THE SHIFTING CENTRE OF GLOBAL GRAVITY
Britain, Canada and the North Pacific

Kim Richard Nossal
2012 Canada-U.K. Colloquium Rapporteur’s Report
The Shifting Centre of Global Gravity: Britain, Canada and the North Pacific

Rapporteur’s Report

Kim Richard Nossal

Canada-UK Colloquium, 14–16 November 2012
Vancouver, British Columbia

School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University
British Committee, Canada-UK Colloquia
The Canada-UK Colloquia

The Canada-UK Colloquia are annual events that aim to promote the advantages of a close and dynamic relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom through the advancement of education in a wider context. These conferences bring together British and Canadian parliamentarians, public officials, academics, business people, journalists and broadcasters, other private sector representatives, graduate students, and others. The organizers focus on issues of immediate relevance and concern to both countries with the aim of exchanging experience and enhancing policy outcomes. One of the main endeavours of the Colloquia is to address these issues through engaging British and Canadian experts in the exchange of knowledge, experience and ideas and the dissemination of their conclusions in a published report. Previous reports can be found at www.canada-uk.net.

The first colloquium was held at Cumberland Lodge in Windsor Great Park in 1971 to examine the bilateral relationship. A British steering committee, later to become the Canada-UK Colloquia, was launched in 1986. The School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University assumed responsibility for the Canadian side in 1996, succeeding the Institute for Research on Public Policy.

The Colloquia are supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Canada and by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom, as well as by private sector sponsors. They are organized by the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University, on the Canadian side, and by the Canada-UK Colloquia Committee of the British side, from which an executive board, the Council of Management, is elected annually.
About the Author

Kim Richard Nossal is a professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University. Educated in Melbourne, Beijing, Toronto, and Hong Kong, he received his B.A., (1972), M.A. (1974), and Ph.D. (1977) in Political Economy from the University of Toronto. In 1976, he joined the Department of Political Science at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, serving as chair of the department from 1992 to 1996.

In 2001, he was appointed head of the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s, a position he held until 2009. From 2008 to 2013, he was the Sir Edward Peacock Professor of International Relations. From 2011 until 2013 he served as the director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy in the School of Policy Studies; in 2013 he was appointed as the Director of the School.

Nossal has served as editor of International Journal, the quarterly journal of the Canadian International Council, Canada’s institute of international affairs, and sits on the editorial boards of several journals. He has served as president of both the Australian and New Zealand Studies Association of North America (1999–2001) and the Canadian Political Science Association (2005–2006).

He has authored or edited a number of books, including The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (1985, 1989, 1997); Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (with Andrew F. Cooper and Richard A. Higgott, 1993); Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy (1994); Diplomatic Departures: The Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy (ed. with Nelson Michaud, 2001); Politique
# Table of Contents

Preface ix

The Shifting Centre of Global Gravity: Britain, Canada and the North Pacific  
*Kim Richard Nossal* 1

**APPENDIX**

Program 26

List of Participants 29
This Rapporteur’s Report summarizes the discussions at the Canada-
United Kingdom Colloquium on “The Shifting Centre of Global
Gravity: Britain, Canada and the North Pacific,” held in Vancouver,
Canada’s Pacific Gateway, in November 2012.

The pre-colloquium briefing sessions for the UK team were espe-
cially valuable this year, providing a comprehensive perspective on
British Columbia’s Pacific vocation. We were privileged to hear about
the Pacific gateway from Mary Polak, the BC Minister of Transport,
Tony Gugliotta of the Vancouver Airport Authority, Larry Blain of
Partnerships BC, and Michael Henderson of Transport Canada. Can-
dis Callison, of the University of British Columbia, provided a First
Nations perspective, and Erin Williams of the Asia-Pacific Founda-
tion briefed us on Canadian public opinion on Asia. Joseph Caron, a
former senior diplomat, provided an orientation to the key themes in
Canadian foreign policy. The day concluded with a thought-provoking
challenge to the Colloquium from Gordon Campbell, the premier of
British Columbia from 2001 to 2011, and now Canada’s High Com-
missioner in London.

The colloquium is only possible because of the assistance of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada and the UK Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office. The ambitious program for this year’s event also
depended on support from TD Bank Financial Group, Simon Fraser
University, the Port of Vancouver Authority, Hitachi Europe, HSBC,
and the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation. We are deeply apprecia-
tive of their help: we would not have been in Vancouver without them.

The remarkable success of this year’s Colloquium is due to a small group of people. The special advisers to the Colloquium, Kim Richard Nossal in Canada, and David Cope, Klaus Dodds and Nicolas Maclean in the UK, assembled an exceptional group of presenters and participants. We are also very appreciative of the counsel provided by Anthony Cary as Honorary President of the UK committee and Mel Cappe as chair of the Canadian advisory body. We should like to express our special gratitude to Tony Penikett and to Simon Fraser University. Tony’s help was invaluable in organizing a complex event thousands of kilometers away from Kingston; SFU’s consistent support for the Colloquium was likewise crucial and much appreciated. We were again the beneficiary of the exceptional logistical support of Chris Cornish of the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s, assisted by Maureen Bartram of the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s, and Eva Lewis at Simon Fraser University. The UK team was, as always, ably coordinated by George Edmonds-Brown.

We would like to express our admiration and thanks to the author of this report, Kim Richard Nossal, for marshalling the complex and wide-ranging issues that were discussed, and for reporting them in such an erudite and readable report. His task was made easier by the thoughtful presentations made by our speakers at the Colloquium, to whom we are enormously grateful for stimulating such interesting debates among a distinguished group of participants. It is also a pleasure to record our appreciation to Don Campbell who brought his long expertise on these issues to his incisive chairing of the proceedings.

