attacked American soil, sparking widespread anger, and ultimately leading to America's entry into World War II. Due to the unique nature of this attack and the pivotal role it played in pushing the country to war, it has drawn considerable attention from historians. Some revisionist historians have put forth the theory that the event was a fabricated manipulation orchestrated by the American government to sway public opinion in favor of war. They argue that US officials were already aware of Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor long before it actually occurred.[2] Implicit in their argument is the assumption that the American government was willing to expose its citizens to disastrous circumstances to garner public support for entering WWII, an idea that would require a complete reevaluation of American history if found to be true.[3] However, an examination of America's internal affairs and foreign policies reveals that the government was, in fact, unaware of Japanese military communications, unwilling to reconcile ideological differences within itself, and unable to create an efficient response to the Japanese threat. Pearl Harbor was a product of the government's mishandling of Japanese relations rather than the result of deliberate manipulations to bring the country into World War II.

Entering the 1930s, Western powers such as the US and UK found themselves in a precarious position, attempting to maintain peace as the threat of war grew.[4] This period was marked by treaties and embargos intended to weaken and disarm aggressive nations.

1. Masahiko Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack: Lessons For Intelligence," Master's thesis, (Tufts University, 2005).
2. Chihiro Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics*, (1967): 13.
3. Robert H. Ferrell, "Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists," *The Historian* 17, no. 2 (1955): 215.
4. Anne Orde, "Appeasement, Isolationism and the Approach of War in the 1930s," in *The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895–1956*, ed. Anne Orde (London: Macmillan Education UK, 1996), 100.

Japan, in particular, was a concern for the global community following its cruel occupation of territories in East and South-East Asia.[5] Japan's actions were fueled by a belief that they were the rightful major power in the East, akin to the US and UK in the West.[6] Japan's hostility prompted concern and disarming actions from the US. Some revisionist historians now conclude that these American actions may have deliberately provoked Japan into war—an outcome that, they argue, could not have caught the US off-guard, as they had access to information on Japan's militaristic intentions.[7] They further argue that American policies and embargoes were designed to antagonize Japan into attacking the United States.[8] However, these theories overlook crucial facts about American policymakers at the time.

It is argued that the US was aware of Japanese militaristic intentions by deciphering Japanese codes under the MAGIC program. The MAGIC program was a cryptanalysis project run by the American government, which focused on breaking code PURPLE, the top priority code for Japanese diplomatic officials.[9] Since code PURPLE was designated for diplomatic communications, most of what they learned did not pertain to military matters, leaving a significant gap in the US intelligence's knowledge of Japanese military's intentions and movements. By 1941, US intelligence believed that they had read virtually all communication between Japanese embassies and the foreign office. According to Captain Safford, who was responsible for intercepting and decoding foreign language ciphers, roughly 97 to 98 percent of all PURPLE codes had been successfully decoded, leading American officials to falsely believe that they had a strong grasp on Japanese intentions.[10]

Revisionist historians often use these facts as evidence that the

5. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 7.
6. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 5.
7. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 14.
8. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 14.
9. Indira Vidyalankar, "Pearl Harbor: Why Surprise?" *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 4 (1980): 848.
10. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 17.

American government must have been aware of the growing Japanese sentiments to attack American soil. However, this argument overlooks one key point: the Japanese military was using different codes that had not yet been accessed by Washington. Most communications regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor happened within the military, with Japanese diplomats being mostly unaware of developing plans.[11] Codes deciphered under PURPLE would not have contained any information about military movements, particularly those within the Navy.[12] The information that the US had about the Japanese military and navy pertained more to their public actions than their inner mechanisms.[13] As a result, the US remained unaware of the disconnect between the Japanese government and the military, and could not have known about strategic plans for an attack. During that time, Japanese diplomats expressed a desire for peace and the US based many decisions on this premise. This ultimately meant that American policymakers operated with more limited information than previously assumed. This limited information, heavily influenced by what Americans thought they knew, led to incorrect predictions about Japanese decision-making. American diplomats considered an attack on American soil from the Imperial Navy to be too risky, as they viewed it to be too weak to successfully carry out such a plan.[14] Consequently, most American officials did not suspect growing frustrations within the Japanese navy or the growing clamor for violent action against the US. America was, therefore, left unaware, not only of any plans to attack, but also of potential targets for attacks. Working off of available information, the best American officials could guess was that the Japanese Navy was most likely to attack somewhere in Southeast Asia.[15] However, these conclusions were drawn from very limited information. With American policy-makers lulled into a false sense of security regarding the likelihood of Japan attacking them, further investigations

11. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 17.
12. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 18.
13. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 18.
14. Yôichi Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," *Naval War College Review* 44, no. 2 (1991): 65.
15. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 18.

into Japanese intentions were not placed, which would prove to be a grave mistake.

Miscalculations, rather than deliberate choices, in the policies and embargoes imposed by America against Japan, led to increasingly hostile relations, making peaceful agreements impossible and unintentionally backing Japan into a corner. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930 limited Japan's naval size, creating a perception of weakness in the minds of both the American government and the Japanese military.[16] The Washington Naval Treaty, signed in 1922 by five powers, including Japan, limited the construction of battleships and aircraft carriers.[17] Japan felt that the terms of the treaty were disproportionate, leaving them inferior to the major powers of the West.[18] The London Naval Treaty had similar terms for reducing naval size.[19] Both treaties were abandoned by Japan in 1936 as they felt unfairly treated as a second-rate power.[20] The primary miscalculation on the part of major Western powers was in treating Japan as inferior to the UK and the US, denying them the same leeway in naval size that the UK and the US enjoyed. This sense of inferiority led Japan to believe they couldn't adequately defend themselves against greater powers, convincing Japanese officials that a preemptive strike was necessary in light of the armed conflict.[21] By choosing to immediately be on the offense, they could ensure that no one else would be able to determine the location or method of attack, allowing them to maintain control over the scenario. Chief of the Navy General Staff, Nagano Osami, believed in a strategy of interception attrition, advocating striking American forces by sea before assuming a defensive position.[22] Yamamoto Isoroku, Marshal Admiral of the Imperial Japanese Navy, backed up Osami, stating that the only way

16. Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," 65.
17. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 7.
18. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 34.
19. Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," 67.
20. Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," 67.
21. Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," 67.
22. Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," 66.

Japan would be successful in a defensive position was if they were able to target the enemy first to weaken them.[23] During this time, the American government was unaware of these growing sentiments in the Japanese Navy, nor did they realize that their actions had contributed to fostering such beliefs. Historian Yoichi Hirama argues that Japan's conviction of weakness was dangerous, as they, in reality, possessed one of the strongest navies at the time.[24] By 1936, Japan had left both treaties and greatly increased its naval size, driven by their perceived weakness compared to Western powers such as the UK and the US.[25] By unknowingly pushing Japan onto the offensive, American actions increased the likelihood of a deadly attack. As hostility from Japan escalated in East and South-East Asia, the US placed further oil and economic sanctions on Japan in October and November of 1941, attempting to dissuade aggressive acts.[26] Just like prior treaties, this embargo further aggravated a nation that already felt weak and marginalized.[27] The US had accidentally forced Japan's hand and increased the likelihood of an attack on American soil.

Though the actions of American officials may have pushed Japan towards an attack, this was an unintended consequence of their inability to reconcile ideological differences, which undermined efforts for peaceful relations with Japan. Professor of political science Abraham Ben-Zvi characterizes the American government's policymakers as divided into three groups: the national pragmatists, the globalist realists, and the globalist idealists.[28] These groups differ in how they approached the breakdown in negotiations with Japan. The national pragmatists preferred to reach a truce with Japan while still retaining good foreign relations with them, while the realists and idealists believed that American opposition to Japanese movements would be the only solution,

23. Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," 66.
24. Hirama, "Japanese Naval Preparations for World War Ll," 67.
25. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 8.
26. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 13.
27. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 13.
28. Abraham Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan, 1940-1941: A Case Study in Misperception," *International Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1975): 230.

idealists further clarifying that leeway could not be given to Japanese foreign policy aims.[29] These three groups were constantly in conflict and contradicted each other.[30] President Franklin D. Roosevelt and foreign diplomat Joseph Grew, the ambassador to Japan at the time, were considered national pragmatists as they were willing to consider a truce with Japan to avoid military involvement in the East.[31] Grew, in particular, expressed concern over the progressively deteriorating relations between Japan and the US, firmly believing that peace conferences between the two countries were the only viable solution.[32] Roosevelt favored a cautious approach to Japan with flexible and opportunistic policies, aiming to appease them and promote peaceful relations with the East.[33]

However, their efforts at peaceful policies were overruled by figures such as Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. Stimson, a globalist realist, advocated for an uncompromising approach with strong economic sanctions.[34] He aimed to weaken Japan into submission through the placement of the aforementioned embargoes and sanctions.[35] Unlike national pragmatists, globalist realists were convinced that economic sanctions alone would be enough to dissuade Japan's aggressive actions, given Japan's dependence on oil imports.[36] Reports of Japanese weakness further bolstered this perspective, leading to the strengthening and tightening of deterrence policies throughout the late 1930s. Unintentionally, Stimson began to push Japan towards an attack.[37] It should be noted that Rosevelt attempted, but ultimately failed, to fight against these sanctions, arguing that oil exports should be reduced

29. Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan," 231.
30. Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan," 230.
31. Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan," 231.
32. Amanda Watts, "Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor," *Constructing the Past* 15, no. 1 (2014): 64.
33. Dan Reiter and John M. Schuessler, "FDR, U.S. Entry into World War II, and Selection Effects Theory [with Reply]," *International Security* 35, no. 2 (2010): 179.
34. Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan," 234.
35. Vidyalankar, "Pearl Harbor: Why Surprise?" 852.
36. Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan," 230.
37. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 15.

rather than completely stopped.[38] This highlights the incompatibility between the different perspectives of American policymakers and their unwillingness to reach a compromise.

Cordell Hull, a globalist idealist, viewed Japan as a rogue nation and believed that no dealings should happen with the country until its foreign policies, especially those concerning exploitation and expansion into Southeast Asia, completely changed.[39] He undermined Joseph Grew and denied any possibility of peace talks with Japanese diplomats.[40] Historian Paul Shroeder asserted that Hull represented one of the major, if not the biggest, obstacles that Japanese diplomats were never able to overcome in their attempts to negotiate peace.[41] Japanese navy leaders, such as Hideki Tojo and Fumimaro Konoe, identified two significant dates, 2 October 1941, and 26 November 1941, when Hull's actions specifically pushed the navy closer to attack.[42] On 2 October, Hull refused summit peace talks, discouraging Konoe and causing unrest within the navy.[43] However, November 26th was considered the point of no return by Japanese officials. In response to the Japanese invasion of South-East Asia, Hull presented Japan with unconditional demands to withdraw their presence.[44] These demands, which were found to be incompatible with Japanese foreign policy and military aims, alongside the various embargos and denial of peace talks, left Japanese navy leaders with the impression that they would not be able to pursue their military goals through peaceful negotiations with the US, with war remaining their only option.[45]

Shroeder also concludes that Hull, while instigating anger in Japan, was also instrumental in ensuring that Grew was never

38. Reiter and Schuessler, "FDR, U.S. Entry into World War II, and Selection Effects Theory," 178.
39. Kobayashi, "U.S. Failures In The Pearl Harbor Attack," 12.
40. Watts, "Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor," 66.
41. Watt, "Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor," 66.
42. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 13.
43. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 13.
44. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 14.
45. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 14.

successful in his efforts to initiate peace talks.[46] According to Abraham Ben-Zvi, Hull was an incredibly uncompromising individual, lacking diplomatic experience, and unwilling to consider Grew's proposals.[47] The rift between Hull and Grew may have been exacerbated by rumors that Grew was a self-ambitious and ineffective diplomat, which potentially further undermined his credibility in Hull's eyes.[48] Regardless, the US government remained very split on its approach to Japanese relations. Personal issues and differing doctrines left them unable to reconcile these differences, and therefore unable to take proper action. According to historian Chihiro Hosoya, many Japanese decision-makers were reluctant to go to war with America until October 1941, when they felt that they had no other choice as all diplomatic negotiations were being rejected.[49] The unbridgeable gaps in mindsets among American diplomats and policymakers ensured that it would be impossible for them to agree on a single peaceful solution. It should be noted that the sentiment of war was particularly strong among the imperial naval officers, but not among civilian leaders, with whom most American communication was happening.[50]

Therefore, although American actions did push Japan towards an attack on Pearl Harbor, this was an unintentional consequence of broken communication within the American government, miscalculations on the intent and power of the Japanese Imperial Navy, and an overall lack of information leading to flawed decision-making. Throughout the 1930s, American officials made several crucial missteps, rooted in ignorance of the true situation at hand, rather than deliberate manipulation. Most American policymakers were against the idea of war with Japan and hoped to resolve issues either through peace talks or by weakening Japan into submission. However, their inability to reconcile these vastly different approaches to Japanese relations was ultimately their downfall, exacerbated by the fact that they were acting

46. Watts, "Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor," 66.
47. Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan," 231.
48. Ben-Zvi, "American Preconceptions and Policies toward Japan," 231.
49. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 15.
50. Hosoya, "Japan's Decision For War In 1941," 16.

on such limited information. A dangerous mix of Japan's perceived weaknesses, alongside the uncompromising approach of several American policymakers, created the perfect storm for Japan to take America by surprise at Pearl Harbor.

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The Cultural Cold War With Europe

AREEN AFTAB

Source: The Central Intelligence Agency Historical Collections
Late August 1961. An East German soldier stands guard on the border with West Berlin.

After the end of the Second World War, the US found itself at an economic advantage on the world stage - something President Truman was highly aware of in his address to Congress and citizens. In the Truman Doctrine, he cited the inability of Britain to provide economic assistance to Greece.[1] The US, henceforth, took on a more active role on the global stage. In the decade following the Truman Doctrine, efforts were made to prevent Soviet expansion and the spread of communism, but the recovery efforts in Europe constitute another layer of the Cold War. Economic recovery programs such as the Marshall Plan were meant to help recover war-torn economies of European countries and they worked alongside specific cultural propaganda initiatives of organizations such as ISB in Austria, but they also constitute a combined effort that helps solidify the US into a superpower status. This paper will argue that the Cold War as a passive war was not only playing out between the US and the Soviet Union as two superpowers but also in the cultural field between recovery recipient countries such as Germany and Austria. If the US was in an arms race with the Soviet Union, it was in a standard-of-living cultural race with Europe.

This paper focuses on Germany and Austria because of their significance to the 'primary' Cold War against the Soviet Union. The goal of this essay is not to lose sight of the significance of the motive to outpace communism through these economic recovery efforts. Scholars have already established this 'primary' Cold War motive of the Marshall Plan in Germany. East Berlin being under Soviet control while West Berlin was under Allied control made the US's propaganda in Germany come into close contact with citizens under Soviet control. Exhibitions in West Berlin created a channel to extend propaganda into Soviet zones through geographic proximity, before the advent of televisions.[2] Austria, served a similar purpose of "curtain penetration," with Vienna

1. Harry S. Truman, "Truman Doctrine," Address to Congress, March 12, 1947, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/truman-doctrine
2. Greg Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* (2005), 263.

being as far east as western influence extended.[3] The simultaneity of the cultural war with Europe can be appreciated by looking at two countries where cultural propaganda and economic recovery efforts were important for the primary Cold War.

What followed in the Truman Doctrine was an awareness of the potential for foreign policy advancement on the cultural front. Holm's analysis of the Truman Doctrine asserts a view of it as a "public-policy ritual carefully crafted for a mass audience" because American leaders at the time were aware of foreign policy having gained a culture-producing impact in the modernizing world order.[4] Greg Castillo further posits that the US, when operating as a post-war occupation government in Germany, faced a secondary Cold War front in the form of German intellectuals.[5] This second front has entirely cultural implications, speaking to the significance of culture.

Two such leftist intellectuals from the famous Frankfurt School, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, term these global efforts to establish mass culture as a "culture industry."[6] Though they focused on Hollywood films as products of this industry, the Truman Doctrine can be thought of as another such product. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the "culture industry" was totalizing because it mobilized repetition, so that "the interest of innumerable consumers is directed to the technique, and not to the contents – which are stubbornly repeated, outworn, and by now half-discredited."[7] In keeping with this notion of 'repetitive content refashioned with technique,' the Doctrine certainly pushes toward a new direction of containment policy. However, it repackages a previously abandoned Wilsonian idea of a globalized

3. Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War,* trans. Diana M. Wolf, (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 80.
4. Michael Holm, "The Marshall Plan: A New Deal for Europe," *Routledge*, 2017, 28.
5. Greg Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War," 265.
6. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, transcribed by Andy Blunden, 1944, accessed December 8, 2022, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/adorno/1944/culture-industry.htm.
7. Horkheimer and Adorno, "The Culture Industry."

world order with added realpolitik.[8] Addressing a mass audience of both American citizens and political leaders, Truman presented a tactful public-relations crafted vision of American economic strength, seeking to be an economic overseer of Greece and Turkey. However, what underscored the speech was a vision for cultural dominance. This is evident in the speech's awareness of technique; Truman's advisors were careful to present the communist threat as a challenge to long-term American values rather than relying on the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey, signaling a shift from military to cultural emphasis.[9]

By highlighting the economic strength of the nation, Truman spoke to the underlying cultural front of the Cold War as America attained cultural salience through its economic export of capitalism. The Cold War's primary front was an economic attack against communism. Truman purported that totalitarianism exploited poverty; by connecting Greece's poverty with the US's ability to keep its hopes alive, he posited that not only was it the only country able to economically support, but that its economic ability is the express restorative against totalitarianism emerging from the Soviet Union.[10] However, through its economic outreach, the US also started trying to win a one-sided cultural war against post-war Europe that had communist and socialist tendencies. Part of the US' Cold War aim was to dampen these tendencies, and cultural competition was "an unspoken aim" underlying it.[11] In Austria, ISB was well-funded enough by virtue of how well the US dollar translated into Austrian currency that it could implement programs in a timely manner. The ISB was an American organization aimed at manufacturing "respect" and "admiration" for "American attitudes;" that is to say an organization for

8. Dennis Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2006), 31.
9. Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine," 32.
10. Harry S. Truman, "Truman Doctrine."
11. Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe*, (Harvard University Press, 2006), 355.

cultural propaganda.[12] Thus, the US.'s economic strength through the value of the dollar held bearing on the capacity of its cultural mission. In the case of Germany, the US's economic capacity did not just allow for effective control of its cultural propaganda, but was part of the propaganda; that is to say, its economic brand was the culture being sold and propagated. Through displays of home furnishings or consumer goods, for instance, a "contemporary lifestyle" was being sold - one that promoted a combined possession of few luxury items with a wider array of low-cost ones. The displays of homes containing these furnishings were marked at the door with an advertisement that credited "technology, rising productivity, economic cooperation and free enterprise" for making "these objects available to our western civilization."[13] Such advertisements presented the capitalist economic system as a bonding instrument. The declaration was nothing short of a metaphorical treaty that hoped to bind together a western civilization as a larger, culturally homogeneous sphere under capitalism. The phrase "our western civilization" also illustrated the peculiarity that the cultural front of the Cold War aimed more towards cooperation than domination.

