Event Report: Democracy in Asia: Building Sustainable Institutions and Practices in Turbulent Times
How do we frame contemporary global assessments of the state of democracy around the world? How does the political struggle between democracy and authoritarianism affect the Asian region? The Democracy in Asia conference on March 7th, 2019 invited experts from around the world to discuss precisely this subject – how do we define democracy in today’s world, and what are its consequences? The conference’s purpose was to bring current comparative research on the evolution of democratic institutions and practices of government into dialogue with cutting-edge conceptual work on democracy and democratization. Participants addressed the challenge of maintaining domestic and international stability in the face of globalized capitalism and systemic power.
DEMOCRACY AND JAPAN
On March 7th, 2019, a panel of experts from around the world came together at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto to discuss a contentious issue: against the rising autocratic wave, wherefore goes the future of democracy in Asia? The conference’s purpose was to pair “current comparative research” on the evolution of democratic institutions and government policies with cutting-edge conceptual work on democracy and democratization.
The conference began with welcoming remarks from Randall Hansen, interim director of the Munk School. Mr. Hansen emphasized the relevance of the conference’s theme, democracy in Asia, in today’s world. He introduced Louis W. Pauly, interim director of the Centre for the Study of Global Japan, as the panel chair, and discussant Professor David A. Welch of the Balsillie School of International Affairs. In addition, he welcomed distinguished panelists Lucan Ahmad Way, Seva Gunitsky, Lynette Ong, Phillip Lipscy, Maiko Ichihara, Yusuke Takagi, Joseph Wong, Dan Slater, Sang-Young Rhyu, and Diana Fu.
Mr. Pauly confirmed that Canada’s study centres welcome free and open debates on contentious and controversial themes – today’s conference is no exception, with an in-depth focus on democracy and citizenship. The new Centre for the Study of Global Japan recently received a grant for the study of democracy in Asia, so these themes resonate deeply at the Munk School. The key academic theme of this conference, as emphasized by Mr. Pauly, was that a “certain contest [of democracy versus authoritarianism] is gathering around the world.” In East Asia, this contest manifests in internal policy challenges (aging populations, securing energy resources) and collective action problems (climate change, weapons of mass destruction). Citizens’ faith in their governments become a matter of political legitimacy – if the state is able to address these challenges, they are considered legitimate powers. Thus, autocratic alternatives to democracy rise; the battle against authoritarianism is daunting for democratic states. Mr. Pauly concluded his remarks with the conference agenda. The first panel outlines democracy in Japan, and the second panel following the break focuses on democracy in specific case studies.
Presentations
As the conference’s first panelist, Professor Lucan Ahmad Way of the University of Toronto posed a key question for his presentation: Are we actually in the midst of a democratic recession? Democracy today certainly has its challenges – examples include populism in the U.S. and Europe, and the rise of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Prof. Way consulted his data to answer this question. From the end of the Cold War to the early 2000s, the number of democracies in the world has increased at a consistent rate. Since the 2000s, however, the number has flatlined. The stagnation of democracy provokes pessimism; yet, Mr. Way argued that there are good and bad reasons for this pessimism. The end of the Cold War created unrealistic optimism about democracy; however, just because it stopped expanding does not mean it will disappear entirely. In fact, democracy has only disappeared in 3 states: Hungary, Venezuela, and Poland. That being said, this stagnation has led to rising polarization and xenophobic parties in the U.S., India, and Brazil. Prof. Way concluded we must be precise about democracy’s crisis – there is not much evidence for real democratic recession. There is, however, plenty of evidence for the decline in quality of democracy. We also see increasingly effective social control in established autocracies. In essence, it is crucial we address the root cause of the stagnation – political polarization. In an age where political forces view opponents as existential threats, the real threat to democracy lies in polarization and fear.