At the end of this report you will find a set of recommendations and suggestions encapsulating the conclusions that emerged from the Colloquium. We hope that these thoughts will be useful to policy-makers in both countries.

Robert Wolfe    Philip J Peacock
School of Policy Studies    Chairman
Queen’s University    British Committee
This is Robert Wolfe’s last Colloquium as organizer for the Canadian side. All those involved in the Canada-UK Colloquia over the years, from both the Canadian and British sides, extend their sincere and effusive thanks to Bob for his dedication to the Colloquia, and the enormous contribution he made to its success.
The Shifting Centre of Global Gravity: Britain, Canada and the North Pacific

Kim Richard Nossal

INTRODUCTION

If the centre of gravity in global politics during the twentieth century was the North Atlantic, is the centre of gravity in the twenty-first century shifting to the Asia-Pacific? This region is home to almost half of the world’s population and the world’s most powerful economies and in the coming decades, the interactions of the major states that ring the North Pacific—the United States, the Russian Federation, Japan, and the People’s Republic of China—will be the drivers of global politics. The political, economic, and cultural interactions among the large powers themselves, and between the major states and the smaller countries of the Asia-Pacific, no longer have only regional significance: they will affect politics at a global level.

Such a shift in the centre of gravity towards the Asia-Pacific region poses a number of major challenges for the patterns and processes of global governance in the twenty-first century. The marked economic growth of the region that began in the last years of the Cold War and so dramatically accelerated since then has been one driver of the change in the centre of gravity, accelerated by the slowdown in economic growth in the Atlantic area. Another driver has been the emergence of China as a major player in all dimensions of global politics—economic, diplomatic, military, cultural and environmental. Chinese
policy decisions will have a major impact on the emerging patterns of global governance, but Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Russia are also major players in these domains.

The role of the United States will also be crucial to the evolution of the shift to the North Pacific as the focus of global politics. This region has a growing strategic as well as trading significance, and how the administration in Washington responds to the challenges and opportunities will have a marked impact on the shape of global politics and the global political economy in the next decade. Certainly the administration of Barack Obama has committed the United States to a “rebalancing.” As the US Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, put it in October 2011:

At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over—and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power.1

This tectonic shift promises to produce major impacts for countries like Britain and Canada, which have deep interests in both the Atlantic and the Pacific areas, and equally deep interests in the evolving shape of global governance in such crucial areas as trade, investment, resources, the environment, and security of different kinds. In addition, the evolving shape of the security environment in the North Pacific will be of signal importance. As formal alliance partners of the United States, each with its own “special relationship” with Washington, the British and Canadian governments have a deep

interest in how the security relationships in the North Pacific will affect other global issues and the governance of those issues.

But if Britain and Canada will inevitably be affected by this shift to the Asia-Pacific, what role can these two countries play in the years ahead? In the words of one Colloquium participant, are these two countries destined to be little more than “anxious observers,” or can the governments in London and Ottawa play a more active role in an evolving global order that will be centred more and more on the Asia-Pacific? As Gordon Campbell, Canada’s high commissioner to the UK, and a former premier of British Columbia, put it in his challenge to the Colloquium, the new shape of the global order will surely have profound implications for both Britain and Canada.

To explore these implications was the central purpose of the 2012 Colloquium. It sought to do so by looking at the broader issue in five distinct dimensions: security; economic trade and investment; global governance; energy, resources and the environment; and culture. What follows is not a verbatim account of the discussion of these separate dimensions, but an attempt to capture the broad flow of what were lively discussions at the Colloquium.

THE SECURITY CHALLENGES

Because the security situation in the Asia-Pacific has such a critical impact on other aspects of the regional political economy, the Colloquium began with a consideration of the security challenges that accompany the growing importance of the North Pacific. The Colloquium’s discussions were framed by two presentations that examined the security environment.

Brian L. Job, professor of international relations at the University of British Columbia, outlined the key drivers of the evolving security relationships in the North Pacific. First, the continuing rapid economic growth in the Asia-Pacific, contrasting with the continuing impact of the 2008 global financial crisis in the United States and the West more generally, had an impact on the security relationship. Particularly in China, the economic disparities that were becoming more and more pronounced put a particular premium on domestic priorities, but in
such a way that domestic politics were increasingly driving foreign policy. Second, the evolving nature of China as a power with increasing global reach promised to have an impact on security. The fact that there were 35,000 Chinese in Libya at the time of the 2011 civil war was one small indicator of the nexus of that global reach and broader security considerations. Third, the broader security environment was very much affected by the relationship between the United States and China, a relationship affected by the paradox that while there remains considerable “strategic distrust” between China and the US, the two states are locked together in mutual dependence.

There are at present several important potential crisis points in this evolving environment, and all of them are not only long-standing, but are unlikely to be resolved quickly. There are two long-standing issues of national unification, both dating back to the immediate post-1945 period. The Korean peninsula continues to pose a major threat to regional security because the new regime of Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang shows no signs of giving up its efforts to use nuclear weapons as a tool of regional diplomacy. And North Korea’s traditional supporter, the People’s Republic of China, continues to define its national interests in terms of a divided peninsula. By contrast, the political divisions across the Taiwan straits have been mitigated to a marked degree by the continuing growth of the importance of cross-strait economic and interpersonal ties. Trade between the PRC and Taiwan has increased massively: between 2001 and 2011, trade grew from $31.5 billion to $120.8 billion, a 284 per cent increase. Likewise, the human dimension of cross-strait relations is no less important: the million visitors a day help provide a modifying impact on “sisterly relations” across the straits and a dissipation of the deep tensions of an earlier era.