Though the cultural Cold War appeared to be with Europe, there were some indications of the cold war being *against* it as well. The contention of the US's post-war recovery efforts showed where the European established view of the US as a "cultural wasteland" needed to be overcome.[14] The US's strong reliance on its economy made sense as it generated among its post-war occupation subjects like Austria an intrigue towards its scale of wealth, which extended to a general admiration of all things American. This intrigue was its strength against Europe's high culture that marked Europe's "home turf."[15] Indeed, Truman received advice that termed the potential fall of Europe into totalitarianism as not simply requiring material sacrifices

12. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold*, 69-72.
13. Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War," 276.
14. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, 68.
15. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War,* 69.

from the US, but as an immense "spiritual loss."[16] Dennis Merrill's view on the US's spread of modernity would explain this "spiritual loss." Merrill argues that American attempts to spread its cultural ideology of modernity treaded uncharted paths. The Truman Doctrine displayed both a production and consumption of modernity, advancing its benefits while considering (as it confronts) dangers unknown of mid-twentieth century life.[17] Hence, the US appears self-conscious of its lack of a cultural foothold in foreign policy, and not without good reason as given the aforementioned socialist inclinations of war-torn European economies in Austria and Germany.

This cultural insecurity carried over into a cultural Cold War with Europe for alliance and not dominance, which became visible through American recovery programs' sensitivity to European sensibilities. The cultural product the US was generating through capitalism, its popular culture, was not the most favored by Marshall Plan officials.[18] The American taste exhibits in Germany were only aimed at European consumption, thus demonstrating a global cultural advertisement campaign with a target audience in mind.[19] In other words, whether or not the popular culture presented as American is to American tastes was less important than it being favorably received in Europe as an American product. The specificity was also evident in the distinct treatment Germany received as a European nation. European countries in general, as beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan, were privileged for raising the standard of living, which was the economic metric the US sought to promote globally.[20] For instance, in a country like Japan, it was more geoeconomically favorable for the US to obtain production of consumer goods rather than promoting their consumption.[21] Germany, as a European country, received aid

16. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 191.
17. Merill, "The Truman Doctrine," 34.
18. Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War," 273.
19. Castillo, "Domesticating the Cold War," 273.
20. Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 339-340.
21. Grazia, *Irresistible Empire,* 355.

differently than Greece, which was promised aid through the Truman Doctrine. In Germany, the Marshall Plan encouraged the independent German creation of post-war recovery strategies, which it would then fund.[22] Whereas, as the Truman Address demonstrated, Greece's aid was to be overseen by military assignments.[23] Hence, the European Recovery Program (ERP) under the Marshall Plan did not have such an overbearing presence; it merely attempted to rebuild nations like Germany, affording them a degree of autonomy.

Austria too had this share of autonomy and a distinct position, although differently from Germany. For while in Germany, the cultural propaganda was aimed more at "reeducation," the Austrian propaganda plan called for "reorientation." The latter was a softer approach of propaganda that sought to avoid replicating its reception in Austria as brainwashing, given that brainwashing was how the propaganda methods tended to be received in Germany.[24] Thus, the plan evolved in response to European reception from region to region. In addition to the geographic and spatial adaptability, the plan evolved across time due to politics. Because Austrians disliked aggressive anti-Soviet policy, American officials in Austria sought a quieter approach given that Austria, at large, already favored the presence of the US over that of the Soviet Union. The officials present in the context of the recovery program thus demonstrated a responsiveness to Austrian temperament, showing the stakes involved in a possible failure to attain cultural influence understood by assigned personnel in Austria.[25] The officials wanted to allow for some criticism of the US – its racism for instance – in order to maintain a non-propaganda appearance of their work, which was opposed by US Congress members who wanted a more aggressive approach disavowing any criticisms of the US.[26] However, despite the liberal views of ISB officials working in Austria, threats such as the rise

22. Merill, "The Truman Doctrine," 35.
23. Truman, "Truman Doctrine."
24. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War,* 67.
25. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, 74
26. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, 75.

of right-wing conservatism produced an expansion of propaganda.[27] Be it this responsiveness to the Austrian sociopolitical climate or the reliance on Germany to draft its own recovery plan to be financially facilitated by the Marshall Plan, these post-war rebuilding programs showed a narrower power gap between the US and Europe even though the US had complete economic advantage over Europe in this period. This relationship thus suggests that Europe's cultural relevance, something that seems to have been maintained on the global stage, was sought after by the US in this secondary Cold War.
The Marshall Plan was meant to benefit the US However, it too serviced the alliance and cooperation aim. Victoria de Grazia suggests that the Marshall Plan ought to be considered as not "enlightened benefaction, but as bearer of new ways of thinking about producing affluence" in Europe.[28] Bound in her phrasing of "thinking" and "affluence" is this tied cultural-influence-through-economic-modeling argument this essay presents. Regardless of the influence outward, there was also a return in this for the US More than just a handout, Holm argues that the Marshall Plan consisted of "demands that tied [Germany] to the inter-European American idea."[29] Furthermore, by introducing products, manufacturing systems, and management methods, the US relaxed its economic strain, and the Marshall Plan made for a lucrative investment.[30] Thus the recovery efforts are the US's attempt to dominate the global stage more fully: maintain its economic supremacy over Europe, while also building an alliance with European war-torn economies to become a cultural torch-bearer.

Europe was not always culturally ahead, however. While US's Hollywood was treading on its global mission, film in Austria was never a strong industry. Wagnleitner argues that because Austria's already weak film industry "as a result of cultural and political intolerance, incompetence, and racial prejudice–defused *itself*, the US film was

27. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, 78-79
28. Grazia, *Irresistible Empire,* 338
29. Holm, "The Marshall Plan," 91.
30. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War,* 277.

strengthened and in turn could affect Austria more effectively."[31] The part about more effective influence by the US held true. While Austrian film productions could be relegated to categorizations such as "Austria–see Germany," the statistical reality of films consumed can be conveyed through: "Austria–see Hollywood."[32] In other words, Germany dominated the supply side of film in Austria, and Hollywood dominated the demand. Germany too, once the strongest competitor of Hollywood, had been conquered after its loss to the Allies in World War II.[33] Thus, where the US was not culturally inferior, it sought to dominate, which suggests the competitive nature of recovery efforts that are yet largely an alliance mission.

The United States was always competing against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, while it was seeking cultural influence and approval in Europe. However, as is evident through its non-domineering approach with the recovery efforts in Europe after World War II, coexisting with its lacking global status in the emerging field of cultural foreign policy, it was also in a cultural Cold War with Europe. Recovery efforts in Austria and Germany sought to dominate where possible – such as in the film industry – and employ subtle advertising – such as with home furnishings in Germany – where needed. This cooperative competition suggests that, despite the general framing of the Cold War era as a bipolar contest between two superpowers, there also emerges a need to consider implicit superpowers. Europe, on an axis of cultural influence even at a time of economic plunder, would constitute such superpower. Further research might unearth more, particularly in the supposed "third world" that helps to recast our view of power in the foreign policy landscape.

31. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War*, 253
32. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War, 253*.
33. Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War,* 256.

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A New Look at the New Look: Preemption and Flexibility in Massive Retaliation

TONY XUN



Source: The National Archives
February 7, 1954. President Dwight D. Eisenhower Delivers His First State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress.

When President Dwight D. Eisenhower publicly introduced his new national security stance in his 1954 State of the Union Address, he did not mention the "New Look" by name.[1] Nonetheless, scholars have long characterized the New Look and its implementation as America's basic security framework throughout the Eisenhower administration, despite a lack of consensus on what exactly it entailed. The New Look's military stance involved NATO cooperation to keep the US responsible for nuclear strategy while shifting the burden of conventional military forces toward its European NATO allies. This essay seeks to investigate the New Look, focussing on massive retaliation: the policy of using American nuclear weaponry to protect the sovereignty of NATO members paired with a rejection of limited, non-nuclear war with the USSR. This analysis looks to the views of Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as primary decision-makers within the American government. Though I am not blind to interservice rivalries within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and interdepartmental conflicts between the military and the treasury, my analysis assumes they are relatively unimportant compared to the top-level strategic decisions of Eisenhower and Dulles. This essay also analyzes US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security documents and their relevance to the NATO area, as NATO Europe was the primary strategic priority of the Eisenhower administration. In the context of nuclear policy, I find it appropriate to include documents from NATO and the US's National Security Council (NSC) in the same analytical lens because NATO's nuclear action was fundamentally derived from American presidential authority; Eisenhower declared that NATO documents would not diminish American unilateral nuclear action.[2] While NATO's Military Council and the US NSC remained separate entities, in practice, nuclear weaponry in Europe was dictated by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his nuclear preauthorization stemming from President

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," Transcript of speech delivered at Congress, Washington, DC, January 7, 1954, https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/1954_state_of_the_union.pdf
2. Robert Allen Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain and the Foundations of NATO Strategy, 1948-1957" (dissertation, University Microfilms International, 1991), 631.

Eisenhower.[3]

This essay does not attempt to tackle the question of what exactly the New Look entailed, but it will deal with two major strategic concepts and their relation to massive retaliation. Firstly, to what extent did massive retaliation really mean "massive preemption", or a strategy that called for NATO nuclear forces to strike *before* a Soviet first strike?[4] In *The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960*, David Alan Rosenberg argues that "massive retaliation" becomes a misnomer; American long-range strategic capabilities were to strike the USSR at the source of Soviet nuclear power, even before any actual Soviet nuclear threat left the ground.[5] Secondly, how "flexible" was the New Look? Was the New Look more flexible in its approach than Democratic critics suggested? A reading of American security doctrine that emphasizes flexibility in the New Look implicitly moves away from the primacy of massive retaliation, leaving space for the development of conventional military force. The themes of preemption and flexibility are most critically found in four integral national security documents, all of which were approved by Eisenhower and Dulles. I take *A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary* (NSC 162/2) and *North Atlantic Military Committee Decision on M.C. 48 – A Report by the Military Committee on The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years* (MC 48) to characterize the early Eisenhower administration and *Final Decision on MC 14/2 – A Report by the Military Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area* (MC 14/2) and *Final Decision on MC 48/2 – A Report by the Military Committee on Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept* (MC 48/2) to characterize the later period, since the Eisenhower administration dominated their creations.[6] While all documents nominally reject preemptive strikes, these documents imply

3. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Making of the Western Defense System: France, the United States, and MC 48," in *The Cold War and after: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 145.
4. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security* 7, no. 4 (1983): 25.
5. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 25.
6. Trachtenberg, "The Making of the Western Defense System," 146.

the pre-eminence of massive preemption, especially earlier in the administration. In Eisenhower's early presidency, massive retaliation relied on a "tripwire" defense of Europe. While this logic was not wholly rejected later in the administration, it came to coexist with a hybrid massive retaliation-flexible response strategy, where "shield" forces replaced "tripwire" deterrence.

Scholars have not come to a consensus about the New Look's central tenets or how to interpret the role of massive retaliation. John Lewis Gaddis suggests in *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* that the central concept of the New Look was asymmetric response, or of "reacting to adversary challenges in ways calculated to apply one's strengths against the other side's weaknesses, even if this meant shifting the nature and location of the confrontation."[7] Gaddis recognizes nuclear strategy as a major component of the New Look, but argues that alliances, psychological warfare, covert action, and diplomacy were also crucial.[8] Gaddis therefore argues that massive retaliation was not at the core of the New Look, and the term was popularized by media sensationalization of Dulles' overstatements.[9] In *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*, however, Marc Trachtenberg says the "main idea" behind the New Look was to concentrate American military energy on strategic nuclear forces in North America, leaving NATO Europe to supply the bulk, though not the entirety, of the military forces required for local defense.[10] The American role in the New Look, writes Trachtenberg, was to focus on waging a general nuclear war with the Soviet Union and the striking capabilities it entailed.[11] According to Trachtenberg, the New Look involved a significant role for conventional forces in Europe in war preparations, and space for massive preemption. In

7. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 145.
8. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment,* 145.
9. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 159.
10. Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 151.
11. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 152.

Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, Bowie and Immerman interpret a *Foreign Affairs* article published by Dulles to explain that the New Look was rooted in military cooperation with allies and deterrence of Soviet aggression through massive retaliation.[12] Bowie and Immerman are somewhat susceptible to taking the Eisenhower administration at face value, emphasizing the deterrent function of massive retaliation to produce peace. Bowie and Immerman therefore see little room for either massive preemption or "flexibility"; neither would be necessary. Neither Trachtenberg nor Bowie and Immerman highlight a concept of asymmetric response, instead emphasizing massive retaliation. This essay charts a path between Gaddis and Tractenberg by emphasizing the centrality of massive retaliation and massive preemption, but also highlighting when the New Look shifted towards greater flexibility.

NSC 162/2 and MC 48 in the Early Eisenhower Administration

The first major national security paper of the Eisenhower administration, NSC 162/2, entrenched the basic stances of the New Look for the first time. NSC 162/2 originated from "Project Solarium", a comprehensive high-level strategy review that examined containment, rollback, and spheres of influence strategies.[13] The administration's decisions on Project Solarium formed the background of NSC 162/2,[14] approved on 30 October 1953.[15] NSC 162/2's authors wrote at length about the nature of the Soviet threat to American national security and the implications of American alliances and foreign commitments. These assumptions, including a strictly anti-communist orientation and a military commitment to NATO against a Soviet security challenge, were carryovers from the Truman era. More pertinently, NSC 162/2 firmly relied on massive retaliation through offensive nuclear striking

12. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York City, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 200.
13. Samuel F. Wells, "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," *Political Science Quarterly* 96, no. 1 (1981): 44.
14. Wells, "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," 44.
15. William Z. Slany, ed., "Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 25, 1954," 2 Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954 § (1984). Document 101, 578.

power, to be delivered by the US against the USSR. Though NSC 162/2 also considered the US alliances and the preservation of a stable capitalist economy as vital to national security, it held "maintaining a strong security posture" as key to its efforts to "counter Soviet military aggression".[16] At the heart of the strategic concept was an unflinching and explicit "emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength" built on "massive atomic capability".[17] In fact, the NSC viewed the deterrent power of American nuclear striking capabilities as the primary force keeping the USSR at bay already, even before any policy change. Though NSC 162/2 explained Soviet objectives as "the eventual domination of the non-communist world", a general war with the USSR already seemed unlikely to the NSC due to "the US capability to retaliate massively".[18] "The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe," it wrote, was "the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked."[19] Clearly, then, NSC 162/2 intended to rely on massive retaliation as the mainstay of European defense.

Massive retaliation alone, however, did not compose the entirety of the NSC's defense planning against a Soviet invasion of Europe. Eisenhower had long wanted to withdraw American conventional forces from NATO Europe, arguing for a "redeployment" of troops back home.[20] He argued that the US was overextended, believing that Truman's policy of military deployments around the Eurasian periphery curtailed American freedom of action.[21] Eisenhower and Dulles, however, agreed that a complete withdrawal might risk a slide into unilateralism, expressing a common antipathy for Senator Robert A. Taft's "fortress America" concept, or the idea that American political and military power should withdraw back home to prioritize

16. Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," 591.
17. Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," 591.
18. Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," 580.
19. Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," 585.
20. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 152.
21. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 152.

domestic defense over international commitments.[22] If American allies interpreted the New Look as proof of an isolationist shift, Dulles wrote to Eisenhower in a September 1953 memorandum, "I doubt any eloquence of reasoning on our part would prevent disintegration and deterioration of our position."[23] If NATO Europe came to question American commitment to European defense, the integrity of the NATO alliance itself might be undermined.[24]

Eisenhower's solution to this problem in NSC 162/2 was deployment of American forces in Europe as a "nuclear tripwire". Deploying enough conventional forces to enable NATO to physically repel a full-scale Soviet invasion was a near-impossibility and an expensive distraction in the nuclear age. Instead, Eisenhower left enough forces in Europe to ensure American involvement in European security. A Soviet invasion of NATO Europe, then, would guarantee American reaction; Eisenhower could hardly let American military installations be overrun by Soviet invaders. The strength of an American response would not be measured in the number of divisions the Americans could field in Western Europe, but by the atomic firepower of massive retaliation, thus deterring Soviet invasion without having to maintain massive conventional military commitments in Europe. Simultaneously, the tripwire would reassure American allies that the US was committed to upholding its military commitments to NATO in the nuclear age, and therefore prevent NATO's disintegration. NSC 162/2 did not explicitly spell out all of this logic, perhaps consciously avoiding "fortress America" characterization. However, it does trace the outlines of the nuclear tripwire concept. Though it announced that US military aid in Western Europe "must eventually be reduced", it still intended to communicate American "manifest determination."[25] While calling for Western Europe to contribute to

22. Gaddis, "Strategies of Containment," 125
23. Slany, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954," Document 88.
24. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 189.
25. Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 25, 1954," Document 101, 585.

its own defense, it conceded that American deployments provide a political, tripwire function: "the presence of US forces in Western Europe makes a contribution other than military [a political signal] to the strength and cohesion of the free world coalition."[26] Again, the nuclear tripwire and the rest of the recommendations were wholly contingent on massive retaliatory capability. NSC 162/2 was considered "valid only so long as the United States maintains a retaliatory capability that cannot be neutralized by a surprise Soviet attack."[27]

The logic of nuclear deterrence through massive retaliation was spelled out more explicitly on 22 November 1954 in MC 48. MC 48 was important as the first NATO document of its kind to explicitly plan around the immediate usage of nuclear weaponry upon the outbreak of war.[28] Thus, with MC 48, Eisenhower's New Look was fully integrated into NATO's strategic planning. Here, the nuances of NATO nuclear strategy, as well as some of its implications for massive preemption, are laid out more clearly. MC 48 constructs the framework of Eisenhower's massive retaliation by deriving a few key military and political assertions. Modern war, it asserted, had been fundamentally altered by the sheer destructive potential of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.[29] MC 48 considered air defense systems and air defense weapons insufficient protection against strategic nuclear strikes; the only effective way to stop nuclear attack was to destroy Soviet "means of delivery at source."[30] The implication was that Eisenhower might protect London or Paris from nuclear destruction only by attacking the USSR in an overwhelming first strike. Soviet military planners, MC 48 reasoned, would surely come to a parallel conclusion; that their only chance of avoiding nuclear destruction in a general war with NATO would "rest upon their sudden destruction of NATO's ability to

26. Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," 585.
27. Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," 585.
28. Marc Trachtenberg, "The Making of the Western Defense System," 142.
29. North Atlantic Military Committee, "North Atlantic Military Committee Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," M.C. 48 (Final) § (1997), https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a541122a.pdf, 2.
30. North Atlantic Military Committee, "Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," 3.

counter-attack immediately and decisively with atomic weapons."[31] If either the USSR or the US intended to start a general war, both would be enormously incentivized to immediately escalate into a nuclear war in the hopes of destroying the enemy's retaliatory capabilities. Whoever gained initial air superiority, then, would gain the initiative, unload their nuclear stockpile onto the other, and thereby "prevent the enemy regaining the initiative."[32] Airborne nuclear capabilities were enough to destroy critical political and military functions of the Soviet state, so long as NATO gained the requisite advantages.[33] A third world war would hinge on achieving "superiority in the initial phase", unlike the gradual buildup of military-industrial strength in the preceding two world wars.[34]

From these tenets, the Military Command concluded that NATO's strategic priorities required strengthening "forces-in-being," or immediately combat-ready forces, that could survive an initial Soviet assault and participate in the battle for air supremacy.[35] However, even in MC 48, it would be a mistake to read NATO strategy as solely reliant on nuclear striking capabilities. Though Eisenhower planned for winning a general nuclear war with the USSR, MC 48 still held an important role for conventional forces in Europe. Even as Eisenhower intended to force the USSR to fold through nuclear deterrence, MC 48 insisted on a "German contribution" to the defense of Europe in a "forward defense".[36] What role did conventional forces on the European continent play in a nuclear exchange? Though Eisenhower and Dulles planned to win a general war with nuclear weapons, unlike Truman and Acheson, he did not think of them as an option of last resort.[37] Eisenhower intended to use nuclear weaponry wherever militarily appropriate. When his administration sought to deter Soviet aggression

31. North Atlantic Military Committee, "Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," 3.
32. North Atlantic Military Committee, " Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," 4.
33. North Atlantic Military Committee, " Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," 4.
34. North Atlantic Military Committee, " Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," 5.
35. North Atlantic Military Committee, " Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," 11.
36. North Atlantic Military Committee, " Decision on M.C. 48 (Final)," 11.
37. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," 28.

through nuclear diplomacy, as he often publicly did, he was not bluffing.[38] When Eisenhower sought to reinforce the deterrent effect in order to avoid war, he doubled down on the striking capabilities of the SAC.[39] To Eisenhower, the ability to merely destroy Soviet retaliatory capabilities was insufficient; MC 48 called for a territorial defense of Europe. Since American defense of Europe largely amounted to a tripwire, continental defense required substantial military force that, given the preponderance of Soviet military power, could simply not be matched by France and the UK. A German contribution to NATO defenses would not enable NATO to win a long war of attrition against the Soviet military juggernaut, but would provide for a temporary stopgap to prevent Europe from being overrun while American strategic forces crippled the USSR.