The second panelist, University of Toronto Associate Professor Seva Gunitsky, was not present at the conference. His lecture on the Great Powers and the Future of Democracy, was read by Mr. Pauly. As an international relations scholar, Mr. Gunitsky theorizes about democratic transitions at the systems level. His research highlights exactly 13 bursts of democratization since the 18th century. Peaks include the rise of democratization in the 1920s, then autocratization, followed by a democratic wave post-World War I. In the 1980s, the world witnessed another wave of democratization, through Reagan and Thatcher’s neoliberalism. Finally, in 2018, we witnessed a peak – not a plateau – of further democratization. Prof. Gunitsky argues that Asia is the contemporary battleground for autocracy versus democracy, citing North and South Korea as a pertinent example. Abrupt shifts in state power distribution and gaps for democratic reform opened by hegemonic shocks are, he argues, the causes for waves of democracy and autocracy. In essence, Prof. Gunitsky’s research adheres to the structuralist view that failure is inherent in democratic waves. Hegemony does not last forever – it has a life cycle like everything else, and democratic studies must acknowledge that populists and elites are embedded in the transnational process. It reminds us that democracy cannot be reduced to individual components and gives insights into the nature of democracy itself.
Associate Professor Lynette Ong of the University of Toronto was the third panelist, presenting the Study of China in the World in 2019. She asked the research question, how has world’s largest non-democracy achieved rapid economic growth without democratic institutions? And how long will it last? Prof. Ong observed that China is currently at an economic inflection point; this year’s projected economic growth rate is lower for the first time since 2008. That year, the Chinese government prevented crisis by stimulating the economy. It created a shadow banking system, which allowed local governments to borrow money from the state. However, this promotion of urbanization and development generated debt. This time, the government cannot afford to lend capital and thus must produce more with fewer resources. In terms of institutions essential to long-run growth, such as poverty rights and the rule of law, China falls behind. Under Xi Jinping, government policies are more exclusive. The social credit system, civil society clamp-down, censorship, and internment camps suppress civil society and human rights. Ms. Ong argues this is incompatible for knowledge-based economy. If China wants to develop according to the East Asian Tigers’ growth model in the 1980s to 1990s, it must transition into a new model that addresses citizen rights. Fortunately, now that China has globalized, data on the government and corporate interests overseas is more available. The study of China today is therefore more accessible than it was just a couple decades ago.
Fourth panelist Assistant Professor Phillip Lipscy of Stanford University presented two papers on Democracy, Financial Crises, and Economic Volatility. His first paper, Democracy and Financial Crisis, highlights how Japan’s land crisis from 1975 to 2019 impacted the geopolitics of Asia. Its slow growth and difficulty to recover ultimately led to the rise of China. It furthermore led to the idea that “strong men” such as Xi Jinping are better leaders than those in democratic states. Prof. Lipscy found that democratic countries are twice as likely to experience financial crisis compared to autocracies – the democratic stability from World War II to the 1990s was anomalous. His findings imply that democracy’s perceived advantages – containment, accountability, financial freedoms and liberalization, and free trade – make them more susceptible to financial crisis. Prof. Lipscy’s second paper on Democracy and the Volatility of Economic Growth further compliments these themes. He argues that autocratic volatility only hurts the nation itself. Since democracies cooperate in the global economy, major financial crises are systemic and affect them democratic states more. In the 1930s, for example, democracies experienced the greatest impact of global depression. Prof. Lipscy finished his presentation with two questions for the audience: Is democracy self-destructive? And how can we counter authoritarian capitalism?
The final speaker of the Democracy in Japan panel was Maiko Ichihara, Associate Professor at Hitotsubashi University. She presented on Japan’s international assistance policy and the 1992 Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, which paved the way for Japan’s current foreign policy. Since the mid-2000s, Japan has supported the democratization of other countries. After being elected, Prime Minister Abe expanded democratic assistance aid to legal and state development and away from the political parties of other nations. Prof. Ichihara noted this was an effort to change the power structure in Asia, as China grows as a world power. The assistance policy was thus the neoclassical realist response; however, it differs from the U.S.’s liberal democratic structure, as it works sustainably and considers the long-term effects. Features include assistance without imposition and Modernization Theory, described as economic development for political development.