The same cannot be said of the friction between the Northeast Asian states on the issue of a series of confrontations over disputed islands, often framed and driven by domestic politics. In the case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the manoeuvring of the governments in Beijing and Tokyo would lead The Economist to wonder aloud in September 2012 whether it was possible that China and Japan could really go to war over these islands. While these disputes have not escalated, there continue to be pointed references to the
disputed islands in the Asia-Pacific as a “tinderbox,” with the often explicit fear that without careful political management, the disputants could lose control of the process.

One of the reasons why these conflicts are seen as so challenging for the future of regional security is that relations among the countries in the region remain in flux. Some in the United States point to the persistent increases in Chinese defence spending as a primary cause for concern. Whichever set of numbers one uses—whether the “high side” numbers preferred by the United States Department of Defense, the much more modest “low side” numbers put out by China itself, or those in the middle used by researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—the trajectory of defence spending by China can readily be made to appear sharply upward. And the efforts of the People’s Liberation Army to acquire new and modern military capabilities and weapons systems arouse comparable fears: when the PLA Navy commissioned China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in September 2012, for example, it was widely characterized in the US media as posing a threat to American naval supremacy in the Pacific. A range of other Chinese military programs—the pursuit of anti-ship weapons capability, the development of missile defence systems and long-range strike aircraft, efforts to militarize outer space—arouses comparable concerns.

Alternative narratives are of course possible. For example, as a percentage of GDP, China’s defence spending over the decade after 2001 is essentially flat, the huge increase in actual expenditures the result of the massive increase in Chinese wealth over this period. Likewise, one can readily point out that defence spending by the United States far surpasses the combined military spending of all other states in the Asia-Pacific. And the Liaoning, first laid down as part of the Soviet naval fleet nearly three decades ago, is hardly a match for the eleven carrier strike groups that the United States is able to deploy.

But such alternative narratives tend to be dismissed, and do little to allay the strategic distrust that exists between China and the United States. And part of that strategic distrust comes from an increasing recognition that as China becomes a more global power, it is developing
the same kind of concern for maritime security that has long been a mark of American policy. China increasingly depends on maritime and overland transit routes for the imports, particularly national resources, vital for its industrial production. Hence China’s growing interest in marking out maritime security issues, particularly in the South China Sea. But China’s maritime concerns are increasingly global in scope: it is not by coincidence that we have seen the emergence of China’s conception of itself as a “near-Arctic” state, seeking permanent observer status on the Arctic Council, and increasing its Arctic activities with its polar icebreaker, the Xuelong.

The challenges posed by these factors are made more problematic by the nature of the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike the security architecture in the Atlantic area, which was relatively simple in design, dominated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific is complex, multifaceted, and multidimensional. But the overlapping and complex systems of regional security arrangements make the mitigation of conflict considerably more difficult. In particular, it becomes more difficult to rein in political manoeuvres undertaken primarily for domestic political advantage.

In his presentation, Glenn Hook, director of the Graduate School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, elaborated on one key element of the broader security challenges in the contemporary Asia-Pacific. Interweaving the legacies of Japanese imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century and American occupation of Japan and subsequent alliance with that country in the second half of the century, Professor Hook argued that the transition in global order from the Atlantic to the Pacific has been deeply affected by these historical trends.

First, American strategy has moved along with the shift in the centre of gravity. The “pivot to Asia” first bruited by US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in October 2011 was embraced by President Barack Obama as the “rebalancing” of the United States away from the decade-long focus on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the “pivot” has brought in its wake an unintended consequence: an impact on the
alliance system that for more than sixty-five years was the underpinning of the postwar regional order in the Asia-Pacific. With shifts in American strategy came a major concern for all American allies in the region: what impact would a “rebalancing”—particularly the downsizing of the US armed forces and the withdrawal of some military capabilities from Japan and Korea—have on the alliance relationship?

We have to see the Chinese-Japanese relationship as evolving in the context of these twin legacies. The emerging dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands reflects a certain fragility in the alliance relationship between Japan and the United States, since the islands were subjected to American “administrative control” after the Second World War, and the issue of sovereignty is not clearly laid out.

While pragmatism and an eye to economic interests tended to subordinate quarrels over ownership in the past—captured well by the expression “hot economies, cool politics”—what we have seen in the recent past is the emergence of “cool economics.” This has taken the form of dampening trade and investment between the two countries, and, most dramatically, the outbreak in September 2012 of widespread riots against Japanese firms operating in China that led to significant declines in Japanese automobile production in China.

In short, one of the consequences of the “pivot” is the greater exposure of the legacies of history in the Asia-Pacific, and the unwillingness and inability of both the Chinese and Japanese to confront their relationship within a historical perspective. Critically, there are no effective institutional mechanisms for the two countries to discuss, or resolve, the impacts of these legacies.

Much of the discussion that followed fixed on the clear challenges posed by what appears to be a re-emerging conflict between China and Japan in which disputed islands are used as symbols for a much deeper set of differences that have their roots in unresolved issues that are left over from history. A number of participants with deep experience in Asia-Pacific affairs openly worried that what we were seeing in this dispute was the lowest ebb in relations

“Be it thy course to busy giddy minds/With foreign quarrels”
for decades. Others were concerned that, in each country, there were domestic factors propelling the dispute. One participant reminded the Colloquium that the strategy of diverting domestic discontent by focusing on external concerns was hardly new: Shakespeare had Henry IV advise his son “to busy giddy minds/With foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out,/May waste the memory of the former days” (Second Part of King Henry IV, IV.v.213-215). But there was also a recognition that appeals to nationalist, or ultranationalist, sentiment could have the effect of entrenching conflictual positions, making it more difficult to manage what in essence has been constructed as a zero-sum dispute.

