Skilled migration to China and the BRI
Since the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) launch, strengthening people-to-people ties has been one of its cooperation priorities. This is implemented through a wide array of student and academic exchanges, research cooperation, joint vocational training, as well as tourism [1]. With the PRC government being the driving force of the BRI, China guides the way these exchanges – or forms of migration – develop between China and other BRI countries. To date, the majority of research on migration along the BRI focusses on Chinese nationals who emigrate to engage in economic activities, studies, or research in other BRI countries. But, as Pál Nyiri observed in his recent contribution to the Transformations blog, diverse factors influence these patterns of emigration.
Despite this important research on Chinese emigration and the fact that the country continues to face more emigration than immigration, the flow of migrants is by no means unidirectional. China’s transitioning economy, outflow of skilled workers – or “talents” as the Chinese government prefers to call them – and looming undersupply of skilled labour due to population decline all put pressure on the government. These pressures threaten future economic growth, employment, and political stability. The Chinese government has implemented legal changes, as well as national and regional policies, to attract skilled workers. These efforts target overseas Chinese [2], foreign nationals with Chinese ancestry, and skilled foreign nationals in an effort to attract workers, entrepreneurs, and researchers. Efforts to attract skilled migrants focus on engineers, scientists, and specialists in key technologies, who possess prized knowledge in the labour market of the PRC. So far, however, these policies have yielded unsatisfactory results [3].
In a thorough analysis of national Chinese migration legislation and bilateral, as well as multilateral, cooperation efforts between China and BRI countries, I examined whether and how China is in a position to access and retain skilled nationals from BRI countries for the national labour market [4]. I identified the mechanisms intended to facilitate labour import and the advantageous position of BRI nationals in accessing these resources. Chinese legislation, press releases, joint communiqués, free trade agreements, mutual visa exemption agreements, and BRI memoranda of understanding served as sources for the analysis. While for the most part Chinese migration legislation targets skilled foreign nationals as such, some special policies exist that target nationals from BRI countries.
Generally, domestic laws governing foreign nationals’ labour and mobility in China do not include specific regulations aimed at supporting sending countries’ economic development. Until recently, all foreign students were forced to return to their home countries after finishing their studies, leading to a forced return by higher-skilled migrants. More recent regulations, however, now allow the best students to stay after graduation to start their own companies, do internships, and work in China. Like some of their contemporaries in economically developed countries in the Global North, Chinese policymakers, have started to value domestic labour market demands for skilled labour from abroad. Regulations governing the attraction of highly skilled or skilled foreign nationals do not include measures to refrain from attracting workers in sectors where sending countries are suffering from insufficient human resources [5]. Foreign workers selected for a Category A work permit (the most favourable of three permit categories) can obtain work-related residence permits with a maximum validity of five years [6]. Afterwards, these workers can apply for renewal and might also be eligible to apply for permanent residency [7]. Furthermore, foreign workers generally enjoy the right to bring their spouse and underage children with them when moving to China [8]. Spouse and family reunion visas do not allow their holders to work [9]. Looking at the last decade of reforms, Chinese migration law seems to be moving towards the more permanent retention of foreign skilled workers and a diversification of such attraction channels through talent plans, policies, and permanent residency reforms.
Legal changes designed to retain skilled workers, students, and academics from China and abroad have made it easier to enter, remain, and work in China. This is especially true for BRI nationals, with the establishment of additional resources like scholarships and specialized talent plans. Nevertheless, up until now, and with the exception of Filipino English teachers [10], skilled migrants are not being attracted to China under bilateral employment agreements.
Since the introduction of the BRI, migration from member countries shows a significant and sharp rise, with strong regional migration patterns that have mainly emerged out of historical ties between countries [11]. Travel between China and BRI members rose by 39 per cent between 2013 and 2017 [12], representing a total of 26.5 million people. This is significantly higher than travel between China and non-BRI countries [13]. Yet numbers also show that China is not a major participant of BRI migration networks: other migration flows within the former members of the Soviet Union, for example, are stronger [14]. Further, net emigration of skilled and highly skilled Chinese to BRI countries for infrastructure projects characterizes the current situation [15]. At the same time, scholars foresee future increases of immigration of BRI nationals as a consequence of trade and business, including increased immigration of tourists, students, academics, and skilled workers to China [16]. Since as early as 2017, there have been suggestions to use the free movement of workers within the European Union as an example to facilitate labour mobility within the BRI through the relaxation of visa and work permit regulations, the recognition of foreign credentials and skills, and the promotion of joint skill building in business and academia [17]. As part of BRI cooperation, several agreements include judicial cooperation in the form of legal conferences [18], the translation of Chinese laws [19], and coordination on legislation and the capacity building of legal personnel [20], including migration legislation [21]. The published results of these efforts, however, merely address and strongly focus on securitization of shared border regions. Even the newest publication on the topic strongly leans towards problematising migration as such and viewing all movement of people as a potential threat to national security [22]. So far, judicial cooperation efforts do not include movement facilitation for skilled workers.