Q&A
Following panel presentations, discussant David Welch posed several questions to the panelists. First, he asked what quality of democracies cause crisis? Could it be participation, deliberation, or public engagement? Prof. Way responded that, with polarization and the uptick of public engagement, we experience the “double-edged sword” of citizen participation and its costs – the rise of populism. Prof. Lipscy addressed Prof. Welch’s mention of quality – following this logic, could Japan really be considered a high-quality democracy? He noted Abe “gets stuff done,” but is often critiqued for suppressing the media.
Secondly, Prof. Welch asked about the fate of authoritarianism in Asia, particularly from China. What would have happened if the Nationalists had won? What is the next-step for the nation? Will China one day become democratic? In response, Prof. Ong stated that China’s Nationalist government was corrupt from beginning. The CCP attempted to liberalize but went too far at Tiananmen in 1989; China would arguably have become a democracy if 1989 had not happened. Constitutionally, Xi Jinping can reign as long as he wants; no one knows how long he will last. As for authoritarian shadow economies and black markets, Prof. Lipscy remarked that states can “avoid the topic [of democratization]” when you have strong economic growth. This happened to Japan in the past, and it can be applied to China today. However, problems begin to “hit the fan” when economic growth does not catch up to civic growth. All in all, democracies “tend to have more” with some exceptions, such as the recent Asian economic crisis.
The final discussant questions involved citizen opinion in Japan. What do people in Japan consider its greatest democratic success? What does it see as its comparative advantage for democratic promotion? And what would its next big change be? Prof. Ichihara responded that the Japanese public does not often talk about it, but there was unanimous disappointment in Japan’s continued support in Cambodia. Since then, the Japanese government has decided to not monitor the elections there. In terms of recommendations, she suggested that only some portions of ODA go to overseas civil society and that Japan expands its foreign aid through grants instead. As for China, there is skepticism in Japan that China will not give autonomy to developing countries through Belt and Road.
Next, the panel opened up to the audience for questions. A recent graduate of U of T asked a question pertaining to the Hegemonic Stability Theory. What happens to the balance of power when you have the decline from unipolarity to multipolarity without war? Prof. Welch responded that the world is only unipolar now militarily, and it has been this way for a long time.
Current fourth-year U of T student Angela Hou posed questions to Profs. Ong and Lipscy: Does every system have self-destructive mechanism? Does country response depend on democracy, or its own identity? Ms. Ong responded that if an inclusive institution is in place, it will help a country in bad times. This includes the rule of law and the delegation of power. Prof. Lipscy added that destruction depends on the mechanisms and policies involved.
PhD student Yao Wen asked if there are parallels between China’s regime and Japan’s democratic strategy. Do Japanese policymakers view China as a threat to their democratic promotion? To which Ms. Ichihara responded, Japan does not seek economic cooperation with China, due to its spreading regime.
Finally, an audience member asked if the falling world population affects how democracies and autocracies maintain order. Ms. Ichihara drew on Japan’s guideline for maintaining, created in 2009; assistance is for national interest only. On demographics, Mr. Lipscy noted that Japan has cut spending on the elderly, even though the majority of the voting population is elderly. This has opened elections to foreign workers and youth to make their votes count. “Democracy thrives when people live it,” added Prof. Welch.
DEMOCRACY IN SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES
The second half of the conference focused on the democracy in specific Asian countries. Mr. Pauly introduced distinguished panelists Yusuke Takagi, Joseph Wong, Dan Slater, Sang-young Rhyu, and Diana Fu.
Presentations
Assistant Professor Yusuke Takagi of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) began this portion of the conference with the case of the Philippines. He argues that, since 2016, there has been a decline of democracy in the Philippines. Under President Duterte, censorship is prevalent through anti-drug campaign and detainment of journalists and senators. Potential reasons for this decline may be due to party politics at the institutional level, personality politics at the individual level, and coalition politics in presidential support. He argues that personality politics are not the most important factor to the election of Duterte; however, they are crucial. The mobilization of Central Philippines marginalized sector, for instance, aided the presidential campaign. Will Duterte enjoy support if he abandons current policy? Prof. Takagi concludes we must shift the conversation from what is missing from democracy in the Philippines to what can make it work.