Given the disastrous implications of a Soviet nuclear first strike, one might wonder how MC 48 could root its fundamental security strategy on a *retaliatory* nuclear strike. MC 48 provides an answer to this dilemma by tasking NATO forces-in-being with a "dual role of a deterrent force and a force capable of surviving and countering the enemy's initial onslaught."[40] While MC 48 writes extensively of necessitating the survivability of NATO forces-in-being, it still allows for the possibility that nuclear warfare could potentially facilitate initial Soviet superiority, only writing that current NATO nuclear superiority "should" provide for a major advantage.[41] Despite NATO advantages, MC 48 recognized that success was far from guaranteed, outlining Soviet advantages in the initiative and surprise, which could still "greatly influence the outcome of the war" despite apparent NATO nuclear superiority.[42] Given that MC 48 expected the USSR to rely on a strategy of surprise nuclear attacks in a general war, its professed solution of building up survivable forces-in-being capable of counter-

38. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," 28.
39. Gaddis, "Strategies of Containment," 174.
40. North American Military Committee, "M.C. 48 (Final)," 20.
41. North American Military Committee, "M.C. 48 (Final)," 5.
42. North American Military Committee, "M.C. 48 (Final)," 6.

attacking risked massive destruction of NATO military capabilities. As MC 48's nominal strategy was to deter the USSR by promising grave risk of similar nuclear destruction, massive deterrence might seem somewhat strategically incoherent. How could NATO have expected to deter the USSR with a strategy that implied accepting the same risk of destruction to itself?

MC 48's logic implied that Eisenhower could manage strategic risk to tolerable levels by interpreting massive retaliation as massive preemption. It's important to note that NSC 162/2, MC 48, MC 14/2, and MC 48/2 all explicitly rejected a preemptive first strike. "The initiation of a war by NATO would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the Alliance," MC 48 claimed. "War, therefore, can come only as a result of Communist aggression either intentional or as a result of miscalculation." MC 14/2 held that its strategic objective was to prevent war via deterrence, not to begin one through a massive first strike.[43] Nonetheless, Trachtenberg convincingly argues that these statements should not be read as proof of NATO's strategic benevolence. Despite MC 48's rejection of massive preemption, Eisenhower suggested that he might launch SAC bomber forces while the USSR was merely preparing for war, before any actual attack might come.[44] In a meeting with the JCS, Eisenhower emphasized his "firm intention to launch a strategic air force immediately in case of *alert* of actual attack."[45] Through preauthorizing the Supreme Air Commander Europe to immediately launch nuclear strikes, Eisenhower and MC 48 prioritized rapid response. The goal was to "blunt the enemy's initial threat," or, preferably, to eliminate it by preventing the Soviet attack from ever coming.[46] Eisenhower focussed intently on how much American nuclear strategy could hurt the enemy – he was unlikely to have risked his offensive nuclear capabilities to a Soviet first strike if he believed the appropriate situation had arrived.

43. North American Military Committee,"MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision) § (1997), 2.
44. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 164.
45. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 164.
46. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 162.

NATO's nominal principles mattered relatively little to Eisenhower when nuclear conflict was on the table. In a general war with the USSR, Eisenhower declared at a NSC meeting in March 1954, "the United States would be applying a force so terrible one simply could not be meticulous as to the methods by which the force was brought to bear."[47] Eisenhower's intentions of assuring victory at any cost in a general nuclear war in a high-pressure situation leave little doubt that MC 48's "fundamental principles" were secondary priorities, if not distractions from the real goal of victory at any cost. At the March 1954 NSC meeting, Eisenhower speculated that "every single nation, including the United States, which entered into this [general nuclear] war as a free nation would come out of it as a dictatorship."[48] Even American democracy was an acceptable "price of survival" to Eisenhower.[49]

Massive preemption did not only exist in Eisenhower's mind and speech. MC 48 itself implicitly favors it, euphemistically calling for NATO to "reduce the threat at source."[50] The wording in MC 48 is not consistent with a "retaliatory" response. "The only presently feasible way of stopping an enemy from delivering atomic weapons against selected targets in Europe," MC 48 writes, "is to destroy his means of delivery at source." Since MC 48 acknowledged that air defense offered insufficient protection and survivability capabilities were vulnerable to the element of surprise, the only way SAC might have offered this protection was by destroying Soviet planes before takeoff. Trachtenberg argues that this was common knowledge. The only way to destroy the Soviet nuclear capability in a meaningful sense, he writes, was while it was "vulnerable to attack, which is to say before

47. William Z. Slany, ed., "Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 25, 1954," 2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 § (1984). Document 114, 641.
48.Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," Document 114, 642.
49.Slany, "Memorandum of Discussion," Document 114, 642.
50. North American Military Committee, "M.C. 48 (Final)," 16.

the bomber force actually became airborne".[51] MC 48, in its expectation that war would likely come through surprise Soviet nuclear aggression, implied that NATO would be safest if the SAC was in the air before Soviet planes were – that is, *before* the Soviet leadership believed itself at war. If NATO believed war was inevitable, they should attack first, and, expecting the USSR act likewise, NATO was incentivized to launch as soon as they believed general war was inevitable.

MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 in the Late Eisenhower Administration

In the summer of 1956, NATO's Military Committee began to draft MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 in hopes of updating MC 3/5 and MC 14/1, outdated strategy documents dating from 1952, to bring them in line with the strategic concepts adopted in MC 48, including the integration of New Look nuclear strategy into NATO planning.[52] MC 14/2 is conventionally seen as a wholesale acceptance of massive retaliation, in line with MC 48.[53] However, due to the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Uprising, among other political developments, 1956 brought new ideas to the forefront. Chief among them was a newfound "flexibility" in NATO thinking.[54] Dulles, an early proponent of flexibility, explained in a January 1955 meeting that flexibility was the solution to being forced between choosing "not responding to local aggression" or "applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation."[55] In other words, Dulles wanted choices other than "holocaust" or "surrender".[56] Conceptualized in NSC 14/2, flexibility was required to "meet limited military situations short of general war outside the NATO area".[57] Both Dulles and NSC 14/2 stressed that a flexible orientation should not prevent NATO from using nuclear weapons where appropriate to advance security interests.

51. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 160.
52. Gregory W Pedlow, October 1997, XIX.
53. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," 1012.
54. Pedlow, "The Evolution of NATO Strategy," XIX
55. John P. Glennon, ed., "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957," 19 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 § (1990). Document 6.
56. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 186.
57.North American Military Committee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision) ," 14.

Nonetheless, the new flexible philosophy marks a distinct break with a "purer" massive retaliation upheld by Eisenhower.

During the administration, Dulles had begun to conclude that massive retaliation might have begun to justify nuclear overdependency and European reliance on American strategic nuclear weapons, neglecting their own defense capabilities.[58] Wampler argues that there was a growing awareness, especially among the cash-strapped British, that nuclear weapons were not a miracle drug for reducing the costs of defense and would not make meeting NATO defense commitments as easy as hoped.[59] Flexibility found its way onto MC 14/2 in language that was absent in MC 48. For example, MC 14/2 identified threats to NATO security including "infiltrations, incursions, or hostile actions" that NATO had to be capable of addressing "in appropriate strength" and "without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons."[60] MC 14/2 saw new Soviet threats in attempts to influence non-NATO countries that were deemed crucial to NATO interests.[61] As a result, a local war might break out, and might therefore present NATO with relatively small-scale challenges that might not be appropriate to solve with nuclear strikes. The MC 48 assumption that massive retaliation defended by a nuclear tripwire would be sufficient to defend Europe was ceding ground to a broader threat assessment.

The policy implication of this shift in MC 14/2 was the introduction of "shield" forces as an essential part of European defense. MC 14/2 called for "shield forces" to maintain the territorial integrity of Western Europe.[62] Though they were to be equipped with an "integrated nuclear capability", the relatively minimalistic nature of American deployments in Western Europe implied that shield forces were to be primarily European.[63] In comparison, MC 14/2 primarily

58. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," 1035.
59. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," 653.
60. North American Military Committee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 14.
61. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," 12.
62. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," 18.
63. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," 18.

identifies North America's significance as the origin of a strategic air counter-offensive: the United States was not expected to provide the shield forces.[64] Though it was not reflected in MC 14/2, the Army championed shield forces at the heart of a radical break with MC 48. Tired of being sidelined by the Air Force and SAC, General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, argued for a robust, rigid shield in Europe, and a heightened threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.[65] MC 48 viewed conventional ground forces as a forward European defense while SAC single-handedly won a general nuclear war, as well as incremental "chips" with which NATO could force the USSR to back down.[66] Taylor instead envisioned a controlled escalation, replacing the rapid escalation of massive retaliation, where ground troops would respond in kind to communist aggression.[67] Where earlier massive retaliation had focussed nearly exclusively on strategic air striking capabilities, a division of labour was emerging between Western Europe and the United States in the late Eisenhower administration at the same time that the Eisenhower administration was shifted unevenly towards flexible response and limited war.

The dichotomy between "nuclear retaliatory forces" and "shield forces" was explicitly laid out in MC 48/2. The general concept of MC 48/2 differentiated between strategic striking forces that had traditionally been central to massive retaliation, and defensively prepared shield forces intended to defend Europe from other kinds of aggression. Though both types of forces were to be armed with nuclear weapons and placed on immediate alert, the differentiation clearly implied a military defense of Europe instead of mostly relying on deterrence. In comparison with the forces-in-being expounded in MC 48, MC 48/2 was relatively demanding on its requirements for shield forces, asking that they meet a variety of aggressions related to "lesser threats envisaged in the strategic concept", instead of merely standing

64.North American Military Committee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 14.
65. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 186.
66. Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 187.
67.Trachtenberg, "A Constructed Peace," 188.

by for the initial phase of a general nuclear war.[68] NATO requirements were shifting in the direction of requiring shield forces to flexibly react to a number of different potential scenarios, rather than only deterrence through a massive preemptive attack against Soviet nuclear forces.

Despite these developments, the introduction of flexibility in the late Eisenhower administration should not be overstated. Firstly, requests for flexible military forces capable of fighting local conflicts, small wars, and gradual escalation, were often rejected by Eisenhower. Instead of seeing nuclear deterrence forces as an "umbrella" under which limited, conventional military operations could be safely conducted, Eisenhower thought of mutual deterrence as a "lightning rod" that would increase, rather than decrease danger. In a May 1958 NSC meeting, he explained that he could not believe that the US could fight the USSR in a "nice, sweet, World War II type of war"; escalation would be swift and dangerous.[69] Eisenhower's perspective remained largely dominant in MC 14/2 and MC 48/4. Both documents still considered general nuclear war the primary threat to which the majority of NATO resources should be allocated; both engaged in the logic of massive preemption that characterized the early administration. MC 14/2 did recognize that certain nations needed to "retain the flexibility required to permit action to meet limited military situations short of general war outside the NATO area," but blunted that flexibility by requiring it to be "harmonized with the primary importance of protecting the NATO area".[70] While MC 14/2 allowed NATO countries to allocate some resources to secondary priorities, NATO strategy remained firmly centered around a nuclear defense of Europe. Similarly, while MC 48/2 tasked land forces with maintaining NATO's land borders, their primary function was still intended to be a forward defense of NATO in a general nuclear war where a SAC nuclear

68. North American Military Committee, Final Decision on MC 48/2 § (1997), 10.
69. David S. Patterson, ed., "Memorandum of Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the National Security Council," 3 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 § (1996). Document 23, 87.
70. North American Military Committee,"MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 14.

counter-offensive was to be responsible for destroying the Soviet will to fight.[71]

More strategic details within MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 confirm that massive retaliation and its close relationship with massive preemption survived late into the Eisenhower period. MC 14/2 maintained that the defense of NATO Europe was still dependent on a massive strategic nuclear strike against the USSR, and that NATO should therefore "be prepared to take the initiative in their use".[72] A blend of flexible response and massive retaliation drive MC 14/2's treatment of hostile "operations with limited objections": it instructs NATO to eliminate threats "without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons".[73] If Soviet sponsorship for such actions was absent or indeterminable, MC 14/2 carved out a role for flexible conventional forces when it instructs NATO to "attempt to limit the geographic scope of the military action", even though the attack "would not be limited in a political sense".[74] However, if the USSR sought to "broaden the scope of such an incident or to prolong it", MC 14/2 reverted to the massive retaliation doctrine of general nuclear war, maintaining its emphasis on strategic nuclear striking capabilities.[75] The logic of massive preemption is reinforced in this case: both MC 14/2 and MC 48/2 were clear that "in no case is there a concept of limited war with the Soviets."[76] Echoing Eisenhower's skepticism of the ability to fight a "nice, sweet, World War II type of war", a rejection of limited war implied a rapid escalation to offensive nuclear strikes, and therefore preemptive atomic war.[77] While some flexible elements proliferated in MC 14/2 and MC 48/2, they largely coexisted with a strict massive retaliation policy that remained the dominant national security paradigm.

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71. Final Decision on MC 48/2, 10.
72. North American Military Commitee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 12.
73. North American Military Commitee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 14.
74. North American Military Commitee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 11.
75. North American Military Commitee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 11.
76. North American Military Commitee, "MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final Decision)," 9.
77. David S. Patterson, "Memorandum of Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the National Security Council," Document 23.

When JFK and the Democrats challenged Eisenhower and Nixon's Republican Party for the presidency in 1960, massive retaliation and national security policy fell under public scrutiny. The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and allegations of a missile gap, arguing that the USSR had quantitatively overtaken the US in nuclear weaponry, were weaponized for political and persuasive ends by JFK. The political and technological context of massive retaliation had changed since Project Solarium had embarked in 1953. Massive retaliation consistently reigned as the controlling paradigm, with an implicit threat of massive preemption reinforced by the logic of strategic air striking offensives, despite official insistences that NATO would never start a war. Though Eisenhower rarely emphasized it, his national security policy moved away from a "pure" massive retaliation, softened by an increasingly flexible orientation. Most notably, the NSC's early tripwire strategy was replaced by a more robust dual reliance on strategic nuclear offensive forces and local shield defensive forces. As the decade wore on, differences emerged between Eisenhower's massive retaliation and Dulles' wishes to diversify with flexible response. Eisenhower's massive retaliation, built upon American nuclear superiority, eventually fell to a regime of nuclear parity, but not before the New Look influenced a decade of NATO security policy.

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Source: The National Archives
August 14, 1956. Dwight D. Eisenhower meeting with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the White House.

Rising Crime, or Political Tool?

OMID INTEZAM

Source: Tingey Injury Law Firm
Lady Justice, depicted here in a bronze statue, symbolizes the ethical cornerstone of jurisprudence.

From captivating our collective gaze to taking center stage in the political arena, there exists a compelling force that effortlessly grabs hold of universal attention: crime. The 2022 US midterm election was no different. According to recent polls, three-quarters of voters said violent crime is a major problem, making it a central issue going into the 2022 midterm election.[1] While candidates from across the political spectrum have differing views on crime, there is one constant: no political candidate dares ignore crime as an issue. By analyzing crime-policy discussion in the Pennsylvania Senate race between Democrat candidate John Fetterman and Republican candidate Mehmet Oz, this essay will demonstrate how political ideology is reflected in issues relating to crime and criminal justice.

What is Political Ideology in the American Context?

Sets of values, principles, and fundamental beliefs about politics, law, and government are often grouped together and labeled as a political ideology. Within the United States, the Democratic and Republican political parties have a diverse set of ideologies particularly between parties, but also within. Despite the diversity of political ideology, The Democratic Party often supports the idea of social change and advocacy through the involvement of government, while The Republican Party endorses depending on the status quo and directing a more limited form of government. Within these two ideology categorizations, one could group equality and individual freedom as being more favored by Democrats, and having a more structured, ordered society as a more Republican notion. The two dominant political parties within the United States have each adopted these sets of political ideologies that often presents itself in the policy they advocate for - liberalism being the foundation of the Democratic Party, and conservatism being the foundation of the Republican Party. For the purpose of this essay, the term 'liberals' and 'Democrats' will be used interchangeably, as well as 'conservatives' and 'Republicans.' Reducing crime is something that unites the entire electorate, yet

1. Elena Schneider, "Midterm voters key in on crime," *Politico*, October 5, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/05/midterm-voters-crime-guns-00060393.

the question of how to reduce crime increases the divide.[2] Liberals generally believe crime is a social issue that can be reduced through social programs, while conservatives tend to believe in more punitive solutions that include harsher sentencing and more funding for law enforcement bodies.[3] The only agreements between Democrats and Republicans concerning crime are that crime continues to be a major problem, and that violent crime has been increasing. Despite there being consensus on these two points, this essay will now examine if crime is increasing as public opinion would suggest.