Reflecting on the full range of security challenges surveyed in this session—the strategic mistrust between China and the United States, the problems on the Korean peninsula, and the quarrels over disputed islands—some of the discussion focused on whether Britain and Canada, as two countries that have strong ties to the United States, but also have a deep interest in the peaceful resolution of differences in the Asia-Pacific, should act to temper the “hot voices,” and if so, whether it was possible to encourage a cooler approach. While some participants were sceptical that the island dispute could be multilateralized, a number of participants expressed the view that both Britain and Canada had an interest in conveying our thoughts to Americans on the broader strategic issues involving China.

TRADE, INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY

The purpose of this session was to explore the areas of common interest for Canada and the United Kingdom in the evolving North Pacific economy with its manufacturing powerhouses. What are the consequences of inward and outward investment in and from these, including the conditions affecting investment in China and other North Pacific states? What are the challenges for global governance posed by American debt, Japanese stagnation, and the euro crisis? How will Britain and Canada be affected by the increasing tension in the region between multilateralism and the proliferation of regional trade arrangements? The discussion was framed by presentations by Margaret Cornish, Beijing Chief Representative of Bennett Jones Commercial

Margaret Cornish focused on a fundamental contest in economic terms that is being played out as the centre of global gravity shifts to the Asia-Pacific, with continued high rates of economic growth in Asia, flat rates of growth in the United States, and negative growth in Europe, and a propensity of European and American firms to come to Asia to offset losses in Europe and the United States.

On one side is the gradual emergence of a pole of economic power centred in East Asia, buttressed by the proliferation of regional and bilateral trade agreements following the failure of the Doha Round. The efforts of China to expand the range of trade agreements with countries in the Asia-Pacific has already borne fruit in the free trade area with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that came into effect in 2010; the possibility that China could negotiate future free trade agreements with Japan and South Korea would confirm a China-centred economic bloc.

The prospects of such a China-centred bloc has created considerable anxiety. Some suggest that such a network of East Asian agreements would create “a line down the Pacific,” and is often bruited as one of the reasons why the United States was prompted to launch a competing regional arrangement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Some of this anxiety about China mirrors the kind of anxiety that one finds in the security realm. This may be one reason why political discourse in the United States, particularly during the 2012 election season, fixed on China as a “currency manipulator,” and on the need to “socialize” China in the norms of the multilateral trading system. But the charge of currency manipulation has not been true for more than a year, even though it continued to have tremendous staying power in American politics. And contrary to the argument that China needs to be “socialized,” it is clear that the government in Beijing has sought to become a leading member of the World Trade Organization, and a co-operative and compliant participant in the multilateral governance structure of that organization. In short, China has come to see the value in the multilateral system.
But the difficulties facing the multilateral trading system in the last decade have transformed the broader environment, leading to the possibility of spillover between the trade environment and the security environment. In this view, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is not just about economics, trade and investment. Rather, it could become a problem if the TPP were seen as a security arrangement masquerading as a trade arrangement.

In his remarks to the Colloquium, Sir Stephen stressed the deepening networks of free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific. The “noodle soup” nature of these agreements, he argued, were both reflective of, and contributing to, the growth of the economies of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia alike. And the European countries were seeking to solve some of their deeply-rooted problems by active participation in Asian growth. That is one of the reasons why there is a common view that the increasing trade interdependence is to be welcomed—as a way to bridge the deep political divisions in the Asia-Pacific.

But there is a paradox in the contemporary Asia-Pacific. Interdependence among the Asia-Pacific economies has deepened to the point where “cool politics” can have a potentially disruptive impact: political disputes could easily have serious economic repercussions, and global impacts.

It is for this reason that the continued role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific is crucial. The capacity—and willingness—of the United States to provide territorial and maritime protection to key economies in the Asia-Pacific will remain key to the prosperity of the region as a whole. Since Korea, Taiwan, and Japan are critical economies, the ability of the United States to project power into the Pacific in the medium and longer term will be necessary to sustain the positive effects of the contemporary trade arrangements.

THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

In this session, participants discussed the evolving patterns of governance in the Asia-Pacific. How is growing competition between countries in the region—between China and Japan, for example—influencing the broader architecture of governance in the Asia-Pacific?
How are patterns of regional governance being integrated into—and affecting—broader global institutions? What are the global implications of regional summity, such as the East Asia Summit and the China-Japan-Korea process? And will institutions of global governance—such as the G20, six of whose members ring the North Pacific—affect regional governance in the Pacific?

In his presentation to the Colloquium, Sir David Warren, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Japan from 2008 to 2012, suggested that the institutions available for the management of regional problems in the Asia-Pacific were less than adequate. As he noted, it is often suggested that the region has twenty-first century problems, but nineteenth century diplomatic structures with which to deal with them.

Any consideration of regional or global governance needs to be framed by asking: what are the strategic objectives? It can be argued that in the absence of a multi-layered international grouping of the kind that we see the Atlantic area, a pan-Asian settlement has to depend on achieving two broad goals: first, the maintenance of United States military effectiveness in the Asia-Pacific; second, the maintenance of Chinese economic growth. In short, closer economic integration might be the only way to mitigate political tensions that tend to be driven by nationalist forces. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, it can be argued, is a good example: this is widely seen as an existential issue that promises to have a major impact on the Japanese economy.