The second panelist, U of T Professor Joseph Wong presented on Japan: Asia’s First Unlikely Democracy. The conventional wisdom of democracy is that it rises from regime or state collapse. Instead, Mr. Wong argues for “democracy through strength” – an incumbent regime can bring about democracy, without political catastrophe. In Asia, Taiwan is an excellent example of a peaceful democratic transition. It went from martial law under the Guo Mindang to an established liberal democracy. The root of Asian democracy lies in the time period following the Second World War. Some argue that Japan, the unlikeliest democracy to emerge, was “democratized” through imposition by the U.S. Mr. Wong acknowledges this argument, but he adds that the pre-existing conservative elite knowingly conceded to America, in order for Japanese democratic concession to occur. Following the war, U.S. General MacArthur consulted the incumbent elite in Japan to craft the new Constitution. The elite resisted U.S. imposition; they accepted the Constitution with the intention to revise it later. However, by 1947, it became evident that democracy could work in favour of the elite. The ruling class became Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, with the dominant coalition in the Diet. The Party portrayed itself as democratic reform for self-advantage. It eliminated the power of its main opponent, the military, in the Constitution. It created a multi-member electoral district system to benefit the Party’s seat advantage. Finally, it utilized U.S. anti-communist efforts in Asia to eliminate the Leftist opposition entirely. The revival of combines and the Japanese economy is thus, Mr. Wong argues, tied to the elite’s post-war history. Interestingly, there is no current counterwave to Japan’s model for democracy. This is perhaps due to some authoritarian characteristics of its democratic model.
The following speaker, Professor Dan Slater of the University of Michigan, is co-authoring a book on unlikely democracies with Prof. Wong. He highlights Indonesia as Asia’s newest unlikely democracy, describing its political system as “indicative to the rest of the world today.” Prof. Slater distinguishes electoral authoritarianism from illiberal democracy. In electoral authoritarianism, politicians attempt to control elections entirely through censorship and an uneven playing field. A liberal democracy, in contrast, will do whatever they want after being elected. They make use of the power they have won, for the length of their term. He argues the consensus on democratic erosion does not predict the future of democracy. Indonesia does not confront the threat from electoral authoritarianism like neighbouring Cambodia, nor does it confront military takeover like Thailand. That being said, Indonesia always confronts illiberal democracy because it only recently democratized with help from incumbent conservatives. While state governance is weak, the elite are strong; the dominant political party will either be in the majority or share power with the winner of the electoral game. Thus, the dominant party can succeed without supressing other parties and Indonesia can adhere to democracy. He argues that Indonesia’s strengths lie in its concentration of power; those who are democratically elected are conservative political elites and the military fares well by tying itself to dominant parties. However, its strengths can also bear weakness. Indonesia has zero immunity against illiberal democracy, which may one day lead to a Duterte-like authoritarian leader. Its robust democracy, due to a cohesive national identity, is increasingly under attack. The nationalist Pancasila Party wants Indonesia to be ruled under one ethnicity, eliminating the country’s religious and ethnic diversity. Prof. Slater accredits Indonesian voters for keeping the country democratic for the past few decades. He concludes that democracies do not only grow stronger over time – they are always at threat. One can never preclude illiberal democracies, and some democracies are at greater threat than others.
The third case study covered Upgrading Democracy in Korea, by Yonsei University Professor Sang-young Rhyu. Three historical events determined the state of democracy in modern-day South Korea: the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, which called for a direct presidential election system and ended in massacre; the opening of democracy in 1987; and the peaceful impeachment of Park Geun-hee in 2016. Prof. Rhyu argues that political transition in Korea occurred due to the linkage between politics and economy from below. From the minimalist viewpoint, Korea officially accomplished democracy in 1987. In 1995, democracy consolidated completely, through free and fair democratic elections. The maximalist approach argues otherwise; it states that 1995 was the transition, not the consolidation, of democracy. Today, Korea is in the process of institutional and cultural democratic consolidation. Corruption and military influence in politics pose a threat to democratic institutions. Prof. Rhyu described the Park Geun-hee government as a “bringer of shame to the Korean people.” He concluded there is no fixed global norm to solving political gridlock, market forces, and the issue of North Korea. In the end, the goal is sustainable democracy.