Is Crime Increasing?

Crime in the United States is simultaneously increasing and decreasing depending on the specific region, type of crime, and the severity of crime.[4] Thus, there is no single answer to the question "Is crime increasing?" What creates further complications is that there is no centralized authority in the United States that sufficiently records crime rates around the country. Although the FBI attempts to collect national crime statistics yearly, there are about 17,000 police departments across the US, and none of them are required to report crime statistics to the FBI.[5] Nevertheless, despite the less-than-ideal data collection methods, the FBI does release yearly crime statistics that are often cited by politicians. The latest complete data set is for 2020-2021 and shows a national decrease in violent crime by about one percent, with much of that figure being attributed to an 8.9 percent decrease in robberies.[6] On the national level, violent crime is

2. Andrew Romano, "2022 poll: Republicans close gap on midterm ballot by attacking Democrats on crime," *Yahoo! News*, October 19, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/2022-poll-republicans-close-gap-on-midterm-ballot-by-attacking-democrats-on-crime-090032522.html.
3. Ronald Brownstein, "What's really going on with the crime rate?" *The Atlantic*, October 20, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2022/10/crime-rate-justice-republicans-2022-elections/671800/.
4. Justin Nix, "Is Crime on the Rise? A Criminologist Explains Why the Answer Can Vary," *Snopes*, October 24, 2022, https://www.snopes.com/news/2022/10/24/crime-rate-explained-2022-midterm-election/.
5. Nix, "Is Crime on the Rise?"
6. Devan Markham and Evan Lambert, "Rising crime nationwide fuels midterm elections," *NewsNation*, October 14, 2022, https://www.newsnationnow.com/politics/rising-crime-midterm-elections/.

decreasing, yet since the nature of the midterm election is regional, it is more appropriate to analyze regional crime changes.

As one could correctly assume that crime rates vary dramatically at the state level, this often becomes the focus of midterm elections. In the past year, the state of Pennsylvania saw the highest increase in violent crime, while Vermont saw the largest decrease in violent crime. Based on this dramatic increase in Pennsylvania, the issue of violent crime became a contested topic across the state's midterm election.[7] The Pennsylvania Senate race between Democrat candidate John Fetterman and Republican candidate Mehmet Oz exemplified the congestion between political ideologies that crime can generate.

The Oz-Fetterman Pennsylvania Midterm Senate Race

Violent crime has become a significant point of conversation in the state of Pennsylvania due to the state experiencing the country's largest yearly increase for the year in crime at 27.1 percent.[8] Much of this came from the increase in both violent and property crime in the city of Philadelphia. Philadelphia's crime rates continue to be some of the highest in the country[9]. Given the record-high crime rates and public opinion polls showing crime as a significant issue, candidates have focused on addressing crime, with Republicans specifically making it the center of their campaign.

At the same time, the overturning of Roe v. Wade by a conservative Supreme Court prompted many Republican candidates to go on the defensive due to the negative backlash and protests. As recently reported by *The Wall Street Journal*, the Republican Party has shifted its focus on crime as a means to divert attention from the overturning

7. Samuel Stebbins, "How the violent crime rate in Pennsylvania compares to other states," *The Center Square*, October 4, 2021, https://www.thecentersquare.com/pennsylvania/how-the-violent-crime-rate-in-pennsylva%20nia-compares-to-other-states/article_af4ca856-a006-56ec-a00e-424e0c19c087.html.
8. Samuel Stebbins, "How the violent crime rate in Pennsylvania compares to other states."
9. Samuel Stebbins, "How the violent crime rate in Pennsylvania compares to other states."

of Roe v. Wade, and as an effort to benefit from the fear surrounding crime.[10] The Democratic Party also has focused on crime, advocating for liberal policies that emphasize social solutions for crime reduction, thus presenting a contrasting approach to the Republican stance.

Republican Candidate Metmet Oz on Crime

The Senate election between Oz and Fetterman exemplified recent trends practiced by the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively. Oz shifted his campaign to focus on the record-high increase in crime, placing blame on Fetterman for contributing to this ongoing rise given Fetterman's role as the chair of the States Board of Pardons. Specifically, Oz highlighted two specific pardons in which Fetterman was involved—those of Dennis Horton and Lee Horton. The Horton brothers were serving life sentences for second-degree murder in a deadly 1993 armed robbery and have long-maintained their innocence. Fetterman vowed to advocate for their release - even if it ended his political career.[11] In [year], their sentences were commuted by Governor Tom Wolf, based on a recommendation from the Board of Pardons chaired by Fetterman. This was one of many cases in which Fetterman advocated for clemency and, as he predicted, it was used by the Republican candidate during the final stages of the election to portray Fetterman as "soft on crime" . Oz portrayed Fetterman's advocacy for clemency as being "soft on crime" and forwarded a more punitive and conservative policy.

Oz advocated for a more punitive criminal justice system through the use of mandatory minimum sentences.[12] Mandatory

10. Alex Mousan, "Crime Ads Play Big Role in Competitive House, Senate Races," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/crime-ads-play-big-role-in-competitive-house-senate-races-11665454787.
11. Henry J. Gomez, "Fetterman's clemency crusade draws soft-on-crime attacks from Oz in Pennsylvania Senate race," *NBC News*, September 24, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2022-election/fettermans-clemency-crusade-draws-sof%20t-crime-attacks-oz-pennsylvania-s-rcna49055.
12. Paula Reed Ward, "Crime a focal point in U.S. Senate race between Fetterman, Oz," *The Tribune-Review*, October 31, 2022, https://triblive.com/news/pennsylvania/crime-a-focal-point-in-u-s-senate-race-between-fetterman-oz/.

minimum sentences are when a legislature appoints a specific minimum sentence length rather than the court issuing a sentence based on the facts of the case including consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors. The goal of mandatory minimums is to reduce recidivism which, proponents believe, will reduce crime by the use of harsh punishment as a deterrent. One of the most well-known examples of the use of mandatory minimums is that of Republican President Richard Nixon and his war on drugs which involved the implementation of lengthy minimum sentences for drug-related offenses.[13] The legislation was criticized for both its targeting of certain racial groups and its grouping of offenders. For example, a youth who committed his first drug-related offense would be sentenced identically to a repeat offender. Oz forwarded a very conservative notion of being tough on crime through an ideological framework of punitiveness and order. Oz supported a mandatory life sentence for those convicted of second-degree murder—the same sentence that Fetterman advocated against for Dennis and Lee Horton. Unlike Oz, Fetterman considered context when discussing clemency. Although Fetterman is the chair of the Board of Pardons, the board makes decisions based on the recommendation of lawmakers, judges, and attorneys. Further, clemency itself must be granted by the current Governor. Applying context to the criminal justice system is extremely important, as mitigating and aggravating factors can alter a defendant's level of culpability. The Republican conception of crime can most simply be summarized by the phrase "if you commit the crime, you do the time." This conservative notion gives little regard for context and instead argues that offenders must always be punished harshly to reduce recidivism.

Democratic Candidate Fetterman on Crime

Fetterman's stance on criminal justice focused on two main points: the abolition of mandatory minimum sentences, and stricter

13. "A History of the Drug War," Drug Policy Alliance, accessed November 1, 2022, https://drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war.

gun control policies.[14] Fetterman took the position that being tough on crime does not mean unreasonably high sentences, but rather the opposite. Fetterman specifically took issue with mandatory minimum life sentences without the chance for parole, arguing that due to racial inequalities, certain groups are likely to be targeted. Fetterman argued that the best way to reduce crime in the state was to enact stricter gun control legislation since most violent crimes involve the use of firearms.[15] His campaign referred to these changes as common sense gun laws which include increasing background checks for firearm ownership and a more *sincere effort* to decrease the number of illegal firearms.[16] Oz opposed these proposals which he argued would result in increased governmental interference. Fetterman also repeatedly cited his time as Mayor of Braddock and how crime under his leadership was reduced through social policies and working to reform the police. Change from the bottom up rather than the top down is a key characteristic of Fetterman's policy on the reduction of violent crime.

Concluding Remarks

Across the United States, crime is simultaneously increasing and decreasing depending on the location of analysis and what type of crime is being analyzed. The state of Pennsylvania experienced a record increase in violent crime in recent years that became the focus of the 2022 Senate election. Public opinion polls have shown that crime was a key issue in the state's election.[17] Republican candidate Oz focused on a more punitive approach to crime that acts to reduce recidivism through mandatory minimum sentences, while Democratic candidate

14. Ward, Paula Reed, "Crime a focal point in U.S. Senate race between Fetterman, Oz," *TribLIVE*, October 31 2022, https://triblive.com/news/pennsylvania/crime-a-focal-point-in-u-s-senate-race-between-fetterman-oz/.
15. Abbie VanSickle and Cary Aspinwall, "A Pa. mandatory life-without-parole sentence is a flash point between Oz and Fetterman," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 27, 2022, https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania-felony-murder-fetterman-oz-debate-20221025.html.
16. "Taking on Crime," Fetterman for PA, accessed November 1, 2022. https://johnfetterman.com/issue/taking-on-crime/.
17. Keya Vakil, "'Gross Fear Mongering': How Dr. Oz is Distorting John Fetterman's Record to Scare Voters," *The Keystone*, September 26, 2022, https://keystonenewsroom.com/story/gross-fear-mongering-how-dr-oz-is-distorting-john-fettermans-record-to-scare-voters/.

Fetterman emphasized social solutions to crime and stricter gun control regulations. The election of Fetterman over Oz demonstrates an apparent approval from voters of the liberal approach to criminal justice, but the slim margin of fewer than 200,000 votes highlights the deep divide that continues to exist amongst the American electorate.[18]

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18. "John Fetterman." Ballotpedia, accessed February 7, 2023. https://ballotpedia.org/John_Fetterman.

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Source: AP
January 3, 2023. Vice President Kamala Harris participates in a ceremonial swearing-in of Pennsylvania Sen. John Fetterman in the Old Senate Chamber on Capitol Hill.

Source: Matt Rourke, AP
May 11, 2022. Republican Senate candidate Mehmet Oz takes part in a forum in Newtown, PA

Black Faith'Can Move Mountains: Faith, Race & Survival in *If Beale Street Could Talk*

ASHVINI GIRIDARAN



Source: Bastian Greshake Tzovaras
January 12, 2019. California Theatres' signage for the movies playing.

In his book *Let Us Dream,* Pope Francis writes that "if you get through [trials]...you come out better or worse but never the same."[1] In the face of hardship, the way to 'get through' is often to turn to faith. In his article, "Making a Way Out of No Way," Joe Tolbert Jr. coins the term "Black faith" to describe the acts of Black Americans who "resist" the prejudiced ideology of their oppressors and "affirm their humanity and freedom" in the face of racial discrimination.[2] This practice of resistant Black faith amidst the 'trials' of being Black in America is showcased in Barry Jenkins's 2018 film *If Beale Street Could Talk.* The engaged couple central to the film, Tish and Fonny, suffer struggles such as exorbitant legal fees and housing discrimination amidst Fonny being wrongfully incarcerated for rape in a racialized case of mistaken identity. However, they are able to overcome these tribulations through sacrificial love and their union, both acts of 'Black faith.' Thus, in the film *If Beale Street Could Talk,* Barry Jenkins illustrates through the love story of Tish and Fonny, how 'Black faith' empowers survival of socio-economic hardship in America.

First and foremost, Tish and Fonny's family's 'Black faith.' The ready love of Tish's parents, sister, and Fonny's father towards the couple's unborn child is an exemplification of 'Black faith' and enables their economic survival. When Tish tells her parents, sister, and future in-laws that she's pregnant with Fonny's baby, Fonny's mom Alice reacts by stating that she knew Tish would be "the destruction of [her] son," adding, "that child was born in sin and the Holy Ghost is gon' cause it to shrivel in [Tish's] womb."[3] As she exits the room, Tish's mom Sharon stops her and states, "That child is your grandchild. It didn't have anything to do with how it got here. 'Aint none of us do."[4] In the end, Tish's immediate family—her mother, father, and sister— as well as Fonny's father, support her pregnancy. However, Alice and her

1. Pope Francis, *Let Us Dream: the Path to a Better Future* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 6.
2. Joe Tolbert, "Making A Way Out of No Way: Black Faith in Barry Jenkins's If Beale Street Could Talk," *Cross Currents* 70, no. 3 (2020): 304.
3. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, directed by Barry Jenkins (Entertainment One Films, 2019), 0:25:52, https://www.netflix.com/ca/title/81019839?source=35.
4. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 0:27:52 to 0:28:02.

daughters, who are depicted as being fundamentalist Christians, do not. The stark juxtaposition between the reactionary statements of both mothers is indicative of how they each cope with hardship. Sharon's response is a demonstration of 'Black faith.' By stating that none of them had control over the conception of the child, she references the collective powerlessness experienced by Tish and Fonny's family members in this unexpected predicament. Furthermore, by telling Alice that the child Tish is carrying is "her grandchild," Sharon claims the unborn life as kin. What the family does have control over, she implies, is how they "get through" and respond to this unexpected conception. In choosing to assume the role of this child's grandparent and support Tish, Sharon as well as Tish's other advocates demonstrate 'Black faith.' They assert both beings' personhood in the face of racialized dehumanization. In "Making a Way Out of No Way," Tolbert specifically highlights how Alice's comments reflect her internalized racism. He writes that "this scene shows…the ways that religion is weaponized in such a way that [Black Americans] can perpetuate the dominant culture's ideologies against [themselves]."[5] He then likens Alice's invocation of the Bible to that of slaveholders Christianizing the very people they enslaved, highlighting parts of the Bible that "admonished the enslaved to obey…promising their freedom as a reward in heaven."[6] Like the slaveholders, Alice hypocritically "weaponizes" the Bible in a way that fortifies her preconceived interests; she focuses on the 'sins' committed by others while conveniently ignoring the Christian commandment to love others, including the unborn. In this scene, Alice embodies the rhetoric of the dominant culture, that of white Christianity, to affront Tish and her unborn child. Her comment that she "knew" Tish would be "the destruction of her son" is a loaded one; in the film's source material, Alice makes the very same comment out of her prejudice against Tish's skin color, which is darker than her own and that of the others in Fonny's family. Alice wields colorism like white Americans perpetuate racism against Black Americans. In the end, she demonizes Tish and her child as corrupt entities, Tish as the 'dark-

5. Tolbert, "Making A Way Out of No Way," 304.
6. Tolbert, "Making A Way Out of No Way," 304.

skinned destroyer' of her son and the child as 'created in sin.' Thus, the family's solidarity is an act of defiance against Alice's prejudiced rhetoric and a powerful affirmation of Tish and her child's humanity as Black Americans.

It is this 'Black faith' which allows them to persevere through economic hardship. As the cost and time against both Fonny's release and the baby's arrival begin to mount, everyone rallies around the expecting mother and unborn child. In one scene, Fonny's father Frank, frets over how they will be able to afford both the legal fees and the cost of the impending baby at breakfast with Tish's dad Joseph. Joseph then replies, "You ever been worried about the money? You raised them somehow, you fed them somehow…They stole [the money] from us. These are our children and we got to set them free."[7] In the following scenes, Tish narrates how she goes to work "wearing dresses that fit like sex," her mother takes time off work to gather information for Fonny's case and though they don't tell Tish, Frank and Joseph, steal from their workplace to make money.[8] Overall, amidst financial anxiety and fraught familial circumstances, Tish is able to make ends meet through the solidarity of her family. The child's grandfathers' actions in stealing from their workplaces is a defiant reclamation of the historical fruits of enslaved Black labor. Their illicit mobilization of Black faith is echoed in softer forms by Tish and her mom. Tish sexualizes herself to earn more from her job at a perfume counter and Sharon travels to a foreign country to gather intel for the case. Though one is economically productive and the other is not, both sacrifice their personal comfort for the betterment of the child. In the end, there is no concrete plan to survive the costs of it all; there are no described spreadsheets or pay increases. Rather, it is the sacrificial love that Tish's supportive family members display out of recognition of her and her child's dignity and need that fuels their economic survival.

Similarly, it is the couple's 'Black faith' that fuels their social

7. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 1:13:39 to 1:14:09.
8. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 1:15:02 to 1:15:38.

survival against systemic racism and prejudice. Tish and Fonny's 'Black love' in forming their own family is an act of 'Black faith.' Prior to Fonny's incarceration, the two search for their own apartment. Time after time, their applications are rejected by landlords upon discovery of their race. Of their predicament, Fonny's friend Daniel remarks, "Man, this country does not like [n-word]. They don't like [n-word] so much that they would rent to a leper before they rent to a [n-word]."[9] Firstly, Daniel's comments are revelatory of the systematic racism pertinent in the housing market in 1970s Harlem. He invokes a Biblical allusion, referencing the 'leper.' In the Bible, the disease of lepers is symbolic of a physical manifestation of sin, thus, they were viewed as unclean and severely stigmatized in society.[10] Here, Daniel is emphasizing how their status as Black Americans is so deeply devalued in their community that a landlord would hypothetically rent to the shunned leper prior to renting to a Black person. In persisting to search despite the dehumanization they face from landlords, Tish and Fonny push back against the systemic racism they face, asserting their worthiness and belonging, as Black people, in a home. This is an act of 'Black faith.' In the end, however, Tish and Fonny's application is accepted by a Jewish landlord. When asked about why he is renting to them, the landlord states that "he digs people who love each other." "I'm my mother's son," he explains, "sometimes that's all the difference between us and them."[11] Their eventual landlord's response to why he is choosing to rent to them is a show of allyship. In his article, Tolbert explains that "this Black love is an essential component of Black faith. The love of God, love of self, and love of community is what enables Black faith to persist in spite of circumstances."[12] The landlord's comments that he is "[his] mother's son" can be interpreted as a reference to his own status as a Jewish person given how many sects of Judaism trace Jewish descent through the matrilineal line. This is further supported by his later remark where he draws a distinction

9. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 0:50:15 to 0:50:30.
10. "Leprosy." Leviticus 13–14. Church of Jesus Christ. Accessed 31 May 2023.
11. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 1:08:14 to 1:08:32.
12. Tolbert, "Making A Way Out of No Way," 305.

between himself, Tish, and Fonny—"us"—and the dominant culture, "them." His status as a Jewish person distinguishes him from other white people in the broader white, Christian American society. He is thus able to understand and align himself with the marginalization experienced by Tish and Fonny as Black Americans. The landlord's decision to rent to them is an empowerment of their Black love. His sympathy and allyship towards the plight of Tish and Fonny as Black Americans help further their Black love by pushing back against the systemic discrimination they face.