What options for political management are available for this region? Before the Global Financial Crisis there had been a widespread assumption that the solution to the governance problem would be the “G2”—the United States and China—but for a variety of reasons this never came to pass. Other analysts, by contrast, believed that ASEAN could be a centre for regional management, and could serve as a locus for discussion between China, Korea and Japan. While the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Agreement has been a useful reminder of the capacity of this group of states to co-operate on core financial and economic issues, a number of issues needing careful management lie beyond the capacity of an ASEAN-based process. Security of different kinds—energy security, food security, maritime security, nuclear security—is unlikely to be addressed in this forum.
Outside actors could have a role in encouraging alternative options. The European Union, for example, could and should involve itself in the process; if the EU does not play a role in the Asia-Pacific, there is a serious risk that Europe will be seen to lose its relevance.

Paul Evans of the University of British Columbia posed three questions to the Colloquium: Does multilateral security co-operation in the North Pacific have a future? What kinds of diplomacy, institution-building, and transnational processes will be needed in the future to ensure that there is an alignment between increasing economic integration on the one hand, and political and security relations on the other? And finally, what kind of role can Canada and the United Kingdom play in promoting regional multilateralism?

Professor Evans admitted that from the perspective of 2012, the prospects for encouraging co-management in the region looked difficult. There was a “new sobriety” in contemporary international relations; although the United Kingdom was pursuing a new approach in the Asia-Pacific, and although Canada was trying a “little re-engagement” in the region, there were several impediments. There were two weather systems sweeping across the Asia-Pacific. On the one hand, there were strong person-to-person links and complex transnational ties. On the other hand, “new winds” were also blowing—the winds of nationalism.

In such an environment, countries like Canada and the United Kingdom could be useful as “shock absorbers” in great-power relations, in the way that middle powers sought to do in the middle of the twentieth century. These countries could be “middle powers with twenty-first century characteristics.” They could involve themselves in an effort to create international order, but with a recognition that what was needed was not the creation of the international order, but just an international order.

SPECIAL SESSION: MINISTER FAST ON CANADA AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The Hon. Ed Fast, Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, gave a special address to the Colloquium. In his remarks, the minister noted that the Canadian government’s approach
to the changing nature of the Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century was predicated on the assumption that global trade will continue to be the driver of economic growth into the future. It is for this reason that Canada was joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Mr. Fast also noted that the federal government was keen to promote student mobility, and to double the present number of international students in Canada.

In response to a question about global value chains, the minister acknowledged that we need to rethink the nature of “imports” and “exports,” and how we define them. Noting the efforts of the federal government to enhance the west coast as a natural gateway to the Asia-Pacific by investment in infrastructure, the minister also underscored the importance to Canada of energy exports. He noted that his government was committed to seeking markets for Canadian energy beyond the traditional American market: “It is in our interests,” he asserted, “to diversify our energy markets—and we need to find ways to get our energy to other markets.”

ENERGY, RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The Colloquium took up the issue of energy and natural resources in the following session. Energy and resources are playing a key role in the changes in global politics, as Asian countries seek to ensure secure access to resources over the longer term. While American allies like Japan and South Korea depend on US hegemony for the secure flow of resources, China has sought to lock in that supply through long-term contracts and joint ownership of offshore and onshore resources, and a willingness to use resource supply for short-term political benefits, as the rare earths episode demonstrated. What are the global implications of the North Pacific countries’ search for secure control of energy and natural resources supply? How will the change in patterns affect Britain’s and Canada’s relationships with their traditional trading partners? And as energy production increases, what implications will this

“We need to find ways to get our energy to other markets.”
have for the search for solutions to the global problem of greenhouse gas emissions and the local problems of air and water quality?

Peter Hills, former Director of the Kadoorie Institute at the University of Hong Kong, provided the Colloquium with a survey of the current trends and future prospects in energy and natural resource consumption in the North Pacific area. One key assumption was that while economic growth in the region might slow somewhat, it would continue to outpace all other major regions, and that this growth would have a major impact on resource demand, particularly in China. At the same time, however, the changing demographics in the Asia-Pacific would have major long-term implications for the region—and thus for the global economy. Importantly, in the three major economies of the North Pacific—China, Japan, and Korea—the population was ageing at a rapid rate, and likely to place pressure on the labour force and the provision of social needs as countries like China began to see the emergence of the so-called “4-2-1 family,” in which a single working child is responsible for two parents and four grandparents in retirement.

The importance of energy and resources for continued economic growth in the region puts into perspective the tensions that have emerged over territorial disputes. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in the East China Sea, and China’s extensive “nine-dash” maritime claims in the South China Sea, have to be seen in the context of the significant oil and gas and fishery resources in the disputed territorial waters.

Two further issues will have an impact on the future picture of energy and resources: rare earths and shale gas. On rare earths, China has a dominant position, largely as a consequence of production running down elsewhere in the world over the last twenty years. While rare earth production elsewhere is likely to rebound in the next decade, it is probable that China will retain its predominant position as a producer and supplier.

China has extensive shale gas reserves, and this may help the transition to the greater use of cleaner fuels, with the benefits of both energy security and reduced air pollution. The major obstacles to the fuller exploitation of shale gas in China include the limited availability of the water necessary for shale gas extraction and the possibility of contamination from hydraulic fracking.
But the Central People’s Government is likely to seek to address these challenges, since there has emerged in China a recognition of the need to move to a greener path to development. Thus, for example, the government intends to launch an emissions trading scheme in seven heavy-emissions regions in 2013 with the goal of reducing CO2 emissions by 700 million tons by 2014; likewise, the real-time monitoring of fine particle pollution, or $\text{PM}_{2.5}$, is being introduced in Beijing and will be extended to 74 other cities.