Evaluating Chinese efforts to attract skilled migrants from BRI countries
The net migration predictions for most countries along the BRI, including China, show negative trends for 2020, anticipating a larger outbound than inbound migration [23]. So far, it is estimated that over 75 per cent of tertiary-educated—hence, highly skilled—migrants live in countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [24]. Yet changes abroad such as the tightening of regulations under the Trump administration in the US and xenophobic tendencies in European countries have damaged their attractiveness as destination countries in the eyes of skilled migrants. These foreign developments, as well as China’s recent efforts to retain talent and increasing academic and educational cooperation (including visa facilitation), enable the Chinese government to facilitate regular migration from BRI countries to its territory. Furthermore, China can attract students and academics from BRI member states through targeted scholarships, research opportunities, and cooperation. Chinese laws are increasingly equipped to offer those who wish to stay the option to do so. If policies intended to retain skilled migrants and foreign graduates of Chinese universities become more widely implemented throughout China, they will increase the pool of skilled foreign workers for Chinese companies. With the special care awarded to BRI nationals within this pool, the retention success among this demographic will likely be larger. However, Chinese efforts do not guarantee the long-term retention of skilled migrants. The government’s overall strategy aims for a transition towards ‘effective talent’, away from the former focus on numbers. Nevertheless, President Xi Jinping’s strategy of ‘gathering the talents of the world and using them’ has come to describe China’s vision of attracting skilled migrants [25]. Now, talent introduction is seen as key for realizing the policy goal of ‘Made in China 2025’ [26], and is facilitated by the PRC’s cooperative approach to BRI countries as potential labour pools [27].
The Chinese government and its representatives have repeatedly stressed that the BRI belongs to all people and is not a ‘Chinese’ initiative per se [28]. Yet, through its national legislation and other efforts in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on student, academic, and personnel mobility, as well as its market dominance the Chinese government occupies a position of power in shaping the trajectories of migration from BRI countries. Questions remain regarding intellectual property rights over joint research results, the utilization of research results for enhancing China’s military power, and the sensitivity of Chinese skilled migration legislation towards possible brain drain effects through the retention of excellent students and academics from developing BRI countries. Equally questionable is whether Chinese society, whose perceptions are shaped by the Chinese Communist Party’s ethno-nationalistic and patriotic nation-building efforts, is open to the long-term and increasing presence of foreign nationals. Discrimination and racism are problems despite the government’s lack of interest in this matter [29]. It remains to be seen whether China will use this power to shape a ‘win-win’ development strategy or to strengthen its own labour market by drawing in technical knowledge and human resources from BRI participants.
[1] Belt and Road Cooperation: Shaping a Brighter Shared Future, Joint Communique of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (27 April 2019) art 34–5.
[2] This includes those Chinese nationals who no longer hold a Chinese household registration (hukou) due to prolonged residency abroad and hence have less rights than full Chinese citizens who hold both, PRC nationality and a Hukou.
[3] Frank N Pieke and others, ‘How Immigration Is Shaping Chinese Society’ China Monitor (Mercator Institute of China Studies, November 2019) <https://www.merics.org/en/china-monitor/china-immigration> accessed 25 June 2020.
[4] A free draft version of the full paper here.
[5] Such provisions are part of the Council Directive (EC) 2009/50 [2009] OJ L155/17 paras 21–2.
[6] ‘Tentative Management and Service Handbook for Foreign nationals Work Permits in China’ (外国人来 华工作许可服务指南(暂行)) in Notice of State Bureau of Foreign Experts Affairs on issuing the Tentative Management and Service Handbook for Foreign nationals Working in China (国家外国专家 局关于印发外国人来华工作许可服务指南(暂行)的通知) (29 March 2017) Annex 12, art 7(9).
[7] Ministry of Public Security (MPS), National Immigration Bureau Promotes 12 Immigration and Exit- Entry Facilitation Policies for the Promotion of Free Trade in the Country (国家移民管理局在全国范围内推广复制促进服务自贸区建设12条移民与出入境便利政策) (19 September 2019) point 4 <https://web.archive.org/web/20190919091519/http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-07/17/content_5410623.htm> accessed 25 June 2020.
[8] Administrative Provisions on the Employment of Foreign nationals in China (外国人在中国就业管理规定) (11 December 2010; revised 2017) art 8.
[9] Administrative Provisions on the Employment of Foreign nationals in China (外国人在中国就业管理规定) (11 December 2010; revised 2017) art 8.
[10] Administrative Provisions on the Employment of Foreign nationals in China (外国人在中国就业管理规定) (11 December 2010; revised 2017) art 8.
[11] Based on data for 2010–15, according to Xiaoge Wang, ‘Study on the Structural Evolution and Mechanisms of Population Migration among Belt and Road Countries’ (一带一路’沿线国家间人口迁移的结构演变与机制研究) (Master’s thesis, Nanjing Normal University, 2019) 3
[12] Wenting Zhou, ‘Personnel Flow Up between China, Initiative Participants’ China Daily (15 May 2018) <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2018-05/15/content_36200553.htm> accessed 25 June 2020.
[13] Wenting Zhou, ‘Personnel Flow Up between China, Initiative Participants’ China Daily (15 May 2018) <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2018-05/15/content_36200553.htm> accessed 25 June 2020.