It is 'Black faith' that allows Tish, Fonny, and later their young son to survive the harsh realities of Fonny's wrongful incarceration. In the final scene of the film, Tish and her now three-year-old three son visit Fonny in prison. It is revealed that he ultimately chose to take a plea deal as key evidence was suppressed by the police and his odds of a legal victory in court were stacked against him. During their visit, Fonny moves to eat a snack but is quickly stopped by his son, Alonso Jr., who reminds him that "you gotta say grace." Alonso Jr. then prays, "Thank you God for the food we're 'bout to eat and for all our blessings and we have a seat and for my daddy. In Jesus's name, Amen."[13] Tish and Fonny then share a long knowing look before the camera pans out. Alonso Jr.'s prayer is a significant representation of how 'Black faith' as a familial unit furthers survival against the injustice of Fonny's incarceration. The fact that he stops his father to pray showcases how the ritual of daily mealtime prayer and expressing gratitude sustains Tish and her son amidst the hardship of Fonny's unjust absence. The presence of Fonny's partner and son in the prison room is a representation of 'Black faith.' Despite the inequality he experiences daily in the criminal justice system, he has a family community that loves him - as evidenced by the presence and prayer of his child: "Thank you God…for my daddy" - as well as his own faith that fuels him.[14] Tish and Fonny's reaction to the prayer and the expression that they share is evidence of survival; though the circumstances of

13. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 1:51:30 to 1:52:06.
14. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 1:51:30 to 1:52:06.

their lives are marred by social inequity as Black Americans, they are not robbed of the pursuit of happiness. With and through the love they share, Fonny and Tish are okay. Thus, Tish and Fonny's 'Black faith' as exhibited with and through their family allows them to persevere through systemic racial injustice.

In Barry Jenkins' 2018 film *If Beale Street Could Talk,* Tish and Fonny show how 'Black faith'—acts of resistance against the dehumanization of Black Americans—can enable steadfastness amidst social and economic struggle. Specifically, 'Black faith' in the form of familial love and sacrifice allows Tish to stay afloat amidst economic hardship. Similarly, it is 'Black faith' in the form of a familial union that allows both Tish and Fonny to "get through" the struggles of housing insecurity and Fonny's incarceration. By the film's end, Tish and Fonny never get married. Tish herself acknowledges, "neither of us cares what that means. Neither of us is young anymore."[15] The economic and social trials they faced forced them to grow up and rendered marriage, a milestone often associated with adulthood and 'coming of age,' devoid of meaning. 'Black Faith' allows Tish and Fonny to "get through" the present challenges, but with it, Tolbert writes, "is bound up…the belief and hope that this world can be better"[16] and unsaid: faith that their son will not be robbed of his innocence the same way.

15. *If Beale Street Could Talk*, 1:54:30-1:55:10.
16. Tolbert, "Making A Way Out of No Way," 309.

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Source: If Beale Street Could Talk (2018)
Scene between Clementine "Tish" Rivers (KiKi Layne) and Alonzo "Fonny" Hunt (Stephan James) in *If Beale Street Could Talk*.

Beyond Black and White: *BlacKkKlansman* and Black Progress

KIERA QUINLIVAN



Source: shrimpy99, Devianart
Fan-made poster for Spike Lee's *BlacKkKlansman* (2018)

Set during the 1970s Black Power movement, Spike Lee's 2018 film, *BlacKkKlansman*, follows Black police officer Ron Stallworth as he infiltrates the local Ku Klux Klan and begins a romantic relationship with Black Power activist, Patrice Dumas.[1] Although inspired by Ron Stallworth's memoir, Lee intended to provoke a commentary on Black activism's historical debates.[2] As such, the film attends to two major genealogies of Black thought: accommodation and militancy. Accommodation is exemplified in Booker T Washington's 1895 "Atlanta Exposition Address", and Paul Lawrence Dunbar's 1896 poem, "We Wear the Mask" as both address the theme of tolerance towards the existing racial order.[3] In contrast, Claude McKay's 1919 poem "If We Must Die" and Malcolm X's 1963 speech, "Message to the Grassroots" develop the ideology of militancy by presenting racial progress as a battle against racial oppression and its white beneficiaries.[4] Given this contrast, twentieth-century historians have represented accommodation and militancy as binary opposites, using them to contrast the ideologies of various Black leaders and movements.[5] However, *BlacKkKlansman* challenges this mainstream conception of Black progress through its depiction of Ron and Patrice because it reconfigures the ideologies of accommodation and militancy as complementary forces rather than binary opposites.

Within *BlacKkKlansman*, Lee represents Patrice as the embodiment of the militant tradition of Black thought. Connecting

1. *BlacKkKlansman,* directed by Spike Lee (Focus Films, 2018), 2:15:14, https://streaming-acf-film-com. myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/audiocine/play/ec37ca71c46d0462?referrer=marc.
2. Spike Lee, "Spike Lee Interview: *BlacKkKlansman*," interview by John Deckelmeier, *Screen Rant*, October 26, 2018, https://screenrant.com/spike-lee-blackkklansman-interview/.
3. Booker T Washington, "Atlanta Exposition Address (1895)" in *The Booker T. Washington Papers*, ed. Louis R. Harlan, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974) http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/39/ ; Paul Lawrence Dunbar, "We Wear the Mask (1896)," in *The Complete Poems of Paul Laurence Dunbar* (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, n.d) References are to line. https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44203/We-wear-the-mask.
4. Claude McKay, "If We Must Die," 1919. References are to line.https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/ 44203/we-wear-the-mask.; Malcolm X, "Message to the Grassroots," transcript of speech given in Detroit, November 10, 1963. http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/malcgrass.html.
5. Pero Gaglo Dagbovie, "Exploring a Century of Historical Scholarship on Booker T. Washington," *The Journal of African American History* 92, no. 2 (2007), 253.

Patrice to the Black Power movement, Lee modeled the fictional character of Patrice after real Black Power movement activists Angela Davis and Kathleen Cleaver.[6] Consequently, Patrice's rhetoric mirrors the language of Malcolm X and Claude McKay. Patrice unflinchingly refers to police officers as "pigs," expressing a strong belief in the police as enemies to Black progress.[7] This view of the police as the enemy reflects the polarizing mentality established by Malcolm X and McKay. Within "Message to the Grassroots," Malcolm X represents "the white man" as the common enemy, suggesting an adversarial relationship between Black and white society.[8] McKay similarly represents Black struggle as a battle against a "common foe," representing white society as a hegemonic antagonist to the Black community.[9] Moreover, Patrice dismisses the United States as a fundamentally "racist system," necessitating the liberation of Black people from these oppressive structures.[10] This sentiment directly parallels Malcolm X's metaphor of America as a "prison" that must be escaped in order to realize the Black community's true potential.[11] In fact, Lee presents Patrice's association with the Black Power movement as the defining feature of her identity. Outraged at Ron's subterfuge as a police officer, Patrice emphasizes her position as "President of the Black Student Union," placing her role within the organization above her relationship with Ron.[12] Most importantly, Patrice refers to Black liberation as a "lifetime job," reinforcing her total commitment to this endeavor.[13] Thus, Lee constructs Patrice's entire identity around the Black Power Movement. Lee not only situates Patrice's beliefs within the same radical genealogy of the movement but he brings it to the forefront of her character. Through this, Patrice serves as the personification of Black militancy within *Blackkklansman*.

6. Lee, "Spike Lee Interview."
7. *BlacKkKlansman*, 0:44:58.
8. X, "Message to the Grassroots."
9. McKay, "If We Must Die," 9.
10. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:03:51 to 1:03:56.
11. X, "Message to the Grassroots."
12. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:25:45.
13. *BlacKkKlansman*, 0:46:11.

Moreover, Lee's depiction of Patrice challenges the popular perception of the Black Power Movement and its militant approach. In their analyses of the era, twentieth-century scholarship vilified the Black Power Movement as the self-destructive antithesis to the Civil Rights Movement by using its self-defense tactics as evidence of the movement's barbarism.[14] Concurrently, public and academic circles criticized the concept of Black Power as being overly threatening to white society for it to engender progress.[15] However, the film encapsulates Patrice's activism in the talk she arranges between lynching survivor, Jerome Turner, and the BSU. Lee intercuts this event with the KKK's initiation ceremony, juxtaposing two groups' exclamations of "Black Power" and "White Power."[16] Through this, Lee demonstrates that Black Power is an expression of resistance to the historical forms of Black subjugation that are incomparable to the racist values of white supremacy. In fact, Patrice's activism leads her to speak out about the sexual harassment she experienced at the hands of a police officer, again representing Black Power as a response to racial oppression.[17] In doing so, Patrice's representation reflects McKay's depiction of Black folks "fighting back" in a final act of defiance against the "murderous" intentions of the white public.[18] Through this, Lee speaks to the historical roots of the Black Power Movement and self-defense as a rebellion against the police brutality and attacks perpetrated against Civil Rights organizers.[19] BlacKkKlansmen recontextualizes the Black Power Movement as a justified reaction to white violence through its depiction of Patrice as a rational, empowered activist. Through this, the film resists the demonizing narrative associated with the Black Power Movement and its militant politics.

14. Peniel E. Joseph, "Toward a Historiography of the Black Power Movement," in *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era*, ed. Peniel Joseph (New York: Routledge, 2006), 3.
15. Michael Dawson, "From the Civil Rights Movement to the Present," in *The Oxford Handbook of African American Citizenship, 1865-Present,* ed. Lawrence Bobo et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 477.
16. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:30:04 to 1:42: 58.
17. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:24:49.
18. McKay, "If We Must Die," 13-14.
19. Dawson, "Civil Rights Movement," 476.

Similarly, Lee depicts Ron as a model of the accommodationist approach to Black progress. Countering Patrice's calls for America's immediate, unconditional acceptance of Black folks, Ron argues that society is not ready to accept Black liberation.[20] As such, his hesitancy to demand Black liberation mirrors Booker T Washington's view of racial justice as a "constant struggle." As Ron critiques Patrice's demand for immediate action, Washington similarly dismissed contemporaneous calls for immediate equality as an "artificial forcing" of racial progress for a community that is not yet prepared for its realization.[21] Moreover, Dunbar's concept of the "mask" arises in Ron's behavior and outlook. According to Dunbar, Black individuals "wear the mask" of obedience to survive in white-dominated spaces.[22] As such, Ron embodies the mask through the stoicism he maintains while another officer mocks him as "Officer Toad," a reference to the Black folks arrested by the police.[23] Moreover, Ron's investigation of the KKK is contingent on his cooperation with white officers because as a Black man, Ron can not impersonate a Klan member in person.[24] Thus, Ron's willingness to work alongside the police force to combat the KKK's racism reflects Washington's view that uplift is a mutual endeavor between "Oppressor [and] oppressed."[25] Therefore, Lee depicts Ron as willing to endure racism to achieve a gradual realization of racial progress. Thus, Ron's approach to racial progress requires him to operate within the existing parameters of society, reflecting the central premise of accommodationism. Through this, Lee utilizes Ron to animate the accommodationist ideology within *BlacKkKlansman*.

Nevertheless, Spike Lee nuances accommodation, using Ron to highlight its unique opportunities for resistance. In twentieth-century analyses of Booker T Washington, historians distanced Washington

20. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:04:33.
21. Booker T Washington, "Atlanta Exposition Address."
22. Paul Lawrence Dunbar, "We Wear the Mask (1896)," 1.
23. *BlacKkKlansman*, 0:11:04 to 0:11:10.
24. *BlacKkKlansman*, 0:32:28 to 0:32:31.
25. Washington, "Atlanta Exposition."

and his accommodationism from the radical tradition of later Black activism.[26] In fact, Hodges argues that Washington "wore the mask" through his overtures to segregationists, using Dunbar's concept to paint accommodationism as delusional.[27] However, Ron uses his mask of respectability to pose as a white man during multiple phone calls with David Duke, the Grand Wizard of the KKK.[28] This allows Ron to humiliate Duke by inviting the entire Intelligence division to laugh at Duke's ignorance.[29] Moreover, Ron photographs Duke with his arms around him while assigned as his bodyguard, shaming him in front of the entire Klan chapter.[30] When threatened, Ron reminds Duke that he could arrest Duke for assaulting an officer, leaving the Klan powerless.[31] Thus, Ron uses the masking tactics and institutional support afforded to him as a police officer to delegitimize and disempower white supremacy. This speaks to the resistance encoded into Dunbar's poem as the mask enables its wearer to "let" white society see only what they choose to reveal.[32] In fact, Booker T Washington himself used the political influence provided by his accommodationist stance to covertly advocate for civil rights.[33] Thus, masking is also an assertion of autonomy and defiance despite its outward acquiescence to oppression. As such, Lee emphasizes that Ron's accommodation tactics allow him to infiltrate and disrupt the very systems that oppress the Black community. Through this, Lee illustrates that accommodation can be used in service of liberation rather than to its detriment, highlighting its hidden radicalism.

Furthermore, Lee addresses the conflict that arises between both ideologies through Ron and Patrice. On his first assignment as a police officer, Ron infiltrates Kwame Ture's speech to the BSU under

26. Dagbovie, "Exploring a Century," 253.
27. Norman Hodges, "Booker T. Washington:'We Wear the Mask'," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 7, no.4 (2004): 108.
28. *BlacKkKlansman.*
29. *BlacKkKlansman*, 2:02:57 to 2:04:07.
30. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:47:46 to 1:48:15.
31. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:46:44 to 1:47:39.
32. Dunbar, "We Wear the Mask," 8.
33. Hodges, "Booker T. Washington," 105.

orders to prevent him from "stirring up" the Black community.[34] Once Patrice discovers Ron's deception, she criticizes him as a "house n-word."[35] This phrase evokes in Malcolm X's analogy of the "House Negro" that condemns Black folks who operate within white supremacist systems as subjugators of their own communities.[36] As such, Lee uses Patrice as the mouthpiece for his criticism of accommodation. At the same time, Ron argues that Patrice could "set [herself] on fire" and "the KKK will still be here."[37] Through this, Lee suggests that militant activism is ignored by white supremacist institutions despite demanding immense sacrifice from its adherents. Thus, Lee uses Ron and Patrice to put accommodation and militancy in conversation with one another, reflecting his perspective on Black history as a dialogue.[38] In interviews, Lee revealed his intent for *BlacKkKlansman* to explore the natural "tensions" he perceived within Black activism.[39] Therefore, Ron and Patrice not only embody their respective ideologies, but their interactions also mirror the debate between these two genealogies that accompanied their development. In doing so, Lee brings these contradictions to the forefront of *BlacKkKlansman*.

Despite this tension, Lee ultimately unites these ideologies through Ron and Patrice's parallel experiences of racial oppression. Following Patrice's criticism of the police force, Connie, the wife of a KKK member, identifies Patrice as "dangerous."[40] The KKK's perception of Patrice as a threat culminates in a failed assassination attempt via bombing.[41] Similarly, Ron is also viewed as a threat. Before he can apprehend Connie for her role in the bombing, he is beaten and arrested

34. *BlacKkKlansman*, 0:12:31 to 0:13:17.
35. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:26:26.
36. X, "Message to the Grassroots."
37. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:25:48.
38. Gordon Slethaug, "Spike Lee, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X: The Politics of Domination and Difference," in *I Sing the Body Politic: History as Prophecy in Contemporary American Literature,* ed. Peter Swirski (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 114.
39. Lee, "Spike Lee Interview."
40. *BlacKkKlansman*, 0:50:12 to 0:50:26.
41. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:52:54 to 1:56:02.

by police officers despite his repeated assertions that he is also an officer.[42] Therefore, Lee suggests in the eyes of the white public, Ron and Patrice's ideological differences are invisible next to the threat of their Blackness. As such, this representation highlights the common theme of racial oppression as a common struggle present within both accommodationist and militant thought. For example, both Dunbar and McKay employ "we" to express the Black community's collective suffering under racism.[43] As such, Lee unites accommodation and militancy under the common cause of Black struggle through Ron and Patrice's parallel experiences of racialized violence. Thus, Lee challenges the significance of the conflict between accommodation and militancy by arguing that divisions are over-exaggerated when contrasted with the hegemonic view of white supremacy.

In fact, Lee stresses the urgency of unity between accommodation and militancy by connecting the struggle of Patrice and Ron to the contemporary moment in the *BlacKkKlansman*'s final scene. At first, Patrice breaks up with Ron because he refuses to quit his job as a police officer, suggesting that accommodation and militancy are inherently incompatible.[44] Before the conversation can continue, the scene shifts to depict Patrice and Ron walking side-by-side towards a window revealing the burning cross of the KKK.[45] In leaving the outcome of Ron and Patrice's relationship unresolved, Lee again argues that the conflict between accommodation and militancy is overshadowed by the persistent threat of white supremacy. At the same time, the parallel positions of Ron and Patrice against the burning cross further emphasize Lee's call for ideological unity against white supremacy. Most importantly, footage of the 2017 Unite the Right Rally follows this scene, drawing an explicit connection between the film's white supremacist antagonists and the alt-right groups of present-day America.[46] Through this cinematic parallel, Lee illustrates his intent

42. *BlacKkKlansman*, 1:54:34 to 1:55:02.
43. Dunbar, "We Wear the Mask;" McKay, "If We Must Die."
44. *BlacKkKlansman*, 2:04:52 to 2:05:23.
45. *BlacKkKlansman*, 2:05:41 to 2:06:00.
46. *BlacKkKlansma*n, 2:06:39 to 2:09:25.

to mobilize his audience against the rising "home-grown terrorism" of white supremacy within the United States.[47] While Lee has often presented his films as reflections on ideological harmony, this call to action infuses *BlacKkKlansmen*'s theme of unity with new outrage.[48] In doing so, Lee conveys *BlacKkKlansman*'s overarching message that modern society must resist ideological infighting and mobilize against the white supremacy that has only become more visible since Ron and Patrice's time.

Thus, *BlacKkKlansman* adds to the genealogy of Black thought through its nuanced approach to accommodation and militancy represented by Ron and Patrice. Rather than regurgitate a myopic perspective, Lee refuses to reduce these characters and their respective ideologies to their weaknesses and pit them against each other. Instead, *BlacKkKlansman* reveals the opportunities for liberation provided by both accommodation and militancy, demonstrating the potential for mutual support in spite of their contradictions. Through this, Lee asserts that these genealogies unite rather than devolve into infighting because white violence remains an embedded threat to Black folks everywhere. As such, Lee offers a new intellectual framework that includes both accommodation and militancy to the modern era of Black activism.

47. Lee, "Spike Lee Interview."
48. Slethaug, "Spike Lee, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X," 114-116.

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Source: Keith Negley, The New Yorker
Art of Ron Stallworth (John David Washington) and Philip "Flip" Zimmerman (Adam Driver) in Spike Lee's *BlacKkKlansman*

Source: Duke Downey, The Chronicle
October 23, 1969. Angela Davis speaks at Mills College.

Source: Library of Congress
March 26, 1964 Washington, D.C. The first and only time that Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr met.



Source: Arthur Paul Bedou
September 18, 1895. Booker T. Washington, delivers his famous "Speech to the Cotton States and International Exposition" at the Atlanta Exposition.