Nancy Olewiler, director of the School of Policy Studies at Simon Fraser University, focused her presentation on the Canadian energy sector by placing Canadian policy within the broader perspective of a global energy outlook. That outlook is marked by a simultaneous rise in both energy demand and emissions of CO2; a global energy market increasingly dominated by emerging economies; and a continued global reliance on fossil fuels for energy. These global developments will have profound implications for climate change effects.

Canada’s overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have resumed their upward trend after a short period of decline following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The GHG emissions from Alberta oil sands production have risen consistently, and this rise will likely continue into the future. Importantly, since 1995, virtually all the incremental increases in oil production in Canada have come from oil sands extraction. The domestic Canadian market for oil is structured so that Canada needs to export increasing amounts of oil in order to sustain oil extraction at forecasted levels. And at present Canada overwhelmingly depends on the United States for its energy exports: in 2011, fully 90 per cent of Canada’s total energy exports went to the United States (including 100 per cent of both natural gas and electricity exports).

The implications for Canada of this changing global outlook are considerable. Increasing criticism is being directed against “dirty” extraction methods, and a concomitant opposition to the transport and sale of energy using such methods—as the American opposition

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2 $\text{PM}_{2.5}$ is particulate matter that has a diameter of 2.5 micrometres or less, approximately 1/30th the diameter of a human hair.
to the Keystone XL pipeline in 2012 demonstrates. With the expansion of shale gas development in the United States, it is not inconceivable that the US will achieve the energy independence that it has so long sought, perhaps within the next decade. When that occurs, Canadians will have to diversify their energy markets, which in turn will require large investment in transportation infrastructure. Moreover, if carbon is priced differently, it is not clear what the global market price of oil will be. Yet there is no serious discussion in Canada on how to reconcile energy development with environmental objectives. Nor has there been a conversation about the potential that Canada’s oil sands investments may become stranded assets if in the future both the United States and Asian countries are able to meet their energy demands from domestic sources.

The policy implications, in this view, include the explicit pricing of carbon; the elimination of subsidies to fossil fuel extraction and transport; the acceleration of investment in energy efficiency technology; and increasing efforts to remove, reuse, or sequester carbon.

Another set of policy implications comes from the increased political salience of Canadian government efforts to increase exports of hydrocarbons to the Asia-Pacific. In British Columbia, the Northern Gateway pipeline, intended to provide a means to get Alberta oil to Asian markets, is deeply controversial. The Colloquium met just as political concerns in Canada over the proposed acquisition of Nexen by China National Offshore Oil Corporation were reaching a crescendo. The result has been an increased caution about seeking stronger economic/investment ties with China.

A NORTH PACIFIC CULTURAL SHIFT?

The Colloquium added to the record number of YouTube views of Psy’s *Gangnam Style* by beginning its session on culture by watching this video, a reminder of the purpose of this session: to consider whether the shift in the centre of gravity to the North Pacific is likely to be accompanied by a “culture shift.” Are the dominant western norms in such areas as intellectual property rights and human rights going to be questioned
and challenged by North Pacific countries? Many of the countries in the North Pacific are seeking to project cultural understandings and identities beyond their borders. This session focussed on the cultural dimension of contemporary North Pacific diplomacy. How have China and Japan moved to mirror attempts by Western countries to project culture in their public diplomacy? What implications does this expansion of cultural diplomacy have for Britain and Canada?

Victor Rabinovitch, a former president and CEO of the Canadian Museum of Civilization, focused his remarks to the Colloquium on the “soft” cultural factors in the shift to the Pacific. While we have seen a shift by creators and disseminators, the key actors in the Asia-Pacific region for this shift are states, via the projection of cultural activities. The Japan Foundation, established in 1972, and the Korea Foundation, set up in 1991, were modelled on European institutions such as the British Council, Alliance Française and the Goethe Institute. They are “soft power” organizations for the promotion of cultural awareness, language training and intellectual exchange.

The People’s Republic of China inaugurated its own efforts in the cultural sphere in 2004 when the first Confucius Institute was opened in Seoul. Operated by the Hànbàn, the colloquial abbreviation for the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language, located within the Ministry of Education), Confucius institutes soon spread across the globe. At last count there were 322 Confucius institutes and 369 Confucius classrooms operating in 96 countries, with a plan to increase the number of institutes to 1,000 by 2020.

Governments have assisted the huge increase in Asian culture in many sectors, from music to design to food to art. Government sponsorship has assisted K-pop, Manga books, and Hello Kitty. Even when governments seek to suppress artists, as the Chinese government did in the case of Ai Weiwei, they invariably boost that artist’s work. But culture moves in both directions, with Hollywood films, Western visual art, music, design, clothing and furnishings attractive to consumers across the Pacific.

Cultural policy—as government behaviour—is likely to emerge if there is a sense of confidence in branding itself as an attractive society
that wants to share its history and values with others, and is comfortable doing so.

Mei Sim Lai, partner of LaiPeters & Co., argued that there will also be a cultural shift that accompanies other shifts to the Pacific, and as the democratization of culture continues. At the same time, however, there will have to be some changes in the way in which the West sees the East. Western media will have to develop a more nuanced view of the East, and Westerners generally will have to learn how to deal with the East on its own terms. While a “fusion culture” is not only possible but likely, there will have to be greater Western sensitivity to unique Eastern institutions and practices, such as the importance of guānxi (关系), i.e., the personal connections crucial for negotiating and operating in an Asia-Pacific context, and miànzi (面子) or “face.” There continues to be some suspicion of China in the West, a function of the broader geopolitical dynamic.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Much of the Colloquium’s focus was on the nature of China’s rise, the nature of the American response, and how countries like Canada and the United Kingdom could most appropriately respond to the shifts in global politics that we are seeing evolve in the Asia-Pacific. To focus the concluding discussion on policy implications and recommendations, the Colloquium heard from two former officials with deep experience in the Asia-Pacific: David Mulroney, Canada’s ambassador to China from 2009 to 2012, and Sir John Boyd, chairman of Asia House in London and the UK ambassador in Japan from 1992 to 1996.