U of T Assistant Professor Diana Fu presented the last case study of State Control in China under Xi Jinping. Noting the theme of the conference, she asked: In the next few decades, is democracy going to lose to authoritarian governance? If so, what kind? Through the case of China, China under Xi could become the beacon of authoritarianism for the rest of the world. An interesting thought experiment, she added, is if China rejects democratic norms and exports its ideological model of authoritarianism. According to Freedom House, 55% of countries are considered not or only partially free. Evidently, the rise of authoritarian “strong men” extends political and cultural influence beyond sovereign borders. Following Xi’s advance in power, the West began describing states with authoritarian traits (expansionism, censorship) as “sharp powers.” Elements of China’s domestic authoritarianism include enhanced digital and offline control, through censorship and public opinion guidance. The state pays commentators to favour the regime online and on social media sites. The creation of the social credit system gives the government the ability to monitor, sanction, and punish its citizens. Overall, the state policy prioritizes collective rights over the individual rights associated with liberal democracies. Xi employs the eradication of rural poverty to justify the “side effects” of land dispossession and internal displacement. Prof. Fu’s research has several implications. First, more research must be conducted on China’s authoritarian model. She is currently conducting research on citizen life under authoritarianism, including letters written by civil society to state officials. Second, we must define the ideal types of authoritarian citizenship – what does it look like? Finally, the empirical implication: the “authoritarian wave” may create a moral and political vacuum for China to fill, especially if the U.S. backslides from democracy.
Q&A
As in the morning, Prof. Welch posed questions to the panelists. Do democracies arise organically from transition? What about the religious cleavage in democracy? For China, are citizens outliers for being an educated population that does not demand a greater political voice? Prof. Fu answered she cannot guarantee that China will be successful in its model, as many of its qualities are not replicable. However, it has made “serious progress” since its development, and it continues to grow.
The panel opened to the floor. Political Science PhD student asked Prof. Slater how does he distinguish authoritarianism from illiberal democracies? Do they not slide into each other? Prof. Slater acknowledged that they can, such as in cases of rigged democratic elections; however, there is a distinction. In the U.S., the Republican electorate leans towards more authoritarian tendencies. Trump is an illiberal democratic president; however, he is not necessarily authoritarianism. He argues the different styles manifest in people; Trump may be an illiberal democratic politician, but McConnell is authoritarian-leaning. In essence, you can “get rid of one without getting rid of other.”
The final question was from retired MP, Mr. Liang. He noted that modern democracies are fairly homogenous, in terms of ethnic and cultural values. How do Asian democracies reconcile with indigenous rights and migration? China is special because it already recognizes 50 minority tribes, but how about Japan and Korea? How can we reconcile differences in multicultural societies? Prof. Slater responded first. He stated that democracies and rights have a complicated relationship; democracies require certain rights to function, but minority rights often remain undefined by the state. Following the U.S. Revolution against Great Britain, for example, African-Americans gained democracy, but lost the rights they had under King George.
Crisis often leads to collapse of regime, supplemented Prof. Wong. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has expected a similar collapse for China – yet, it is still going strong. Furthermore, there is “no imperative” to democratize in China, because the regime portrays its own efforts as positive. Prof. Wong argued the real threat to democracy is polarization. For instance, the 2016 election of the Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party was a pre-emptive celebration. The Party “stomp[ed] on the graves” of the Kuo Mintang loss, only to face backlash a couple years later. Prof. Wong thus concluded that moderate politics are preferable over large gains or losses.
Prof. Fu noted the contentious nature of collective and individual rights. They imply autocracies and democracies have the same goals for the greater good. However, the ends may not justify the means, and the playing field is unequal.
Closing Remarks
Takako Ito, Consul General of Japan in Toronto, closed the conference with some final remarks. Democracy in Asia was the largest panel hosted by the Centre for Global Study of Japan. She lauded the enriching level of discussion, especially concerning the cyclical nature of democracy. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has encouraged democratic participation. Echoing Prof. Ichihara’s earlier statements, recipients of Japan’s ODA have the “last say, no matter what.” The question of how to measure democracy and its erosion persists in academia and today’s conference contributed greatly to the discourse.