A History of Discrimination in Reproductive Care

JAIME PRITCHARD

Source: Brett Sayles
Protest sign reading "Abortion is healthcare."

From early historic records to documented contemporary practices, the US healthcare system has viewed the treatment of white patients in a distinctly different way than that of minority groups. Built by colonial settlers who forcefully assumed power, North American healthcare systems inadvertently promote existing structures of racial superiority.[1] Black and Indigenous childbearing women have faced disproportionate access, care, and treatment, especially in regard to reproductive care. Analyzing literature from the early 1500s to the present day exposes the gap in this sector of the medical system and the tragic effects of these discriminatory practices. This paper will analyze several works of literature that hold critical weight as analytical tools in the field of women's history. Their significance lies in their ability to unveil the enduring racist idealogy that contributed to the shaping of the modern healthcare sphere; only by uncovering these existing barriers can we build a better system.

From the early 1500s, the notion that black women experienced pain in a different capacity than white women began appearing in images and written accounts. This led to a widespread belief that black women required less medication and other pain-relieving treatments than white women in the same situation.[2] The resounding impacts of this ideology echo in the discriminatory treatment of these women in the modern healthcare system. Jennifer Morgan explores how images from the first European explorations of Africa influenced the societal perception of vast groups of people for centuries to come, and analyses the consequences of these depictions.[3] She discusses a passage from Sebastian Munster's writing from the 1500s which describes African women as experiencing no pain and not taking a break from any activity after childbirth.[4] This depiction was transported back

1. Ieman M. El-Mowafi et al, "The Politest Form of Racism: Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Paradigm in Canada," *Reproductive Health* 18, no. 1 (2021): 1.
2. De Neice B. Welch, "An Ethical Analysis of Reproductive Justice in the Context of the Eugenics Movement in the United States," *ProQuest Dissertations Publishing*, 2019, 191.
3. Jennifer L. Morgan, "'Some Could Suckle over Their Shoulder': Male Travelers, Female Bodies, and the Gendering of Racial Ideology, 1500-1770," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 54, no. 1 (1997): 171
4. Morgan, "Some Could Suckle over Their Shoulder," 171.

to Europe, and propagated through images, works of literature, and other forms of media until it resembled a common knowledge basis that black women felt pain, and the pain of childbirth specifically, to a lesser degree than white women.[5] Shifting to a North American perspective, Morgan explains that works describing Native American women painted a picture that echoed the "European Civility" which was understood to be the ideal woman. Rather than an image of the docile and proper European woman which was idealized, the imagery associated with African women was one of savagery and monstrosity.[6]

This understanding of the ideal woman became deeply entwined with the history of eugenics in America. De Neice Welch explains in her dissertation that as the field of eugenics transitioned from theory to a tangible reality, racial differences were used as an explanation for traits that were perceived as societal flaws.[7] Expanding upon Morgan's work—which identified the development of the notion that racial differences were inherent—Welch traces this line of thinking into the 18th century when it became expressed through eugenics and genetic-based theories. It further developed until the early 1900s when this understanding of the inferiority of black people was used to justify practices of forced sterilization. Surgical sterilization was used to eradicate populations that were viewed as "the degeneration of humankind".[8] In 1927, Carrie Buck was the first young woman to face mandated sterilization as authorized by the State of Virginia court.[9] This is just one example of bodily autonomy being taken from black individuals. Women like Carrie Buck were stripped of the ability to make decisions about their own health, exemplifying how the notion of white superiority had permeated the healthcare realm.
In "African-American Midwifery, a History and a Lament," Goode and Rothman study the continuous control over African American fertility and reproduction which has been apparent in America. They

5. Morgan, "Some Could Suckle over Their Shoulder," 179.
6. Morgan, "Some Could Suckle over Their Shoulder," 176.
7. Welch. "An Ethical Analysis of Reproductive Justice," 83-94.
8. Welch. "An Ethical Analysis of Reproductive Justice," 103.
9. Welch. "An Ethical Analysis of Reproductive Justice," 104.

explain that abortion, safe childbirth, contraceptive access and care, and postpartum treatment have often been disproportionately available for African American women. Abortion and the birth control pill can be easily traced back to a history of eugenics and attempts to alter biological diversity in a society.[10] They argue that from hundreds of years of slavery—where Black women were held physically captive—to medical experiments without the use of anesthesia, African American women's reproductive rights have long been buried under discriminatory practices.[11] Moving into a modern societal sphere, it is also important to note that the connection between eugenics and abortion is far from erased and remains a relationship worthy of further study.[12]

The entrenched history of anti-Black racism and its impacts on reproductive freedom within North America is mirrored in many ways by difficulties faced by Indigenous americans. In the United States, Indigenous communities also face discrimination throughout the healthcare system, and in the reproductive realm prominently. Particularly, "environmental injustice leads to reproductive injustice" due to settler colonialism which physically changed the land Indigenous peoples inhabit.[13] With Indigenous groups removed from their lands and placed on reservations or other government-authorized lands, the negative health repercussions of such relocation are a direct result of settler colonial leadership. Researchers studied adult female members of Indigenous groups on the Gulf Coast of the US, discovering a notable reduction of freedom to bear and raise children in this area, which was impacted by their physical environment and health dangers; these included high numbers of untreated chronic diseases, significant

10. Keisha Goode and Barbara Katz Rothman, "African-American Midwifery, a History and a Lament," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 76, no. 1 (2017): 67.
11. Goode and Rothman, "African-American Midwifery," 65.
12. Melissa Murray, "Race-Ing 'Roe': Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the Battle for 'Roe V. Wade,'" *Harvard Law Review* 134, no. 6 (2021): 2036.
13. Jessica L. Liddell and Sarah G. Kington, "'Something Was Attacking Them and Their Reproductive Organs': Environmental Reproductive Justice in an Indigenous Tribe in the United States Gulf Coast," *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 18, no. 2 (2021): 1.

levels of pollutants and contaminants in their food and water supplies, and dangerous practices of landscape development. This exemplifies how forced relocation of some Indigenous groups directly impacted their reproductive abilities, as this community was found to have disproportionately high rates of chronic infertility. To adequately provide reproductive care, reproduction must first be possible which requires a healthy environment.[14] Indigenous sovereignty is inextricably tied with Indigenous reproductive rights as both of these issues have roots in settler colonialism.

The same issue of Indigenous reproductive rights is apparent in Canada as well. The Canadian healthcare system that arose out of colonial structures was not built to adequately serve a diverse populous. Indigenous communities in North America are faced with a plethora of social, economic, and environmental issues which the rest of the population does not have to contend with. They "face disproportionate health burdens and environmental health risks", the impacts of which "are issues of both environmental and reproductive justice".[15] The inclusion of the word "justice" shifts these modern works to a slightly different framework than those of the past.[16]

Recent scholarship goes beyond a level of observation and suggests a reframing of the issue, with hopes of provoking structural and social changes to improve the lives of women in social groups which have previously been mistreated.[17] Eaton and Stephens identify that "women's and girls' reproductive health is shaped by intersecting systemic oppressions" such as "racism, sexism, classism, [and] heterosexism" which "affect their ability to make meaningful

14. Liddell and Kington, "Something Was Attacking Them and Their Reproductive Organs," 3.
15. Elizabeth Hoover et al, "Indigenous Peoples of North America: Environmental Exposures and Reproductive Justice," *Environmental Health Perspectives* 120, no. 12 (2012): 1.
16. Ieman M. El-Mowafi et al, "The Politest Form of Racism: Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Paradigm in Canada," 3.
17. Asia A. Eaton and Dionne P. Stephens, "Reproductive Justice Special Issue Introduction 'Reproductive Justice: Moving the Margins to the Center in Social Issues Research,'" *Journal of Social Issues* 76, no. 2 (2020): 213.

choices about their reproductive lives".[18] Eaton and Stephens's study of intersectional systemic oppressions follow this contemporary movement into a justice-oriented lens of analysis, and advocates for an overhaul of structural changes. Utilizing their understanding that decisions about an individual's health are intrinsically tied to their interactions with others and are made within social systems that uphold structural sexism, racism, and other forms of discrimination, they suggest a new course of action. Firstly, their work highlights the fact that it is critical to understand reproductive healthcare, and the processes and outcomes within it, as "extensions of their interactions with others and with systems, rather than as individual phenomena".[19] This systemic approach that Eaton and Stephens take is centered on a focus on reproductive justice. The centering of justice as the focal point of their area of study is a distinctly contemporary feminist framework, shifting the narrative from one simply of exploration to one that demands change. Eaton and Stephens identify issues that are intrinsically connected to earlier studies of racism, and then move beyond this frame of observation, to one which demands demonstrable action to modify procedures – from the way reproductive rights are studied, to the systems which uphold oppressive acts. Secondly, the modern study of reproductive rights amplifies the voices of those who have previously been missing from the historical archive. For example, Welch's work specifically highlights the plight of marginalized women who have historically been left out of the reproductive rights movement such as incarcerated women.

Within the works analyzed in this paper, it is evident that current healthcare structures are built upon the foundations of past racial ideologies. Critical analysis of historical developments provides the knowledge base necessary for a deeper understanding of current barriers to equity in reproductive rights, and justice in the healthcare system. The modern narrative surrounding this issue takes a distinctly more intersectional approach than that from the past; authors from the

18. Eaton and Stephens, "Reproductive Justice Special Issue Introduction," 208.
19. Eaton and Stephens, "Reproductive Justice Special Issue Introduction," 209.

21st century identify the systemic problems which are apparent from settler colonialism, slavery, and systemic oppression, and suggest ways in which the resounding negative impacts of these practices can be mitigated. Each of these works is centered on an argument surrounding the development of racist practices because of societal beliefs about the superiority and inferiority of specific groups of people. Due to this thread which connects each paper referenced, the literature in review sits on a common platform, amplifying and building upon one another to curate a cohesive narrative surrounding the development of disproportionate reproductive rights.

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Women's Rights are Human Rights: An Exploration of the Actuality of the Feminist Hillary Doctrine in U.S. Foreign Policy 2009-2013

ANYA HALDEMANN

Source: Gage Skidmore
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaking with supporters at a campaign rally at the Intramural Fields at Arizona State University in Tempe, Arizona.

In 1995, the then-First Lady of the United States, Hillary Clinton, took the world stage at the United Nations 4th World Conference on Women Plenary Session in Beijing, firmly proclaiming the words that would become crucial to her legacy: "women's rights are human rights."[1] Since then, Clinton has held titles such as the United States Senator for New York, the Secretary of State, and the Democratic Presidential Nominee. Running through all these official titles are those that continue to permeate her legacy – champion of women's rights, and feminist.

In their book, *The Hillary Doctrine: Sex and American Foreign Policy,* scholar Valerie Hudson and journalist Patricia Leidl assess the strides made by Hillary Clinton in her time as First Lady, US Senator, and Secretary of State to make gender equality a cornerstone of America's international agenda. Specifically, Hudson and Leidl concretize the term 'the Hillary Doctrine,' stating, "This doctrine puts forward the revolutionary proposition that "the subjugation of women is a direct threat to the common security of the world and to the national security of the [United States].""[2]

In this essay, I will explore the validity of the Hillary Doctrine during Clinton's time in the War Room as the Secretary of State. Is it valid to call Hillary Clinton's era in the West Wing, feminist? By analyzing the foreign policies set forth by Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State under Barack Obama's primary Presidential Administration from 2009 to 2013, I will critically question whether those policies were *wholly* feminist or whether those policies pursued by Clinton failed to champion women in the name of national and global security.

To explore the legitimacy of the Hillary Doctrine during her

1. "Women's Rights are Human Rights," United Nations, accessed July 21, 2023, https://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/conf/gov/950905175653.txt.
2. Valerie M. Hudson and Patricia Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine: Sex & American Foreign Policy*, (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), *20*.

term as Secretary of State, this essay will look at the key policies that defined Clinton's four-year term. Notably, this analysis will include her ideology of "Smart Power" and her introduction to the first *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* of 2010.[3] Additionally, I will examine her foreign policy decisions around the surge of the US occupation of Afghanistan, the increase of arms sales to the Persian Gulf States, and the US intervention in Libya. Looking at these policies, I will further argue that despite the coining of the Hillary Doctrine, these specific policies followed by Clinton actively pursued the escalation of conflicts that disproportionally harmed women. Ultimately, these policies undermined the core principles of the Hillary Doctrine and contradicted Clinton's stated goal of lifting women from subjugation.

Framing Feminism

> *"Women are critical to solving virtually every challenge we face as individual nations, and as a community of nations…when women have equal rights, nations are more stable, peaceful, and secure."*[4]

Before delving into the analysis of prominent Clinton foreign policies, it is important to define the terms that would make a policy inherently feminist. Certainly, the Hillary doctrine highlights a key aspect of the feminist ideology, acknowledging that "the subjugation of women is a [..] threat," aligning with an understanding that feminism in its broadest strokes is an ideology that demands the social, political, and economic equality of the sexes.[5] In the realm of international relations, feminist theories distinguish themselves via their ethical commitments to inclusivity, self-reflexivity, and attentiveness to relational power.[6] Notably, much of feminist scholarship is acutely

3. U.S. Department of State, "Leading Through Civilian Power," *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf.
4. U.S. Department of State, "Leading Through Civilian Power."
5. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 20.
6. Jacqui True, Brooke A. Ackerly, and Maria Stern, *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 241-260.

perceptive of power politics in all contexts and attempts to understand the powerful, as well as their relation to the powerless.[7]

Under the umbrella of feminism, we find another theory that should frame our exploration of Clinton's term directing US foreign policy, that of feminist peace and conflict theory (FPCT). FPCT recognizes that patriarchic structures lead to violent conflicts and seeks to overcome this by increasing the visibility of women in peacebuilding efforts.[8] It theorizes that by increasing the visibility of women in peacebuilding, practices become more diverse and better equipped to ensure peace. In this way, FPCT seeks to remedy the mistakes of masculinist militarization, protectionism, and securitization.[9] Furthermore, FPCT pursues social justice, emphasizing structural and systemic justice.[10] Additionally, FPCT is anti-violent, understanding the interconnectivity of all forms of violence. It contends that eliminating violent conflict does not eliminate the violence of the patriarchy against women such as domestic abuse and sexual assault. Noting this, FPCT actively attempts to eliminate all forms of violence.[11] Importantly, FPCT is explicitly linked to the ethos of the Hillary Doctrine. Clinton herself repeatedly echoed the ethos of FPCT during her tenure.[12]

Smart Powered Feminism

Clinton's initial work as Secretary of State began with an endless list of phone calls to her many foreign counterparts. Clinton, speaking on her first days in office, noted that there seemed to be a great sigh of relief regarding the change in foreign policy approach

7. Jacqui True, "Feminism and Gender Studies in International Relations Theory," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2010, Oxford University Press, 1-22.
8. Iris Marion Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 29, no. 1 (2003): 1; Annette Weber, "Feminist Peace and Conflict Theory," in *The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace*, 2010, Oxford University Press, 1-17.
9. Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection," 1-25;
10. Nilay Saiya, Tasneem Zaihra, and Joshua Fidler, "Testing the Hillary Doctrine: Women's Rights and Anti-American Terrorism," *Political Research Quarterly* 70, no.2 (2017), 421-432.
11. Weber, "Feminist Peace and Conflict Theory," 2 .
12. Saiya, Zaihra, and Fidler. "Testing the Hillary Doctrine," 421-422.

with the election of Obama. She went on to state clearly that following the Bush administration's foreign policy, the US has "a lot of damage to repair".[13]

Clinton's means of fixing this damage was clear—her signature "smart power" approach to American global leadership in the 21st century. Clinton's "smart power" was a hard-line approach to militarism and securitization, coupled with a soft approach to cultural politics. This attitude aligns closely with Clinton's progressive "middle of the road" personal politics.[14] Dinesh Sharma notes that as a policy framing, "smart power" was a delineation from the "America First" and isolationist policies of those to the right of Clinton on the political spectrum, while also acting as a warning to those on the left that Americans must remain involved and intervene when required to protect their global interests.[15] Sharma goes further by stating unequivocally that the Hillary Doctrine is at the heart of her "smart power" approach—a policy slant with the potential to ensure great dividends in terms of humanitarian goals and national security intentions.[16] Smart power is a hawkish policy slant, and at the core of the Hillary Doctrine lies a clear feminist ideology. Indeed, under this framing, it is clear why Hudson and Leidl question whether Clinton's policies and goals can be understood as a "feminist-hawk" position.[17]

Initializing Inquiry: The Policy-Wonk Takes Office

Clinton's signature smart-power approach was keenly coupled with an undeniable critical eye for technicalities and detail, earning

13. Megan Carpentier, "Hump Day News Round-up: 'We Have a Lot of Damage to Repair,'" *Foreign Policy*, January 29, 2009, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/01/28/hump-day-news-round-up-we-have-a-lot-of-damage-to-repair/.
14. Hillary Rodham Clinton, *It Takes a Village: and Other Lessons Children Teach Us*, (New York. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 286.
15. Dinesh Sharma, "The Hillary Doctrine Is Smart Power," in *The Global Hillary: Women's Political Leadership in Cultural Contexts* (United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), *Prologue xiv.*
16. Sharma, "The Hillary Doctrine Is Smart Power," *Prologue xvii*.
17. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 49; Mark Landler, "How Hillary Clinton Became a Hawk," *The New York Times*, April 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/magazine/how-hillary-clinton-became-a-hawk.html.

her the title of a policy wonk.[18] Clinton's first major effort as Secretary of State was the initiation of the first-ever *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (QDDR), aimed at outlining and formalizing a four-year plan for the State Department and its new subsidiary, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).[19] Published in 2010, the QDDR would serve as a guiding document for Clinton's tenure as Secretary of State. It ensured that the future of American foreign policy would sustain six distinct areas for development: "sustainable economic growth, food security, global health, climate change, democracy and governance, and humanitarian assistance."[20] Of particular relevance, the QDDR unequivocally stated, "In each area, we will invest in women and girls at every turn, with [the] goal of empowering them."[21] Hudson and Leidl remark that this is a document deeply rooted in human rights discourse but also invokes the realist principles central to Clinton's "smart power" approach.[22] Further, the QDDR is a prime example of a foreign policy underpinned by feminist notions of peace and security building, highlighted by the report's systemic justice strategy. As Clinton entered this esteemed office, her goals during her term were entirely framed under a feminist ideology. Famously, in 2011, former State Department Director Theresa Loar somewhat jokingly stated that "[she] honestly thinks Hillary Clinton wakes up every day thinking about how to improve the lives of women and girls."[23]

Abetting the Afghanistan Surge

Clinton inherited a massive foreign policy crisis from her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice: the instability of Afghanistan. Upon taking office, Clinton faced a distinct diplomatic mission amidst rifts within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), civilian deaths

18. Tamara Keith, "Clinton Runs as Wonk in Chief, Trying to Win Hearts with Plans," *NPR*, January 30, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/01/30/464762073/clinton-runs-as-wonk-in-chief-trying-to-win-hearts-with-plans.
19. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 52.
20. U.S. Department of State, "Leading Through Civilian Power," x.
21. U.S. Department of State, "Leading Through Civilian Power," x.
22. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 145.
23. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 53.

from errant US fire, and resurgent terrorist forces. Journalists Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes contend that during Obama's first term, his administration's policy on Afghanistan was a clamorous source of contention.[24] Much of this contention erupted against Obama from an alliance between Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and other military leaders.[25] This alliance pushed Obama to double his initial commitment of 20,000 troops.[26] This demand was vexing for the Commander in Chief as Obama had initially hoped that the US would shrink its military footprint in the region. Clinton believed effectively ensuring that "Afghanistan did not once again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda or other transnational extremists" required a robust military presence.[27] It is here we see the hawk take flight; Clinton used her role as Secretary of State to increase and deepen the US's military presence and commitment in a region that was already fraught with humanitarian issues. Clinton justified the troop increase as part of a "comprehensive civil-military campaign" that would pressure the Taliban to enter diplomatic negotiations and end the war.[28] Pressure, however, could equally trigger an escalation by the Taliban. Further, increased militarisation contradicts much of the feminist scholarship on peacebuilding. Clinton's willingness to support the Afghanistan surge represents a contradiction to her own doctrine, as she seemed naive to the impact militarisation would have on the already marginalized Afghan women. This was not and cannot be understood as an act of fixing the damage made by the previous administration, as Clinton initially claimed.