David Mulroney argued that neither Britain nor Canada should be indifferent to the evolving politics of the Asia-Pacific, which he characterized as a time of instability depending on whether one took an optimistic or pessimistic view of the trajectory of change. In his view, countries like Britain and Canada should work with the United States, ensuring that, as he put it, there was “no daylight” between American, British, and Canadian positions. But he also stressed the importance of increasing talks among officials on Asia-Pacific issues to encourage a “habit of collaboration.” In the case of Canada, he also suggested that
Ottawa should consider a “slight Canadian pivot” to the Pacific, seeking, for example, to increase engagement between the Royal Canadian Navy and the PLA Navy.

Sir John Boyd noted that Britain and Canada found themselves in essentially the same position on the issues of the Asia-Pacific, twinned as “middle powers plus.” Both governments, he suggested, had a deep interest in remaining engaged, by, for example, encouraging the reform process in China, seeking an intensification of consultation, and searching for ways to engage both China and Japan. He, too, believed that it was important to generate support for the US “pivot,” but to find an appropriate balance between containment and engagement.

As might be expected in a meeting of experts, there were contending perspectives on important issues. Some participants, for example, questioned the very premise implicit in the title of the Colloquium that there has been an unambiguous shift in the centre of gravity. Some participants argued that this was somewhat premature, and that the United States continues to be the leading actor in global politics. Likewise, there was lively discussion on what the Colloquium might recommend to the two governments. Among the broad issues for discussion were the following:

- The trajectory of change in China itself is still evolving. While the government in Beijing is clearly emerging as a rule-maker in global governance in its own right, it is not yet clear whether China will end up as a responsive stakeholder that implicitly accepts Western values, such as the rule of law and freedom of expression. Or will Beijing maintain values that are sometimes, often mistakenly, seen as driven by antipathy to the West?

- As the centre of global gravity continues to shift to the Asia-Pacific, we may be seeing an increasing suspicion of international law and multilateral architecture as an inappropriate constraint on national freedom of action. The slow but steady drift away from multilateralism in global trade to preferential trade agreements is one manifestation of this. Some participants at the Colloquium argued that Britain and Canada could help to encourage a reflex towards international law and multilateral
regulation and away from extreme nationalist positions that cast suspicion on multilateralism.

- There was a general concern with the possibility that debates about the eventual impact of the putative rise of China and the equally putative decline of the United States could easily become a self-fulfilling prophesy, echoing Henry Kissinger’s open worry that both the United States and China will “analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophesies” about war. Kissinger’s persistent reminder is that, to use the title of a recent article, conflict is always a choice, not a necessity; there was considerable agreement among Colloquium participants that the United Kingdom and Canada should make efforts to minimize misperceptions and maximize the room for dialogue.

- Some Colloquium participants agreed that it was important to understand the US position on the Asia-Pacific as much as East Asia’s attitude to the West. Likewise, there was some agreement that it was going to be difficult for Britain and Canada to exert influence in the region when both countries were widely regarded by their principal friends and allies in the region as outsiders. Moreover, there was a tendency in Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and other capitals to maintain the exclusivity of bilateral relations with the United States on core strategic issues.

- Some participants argued that both the UK and Canadian governments should not try to lecture allied governments about the future of the Pacific. This was particularly true of the United States: informal dealings with the US were seen as preferable to telling the US publicly how to manage its affairs with East Asia. On the other hand, however, some participants felt that we would be remiss if we did not talk to the United States and other allied governments about alternatives.

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Some participants argued that the projection of US power in the region should be maintained for security purposes, especially in the absence of any regional institution comparable to NATO. While many Colloquium participants underscored the importance of “soft power,” there was also the view on the part of some participants that the deployment of hard military power continued to be important for the maintenance of regional order. This would help to discourage territorial challenges and facilitate the fostering of trade and cultural activity, which fare less well in times of political uncertainty.

There was widespread agreement among Colloquium participants that there remains considerable system friction, focused on instability on the Korean peninsula, rival maritime territorial claims, human rights issues, the failure to discourage ultranationalism, and problems surrounding trade and investment, particularly intellectual property rights.

There was also considerable agreement among participants that one of the core sources of system friction came from the narratives of history that were dominant in the region. The history of the region is frequently being used—and abused—by some countries in East Asia. While they are by no means alone in the manipulation of historical narratives, East Asian countries tend to treat history as a narrative about the present, not a story about the past. Partial and distorted accounts of the past that are set out in school textbooks, for example, or museums or the national media, tend to perpetuate national myths and national grievances, and frequently cast other countries, nations, or ethnic groups as enemies without any attempt at nuanced explanations of cause and effect in history from the opposing point of view. While neither the British nor Canadian government is in the strongest position to suggest to others how history should be interpreted or taught, there is some experience and expertise in both countries on the depoliticization of historical issues that could be useful, particularly if academic and judicial networks took the lead.
• A number of participants agreed that the related issues of energy and the environment deserve increased scrutiny. The continued heavy dependence on fossil fuel, and the impact of increased demand on the future trajectory of GHG emissions, suggest that the British and Canadian governments should take the lead in raising the option of nuclear energy as a logical, practical and sustainable alternative for the future—the difficulties of dealing with spent nuclear fuel and the impact of the Fukushima disaster of 2011 notwithstanding.