[14] Based on data for 2010–15, according to Xiaoge Wang, ‘Study on the Structural Evolution and Mechanisms of Population Migration among Belt and Road Countries’ (一带一路’沿线国家间人口迁移的结构演变与机制研究) (Master’s thesis, Nanjing Normal University, 2019) 3.
[15] Based on data for 2010–15, according to Xiaoge Wang, ‘Study on the Structural Evolution and Mechanisms of Population Migration among Belt and Road Countries’ (一带一路’沿线国家间人口迁移的结构演变与机制研究) (Master’s thesis, Nanjing Normal University, 2019) 3.
[16] Yuan Ren, ‘Who Will Immigrate to China under the BRI’ Academic Forum on Inverse Globalization and New Globalization (2017) <http://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1845998> accessed 25 June 2020.
[17] Hui Wang, ‘The Opportunities and Challenges of Migration in the Belt and Road Region’ DOC Research Institute (July 2017) <https://doc-research.org/2017/07/opportunities-challenges-migration-belt-road/> accessed 25 June 2020.
[18] ‘Chairs’ Statement of the China Forum on International Legal Cooperation’ China Forum on International Legal Cooperation (2019) <https://www.chinalaw.org.cn/portal/article/index/id/27162.html> accessed 25 June 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), List of Deliverables of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (27 April 2019) point 24 <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1658767.shtml> accessed 25 June 2020.
[19] Xiaobo Dong and Bo Hu, ‘Enhancing Legal Cultural Soft Power: From the Perspective of Translating Chinese Laws and Regulations’ (2020) 1 China Legal Science 31.
[20] ‘Chairs’ Statement of the China Forum on International Legal Cooperation’ China Forum on International Legal Cooperation (2019) <https://www.chinalaw.org.cn/portal/article/index/id/27162.html> accessed 25 June 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), List of Deliverables of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (27 April 2019) point 24 <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1658767.shtml> accessed 25 June 2020. Xiaobo Dong and Bo Hu, ‘Enhancing Legal Cultural Soft Power: From the Perspective of Translating Chinese Laws and Regulations’ (2020) 1 China Legal Science 31. Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2015) point 25(1) <https://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1327960.htm> accessed 25 June 2020; Joint Statement between the PRC and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2016) point 13 <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/sbwj/1425.htm> accessed 25 June 2020; Joint Statement between the Government of the PRC and the Government of the Republic of Singapore (2018) points 5, 11 <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/sbwj/71762.htm> accessed 25 June 2020.
[21] China’s Arab Policy Paper (2016) point 5(4) <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/sbwj/1431.htm> accessed 25 June 2020; MFA, Joint Press Release between the PRC and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (20 August 2016) <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649665393/t1390889.shtml> accessed 25 June 2020.
[22] Hong Mi, Yuan Li, Qiyini Ma, “The Belt and Road” International Migration of Asia Research on Multilateral Population Security, Routledge (2022) 5.
[23] One Belt One Road (OBOR) International Migration and Multilateral Population Security Project, Population Forecast of ‘Belt and Road’ Countries along the Route (29 February 2020) <https://web.archive.org/web/20200229175255/http://obormpop.com/page100?_l.en> accessed 25 June 2020.
[24] Kone, Zovanga L and .zden, .ağlar, ‘Brain Drain, Gain and Circulation’ in Kenneth A Reinert (eds), Handbook of Globalisation and Development (Edward Elgar 2017) 349.
[25] Fengyun Lei, ‘Gather the Talents of the World to Serve China’s Reform and Development and the Construction of the “Belt and Road”’ (聚天下英才而用之, 服务中国改革发展, 服务”一带一路”建设), 7th Migration Law Forum (第七届移民法论坛： 新时代中国移民法建设(2019 全球人才流动、移民与移民法)) (2019) 405 (copy on file with the author).
[26] Xu Luo, ‘The Advantage of the Talent System with Chinese Characteristics Is Further Highlighted’ (中国特色人才制度优势进一步彰显) Guangming Daily (13 November 2018) <https://web.archive.org/web/20190919142100/http://www.1000plan.org.cn/qrjh/article/78555> accessed 25 June 2020.
[27] Fengyun Lei, ‘Gather the Talents of the World to Serve China’s Reform and Development and the Construction of the “Belt and Road”’ (聚天下英才而用之, 服务中国改革发展, 服务”一带一路”建设), 7th Migration Law Forum (第七届移民法论坛： 新时代中国移民法建设(2019 全球人才流动、移民与移民法)) (2019) 405 (copy on file with the author).
[28] National Development and Reform Commission of the PRC (n 18); Muzi Li, ‘Belt and RoadInitiative Belongs to the Whole World: Chinese Envoy’ Xinhua (14 June 2018) <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/14/c_137251968.htm> accessed 25 June 2020.
[29] Frank Dikoetter, ‘The Discourse of Race in Twentieth-Century China’ in Rotem Kowner and Walter Demel (eds), Race and Racism in Modern East Asia (Koninklijke Brill 2013) 351.