Munitions as Merchandise

During her term, Clinton's drive for economic growth was propelled in large part by her proclivity for arms and weapons sales. In 2011, Hillary's State Department brokered unprecedented arms

24. Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes, *HRC: State Secrets and the Rebirth of Hillary Clinton*, 1st ed, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2014) 204-207.
25. Allen and Parnes, *HRC*, 204-207.
26. Allen and Parnes, *HRC*, 204-207.
27. Allen and Parnes, *HRC*, 205.
28. Allen and Parnes, *HRC*, 206.

trades with the Persian Gulf states ostensibly to establish a regional missile defense system to protect surrounding regions, oil refineries, pipelines, and military bases from the mounting tensions in Iran and deter nuclear escalations.[29] This extraordinary increase under Clinton totaled $66.3 billion; the cost equated to more than three-quarters of the 2011 global arms market which was valued at $85.3 billion.[30] The sales of American weapons were predominantly brokered with three states: Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Even though mounting tensions with Iran were the stated reason for these sales, it should be noted that these Gulf states did not share a border with Iran.[31] While their arms purchases did include complex missile defense systems, a large share of the sales focused on expensive war air vehicles, this latter portion of the sale is important to note as it highlights the sale of offensive arms, and not simply those that may be used defensively.[32] In Eliza Featherstone's book *False Choices: The Faux Feminism of Hillary Rodham Clinton,* Featherstone examines a WikiLeaks-released 2009 cable written by Clinton, where Clinton claims that Saudi Arabia was "the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide."[33] Moreover, Hudson and Leidl note that Saudi Arabia has actively sent anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles bought from the United States for the direct purpose of shifting the balance of Islamism to a Sunni hegemony.[34] Clinton knowingly sold arms to states that fund extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS.[35] Hudson and Leidl note that Saudi Arabia is perhaps Clinton's greatest hypocrisy, representing a distinct failure of The Hillary Doctrine; Clinton's active arms sales to Saudi Arabia deepened

29. Thom Shanker, "U.S. Arms Sales Make up Most of Global Market," *The New York Times*, August 26, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/world/middleeast/us-foreign-arms-sales-reach-66-3-billion-in-2011.html.
30. Shanker, "U.S. Arms Sales Make up Most of Global Market."
31. Shanker, "U.S. Arms Sales Make up Most of Global Market."
32. Shanker, "U.S. Arms Sales Make up Most of Global Market."
33. Liza Featherstone, *False Choices: the Faux Feminism of Hillary Rodham Clinton*, (London: Verso, 2016) *Prolgue i-xii*.
34. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 360
35. U.S. Secretary of State, "Terrorist Finance: Action Request For Senior Level Engagement on Terrorism Finance," Wikileaks Cable: 09STATE131801_a, dated December 30, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE131801_a.html; Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 153.

US relations with a state actively enabling the subjugation of women through support for extremist groups.

Lobbying for Libya

In response to the events of the Libyan Civil War, a coalition resembelling NATO intervened in Libya to achieve a ceasefire and end crimes against humanity.[36] It was not the intention of Obama, Vice President Biden, or Secretary of Defense Gates to intervene. In fact, all three of these men were cited as directly opposing it.[37] It took the combined lobbying efforts of Clinton, US ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, and Special Assistant to the President Samantha Power to convince the President to pursue a UN Security Council Resolution authorizing the international coalition of military intervention.[38] Bob Dreyfuss, in an article for *The Nation* puts it plainly: "All three are liberal interventionists, and all three seem to believe that when the United States exercises military force it has some profound, moral, life-saving character to it."[39] Miallika Dutt, the founder of human rights organization Breakthrough, states that Clinton can not be a savior of women under these conditions of US foreign policy, as they create circumstances for enormous amounts of violence against women.[40] Indeed, Dutt damningly critiques Clinton's humanitarian interventionism in the name of lifting women from subjugation, as it reiterates the imperialism of the Bush administration's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.[41] Clinton's push for intervention in Libya can be seen to undermine her doctrine and confirm her hawkish military interventionism.

36. Security Council resolution 1973, [On the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya] (2011).
37. Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, "Obama Takes Hard Line with Libya after Shift by Clinton," *The New York Times*, March 19, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/africa/19policy.html.
38. Bob Dreyfuss, "Obama's Women Advisers Pushed War against Libya," *The Nation*, June 29, 2015, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/obamas-women-advisers-pushed-war-against-libya/.
39. Bob Dreyfuss, "Obama's Women Advisers Pushed War against Libya," *The Nation*, June 29, 2015, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/obamas-women-advisers-pushed-war-against-libya/.
40. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 161.
41. Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 161.

A Denial of Doctrine

In many cases where Clinton had the personal opportunity to uplift women, she did so. She appointed numerous women to positions of power and increased funding for the Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues tenfold.[42] This office itself was founded in reaction to the QDDR and maintains a space in the State Department today. Clinton remains the most widely traveled Secretary of State in history, with 112 foreign visits.[43] During many of her visits, she would call on women's peacebuilding groups.[44] However, Clinton is not immune to failure or critique. Despite her push for the Hillary doctrine under the QDDR, Clinton's foreign policy on Afghanistan and Libya, as well as her unprecedented arms sales, culminated in haplessly unfeminist consequences. The Hillary Doctrine was not at the forefront of her decisions on these policies, and her hawkishness undermined her calls to lift women from subjugation. To put it simply, Clinton's legacy as Secretary of State may be called feminist only in its goals and not in its action.

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42. Karen Garner, *Gender and Foreign Policy in the Clinton Administration*, (Boulder: First Forum Press, 2013), 1-20; Hudson and Leidl, *The Hillary Doctrine*, 142.
43. Glenn Kessler, "Hillary Clinton's overseas diplomacy versus other secretaries of state," *The Washington Post, January 9, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/hillary-clintons-overseas-diplomacy-versus-other-secretaries-of-state/2013/01/08/742f46b2-59f3-11e2-9fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_blog.html*
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From Supermen to Stuntmen: Hegemonic Masculinity and Systems of Power in Post-Classical Hollywood

TOBIAS PHIPPS



Source: Columbia Records Group
Once Upon a Time in Hollywood soundtrack cover art.

The term 'post-classical Hollywood' is fundamentally problematic. How can such divergent films as Superman (1978) and *Once Upon a Time in Hollywood* (2019) (henceforth *Once*) fall into this one category? On the one hand, Richard Donner's *Superman* traces the hero's origins from Kryptionian refugee, through Kansan teenager, and finally to Superman (Christopher Reeve) in Metropolis. With a total international box office earning of over $300 million and being placed in Roger Ebert's 'Top 10 of 1978,'[1] the film was a "critical and commercial smash."[2] On the other hand, Quentin Tarantino's *Once*, a reimagining of the Manson Family's encounter with Sharon Tate, follows the quotidian lives of washed-up actor Rick Dalton (Leonardo DiCaprio) and his ever-present stuntman-cum-handyman Cliff Booth (Brad Pitt) as they struggle to remain relevant in 1969 Hollywood. Despite also making over $300 million,[3] it gained a mixed reception and failed to become a phenomenon like *Superman*, barely breaking even.[4] However, one can overcome the ambiguity of post-classical Hollywood to encompass such diverse texts by structuring the term into specific industrial epochs defined by production and ideological contexts. In doing so, *Superman* now falls under the sub-category of New Hollywood, whilst *Once* can be placed in Postmodern Hollywood. By using these more granular sub-categories, one is presented with explicit discourses by which filmic operations can be clearly articulated. In applying this discursive analysis, this essay shall reveal how both films, despite their differences, are exemplars of the Hollywood blockbuster, a form predicated upon the exploitation of masculinity, its systems of power,

1. "Superman (1978) - Financial Information," The Numbers, www.the-numbers.com/movie/Superman. ; Gregory Carter, "Roger Ebert on the Best of 1978," Screenwriter, August 29, 2011, www.irishtimes.com/blogs/screenwriter/2011/08/29/roger-ebert-on-the-best-of-1978.
2. Tim Schatz, "The New Hollywood," in *Film Theory Goes to the Movies*, ed. Jim Collins (Oxford: Routledge, 1993), 16.
3. Travis Bean, "Box Office: 'Once Upon A Time' Set To Become Second-Highest-Grossing Movie About Hollywood," *Forbes*, October 1, 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/travisbean/2019/10/01/box-office-once-upon-a-time-set-to-become-second-highest-grossing-movie-about-hollywood/?sh=d-51fa12e60e9.
4. Pamela McClintock, "Box Office: Why 'Once Upon a Time in Hollywood's' $40M Debut Doesn't Guarantee a Fairy Tale Ending," *The Hollywood Reporter*, July 19, 2019, www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/once-a-time-hollywood-debut-doesnt-guarantee-a-happy-ending-1227512.

expression, and identification. The notion of traditional masculinity, a term equally as amorphic as post-classical Hollywood, will be elucidated via R W Connell's (1995) landmark theory. The combination of epochal and masculine discourses will demonstrate how *Superman*, which appears liberal in challenging traditional masculinity, but actuality remains conservative, is inverse in its prescription to that of *Once*, which seems to reinforce traditional masculinity only to dismantle it.

In her seminal work *Masculinities*, Connell takes as her basis the "feminist principle" of patriarchy,[5] that a social relation of gender exists around the elevation of men over women.[6] In short, society exists as a hierarchy of power relations where gendered classes are more or less able to control or be controlled. To understand how traditional masculinity (patriarchy) has risen and persists, she seeks to understand what "being a man" means by first examining its historical definitions.[7] After rejecting positivist and essentialist views of gender,[8] she turns to semiotics to study how masculinity operates as socially symbolic behaviours not determined by biology. She overcomes the inherent limitation of semiotics (the tendency to reduce behaviour to an "absolute" binary masculinity and femininity)[9] by incorporating a "relational methodology" that reflects the subjective experiences of gender as they are performed.[10] As such, she moves from objective masculinity to subjective masculinities. This allows her to reconsider traditional patriarchal power as "hegemonic masculinity."[11] Within the broad spectrum of masculinities, certain traits emerge from the interaction of gender experiences that prove themselves to be most conducive to the reproduction of patriarchy.[12] Inversely, the

5. Demetrakis Demetriou, "Connell's Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: a Critique," *Theory and Society* 30, no. 2 (April 2011): 343.
6. Connell, *Masculinities*, 46.
7. Connell, *Masculinities*, 22.
8. Connell, *Masculinities*, 34; 97.
9. Connell, *Masculinities*, 51.
10. Connell, *Masculinities*, 248.
11.Connell, *Masculinities*, 76.
12.Connell, *Masculinities*, 76.

gender experiences that are deemed inefficient are subordinated and marginalised.[13] Hence, hegemonic masculinity is those traits that infer the power to govern "bodily experience, practices and culture,"[14] simultaneously oppressing women and non-hegemonic men, to maintain itself. Through this lens, the question of *Superman*'s representation of traditional masculinity becomes a question of how hegemonic masculinity reproduces itself through the medium of film.

To answer this, it is first necessary to consider how this reproduction is shaped by socio-industrial contexts. The most important of these for *Superman* in 1978 is "the Great Shift"[15] – the breakdown of Keynesian economics and the rise of neoliberalism. Since the Great Depression, leading economists like John Keynes regarded unregulated free markets as fatally flawed,[16] needing "the State" to correct unfettered greed.[17] This had significant implications beyond the economy, as the overarching American ideology became one of maximising individual gain in consideration with, and for the benefit of, all. However, the 1970s recession fuelled contrary economic thought, namely that the Keynesian model was flawed and that "individual choice [ought to] drive the economy."[18] Consequently, the ideology of neoliberalism constructed around the "cult" of the self-serving individual took hold.[19] In other words, power shifted from the state to the individual. These ideological changes directly affected the American film industry. In the collapse of the classical monopolies and the subsequent rise of independents, mass audiences were increasingly segmented by individual "lifestyle" choices.[20] To combat this, "New Hollywood" reinvigorated the "blockbuster."[21] Assembled from many

13.Connell, *Masculinities*, 78; 80.
14.Connell, *Masculinities*, 71.
15. Kathryn Jay, "Something Really Happened: Rethinking the Seventies," *Reviews in American History* 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 337.
16. David Kotz, "What is Neoliberalism?" in *The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism*, ed. David Kotz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 10.
17.Connell, *Masculinities*, 17.
18.Connell, *Masculinities*, 11.
19. Connell, *Masculinities*, 262.
20. Schatz, "The New Hollywood," 10.
21. Schatz, "The New Hollywood," 8; 32.

aesthetic and generic styles to appeal to an audience of mixed tastes, this type of film aimed to maximise profits through a promise of scale (production and narrative), front-loaded by a marketing and distribution blitz.[22] As such, both social and formal transformations impact the construction of hegemonic masculinity in what emerged as the New Hollywood blockbuster. Whilst both masculinities seek to reproduce patriarchal power, Keynesian masculinity presents itself as being in service for all, whereas neoliberal masculinity furthers the interest of the individual.[23] By 1978, in this time of social upheaval, the blockbuster aims to present both variants of the contested hegemonic masculinity in order to maximise commercial success.

Consequently, *Superman* is shaped by Keynesian/neoliberal conflict in its representation of hegemonic masculinity. Specifically, the characterisation of Lois Lane (Margot Kidder) and Clark-Kent-as-reporter reflects a wider destabilisation of gendered power conventions which hegemonic masculinity necessarily presents as "rigid."[24] During their first interaction in the Daily Planet offices, Lois is prominently "masculinised."[25] Lois' authority as she moves through the corporate environment – entering the editor's office without knocking and cutting him off mid-sentence – imbues her with a power that subverts the sanctity of the masculine public sphere.[26] This opposes the characterisation of Clark Kent. Whilst Lois has clearly gained mastery over the masculine space, Clark is "feminised" in his inability to open the chief's bottle of soda, constantly being ignored, and requesting a remittance to be sent to his mother.[27] Thus, the film presents an inversion of a traditional hegemonic masculine dominance. The fact that these traits can be inverted at all suggests that they are not inherently gendered; instead, behaviours stem from the personal

22. Schatz, "The New Hollywood," 19.
23. Kotz, "What is Neoliberalism?" 10.
24. Demetriou, "Connell's Hegemonic Masculinity," 353.
25. Stella Bruzzi, *Men's Cinema: Masculinity and Mise-en-Scene in Hollywood* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 13.
26. Bruzzi, *Men's Cinema*, 13.
27. Bruzzi, *Men's Cinema*, 9.

qualities of specific characters. The film thus illustrates how gender is secondary to the qualitative character of the (neoliberal) individual.

This destabilisation of hegemonic masculinity extends beyond characterisation to formal structures of spectatorial identification. In this early office scene, placing the masculinised Lois at the centre of the frame sets her up as the primary source of psychological identification, as Clark is marginalised to the periphery despite his stature. Furthermore, she directs the camera movement – a symbol of visual "omnipotence" that is usually reserved for masculine characters.[28] During the same sequence, Lois goes on to explicitly direct the spectator's gaze when looking at Clark, through her primacy in shot/reverse shot patterning. This allows her, and the audience, to reduce the feminised Clark to a spectacle of oddity, which she vocalises as "are there any more like you?" Thus, when the audience is made to identify with Lois as bearer of the gaze, not only is the hegemonic masculinity of the diegesis upset, but the audience's "internalise[d]" notion of gender is troubled.[29] This comes to a head during Lois' interview with Superman in which the systems of identification introduced in the office are intensified. Not only does Lois remain bearer of the gaze through the aforementioned editing patterns, but the viewer's consciousness and hers are united when we hear her internal monologue. In its effort to appeal to the widest audience, *Superman,* as a New Hollywood blockbuster, capitalises on emerging neoliberalism by privileging the individual with new powers over normative expectations (of gender and filmic structures). In doing so, it appears to be a progressive destabilisation of masculinity – invoking a cognitive dissonance between internalised traditional (Keynesian) notions of masculinity and the new (neoliberal) behaviours that characterise Clark and Lois.

However, this subversion of power relations doesn't hold up to scrutiny when examining further the issues of characterisation and

28. Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Screen* 16, no. 3 (October 1975): 12.
29. Connell, *Masculinities*, 165.

psychological identification. Specifically, Superman himself, as the protagonist, is at the centre of the film's reinforcement of traditional hegemony. Connell provides a template of interrelating elements of hegemonic masculinity including leadership, strength, and the capacity to "control" one's own violence.[30] All three traits are exemplified in the moment Superman apprehends the bank robbers who thought they had successfully fled by boat. His presence on the vessel, having tracked them out into the bay, presents Superman as an extension of the Metropolis police force. By literally going further than the police were able to he demonstrates initiative and leads by example of what American "justice" can do.[31] Moreover, the audience witnesses Superman's strength explicitly both when he is unaffected by the robber's attack and when he lifts the entire boat, delivering it to the police. This power is reinforced formally. The positioning of Superman in the centre of the frame, face obscured in shadow, forces the robbers and the spectator to focus entirely on his stature and costume. The "S chevron" draws the viewer's attention to Superman's broad chest and shoulders,[32] icons of the "working class" strength he was initially presented with in the 1930s.[33] Simultaneously, his externalised "Underwear of Power" presents a non-eroticised phallic symbol which ties his bodily strength to that of patriarchal hegemony.[34] Finally, his passivity, in spite of his phallic power, demonstrates restraint of his implied capacity for violence. Instead of attacking the perpetrators, he disarms them verbally with a pun. The fact that the sequence ends with Superman delivering the robbers to the police proves these hegemonic masculine characteristics to all be in the service of others and subjected to the state. Whilst Lois and Clark's characterisation earlier spoke to neoliberal challenges to masculine hegemony, they become insignificant in the shadow of the titular hero's allegiance to Keynesian

30. Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Screen* 16, no. 3: 187.
31. Michael Soares, "The Man of Tomorrow: Superman from American Exceptionalism to Globalisation," *The Journal of Popular Culture* 48, no. 4 (August 2015): 757.
32. Soares, "The Man of Tomorrow," 31.
33. Esther De Dauw, "White Superheroes and Masculinity," in *Hot Pants and Spandex Suits: Gender Representation in American Superhero Comic Books*, ed. Ester de Dauw (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2021), 31.
34. De Dauw, "White Superheroes and Masculinity," 36.

tradition.