• Many participants at the Colloquium felt that Britain and Canada could do more to increase their investment in fostering two-way cultural exchanges with East Asia, particularly in the area of mutual learning of languages. It was argued that language learning should go beyond the tertiary level, and be focussed on both primary and secondary education. The emphasis should be on non-government dialogue: educational institutions, alumni associations, professional, trade, and labour organizations, jurists, editors, journalists, broadcasters, and non-governmental organizations. In particular, diaspora groups in both Britain and Canada from the countries of the Asia-Pacific should be closely engaged in this process.

CONCLUSION

The 2012 Canada-United Kingdom Colloquium focused on an increasingly popular theme, at least judging by the large number of conferences, workshops and colloquia held around the world on this topic in 2012. But the widespread attention of scholars, the media, and government officials is understandable: how relations among the countries that ring the North Pacific region evolve in the decades ahead will have impacts that will be truly global in scope. This report has tried to capture the key elements of the rich conversation that the Colloquium participants, gathered in Vancouver, a key gateway to the Asia-Pacific region, had about how the past and the present might influence the future of regional—and global—politics, and how Britain and Canada might respond to those challenges.
We hope that the report and its conclusions will be useful to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Canada, who sponsored this conversation, and hope that the high commissions in both Ottawa and London will look for ways in which this report can be used to continue the dialogue.
APPENDIX
PROGRAM
The 2012 CANADA-UK COLLOQUIUM
The Shifting Centre of Global Gravity: Britain, Canada and the North Pacific

WEDNESDAY, 14 NOVEMBER

20h00 Dinner hosted by Simon Fraser University

Welcome
Prof. Jonathan Driver, Vice-President, Academic and Provost, Simon Fraser University

Challenge to the Colloquium: Keynote Address
“The North Pacific and the Changing Global Order”
Mr. Gordon Campbell, High Commissioner for Canada, London; former Premier of British Columbia

THURSDAY, 15 NOVEMBER

08h45 Welcome
Prof. Robert Wolfe, Canadian coordinator
Mr. Philip Peacock, Chair of the British Committee

Colloquium chair’s opening remarks
Mr. Donald Campbell, Senior Strategy Advisor, Davis LLP; former Canadian Ambassador to Japan, and to Korea; former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

09h00 Session 1. Security Challenges in the North Pacific
Canada: Prof. Brian Job, University of British Columbia
UK: Prof. Glenn Hook, University of Sheffield

10h30 Coffee/Tea

10h45 Session 2. Trade, Investment, and Economic Policy
Canada: Ms. Margaret Cornish, Bennett Jones Commercial Consulting Inc., Beijing
UK: Sir Stephen Gomersall KCMG, Group Chairman for Europe, Hitachi Group
12h15  Lunch

13h30  Session 3. The North Pacific and Global Governance
Canada: Prof. Paul Evans, Institute of Asian Research, UBC
UK: Sir David Warren KCMG, Her Majesty’s Ambassador, Tokyo, 2008–2012

15h00  Coffee/Tea

15h15  Special Session
Hon. Ed Fast, Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway

16h15  Session 4. Energy, Resources and the Environment
Canada: Prof. Nancy Olewiler, Simon Fraser University
UK: Prof. Peter Hills, Director and Chair Kadoorie Institute Hong Kong

19h30  Reception

20h00  Dinner: sponsored by Port Metro Vancouver
Welcome: Mr. Bob Dechert, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

FRIDAY, 16 NOVEMBER

09h00  Session 5. A North Pacific Culture Shift?
Canada: Mr. Victor Rabinovitch, President Emeritus, Canadian Museum of Civilization

10h30  Coffee/Tea

10h45  Session 6. Policy Implications
Canada: Mr. David Mulroney, former Canadian Ambassador, Beijing
UK: Sir John Boyd KCMG, Chair, Asia House

12h15  Lunch

13h30  Rapporteur’s report and concluding discussion
Prof. Kim Richard Nossal, Queen’s University
14h30 Closing remarks by Colloquium chair
15h00 Organizers’ meeting for the 2013 Colloquium
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIR

Donald Campbell
Senior Strategy Advisor, Davis LLP; former Canadian Ambassador to
Japan, and to Korea; former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

RAPPORTEUR

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School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University

CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Christopher Berzins
Deputy Director for Northern Europe, Foreign Affairs and International
Trade Canada

Dr. Larry Blain
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Prof. Candis Callison
Graduate School of Journalism, University of British Columbia

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Mr. Gordon Campbell
High Commissioner for Canada, London; former premier of British
Columbia

Mr. Mel Cappe
Chairman of the Canadian Advisory Committee
University of Toronto

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Mr. Bob Dechert, MP  
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Prof. Paul Evans  
Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia

Hon. Ed Fast  
Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway

Mr. Jock Finlayson  
Executive Vice-President, Business Council of British Columbia

Ms. Susan Gregson  
Deputy High Commissioner, Canadian High Commission, London

Mr. Tony Gugliotta  
Senior Vice-President, Marketing & Business Development, Vancouver Airport Authority

Mr. Michael Henderson  
Regional Director General, Transport Canada

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University of British Columbia

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Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

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Former Canadian Ambassador, Beijing

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Prof. Tony Penikett  
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Sir David Warren KCMG  
Her Majesty’s Ambassador, Tokyo, 2008–2012  

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