Furthermore, the film proceeds to recuperate its previously subversive psychological systems of identification. Whereas the previous analysis of Lois during her interview-turned-flying sequence saw her in control of the gaze, appearing non-hegemonically assertive, her gaze is reduced to one of adoration in recognising the overwhelming masculine power of Superman. The stereotypical "association" of femininity "with weakness" means that the viewer's identification with Lois only serves to intensify the power of Superman.[35] This flying sequence can be juxtaposed with Superman's later solo flight to save the West Coast. Here Superman becomes the archetypical "active male" subject[36] – it is his gaze, as reaction shots whilst flying, that structures narrative action as he races to save civilians across the San Andreas Fault. Not only is the spectator fully positioned to grasp the extent of Superman's power in these heroic acts (having been made direct witness of it through previous identification with Lois), but in now identifying with Superman directly, the audience is imbued with this totalising masculinity. Moreover, the audience is primed to willingly accept this identification as the return to the traditional alleviates the distress of hitherto cognitive dissonance. Hence, it becomes clear that neoliberalism's upheaval of hegemonic gender roles is only used to increase the success by which Keynesian masculinity is reproduced into the viewer's psyche. This process, however, is not limited to the film's final moments.

Rather, the text secures hegemonic reproduction early in the narrative as the film replays the Oedipal complex with the emergence of Clark-Kent-as-Superman at the moment of Pa Kent's death. Freud saw the Oedipal complex as necessary psychic trauma marking the process in which authority is internalised as the superego, contributing to the production of the authentic self, the ego.[37] The narrative episode

35. Connell, *Masculinities*, 16.
36. Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure," 11.
37. Jean-Michel Quinodoz, *Sigmund Freud: An Introduction* (Oxford: Routledge, 2018), 65.

of Clark's childhood in Smallville is defined by conflict. Whilst Clark wants to reveal his powers to impress his peers, Pa Kent (Oedipal farther, as signified by his overtly paternal moniker) counsels him towards patience, believing that Clark was sent to Earth for a "greater purpose" than high school politics. As soon as Clark recognises this wisdom, Pa Kent is removed from the narrative as he succumbs to a heart attack. Having overcome their conflict, Clark identifies with Pa Kent (literalised through a lingered glace), introjecting the voice of authority such that his Oedipal father is no longer needed. Thus, Clark has become his authentic self – Superman. Connell suggests that the Oedipus complex is a key moment by which hegemonic masculinity sustains itself.[38] If the superego, as Freud states, is authority internalised,[39] and that authority is patriarchal, resolving the Oedipal complex instills the necessary structures for the individual to promulgate hegemonic masculinity. The funeral scene immediately after Oedipal resolution uses a mix of different scales (extreme longshots, extreme medium closeups, and midshots) condensed within a single pan, indicating Clark's/Superman's newfound patriarchal "mastery" as all aspects of the external world are now organised within his (cinematic) gaze.[40] Furthermore, the nature of the father and son's conflict (using masculine power for the self versus using masculine power for others) doubles this moment as the introjection of traditional Keynesian masculinity over neoliberal ideology.

Analysing the historical context of *Superman* reveals that the text's production is defined by tension between Keynesian and neoliberal masculinity, typical of the New Hollywood blockbuster at the time of The Great Shift. However, the film's formal construction demonstrates that simply defining *Superman* as passively reflecting social changes is only partially true. Whilst the film contains contradicting masculinities like those embodied by Lois Lane and Clark Kent, these are recuperated by larger structural systems as the film

38. Connell, *Masculinities*, 19.
39. Quinodoz, *Sigmund Freud*, 74.
40. Steve Neale, "Masculinity as Spectacle," *Screen* 24, no. 6 (November 1983): 5.

actively reinforces the audience's acceptance of traditional Keynesian hegemonic masculine power. This ultimate "slippage" into tradition is unsurprising when considering New Hollywood's largest audience segments:[41] the new "conservative" Generation X wanting to distance themselves from their "hippie parents,"[42] and older adults searching for nostalgic respite in a rapidly changing world. Superman, whose comic book origins in 1938 equates him entirely with the lifespan of Keynesian thought,[43] allows the film to placate social anxieties regarding the erosion of traditional power bases through the rise of neoliberalism by staging the conflict and championing Keynesian victory. This hegemonic propaganda begins in the pre-selling of the film as a technological (itself overtly masculine) event which promises the experience of the childlike innocence of a simpler time in which "you'll believe a *man* can fly." Having exposed how hegemonic masculinity reproduces itself in *Superman*, it is now possible to ask if these same mechanisms persist into contemporary Hollywood.

Yet, to answer this in the case in *Once*, one must again consider the context in which the film was produced. Although the theory of postmodernism was first seriously discussed in the 1960s,[44] it is not until much later that it gains a widespread foothold in popular culture. Postmodernism's suggestion of contemporary life as defined by "fragmentation,"[45] scepticism, recycled aesthetics,[46] and the lack of objective (Enlightenment) truth had,[47] by *Once*'s release in 2019, become a normalised mode of social thought. Thus, *Once* can be considered a postmodern blockbuster: whilst retaining its commercial intent, it institutionalises fragmentation as both an aesthetic concern

41. Andrew Schopp, "'Getting' Dirty': Tarantino's Vengeful Justice, the Marked Viewer and Post-9/11 Cinema," in *American Cinema in the Shadow of 9/11*, ed. Terence McSweeney (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 179.
42. Schopp, "'Getting' Dirty'," 21; 19.
43. De Dauw, "White Superheroes and Masculinity," 31.
44. Richard Appignanesi and Chris Garratt, *Introducing Postmodernism* (London: Penguin, 1995), 3.
45. Catherine Constable, *Postmodernism and Film: Rethinking Hollywood's Aesthetics* (New York: Wallflower Press, 2015), 85.
46. Constable, *Postmodernism and Film*, 76.
47. Constable, *Postmodernism and Film*, 81.

and a social fact. This embrace of fragmentation gives rise to the "double-protagonist" film as an industrial practice.[48] Here, two male stars of equal status compete for and complete a single protagonist role.[49] Commercially, two stars increases the marketing pull,[50] whilst also reflecting the postmodern condition of unified psyche being fragmented, literally projected across two characters.[51] Through a psychoanalytical lens, David Greven, in his analysis of this new form of film, sees the conflict arising between the double protagonists as analogous to the myth of Narcissus and Echo.[52] Whereas the goal of the masculine psyche is to exert power to be both complete and in control (narcissistic), the 'healthy' Oedipal trajectory is achieved through echoistic mechanisms.[53] In taking the father as the supposed ideal role model, the masculine subject shapes his values and behaviours as a response to his perceived idol.[54] Consequently, a tension emerges between the narcissistic desire for unity and the echoistic need to embody the ideal. In light of this, it becomes clear that *Once*, as a postmodern blockbuster, reproduces hegemonic masculinity in the power based conflict between its double protagonists: Rick Dalton and Cliff Booth.

Cliff's embodiment of Narcissus is established in the opening as, whilst he and Rick leave their meeting with Rick's agent Marvin Schwarz, Cliff overtakes Rick and gains control of the camera's movement. This dominance over the formal structure again emerges as he repairs Rick's antenna. As he does this, he holsters his oil like a Western gunslinger before taking off his shirt. The framing of this moment is important. His narcissistic omnipotence is confirmed as his bare torso dominates the frame, giving him bodily precedence over the Hollywood vista behind. This construction, however, raises the risk of

48. David Greven, "Contemporary Hollywood Masculinity and the Double-Protagonist Film," *Cinema Journal* 48, no. 3 (June 2009): 22.
49. Greven, "Contemporary Hollywood Masculinity," 22.
50. Greven, "Contemporary Hollywood Masculinity," 25.
51. Greven, "Contemporary Hollywood Masculinity," 24.
52. Greven, "Contemporary Hollywood Masculinity," 30.
53. Greven, "Contemporary Hollywood Masculinity," 27.
54. Connell, *Masculinities*, 20.

his objectification which would attack his narcissistic agency (in being reduced to a mere sex symbol). Yet, Tarantino's intercutting of this moment with shots of Sharon Tate (Margot Robbie) selecting outfits to wear to the Playboy Mansion displaces any potential eroticism onto the female object of "heterosexual" desire.[55] This allows Cliff's narcissistic presence to remain secure. Furthermore, this characterisation is equated with other, more overt, hegemonic masculine traits. For instance, after overtaking Rick outside the restaurant, Cliff goes on to admonish him for crying "in front of the Mexicans," thereby aligning his narcissistic power with conservative bigotry and masculine "emotional reticence."[56] Additionally, this narcissistic masculinity is proven hegemonic in its capacity for violence. Although masculine hegemony typically favours restraint, as noted with Superman's encounter with the fleeing robbers, it makes exceptions for the enforcement of patriarchal supremacy over opposing classes. Cliff's fighting "prowess" is allowed to be explicitly enacted, including against Bruce Lee and, later, the Manson Family, precisely because it infused with misogynistic overtones (rendered in multiple insinuations that Cliff murdered his wife).

This hegemonic narcissistic masculinity stands in juxtaposition to Rick's Echo. The opening of the film constructs Rick 'echoistically' by introducing him to the audience four times: firstly, as Rick-Dalton-as-Jake-Cahill in the TV Western "Bounty Law"; secondly as the inauthentic Rick Dalton in the publicity interview for "Bounty Law" with Alan Kinkade; thirdly as larger than life Rick-Dalton-as-poster-image; finally, the audience is introduced to theauthentic Rick Dalton at his meeting with Schwarz. By constructing the opening in this way, Tarantino tracks the progression of Rick's fading star image, with each iteration playing on the last, and with each reflection providing a diminishing return. Whilst the seemingly powerful Rick-Dalton-as-Jake-Cahill was in control (winning gunfights and speaking for Cliff in the interview), he is finally reduced to Echo, barely able to

55. Greven, "The Double Protagonist Film," 23.
56. Neale, "Masculinity as Spectacle," 7.

stutter a response to Schwarz's questions. As a result, Tarantino presents a masculinity in crisis – one 'feminised' by the passivity of echoistic positioning. However, the film complicates this conclusion in its denouement. Cliff and Rick's defeat of the Manson Family allows the splintered psyche of the double protagonist to be resolved in unity. Cliff's narcissistic power, displayed in full force as he brutally dispatches the intruders with a cool detachment, is superimposed onto Rick who finally projects his masculinity by discharging his military flamethrower from the hip to torch the female cultist in his swimming pool. Thus, hegemonic masculinity as an overarching (narcissistic) structure has been re-established as Rick has overcome his echoistic decline. But, more than that, Rick's newfound power allows him to ascend beyond his initial TV fame to Hollywood stardom as he enters Sharon Tate's house through gates made heavenly with their pearl-like lights. The film not only seems to overcome the fragmentation of postmodern masculinity (a threat to hegemonic masculinity's dominance over society and culture) but actively valorises such patriarchal masculine traits through deification. Yet, as both the film's title and "historical revisionism" implies,[57] this narrative progression of echoistic redemption in service of hegemonic masculinity may only be a fairy-tale.

Throughout, *Once* consciously and continuously questions the assumed ontological truth of the filmic image. This is exemplified by Rick's performance as the antagonist of the TV pilot "Lancer." Usually, the extradiegetic narratives in the film are distinguished visually, whether through the use of black and white colour grading, a change in aspect ratio, or directly viewing the image on a television set. Yet, in Rick's first "Lancer" scene in the saloon, Tarantino discards the visual demarcation of extradiegetic narratives, choosing to maintain the text's overarching aesthetics, like widescreen and its warm colour palate. However, the sequence remains separate from the central diegesis

57. Schopp, "'Gettin' Dirty,'" 176.

through both Rick forgetting his lines (destroying "realism")[58] and the audience being primed to view this sequence as fiction (as the previous shot was that of Sharon Tate in the cinema). Importantly, this is not the case in the second "Lancer" sequence in which the boundaries of extra/diegesis are blurred. Walking through the Western dressed lot smoking a cigarette, Rick is clearly out of character, but the accompanying non-diegetic Western score suggests that he is already inhabiting the world of "Lancer." Furthermore, Rick merges with his antagonist persona when improvising dialogue. His use of Hispanic slurs reflects his authentic bigotry, as proven in his stereotyped Mexican performance earlier in the film when practicing his lines. In this blurring, the spectator must actively work to parse authentic and created image, at which point 'authenticity' is reduced to absurdity as they become conscious of the entirely constructed nature of the filmic text itself. It is significant that the "Lancer" sequences encompass a moment of Rick's masculine redemption. He is able to overcome the emasculation of forgetting his lines and his emotional outburst in his trailer as his performance and "improv" carries him to "the best acting" his director and co-star "have ever seen." By couching Rick's masculine redemption within postmodern reflexivity, Tarantino questions the assumed truth of a naturalised hegemonic masculinity. Just as the constructedness of film is made explicit, so too are the myths, like echoistic redemption, that underpin masculine hegemony. Yet, at this stage, *Once* goes no further than a probing questioning.

It is through a reconsideration of the final sequence that this questioning becomes an assertion. Rick escapes his echoistic characterisation through a complete identification with Narcissus/Cliff to become violently masculine. By using the flamethrower, Rick visually returns to his previous role as star of "The 14 Fists of McCluskey." As a result, his final attack does not align him with Cliff, but with a previously performed (and overdetermined) image of masculinity – therefore consigning him as an echo of the past. With

58. Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure," 13.

Rick remaining echoistic, one would expect the film to conclude with his reunion with Cliff-as-narcissus. This is not the case. Tarantino reverses the Ovidian tradition (seeing Echo as only being able to sustain herself in relation to others)[59] as Cliff is removed from the scene and the narrative in an ambulance, leaving only Rick. Instead of unifying the postmodern fractured masculinity, Tarantino extrapolates fragmentation to "the extreme" by separating Echo and Narcissus.[60] This means that it is not Rick's hegemonic masculine power that is deified, it is its echo, the image of hegemonic masculinity that reaches ascension. A key part of hegemonic masculinity's ability to propagate is its concrete appearance.[61] Tarantino, however, shows it to be unattached, severed from any original referent. As a result, hegemonic masculinity becomes a Baudrillardian simulacrum, an echo without origin, thereby exposing patriarchy's ethereality and challenging its legitimacy.[62] The true reason Tate invites Rick to her house is to hear his story of the night's events, meaning that the patriarchy produced is only "hyper-reality"[63] – a story from a story with no discernible or legitimate origin. *Once*'s engagement with hegemonic masculinity is inverse to *Superman*'s. Whilst *Superman* appears to present a neoliberal challenge to hegemonic masculinity on to actually reinforce traditional patriarchy, *Once* employs a "complicitous critique" of hegemonic masculinity.[64] *Once* suggests that if hegemonic masculinity can exist as a fiction without legitimacy in reality, all gender experiences are necessarily legitimate in that none have claim to hierarchy.

This essay started from a place of difference (periodisation denoting specific socio-economic and industrial contexts) to unpack and understand how systems of power operate in films across post-classical Hollywood. Whilst this has ultimately revealed similarities, that both *Superman* and *Once* position themselves in relation to

59. Greven, "The Double Protagonist Film," 30.
60. Schopp, "'Gettin' Dirty,'" 22.
61. Demetriou, "Connell's Hegemonic Masculinity," 355.
62. Appignanesi and Garratt, *Introducing Postmodernism*, 54.
63. Appignanesi and Garratt, *Introducing Postmodernism*, 55.
64. Constable, *Postmodernism and Film*, 75.

hegemonic masculinity (either for or against), this approach runs the risk of eliding a more crucial commonality – that both films are blockbusters. In the fifty years since its first use, the term 'blockbuster' has historically been employed as a neutral description of a specific configuration of industrial and aesthetic practices such as front-loading and extensive marketing. Yet, this seemingly innocuous label belies an exploitative ideological core. Hegemonic masculinity is in fact a constituent part of the blockbuster form; all blockbusters take this set of power relations as their organising principle. As such, it is better to understand the blockbuster as the most widespread and profitable example of exploitation cinema. Commonly defined as a mode of film production that profits from the overt spectacularisation of a social issue for commercial gain, examples of exploitation cinema include sexploitation,[65] blaxpolitation and, mixploitation.[66] With the exploited element typically being a taboo, critical discourse has largely studied exploitation films in relation to subordinated identities. Yet, in the blockbuster, it is masculinity that becomes the exploited element. Importantly, the blockbuster's aim to capture the widest possible audience for commercial gain is symbiotic with the aim of hegemonic masculinity to reproduce itself across the widest possible audience for ideological gain.[67] It is possible then to view the blockbuster as 'mascploitation' – films which predefine masculinity, its related power systems, and how the audience should experience them, only then to deliver (exploit) that image of masculinity.

In conclusion, despite their temporal and industrial differences, both *Superman* and *Once* demonstrate that masculinity remains a systemic factor of post-classical Hollywood. Whilst the two films discuss what it means to be masculine through their respective

65. Alica Kozma, "Stephani Rothman and Vampiric Film Histories," in *Women Make Horror, ed. Alison Peirse* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2020), 25; Constable, *Postmodernism and Film*, 31.
66. Gregory Carter, "From Blaxploitation to Mixploitation: Male Leads and Changing Mixed Race Identities," in *Mixed Race Hollywood*, ed. Mary Beltrán and Camilla Fojas (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 203.
67. Schatz, "The New Hollywood," 19.

paradigms as New Hollywood and Postmodern blockbusters, they diverge significantly in the stances they take towards it. Both acknowledge the subjective experience of gender and masculinity, presenting multiple types of masculine power, including Keynesian, neoliberal, narcissistic, and echoistic. Additionally, both champion specific forms of masculinity – elevating it to the status of cultural and social ideal, becoming Connell's hegemonic masculinity. However, whilst *Superman* does this earnestly to reassure an anxious conservative audience, *Once* stages this process as to thoroughly destroy it. Yet, the very fact that patriarchal power structures needed to be exposed by films like *Once* indicates hegemonic prevalence and thus the necessity to continue to study and deconstruct the hitherto overlooked mascploitation blockbuster.

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Source: Andrew Cooper, Sony Pictures Entertainment
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

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